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Abstract 
This thesis is an ethnographic study of Lebanese wine producers and their on-going efforts 
to create and sustain a niche in the international market for their high quality wines. By 
focusing upon enterprising strategies deployed within the Lebanese wine industry and on 
the types of work relations that are formed, I explore how knowledge required for the 
construction of a market entails a capacity to (re)produce it as a social reality. In so doing, 
I pay particular attention to the change in work-related and familial bodies of knowledge in 
the Kefraya region of the Bekaa Valley, a major wine-growing hub in Lebanon. Villagers 
in Kefraya have sold their grapes to wineries across Lebanon since the first harvest of the 
early plantations of the 1950s, which was initiated by a member of the urban mercantile 
elite whose family owned land in the region. 
Part of my analysis considers the history Lebanese wine production and its modernization 
as part of a wider and much longer project of French cultural hegemony in the region that 
pre-exist even the French Mandate of the early twentieth century; it can be traced back to 
the sericulture industry of the seventeenth century. Entangled with the French hegemony 
are the political and economic interests of local actors with extensive trade networks 
extending well beyond the peripheries of the rural plains of the Bekaa, the urban port of 
Beirut, and into the very heart of Europe. I argue that the current enthusiasm for the 
production of high quality wines by elite urban entrepreneurs speaks of a history of social 
transformation and shifts in perceptions of place. Here the discourse of nature that shape 
the production of quality wines also fits within an understanding of history and the market, 
where practices of winegrowing not adhering to standards that serve as elitist markers for 
singularity and authenticity result in lower rankings or failure to be classified as wine at all.  
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Map of Lebanon Source: UN Map 4282 January 2010 
The Kefraya region is located in the West Bekaa and just north of Ain Zebde 
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Introduction 
 
The idea of conducting ethnographic research into the Lebanese wine industry came to 
me in 2004 after the assassination of the former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, on 
February 14th of that year. I was already enrolled on the Master of Research programme 
in the Anthropology Department at Goldsmiths, with the aim of designing a research 
proposal for doctoral study on place-making and the role of collective memory in the 
south of Lebanon. My proposed fieldwork site was the Khiam Detention Centre, located 
in the eponymous town, where Israeli Defence Force and their allies, the South Lebanon 
Army, had kept political prisoners for the duration of their nearly 30 years of 
occupation. Following the IDF’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, the 
Hezbollah party liberated the prisoners, documenting the event on camera. Months later, 
Khiam prison became a site of memory where visitors were offered tours by former 
prisoners. I was a visitor in the summer of 2000, when I joined my mother and father on 
a trip from their Beirut home to the south of Lebanon. At the time I was near completion 
of a Bachelor of Art degree in Archaeology and Art History, and had developed a 
general interest in how the organization of space can contribute towards reproducing 
certain types of social realities.  
Upon arriving in Khiam, I was struck by the location of the prison. It was on the 
highest peak of the town, and right in the centre, so that it overlooked the homes below 
and the hills, mountains, valleys and rivers beyond. It appeared in every sense to be a 
surveillance machine, monitoring the daily lives of people below and afar. I wondered 
how the towers of this building might have served as a panopticon, affecting and 
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transforming peoples’ lives during the Israeli occupation. After further research, I was 
surprised to learn that the detention centre was in fact much older than the Israeli 
occupation. The Khiam Detention Centre was constructed during the French mandate in 
the 1930s, apparently as fortified military barracks. Significantly, it was only a decade or 
so earlier that the new borders of Lebanon had taken shape, following secret 
negotiations between Sykes and Picot that came to conclusion during 1916, in the Asia 
Minor Agreement. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire just three years later, 
the borders that had been agreed upon between Sykes and Picot became a reality. South 
Lebanon would eventually become a governorate in the modern state, which was 
formally granted independence from France in 1943. In light of these observations, I 
started to think more about the legacy of the French administration in the region.   
Unfortunately, my research into Khiam ended not long after. Following the 
assassination of Rafik Hariri, the country was once more in turmoil and about to 
undergo further change. The political division between the 8th and 14th March coalitions 
emerged, where the latter demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian military presence from 
Lebanon. Meanwhile, members of the 8th of March alliance included the Hezbollah 
party, and they took an open pro-Syrian stance. The large-scale protests and sit-ins of 
both political camps in the Martyrs Square of downtown Beirut initially seemed well-
described by journalist Michael Young: as a political awakening of the Lebanese youth 
(2010). Indeed the changes taking place across Lebanon since 2000 seemed to be in line 
with a hope for a better future. Yet despite coming from a Lebanese background on my 
father’s side, and having lived on the outskirts of Beirut as a teenager, I was unable to 
feel any affiliation to the politics of the time. I felt uneasy, especially because as it 
appeared to me that it had taken the murder of one manan extremely wealthy 
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entrepreneur at thatto instigate the mobilisation of so many people. Why had he 
become such an influential figure? I also heavily distrusted the involvement of many of 
the politiciansmostly menwho preached the importance of honour, self-
determinism, and freedom to citizens of a country where levels of inequality are not 
entirely unrelated to the types of political patron-client relations maintained.1   
While my somewhat conclusive observations now belong to a young(er) and 
(more) naïve self, they were a catalyst for the change in my research topic. To be based 
in the south of Lebanon, where the situation remained volatile and unstable, would have 
left me feeling completely out of my depth. Not long after, during the summer of 2006, 
the Khiam Detention Centre was annihilated by Israeli cluster bombs. By this time, I had 
already designed my research proposal for an ethno-historical study of Lebanese wine 
production. I had retained my original interests concerning the historical diversity of 
French hegemony in the region and particularly in terms of the reproduction of space. I 
retraced the steps that had taken me to Khiam, taking with me a simple question: What 
other obvious features can be found across the Lebanese landscape that appears to be 
entwined with a history of the French presence in the region? The inquiry produced 
some rather interesting but complex results.  
As I dug deeper into the literature, it became clear that such a history was 
actually much longer than I had initially envisioned. For example, the beginnings of 
modern Lebanon’s laissez-faire political economy had actually started to take shape as 
early as the nineteenth century, following the integration of Mount Lebanon into the 
                                                 
1 An article in 2009 by Taylor Long for the Now Lebanon news website provides an interesting account of 
the political patronage systems of north Lebanon, where poverty continues to increase. See 
http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=31275. A report published in 2008, by the 
International Poverty Centre, draws attention to disparately unequal levels of consumption in the country 
(Laithy, Abu-Ismail & Hamdan, 2008).  
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international (capitalist) market of silk production. It was during that period that one can 
increasingly see how shared political and economic interests between the French and 
British investors and Beirut’s silk mercantile oligarchy contributed towards the 
decentralisation of the Ottoman administration and facilitated the emergence of a 
market-orientated economy (Gates, 1998). I wondered how such interests might have 
shaped more recent trends in agriculture and industry in the region. 
I consequentially became interested in pursuing a line of enquiry with a question 
raised by Gilsenan concerning the extent to which men are able to actually maintain 
images of status and honour in a “bourgeoning laissez-faire Lebanon”, where the very 
notions of autonomy or self-sufficiency are hardly sustainable (Gilsenan, 1996: 59). The 
predicament of anthropology, as mapped out by Nader, articulated some of my concerns 
about the politics of representation and the production of knowledge (1972 & 1997). 
What kinds of understanding of society and individuals are potentially generated from 
anthropological perspectives? In thinking further about these questions, I found it 
poignant that Nader claims how there has (historically speaking) been a tendency for 
anthropology students to study “problems” that they do not have any “feelings” about 
(1972:2). Nader convincingly argues that studying social problems that directly concern 
us in some way or another generates a much richer understanding about the world we 
live in. Indeed, as Abu-Lughod suggests, the deeply entrenched dichotomies between 
self and other in anthropological endeavours can at the very least be acknowledged 
through a process of making connections and interconnections that are at once historical 
and contemporary between the anthropologist and community of study (1991).  
I therefore felt it pertinent to study elites in order to fill out the ethnographic gap, 
and saw that this was all the more urgent in Lebanon where men of powerespecially 
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economic powerappear to have affected so many livesincluding my own. At the 
same time, and following a closer (re)reading of Nader’s essay, my view of what might 
constitute the “object of study” shifted slightly, so that I began to explore potential 
“social fields,” bearing in mind that the power of “cultural transmission” did not 
necessarily occur vertically (or horizontally) (and see also Bourdieu, 1993). While 
manifestations of power remained unevenly distributed in my mind, I saw that there was 
something much more complex about power dynamics than I had initially realised. As 
Nader points out, by studying the culture of the powerful, such as U.S. food chains, one 
can begin to understand how such institutions can affect not only our lives, but also 
those who live in “traditional” and “non-Western” societies (1972:9).  
With this in mind, I recommenced my search across the Lebanese landscape 
through media articles and old family photographs of trips to different regions of 
Lebanon. I finally recalled a family visit when I was around thirteen years old, to the 
Chateau Kefraya winery, far to the west of the Bekaa Valley (not far from Ain Zebde on 
the map presented earlier). The civil war in Lebanon had only come to an end a year or 
so earlier, in 1992, and as my father drove his old Peugeot 505 with pride across the 
winding roads into the Bekaa Valley, remnants of decades of conflict were stamped into 
the memory of my mind. Yet I remember that when we arrived in the Kefraya region, 
the chateau, with its rather panoptical tower, was as it still is today, peering out from 
above a group of poplar trees with a view that some say extends as far as the Golan 
Heights in southerly hinterlands. As we took some shade from the midday sun, my 
mother was surprised to see that we were not the only visitors to the winery.  
In fact there were a number of other intrepid explorers who had come over that 
Sunday afternoon from Beirut, and there were even a few tourists from France who had 
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come to visit the winery and gaze upon the small patchwork of vineyards encompassing 
the chateau. My father translated my mother’s observations to a guard who had emerged 
from the entrance of the chateau’s gates. He was from the village of Kefraya, located 
further up on the slopes of the mountain range. I vividly remember his response. “Of 
course there are many visitors here,” he said, proudly, in Arabic, “this is the most 
beautiful landscape in the country.” He went on to explain that despite the years of war 
and destruction, the region, like the rest of Lebanon, was in a process of reconstruction 
so that its original beauty would return. Homes would be rebuilt and vines (re)planted 
across the way, on the slopes that surrounded the village. Little did I realise then that 
over a decade later I would settle into a home in the Kefraya village for the duration of a 
year, and that I would walk or drive past this entrance on a daily basis. It was somewhat 
frustrating that I could not recollect the man’s name, and I will always wonder who this 
man from Kefraya was, whom I met when I was barely a teenager. When I thought 
about his comments as a young PhD student, I began to think about what he might have 
meant by landscape and beautyand what understanding of the environment was 
required to produce such a world. Further questions also arose from these early 
memories of Kefraya. Who did this chateau belong to? When was it built? How were 
relations forged through such an arrangement of space? What changes have come to the 
region since the end of the civil war? Finally, were there other similar constructions 
across Lebanon?  
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Pre-fieldwork Encounters  
 
My second encounter with members of the Lebanese wine sector took place in the 
winter of 2005, during the book launch for Michael Karam’s Wines of Lebanon. 
Comfortably tucked into the corner of London’s Westbourne Grove, Al Saqi bookshop 
was the venue for the event. Founded in 1978, this independent publishing company has 
since specialised in stocking and publishing books related to Middle Eastern topics. 
Michael Karam’s book was no exception, offering the inquisitive reader a detailed guide 
of the many wineries of Lebanon. I had arrived early, so I purchased a copy of Wines of 
Lebanon and took refuge in the Lebanese (healthy) fast food shop across the road. While 
awaiting the arrival of my falafel, I gazed up at the shelves, which were neatly aligned 
with different kinds of jars filled with pickled vegetables from Lebanon. A few bottles 
of Lebanese araq and wine stood casually next to some of these jars. Other jars had 
stacked piles of vine leaves. The stuffed vine leaves lay covered in olive oil in 
aluminium containers in the refrigerated counter below. The man who made my falafel 
personally delivered the sandwich to my table and smiled as he looked at the cover of 
the book I had set in front of me. I returned the smile, before I began to eat my sandwich 
and flick through the pages of the large coffee-table book.   
It was clear that the Lebanese wine industry had come a long way since my first 
encounter in 1993. In 1993 the three main producers of wine in Lebanon were Chateaux 
Musar, Ksara, and Kefraya, and production levels were, at a rough estimate, 2.5 million 
bottles. By 2005, production levels were at nearly 6 million bottles with something close 
to 30 wineries, mostly situated in the Bekaa Valleymany of which featured in 
Karam’s book about Lebanese wineries. Some of these wineries were not necessarily 
new, but had ceased production during wartime. I jotted my observations down in my 
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first (pre)fieldwork notebook and also noted with interest that Chateaux Musar, Kefraya, 
and Ksara had maintained production throughout the war and even had managed to 
export a substantial amount of their wines. Indeed these wineries remain the largest in 
the area, where the combined production of Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya contributes 
something like 80% of all wine produced in Lebanon. As I skimmed through the book, I 
thought about its importance for the promotion of Lebanese wines. The layout of the 
book wove together images and texts, giving a particular historical tapestry of Lebanese 
wine.  
According to Karam, winemaking in Lebanon can be traced back to ancient 
civilisations. One of the temples in the three-part temple complex in the Baalbek region 
of the Bekaa Valley is dedicated to the Roman god of wine, Bacchus. The Phoenicians 
who set up trade posts in Beirut and Tyre were important merchants, and wine vessels, 
such as amphorae, are frequently found amongst their artefacts; thus suggesting the 
presence of wine trade in the region. Karam also includes an interview with 
archaeologist Patrick McGovern, who explains that despite the little evidence uncovered 
due to recent conflicts, what has been unearthed indicates that regions of modern-day 
Lebanon were covered in vineyards during ancient times. It was not just ancient 
civilizations of the region, however, that had a hand in painting the history of wine in 
Lebanon. The Jesuit priests and French mandate administrators also had a role in 
altering the viticulture and wine landscapes. The first winery to produce wine the 
“modern way” was constructed by the Jesuits of Ksara in 1857, who also planted 
Cinsault grape varietals brought over from plantations in their monastery in Algeria. 
Such changes led me to think more about the history of wine in Lebanon and of possible 
alterations across the landscape following the modernization of wine production. 
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Although Karam points to a long-standing tradition of wine and araq production in 
Lebanon, I began to wonder how modifications in wine and vine production techniques 
may even reflect broader historical changes not only in agricultural practices, but also 
within political and economic processes. Thus for example, while archaeological 
evidence might be able to prove that wine has been made in Lebanon as far back as the 
Phoenician period, I wondered why such scientific proof might be of importance. Given 
that the viticulture landscape had dramatically altered in the last 3000 years, I also 
wondered if Phoenician wine would taste even remotely similar to contemporary 
Lebanese wine, which Karam eloquently described as having been fashioned to suit 
French palates since at least the mid-nineteenth century (2005). If not, then why call it 
wine?  
Karam does hint at the interrelatedness of such types of changes when he 
informs the reader that the Chateau Ksara winery remained under Vatican ownership 
until 1973, when it was sold to a consortium of Lebanon’s business elites (2005). The 
winery has since become one of the two biggest producers of wine in Lebanon. The 
other, Chateau Kefraya, began production in 1979. However, the founder and current 
chairman, Mr Michel de Bustros, a man described by Karam as belonging to the Beiruti 
“aristocratic” class, had initiated vine plantations on family land in the Kefraya region as 
early as 1949, before extending his project onto villager’s lands in the 1950s. What type 
of vines did he plant? Significantly, while Karam mentions the viticulture of Kefraya, 
there was on the whole little discussion about the region’s vine growers. One exception 
was the Cave Kouroum winery, located in Kefraya and owned by a local man, Mr 
Bassim Rahal. The establishment of this winery, as Mr Sami Rahal, the general 
manager, explained to Karam, resulted from a surplus of grapes from the Kefraya village 
originally intended for the Chateau Ksara winery. However as Chateau Ksara had 
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decided to start up new contracts with vineyard owners in other regions of the Bekaa, the 
Rahal family, who were acting as distributors at the time, had to do something with the 
grapesand wine seemed like the only option. I began to wonder about the vineyard 
owners in Kefraya. Who were they? And why was there so little information available 
about them in Karam’s book?  
The positioning of the vineyard owners, firmly in the background, was also 
reflected in the colourful photographs laid out in the book. The photographer Norbert 
Schiller had been Karam’s partner in the project and there were an abundance of eye-
catching shots recording scenes of daily winemaking activities; such as the somewhat 
romanticized images of Bedouin women dressed colourfully, and smiling as they pluck 
the grapes from the vines in Kefraya. Other images featured men wearing red and white 
kafiyeh over their heads to protect them from the sun, as they shoulder crates of white 
and red grapes. One photograph that caught my attention back then was that of the chief 
of agricultural affairs at the Chateau Kefraya winery. This was Mr Nabhane, who stared 
piercingly through his darkened sunglasses straight into the camera lens; behind him a 
red tractor glaring under the sun looked just as menacing. I wondered about Mr Nabhane 
and what his job entailed. Then there was the larger than life photograph of Mr Yves 
Morard, an oenologist from Bordeaux who had worked at Chateau Kefraya and then at 
Cave Kouroum. Were there other French oenologists working in the Lebanese wine 
industry? 
Also portrayed were different prominent and esteemed individuals of the 
Lebanese wineries. These colourful photographs hinted at the status and sophisticated 
styles of the wineries’ owners, managers and wine-makers in Lebanon. At times, a 
winery-owner and other members of his family, who also worked in the trade, are 
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pictured amongst the oak barrels of the wine cellar, his facial expression suggesting 
concentration as he inhales the aromas of one of his wines from a glass. Other 
photographs depict winery owners and shareholders in more casual clothes against a 
backdrop of exquisite gardens, chateaux, or vineyards. I pondered upon these images 
before writing some final notes in my notebook. What kind of status was conveyed 
through the symbolic use of elite forms such as the chateau? How were they similarif 
at allto those used in the production of French wine?  Why for example, was Michel 
de Bustros described as an aristocrat? Did vineyard owners in Kefraya also perceive him 
as nobility?  
After noting these thoughts, I closed Karam’s book and prepared myself for the 
evening cold awaiting me outside. A room adjacent to the bookshop had been set up for 
the event, with publications of The Wines of Lebanon proudly displayed on tables 
covered in white cloth. Guests also had the opportunity to taste different wines from 
Lebanon and speak with wine merchants. Ms Jane Sowter, manager of Chateau Musar 
UK LTD, explained that during the civil war the winery had gone as far as to establish a 
UK-based company. She was happy to discuss the unique styles of Chateau Musar 
wines, highlighting the fact that these wines improved with age. Chateau Kefraya was 
represented by Phoenicia Wines LTD, whose Lebanese wine merchants were as 
enthusiastic as Ms Sowter and offered me further wine tastings.  
Guests were delighted to have to hand such an array of different wines. As one 
young woman took a seat around the podium, she gushed that these wines tasted like 
“Lebanon in a glass.” She pointed out the bouquet of cedar and thyme coming from her 
glass. These aromas, she explained, stirred up memories of her family’s summer home 
up in the mountains of Lebanon, where she played in the garden as a child. I was 
22 
 
intrigued by the powerful qualities of this wine, which brought forth and conjured up 
exclusive perceptions of place and identity, symbolically charged with notions of 
rootedness and attachment to land. I returned to my seat and later, as the evening 
became a bacchanalian night for some, a couple of Al Saqi’s authors took to the podium 
and read excerpts from the Al-Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, expressing their desire for a 
“little ruby wine and a book of verses.” 
The audience clapped, and pleaded for another verse. The speakers were only too 
happy to oblige and filled their glasses before the poetry reading began again. I was 
making every attempt to limit the effects of the wine and continued to politely decline 
the glasses of red and white circulating amongst the audience. I had been invited by the 
author himself to launch, and hoped to speak with him. After hearing about his book, I 
had contacted Karam directly by email, in the hope of obtaining some advice on my 
research. Unfortunately, we did not have the opportunity to speak much throughout the 
evening as he was in demand. However, he was happy to sign my book, including the 
message: “Happy Hunting in the Bekaa!” 
 
Fieldwork 
 
I arrived in Lebanon at the end of 2005 for a brief pilot study and seeking permission to 
conduct research at some of the wineries in Lebanon and to secure a place to stay for the 
duration of my extended fieldwork. My initial plan was to find out if it would be 
possible to arrange accommodation at either Chateaux Ksara or Kefrayaboth in the 
Bekaa Valley. My first appointment was with Mr de Bustros at his Beirut office, and he 
agreed that I could visit Chateau Kefraya whenever I chose and make contact with those 
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working at the winery in the Bekaa Valley. I was informed that accommodation was not 
available at the winery. I expressed my interest in possibly staying in Kefraya village, 
and asked if he might be able to offer me any suggestions or contacts in the village? De 
Bustros seemed amused by this idea and smiled, stating that if I could find a place to 
stay there, then by all means, it would be a good place to be. 
Communication with the general manager of Chateau Ksara did not run as 
smoothly. Mr Charles Ghostine was initially unwilling to meet with me. It took several 
emails and telephone conversations before Ghostine suggested that I meet with Michael 
Karam, who had just been commissioned by the winery to write a book for their 150th 
anniversary. If Karam agreed with my research then so might Ghostine. Fortunately, 
Karam was willing to meet with me at a café at the ABC shopping mall in the Achrafieh 
district of Beirut. I have to admit that I was starting to feel some pressure to prove 
myself as a worthy researcher, and had become less confident about my intentions to 
study wine production in Lebanon. After about half an hour of nervous rambling to 
Karam, he stopped me and looked relieved. I recall it was at the point when I had 
somehow started to discuss the way Marx might have perceived agriculture in Lebanon. 
I am not sure if Karam’s relief was because my monologue on Marx and the vineyards 
of Mosel had come to an (unfinished) end, or because it had become clear to him that 
my research aims were quite different to his interests. Nevertheless, within an hour of 
our meeting, I called Ghostine, who was now ready to grant me permission to visit the 
Chateau Ksara winery. I was surprised by Ghostine’s change in attitude and thankful to 
Karam for his support. I recall one conversation over the telephone with Ghostine, 
where he warned me to not write any “rubbish” about Chateau Ksara. I truly hope I have 
not.  
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Given that securing accommodation at Chateau Ksara proved impossible, I 
began to turn my attention to finding a place to stay in Kefraya village. As I thought 
more about the possibility, the more sense it made. During a meeting with a winemaker 
working at the Chateau Kefraya winery at the time of the pilot study, it was brought to 
my attention that out of the 700 hectares of vines in the region, approximately 400 
belonged to those living the Kefraya village. Vineyard owners would then sell their 
grapes to wineries across Lebanon. I thought it would be interesting to study the types of 
arrangements vineyard owners had with the wineries. Another dimension was the 
historical relationship between local residents in Kefraya and de Bustros, who is 
recognised for transforming the region into a viticulture landscape.   
It became clear during my initial contact with Kefraya villagers that things were 
very different here, and I would have to go about this communication rather differently 
to the way I had instigated communication with the wine companies. There did not 
appear to be any official viticulture organization in Kefraya and I would have to make 
contact with someone in the village. I felt this was especially difficult because I did not 
know anyone from Kefraya. Further, I was aware from personal experience of Lebanese 
village life that a young woman arriving at somebody’s front door and asking in broken 
Arabic for a place to stay for a year would be unusual at best. While the person at the 
front door would, most likely, be as hospitable as one can be to a stranger, all sorts of 
questions and eyebrows would probably be raised. So taking lead from Abu-Lughod 
(1999), who with the support of her father negotiated a place in an Egyptian Bedouin 
community, I decided to take a similar route. It took some convincing before my 
perplexed father finally gave in, agreeing that if I wanted to stay in Kefraya, then his 
asking for permission on my behalf would be the most appropriate way to go about it. 
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So my dad did what all Lebanese people do when they arrive in a village and don’t 
know anyone. He stopped at the local snack point and asked for directions to the house 
of the Mukhtar.2  
Fortunately the Mukhtar was willing to help and informed my father that a room 
would be available to rent once I returned from England to start my fieldwork in the 
summer of 2006. While delays were to be expected, I don’t think anybody foresaw that 
the reasons for my postponement of fieldwork would be war. The Kefraya region was 
not spared Israeli bombardment. A well-kept memorial for refugees fleeing from the 
south stands on the side of the main road, not far from where they were killed by Israeli 
bombs. Further up in the hills, an Israeli drone crashed not far from another road. As I 
learnt about these events during my time in Kefraya village, I began to wonder if I could 
weave the memory of war into my doctoral thesis. Since at least the 1980s, the region at 
one point or another had been occupied by both Israeli and Syrian militaries, and I 
managed to document many narratives about this period, trying to make sense of these 
memories. Indeed, these experiences could never really be left behind; only a few 
months after my arrival someone uncovered by chance an unexploded mine in a 
vineyard of the Chateau Kefraya estate. After much deliberation, however, I decided to 
steer the focus away from explicit narratives of war and violence because there remained 
several pending ethical issues that I had to address. Generally speaking, these have to do 
with the complexities of negotiating consent. My concerns grew largely from the EASA 
ethical guidelines, where, under the heading of “undue intrusion,” there is mention of 
                                                 
2  I was informed during fieldwork that the meaning of the word “Mukhtar” is “chosen,” and that the 
Mukhtar of Kefraya had been elected by local residents. The office of Mukhtar can be traced to the Ottoman 
Law of Vilayets of 1864 (Baer, 1982). It is unclear if Kefraya village existed at this time, however if it did, 
then the Mukhtar would have been appointed by Ottoman officials. At present the Mukhtar meditates internal 
village disputes, but his role also includes civil servant duties, such as stamping passports and assisting in 
applications. The position of Mukhtar is usually unpaid.  
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potential harm to participants “having been caused to acquire self-knowledge which they 
did not seek or want” (1999:3). Simply put, I feel that further research and consideration 
of the politics of positionality is necessary before presenting these accounts.  
When I finally arrived at the Mukhtar’s front door in December of 2006, his wife 
greeted me and showed me inside. My parents were also present and we all shook the 
hand of the ageing Mukhtar and waited for him to be seated. A few moments later, the 
Mukhtar began to speak and pointed out of the red-paned terrace window to the valley 
below. Beyond the vineyards and rustic ornate villas of the village, the chateau of 
Kefraya crept out once more from the poplar trees. The Mukhtar turned to me, asking in 
his gruff voice, “…and you spoke with de Bustros?” I confirmed that I had. “And he 
knows that you want to research the winery?” I nodded. With that, the Mukhtar and his 
wife got up and I was taken across the road to my first home in Kefraya. This was with 
an elderly couple who had no children and, interestingly, came from one of the two 
families in the village who didn’t own any land (and thus no vineyards).  
Within two weeks of arriving at Kefraya village, I was able to conduct 
participant-observation on a daily basis, both at the winery and in the vineyards of 
Chateau Kefraya, where the recently-hired French oenologist and technical manager, Mr 
Fabrice Guiberteau, allowed me free-range to work with other obliging employees. Not 
long after, I had the opportunity to interview de Bustros, this time at his office in the 
chateau. Local residents in Kefraya also invited me out into the kouroum (vineyards), 
teaching me (with a lot of pride) how to prune and how to pick wild edible plants. As 
my time began to revolve around when and where I could meet with people who worked 
in viniculture and viticulture, it became clear that it was increasingly difficult for the 
elderly couple to accommodate my sporadic schedule. So I took the initiative to speak 
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with the Mukhtar, asking if there were any other places to rent in the village. Not long 
after, the first of the Mukhtar’s three wives passed away. She had lived in one of the 
ground apartments of the Mukhtar’s three-storey red-roof house. His second wife was 
from Beirut and had long since passed away. His third wife lived with him upstairs. 
Meanwhile, his grown son and his family lived on the top floor. Following a month of 
mourning, the Mukhtar offered me the flat to rent. I felt unsure about the correct 
response, but after much discussion with people in the village, expressing my concerns 
about being disrespectful to other members of the family, I accepted the offer. My 
bedroom was close to the entrance and shared the view the Mukhtar had pointed out 
upstairs. A hot stove stood next to my bed, which was invaluable during the long cold 
winter nights, where I wrote covered in layers of blankets and, quite frequently, by 
candlelight when the electricity had gone out.  
I did not, however, spend a great deal of time in my new home. The longer I 
spent out in the vineyards, the closer I grew to the Nabhane family and the more 
evenings I would pass at their villa, which was a little further downhill. Mr Nabhane 
Nabhane, whom I later called Amou or Uncle Nabhane, was in charge of overseeing 
work in the vineyards of Chateau Kefraya, a role he inherited from his father, Mr Abdel 
Helim Nabhane. Nabhane was extremely helpful, particularly when I began piecing 
together a historical narrative of Kefraya. It was, after all, his father who had worked so 
closely with de Bustros to transform the region into what it is today. It was also Nabhane 
who urged me to follow leads that took me out of Kefraya as well. As he reminded me, 
wineries from across Lebanon converge on Kefraya during the harvest.  
Nabhane’s suggestions draw attention to a certain crossroads that I had arrived 
during fieldwork. That is, I had to consider the theoretical consequences of limiting my 
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fieldwork site to the Kefraya region. In some respects, my concerns were similar to 
those expressed by contributors to the edited volume by Gupta and Ferguson (1997).  In 
other words, I felt it pertinent to explore the entanglement of local and global processes 
of power that might have influenced the way the Kefraya region is perceived as a centre 
for wine-growing. I therefore had a choice to remain in Kefraya and visit other regions 
in the Bekaa, or to redesign a methodological framework for a multi-sited fieldwork 
across Lebanon (e.g. Marcus, 1995). I felt that in choosing the former, I would have the 
opportunity to develop strong ties with Kefraya residents and at the very least, become 
acquainted with seasonal migrant workers who came from Syria and beyond. Given that 
it was difficult for me to follow seasonal workers across the borders, I decided that there 
were several practical advantages to setting up base in Kefraya in that I could gain some 
insights into the perspectives of different actors as they converged in the region. Yet it is 
also important to point out that my focus on the seasonal workers remains somewhat 
marginal in my thesis. I chose instead to focus on the management of the wineries so as 
to gain further insights into what types of knowledge were deemed important in the 
decision-making process to make high quality winesand the repercussions these 
decisions had on the transforming Kefraya landscape for the villagers. 
I thus also began to visit the wineries. Given constraint on time, however, I 
limited my fieldwork to visiting wineries located only in the Bekaa Valley who bought 
grapes from the Kefraya region, interviewing winery owners, managers, and oenologists. 
I soon saw that since the end of the civil war in 1991, an important objective for many of 
the wineries has been to increase their exports abroad, creating a niche in the 
international market for high quality wines. Significantly, also brought to the fore was 
that essential for success in carving out a place in an already well-established global 
29 
 
goods market was not only an understanding of the perquisites for market entry but also 
knowledge of the networks that could facilitate such strategies.  
In learning about these networks, I gained further insights into the subtleties of 
the power dynamics, as the larger wineries, Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya not only 
monopolized production in terms of quantity, but also in generating an understanding of 
what quality actually meant. I also became aware of the role of the wine business 
association, the Union Vinicole du Liban (UVL), in campaigning for of the passing of a 
wine law in Lebanon. I also saw how important were their links to the state and 
international wine organizationsmost notably, the Office International de la Vigne et 
du Vin (OIV), seemed to play an important role.  
Winery  Location 
Domaine de Baal Zahle, Bekaa Valley 
Domaine des Tourelles Chtaura, Bekaa Valley 
Domaine Wardy Zahle, Bekaa Valley 
Cave Kouroum Kefraya, Bekaa Valley 
Chateau Ka  Chtaura, Bekaa Valley 
Chateau Kefraya Kefraya, Bekaa Valley 
Chateau Ksara Ksara, Bekaa Valley 
Chateau Musar Ghazir, north Lebanon 
Clost St Thomas Qb Elias, Bekaa Valley 
Coteaux du Liban Zahle, Bekaa Valley 
Chateau Heritage  Qb Elias, Bekaa Valley  
Massaya Taanayel, Bekaa Valley 
Vin Nakad Jdita, Bekaa Valley 
Table 1: Wineries visited during fieldwork  
The data I obtained through these formal and informal interviews also proved 
invaluable, and complemented the data I was gathering at Kefraya; especially in terms of 
the economic and social consequences these strategies might have upon vineyard-
owners in Kefraya who were facing continuous pressure to change the types of grapes 
varietals they grew. The pressure was to grow those deemed desirable by wineries such 
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as Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara. In particular, information from Chateau Ksara’s Mr 
Ghostine and French oenologist Mr James Palgé was extremely useful in terms of 
understanding how the strategies they deployed in order to improve the quality of wines 
not just at Ksara, but across Lebanon, contributed towards the reproduction of other 
enterprising manoeuvreswithin both viniculture and viticulture. To add to this 
perspective, I also made several trips to vineyards across the Bekaa Valley, where I 
conducted similarly formatted interviews, asking about the age and grape varietals they 
grew and about the types of contracts they had with wineries buying their grapes. Of 
interest here was that as some of the Kefraya vineyard owners heard about my visits to 
wineries sourcing their grapes, they too became more at ease discussing some of the 
issues pertaining to costs and contracts.  
Yet it is important to point out that information about the exact costs for 
viticulture maintenance, wages for itinerant workers and how much vineyard owners 
could make from selling grapes was extremely difficult to obtain. Vineyard owners, 
seasonal workers and wineries were all reluctant to discuss such issues. For example, it 
is apparent that a vineyard owner in Kefraya can make anything from $400 or to at least 
ten times the amount depending upon the amount of land, the type of vines and how 
many vines planted per hectare. Yet obtaining the exact the figures proved impossible 
for several reasons. First, I was unable to gain access to records of land ownership. 
Second, residents of Kefraya and beyond were uncomfortable providing me with the 
exact amount of money they received from selling grapes. Third, while the data sheets I 
acquired from Chateau Kefraya did register who the vineyards belonged to and the 
amount of grapes (in kilograms) that were bought, there was still some ambiguity if the 
owners of these vineyards, also sold grapes (perhaps from other vineyards) to other 
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wineries. Nevertheless, visiting vineyards eventually became less formal and thus 
allowed my fieldwork to flow more smoothlyparticularly during harvest time.  
Archival research conducted at the Jesuit-run Taanayel Monastery in the Central 
Bekaa was another significant part of my fieldwork. Historically the Taanayel properties 
were linked with Chateau Ksara and the former continues to grow and sell grapes to the 
latter. Gaining access to the archives was more of a challenge than I had envisioned. 
While the reasons remain unclear, in hindsight I suspect that one aspect had to do with 
the monastery’s relationship with Chateau Ksara and the fact that Karam was writing a 
book about the history of the winery. However, through the support of Mr Elia Ghorra, 
the agricultural engineer in charge of the Taanayel Laiterie, and Père Paul Brouwers, I 
was finally permitted to enter the monastery. The Jesuits residing at the monastery were 
extremely helpful and also kindly allowed me to photocopy less fragile documents. 
After spending approximately two days a week there over a period of two and half 
months, I managed to collect accounts by Jesuits involved in wine production during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which has provided some useful insights 
into the history of agricultural knowledge. I do, however, feel that further archival 
research would be useful in order to develop further understanding about shifts in the 
styles of production that have taken place since the arrival of the Jesuits.  
Nevertheless, after spending time at the monastery I had the opportunity to 
develop contacts at the agricultural department of the Jesuit-run University Saint Joseph, 
which is located a few metres down the road. There, some members of the faculty were 
working with the Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce and Trade to support a viticulture 
cooperative further north in the Bekaa, part of a mission to replace illicit crops (hashish 
and opium) with vines. I have not incorporated their perspectives directly into the thesis 
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because of my decision to maintain focus on Kefrayaand more specifically on the 
region’s residents. Nevertheless, such discussions have allowed further contextualisation 
of Kefraya within the Lebanese viticulture landscape.  
Some notes must be made in this section. First, communication during fieldwork 
was in Arabic, French, and English. The degree of interchange between these languages 
during conversation was an interesting aspect of my research, particularly in terms of 
how it demonstrated different senses of positionality. Yetand to speak of my 
positionality once moreI must confess that at the start of fieldwork my confidence 
speaking Arabic and French was frail, to say the least. However, after a month in 
Kefraya, where to my advantage people were more than happy to correct my 
grammatical mistakes in Arabic and teach me new words, my confidence grew. 
Unfortunately, my Arabic reading and writing remains at an intermediate level and 
presents some self-evident limitations to research. Spending time with French and 
Francophone employees at the wineries allowed me to develop my conversational skills 
in the language. Meanwhile I am able to read French with fluency. Unless stated 
otherwise, I have translated all conversations and texts in this thesis. Second, in order to 
provide some sort of continuity and avoid some confusion, I have used the same 
transliteration format from Arabic into English as used by scholars who I have 
frequently referred to in this thesis. This is also the case for certain terms such as 
kouroum that have already been transliterated by informants. For other words that I have 
translated directly from Arabic into English, I have followed the system of the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES).  
Third, with productivity levels at approximately 6 million bottles, the Lebanese 
wine industry is relatively small- only a fraction of Bordeaux’s average annual 
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production of 850 million bottles.  Anonymity therefore remains on all accounts 
somewhat problematic. I believe that it would have been impossible to conceal the name 
of the region in which I was working, or the names of the wineriesespecially those 
that are more established. It was also clear that, particularly amongst the upper 
management of most wineries, many were experienced in being interviewedperhaps 
more so than I was as an interviewer. In this respect, I consistently felt that most of my 
questions were well anticipatedor strategically left unanswered. This was, at times, 
unnerving, but as time progressed I began to take account of these experiences as part of 
fieldwork. Nonetheless, I constantly asked participants for their consent, and checked 
whether they wished to remain anonymous. Those that expressed such a desire remain 
unnamed and contextualised within this thesis in such a manner as to disassociate them 
from respective wineries, vineyards, and the like.  
Fourth, I must also point out that I have avoided extensive discussion of religious 
sectarianism in Lebanon. This is despite the factand to the surprise of many 
colleagues and friendsthat Kefraya village is a predominantly Sunni-Muslim, and 
there are a number of prominent non-Christian Lebanese business elites who are major 
shareholders of some of the wineries. I did not side-line these issues because they are 
unimportant. Instead, it reflects my feeling that sectarianism as practiced within the 
Lebanese wine industry is less about how relations are forged and bounded explicitly 
through religious affiliation, but rather more subtlety entangled within a wider cultural 
hegemonic project. In this way, Makdisi’s critical approach has been informative, 
because it allows for further understanding as to how sectarianism belongs to a much 
broader (and longer) modernization hegemonic project in the region (2000).  Finally, 
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taking heed of the “ethnographic present,” particularly the perspectives of Fabian and 
Said, I write this thesis in the past tense (Fabian, 2002 & Said, 1979).     
 
 
 A view of some of Kefraya’s vineyards  
 
Outlining the Trade-marking Tradition 
 
In 2005, in a newsletter released by Lebanon’s Investment Development Authority 
(IDAL), the Lebanese wine industry was featured as the country’s most successful agro-
industry. The article reports that in 2003 grape production ranked third in agricultural 
production, with 110,000 tons of grapes harvested that year. While only 6,000 tons of 
those grapes were destined for wine, the industry was deemed a rapidly growing 
industry that merged the agricultural, industrial, and trade sectors. According to IDAL, 
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the wine industry was a $20 million industry in 2003, and although constituting only 
0.05% of the overall national industrial output, it was still outperforming all other 
industries. To illustrate their point, the newsletter informs its readers that from 1996 
until 2003, wine production in Lebanon had doubled to just over 4 million bottles, with a 
number of wineries selling their wines abroad in international markets. Indeed, since the 
end of the civil war and up to the time of my fieldwork, more than ten new wineries had 
been established, and the number has continued to grow to approximately 30.  
Notably however, IDALnor any other governmental organization for that 
matterdoes not offer any financial support for investment or export of Lebanese wines 
and nor are there any subsidized agricultural plans made available for grape growers 
(either wine or table grapes). This is in spite of post-civil war projects such as Export 
Plus, developed by IDAL, which allocated nearly 50 billion Lebanese pounds (around 
US$ 33 million) to support farmers and exporters with quality control, packaging, and 
labelling, as well the as in the transporting of vegetables and fruits to Arab markets 
(Baroudi, 2005). In drawing attention to the accomplishments of the wine industry, the 
IDAL article thus inadvertently sheds light upon some of the broader issues surrounding 
the country’s agricultural development. To put it another way, while agricultural 
production in Lebanon constitutes approximately 6% of the national income and 
represents 17% of the country’s exports, the funds made available to the ministry of 
agriculture makes up less than 0.4% of the national budget (Zurayk, 2013). The disparity 
of these figures is indicative of the importance of private investment in agriculture and 
thus, to some extent, the role it has in shaping Lebanon’s agro-industries and rural 
development. It is all the more significant, therefore, that wine production, which is 
predominantly if not completely privately funded, was officially deemed the fastest 
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growing and (most successful) agro-industry of 2005, with a growing presence in the 
international market for high-quality wines.    
To some degree these observations resonate with those made by Gates in her 
historical analysis of Beirut’s mercantile elite and the emergence of Lebanon’s laissez-
faire political economy (1998). That is to say, not only has policy oriented towards 
establishing an open market economy facilitated in the marginalization of state 
investment in agrarian development, it has also contributed to the formation of particular 
agricultural enterprises in rural Lebanon sustained through investment by the urban elite. 
The significance of contemporary private investment in agriculture might thus reflect 
more recent entrepreneurial strategies by urban elites to secure their market hegemony. 
Given the apparent long-standing interest of Beirut’s elites in wine production, an 
anthropological study of the industry can provide a useful lens through which to explore 
the materialisation of entrepreneurial strategiesboth old and newin rural regions of 
the country. By exploring the materialisation of these strategies as they converge in 
Kefraya, this thesis considers this research question: what can an anthropological study 
of wine contribute to our understanding of the role of elites in shaping and influencing 
the agricultural landscape in Lebanon? 
In this light, the title of this thesis, Trade-marking Tradition: An Ethnographic 
study of the Lebanese Wine Industry, alludes to the normalisation of certain economic 
practices associated with the emergence of a market society. At the same time, it also 
refers to the more contemporary praxis of Lebanese elite entrepreneurs, where market 
privileges are secured by obtaining monopoly rights as producer and supplier of a 
particular brand (e.g. Pratt, 1994). In Chapter Two I explore how the qualities that wine, 
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as a type of prestige good, might possess can potentially allow for a study of elites and 
the transmission of knowledge linked to certain forms of immaterial and manual labour.   
Although wine production may have an extremely long history across the region, 
the methods of viticulture and wine production introduced by the Jesuits during the mid-
nineteenth century continue to have a far-reaching legacy in the Lebanese wine industry. 
For example, Cinsault vines, which were initially shipped over by the Jesuits, have 
become the most prevalent type of wine grape across the country. These new forms of 
production radically altered the viticulture landscape of the Bekaa Valley, and will be 
explored in Chapter Three where I suggest that such practices transformed the very 
notion of the potentiality of the land. We might suggest that the area, which had been 
perceived within the then-weakening ideologies of Ottoman governance, was brought to 
(re)produce European market hegemony (see Mundy, 2004). It is notable, therefore, that 
by the time of the French mandate during the early twentieth century, there was already 
a bourgeoning wine industry in Lebanon. The chapter also draws attention to the 
emergence of the term “chateau” within Lebanese wine production, arguing that such 
practices are suggestive of new conceptual arrangements of space that allowed for the 
forging of new kinds of connections between urban and rural, as well as between local 
and global.   
Chapter Four introduces the Kefraya region, where the “urban aristocrat,” 
Michael de Bustros, instigated the plantation of Cinsault vines a few years after the 
establishment of the independent Lebanese state. Following successful plantations on his 
family land, de Bustros then extended the vineyards onto lands belonging to residents of 
Kefraya, before finally establishing the Chateau Kefraya winery in 1979. Kefraya has 
since become the winegrowing hub of Lebanon, while also being recognized as having a 
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particularly beautiful landscape. Yet despite the fact that most of these vineyards belong 
to residents of Kefraya, they are rarely mentioned in literature about the Lebanese wine 
industryeven within scientific studies about Lebanese viticulture and wine business. 
At the same time, however, it is also of significance that, just as the notion of landscape 
is of importance to non-Kefraya residents and wine experts, villagers also frequently 
used the term “landscape”. 
This shared sense of aesthetic appreciation suggests the materialization of a 
model of place in Kefraya, one that can be situated within wine’s productive forces and 
more broadly within the global market economy. And as with the accounts of non-
Kefraya residents, villagers’ narratives also entangle with those that speak of the 
important role of de Bustros in creating the viticulture landscapeespecially for one 
family in particular. Yet such accounts portray a hierarchical relationship with de 
Bustros that suggest a history of power relations where urban elites began to reinforce 
and articulate their powerful positions over land and labour in way characterised by the 
open market economy. Narratives of the landscape, as told by residents in Kefraya, 
however, also speak of family histories that are entwined with practices out in the 
vineyards of Kefraya.  
Recent demands imposed on residents to pull out their Cinsault vines appear to 
have contributed towards the emergence of new enterprising viticulture actors from 
Kefraya village, who are able to comply with the new expectations of quality. This is 
suggestive of the types of socio-economic changes occurring across the landscape, 
which appear to replicate the cultural norms and forms practiced by wineries in the 
marketing of Lebanese wines. At the same time, such actors do not seem to be willing to 
allow land in Kefraya to be sold off to non-Kefraya residents. Chapter Five continues to 
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explore this theme of transformation begun in Chapter Four, by considering how the 
changing concept of bayt (house) is understood and experienced amongst members of 
the Rahal following their establishment of the only winery owned by villagers from 
Kefraya. The chapter considers the (re)productive powers of Bayt Rahal, exploring how 
relations in the spheres of family and business (as well as politics) inform, shape, and 
affect the other. Chapter Five also extends the trade-marking theme of this thesis by 
examining, in the final section, how the name “Kefraya,” that was trade-marked by 
Chateau Kefraya, has had some important ramifications upon the sentimental 
attachments residents have to kin, house, and place. That is, despite attempts to preserve 
some degree of autonomy and exert control over change, the competing strategies of an 
urban elite attempting to secure market power have endured.      
Chapter Six thus focuses upon the joint enterprising projects envisioned by the 
Lebanese business association of wineries, the Union Vinicole du Liban, established in 
1997 by Chateaux Ksara, Musar, and Kefraya, with the objective of improving the 
overall quality of Lebanese wines and orientating production towards higher categories 
within the international markets. The objectives of regulating and standardizing 
production, while adhering to international guidelines, materialised through the UVL’s 
successful campaign and lobbying for the passing of a wine law in 2000; the first of its 
kind, since the wine legislation passed in 1938 was thrown out in 1983. Perspectives of 
UVL members are explored in the chapter to show how the precariousness of the 
Lebanese state is negotiated to allow wine production to continue to be regulated, in 
order to meet standards stated under Euro-Lebanese trade agreements. 
That the shareholdersespecially those of Chateaux Kefraya and Ksarabelong 
to broader trade networks with links extending across political and trade organizations in 
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Lebanon and beyond, suggests that they are already well-connected provides a pretext 
for an examination of the patron-type business relations formed with more recently 
accepted UVL members. These seem to have the goal of controlling production and 
securing market power. In Chapter Seven, the focus is extended to the role of technical 
expertise in that process. I explore the perspectives of two oenologists, Palgé and 
Guiberteau, who were hired respectively by Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya, concerning 
the concept of quality in the vineyards. They were especially concerned with improving 
the quality and quantity of the grapes sourced from vineyard owners in Kefraya and 
elsewhere in the Bekaa Valley. Central to their objectives was to terminate the use of 
Cinsault grapes grown in Kefraya, which were thought to produce low quality table 
wines. While Palgé had commenced this project as far back as 1993, the repercussions 
of these strategies continue to be far-reaching and will be considered in terms of the 
types of contracts forged with vineyard owners in Kefraya and beyond, examining those 
who were willing to comply with expectations to maintain certain types of grape 
varietals.   
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2: Thematic Contributions 
 
In the following pages I provide a selective literature review of the themes that are 
central to the analytical framework of this thesis. This is my main point of departure: I 
aim to explore the reproduction of certain wine-related practices, practices that fall into 
categories that bring forth ideas of exclusivityor in Bourdieu’s terminology, a sense 
of distinction (1984). In so doing, I set the pretext for asking this question: what are the 
characteristics of wine associated with a motivation and desire to participate in its 
commodity production that appear to be specific to the case of Lebanon?  
 
Visions of Lebanon   
 
The historian Kamal Salibi notes that “when speaking historically of Lebanon, past or 
present”, there is no “one historical script relating to a fully coherent body of territory 
and population” (1988: 4). On one level, Salibi is referring quite literally to how the 
regions that currently make up modern Lebanon did not all belong to the same Ottoman 
administrative unit (wilaya). Thus, unlike the urban notables known as the a‘yān of the 
Syrian cities of Damascus and Aleppo, who were the primary multazims (tax collectors) 
for rural regions that encompassed sections of the Bekaa Valley and north Lebanon, the 
Mount Lebanon Emirate “fiefdom” was organized through a system of contracts 
between the “muqata’ji, mudabbirs (lords’ assistant), farmers and peasants, which were 
all mediated by the Maronite church”(Ghazzal, 2007: 9; see also Chevallier, 1971; 
Harik, 1968; Hourani, 1994; Traboulsi, 2007).  
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 On another level, however, Salibi’s comments regard how different political 
visions of contemporary Lebanon utilize a particular understanding of the country’s 
complicated past as a means to explain and justify more recent events and identities 
(1988 & 2003 & see Hudson, 1985). Salibi’s critique, which seems to be aimed at the 
country’s political and economic elites—as well as its historiographers—is somewhat 
circular in that he concludes by setting up his own view of Lebanon’s past. 
Nevertheless, his observations raise two pertinent, dialectically related issues that will 
be continuously picked up upon throughout this thesis that concern the relationship 
between how one perceives one’s positionality in the world and the production of 
particular kinds of knowledge.  
One issue is concerned with how a certain understanding of the past might 
shape the reality of the present. There is therefore, substantial currency in thinking 
critically about historical process and how social relations within certain contexts may 
contribute towards the production of that history (Davis, 1989 & 1992). On one hand, 
the writing of history can be presented as linear and attached to an awareness that 
contemporary circumstances are cumulative, namely in the way that people become 
knowledgeable about certain types of activities over time, such as the “experienced 
magicians and gardeners in the Trobriands” or the “pruners and wine-makers in 
southern Italy” (1992:17). On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that history is 
not just written but also made through the way people interpret and perceive past 
events, not to mention how this may influence future decisions.   
In this light, Saree Makdisi’s observations concerning a fixation in 
contemporary Lebanon, upon a pre-war past and that they should be perceived as a kind 
“fetishized desire,” resonate quite strongly throughout this thesis (2006). Makdisi 
suggests that this “fetishized desire” is materialised through an active engagement with, 
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for example, black and white photographs and post cards depicting images from the era 
before 1979 and represents a way to come to terms with trauma by filling in gaps of 
periods people do not want to remember. This thesis begins to explore how this sense 
of “fetishized desire” to rebuild an idea of the past might also be one of building a 
particular kind of future intertwined with the motivation to produce and engage in the 
production of wine.  In so doing, this thesis considers how the making of wine and 
other grape derived products in Lebanon might be able to establish a sense of cultural 
continuity precisely because of their historical resonance (Zubaida, 2000 & Tapper, 
2000). At the same time, with a stronger focus on the sphere of production-as opposed 
to the consumption we can also begin to examine how the choice to grow vines might 
also reflect geological and environmental factors that are result of on-going human 
interaction (Braudel, 2012 & 1982; Purcell & Horden, 2000; Allan, 2000). 
In so doing, I adopt an approach similar to Tomich’s understanding of Braudel’s 
longue durée as a continuous and uneven process of long gradual change (“temporal 
movement is produced through very slow, almost geological, societal interaction with 
geography and environment over the very long term”) (Tomich, 2012: 10& Braudel, 
2012). Like Tomich, the exercise here is to redeploy the concept of the longue durée—
and the very long longue durée—through the lens of mid-term and short-term social 
temporalities in an attempt to develop an analysis of the interaction of humans and their 
environment. The point here is that such an exploration of changes in the modes of 
wine production of Lebanon can hopefully elucidate how social transformation is at 
once both cumulative and instigated by agency. In other words, as Wallerstein points 
out, just as with a world-systems approach, Braudel’s notion of the longue durée does 
not imply an eternal and ever-lasting historical era, but an “organic” historical system 
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that entails a particular understanding of the world and which must ultimately come to 
an end (2002).   
Following Wallerstein, I thus situate the emergence of the Lebanese wine 
industry within a capitalist world-system characterised by a certain kind of historical 
system (Wallerstein, 2002). This type of historical system is one that operates on 
“repeated cyclical rhythms of expansion and contradictions,” and with “secular trends 
of development” (Wallerstein, 1979: 390). Such historical processes contrast with those 
of world-empires, which are characterised by “one long history of expansion and 
integration” (ibid.). Notably, there is considerable debate concerning the point at which 
the Ottoman Empire was incorporated into the capitalist world-system (e.g. ibid, 
Mundy, 2007; Mundy & Smith, 2007; Islamaglu-Inan, 1987 & 2004).   However, such 
a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. This is because the apogee of the 
modernization of wine production in Lebanon seems to have occurred during the mid-
nineteenth century, which was a time when the region had already been integrated into 
a world market economy. Yet it is also important to bear in mind that in the region 
constituting modern-day Lebanon, the production of silk for the market emerged during 
the seventeenth century due to the role of the “merchant” Emir Fakhr al-Din Ma’n 
(Traboulsi, 2007).  
 A second issue that arises is thus concerned with the extent to which “written” 
historical knowledge can actually reflect social reality and how it might influence it. 
Especially salient here is what Lee observes as a shift in the demarcation, or at best, a 
separation of different bodies of knowledge into two distinct domains: facts and 
societal/morals/values (Lee, 2007; 2012). That is, the (re)production of “facts”the 
authoritative form of knowledgeoccurs through the scientific disciplines associated 
with discovering, uncovering, and transforming nature (2007: 2). Notably, entangled 
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with the type of scientific knowledge required in the transformation of environment is a 
particular understanding of the economy that is also classified within the realm of the 
factual. This form of economic rationality emerges out of the neo-classical models 
proceeding from Adam Smith’s treatise of the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1982; Hart & 
Hann, 2010). How can value given to scientific knowledge and to those who possess 
such expertise influence perspectives and experiences of the world? In attempting to 
explore these issues, I start by drawing from Stirling’s model for mapping out social 
change (1974 & 1993 & Hann, 1994). Stirling suggests four types of changes to look 
for when conducting research, which are shifts in: social relations, knowledge and 
beliefs, value, and the general circumstances of a society. While these changes overlap 
and are interrelated, my main interest in this thesis is to map out modifications in the 
forms of knowledge that are of value in the production of wine in Lebanon.  
 Notably, the advent of the modern wine industry in Lebanon appears to be 
tangential to the growing importance of Beirut as a significant urban centre during the 
mid-nineteenth century and in conjunction with changing urban-rural relations at that 
time (e.g. Traboulsi, 2007; Burke III, 1988 Baer, 1982) We thus need to understand 
how the kinds of capitalist relations that emerged and dominated economic activities 
during Beirut’s transformation facilitated rural change that would “delimit the space” in 
which other forms and activities could come into existence-including wine production 
(Pratt, 1994: 6).  
 
 
The Elitist Tradition of the Chateau  
 
Notably, it was during the mid-nineteenth century that the “embryonic” mercantile-
financial elite of Beirut began to grow significantly due to increasingly shared 
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economic interests with the Europeans (particularly French) in the regionand 
especially in relation to sericulture and the trade thereof (Gates, 1998: 16). Given this 
apparent shift in economic interests, which aspects of wine production were so 
appealing for investment by certain elites? 
Keeping in mind such types of European alliances in the region, it is useful to 
begin this section by pointing out that it might be significant that the term “elite,” as a 
social category, is prominent in histories of the ancien régime of Europeand 
especially France (Williams, 1985 & Marcus, 1983). While the term shifted in meaning 
during the eighteenth century, when it went from conveying the idea of a group who 
were elected by God to denoting high-ranking feudal status, and then again in the 
nineteenth century, when it became more oriented towards class power, the notion of an 
elite has the potential to evoke much older ideals of nobility and aristocracy (ibid). One 
especially important work that addresses such issues, with which I enter into dialogue 
throughout this thesis, is Ulin’s ethno-historical study of hierarchies in French wine 
production (1996; 1995; 1988; 2002). Ulin explores the historical relationship between 
broader political and economic processes and elite growers in France, who have come 
to monopolize production as well as local and international wine markets, arguing that 
their historicity should be situated within the emergence of the world market during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For example, the term “chateau”, used in French 
wine-growing, was chosen as an architectural model so that elite proprietors were able 
“to distinguish themselves culturally from the masses” (Ulin, 1996: 54). Yet most of the 
wine chateaux of Bordeaux built during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(post-French revolution) were small-scale replicas of those constructed during pre-
revolutionary France. There was, in this regard, no real connection to the nobility of 
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France’s ancien régime, and as such these forms were, as Ulin argues, an invented or 
selective tradition (c.f. Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992; Williams, 1973).   
 This incorporation of the chateau into wine production evokes a hierarchical 
connection to place that, over time, has come to be the generally accepted and most 
replicated model. As I argue in this thesis, this model is not only of importance in 
France, but also in Lebanon, where it serves as one of the pre-requisites for entry into 
the international high-quality wine markets. However, the replication of the chateau, 
surrounded by vineyards, does not necessarily imply cultural homogeneity amongst 
wine producers who emulate such forms associated with high-quality wines.  Rather, as 
Ulin suggests, these practices are indicative of a “market culture”, as opposed to a 
“market society”. This is because the former suggests “differentiated and even 
discordant social assumptions and practices”, whereas the latter does not (Ulin, 2002: 
691). Significantly, such a critique might also imply that there is no need to assume the 
universalityor homogeneityof particular class categories; allowing instead for an 
exploration of the heterogeneity and diversity of practices of status and rank in local 
contexts (Hall, 1988 & 1986; Yanagisako, 2002; Sider, 1998). From such a stance, 
dominant ideas can be understood as part of a process of creating cultural hegemony, 
where the capacity of an elite group to create and reproduce diverse conceptions of 
reality, through an intricate layering of social structures in both immaterial and material 
dimensions, is always implicit (Gramsci, 1971). What sort of historical links, we must 
then ask, are therefore evoked in Lebanon, where it is apparent that similar architectural 
models exist and are utilized by urban elites in rural regions such as Kefraya? 
 Gilsenan’s ethnographic exploration of narratives of power in the Berqayl village 
of Akkar, in north Lebanon, might offer a useful starting point from which to consider 
the social cogency of local elite categories in Kefraya and Lebanese wine production 
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more generally (1996). For Gilsenan, narratives are not simply recounted through 
speech but are communicated via performances, moves, and gestures that are able to 
reproduce cultural norms or generate change; thus the enactment of narratives is just as 
important as their content. At the same time, narratives are perceived as “variations on 
and framed within master narratives of history, of the nature of the community in space 
and time, of hierarchy, identity and place in the world” (Gilsenan, 1996: 60). Gilsenan 
suggests that in the case of Berqayl, narratives often centred on ideas concerning 
qualities of virtue and the “due and worth” associated with men from different social 
ranking. 
A significant aspect of Gilsenan’s perspective of narrative is the concept of 
“status-honour”, where displays of prominence and influence by powerful men were 
often articulated through performances (Gilsenan, 1984 & 1996). Such displays of 
status-honour usually took place during celebrations in “the chateau or villa in the 
countryside”, or in ornate apartments in urban settings, and helped “reproduce and 
produce” notions of personal authority and status while also enforcing their right to 
monopoly privileges over resources such as land (1984: 462). In so doing, the evocation 
of historical continuity reasserted social and economic power, while simultaneously 
concealing how changing spatial divides between urban and rural often came about 
beyond the direct influence of local elites (ibid: 460).  
Broadly speaking, Gilsenan’s take on status-honour as part of Akkar’s “histoire 
mentalités” is an interesting approach to understanding the interrelatedness of 
cumulative forces of historical process and the extent to which an idea of the past can 
shape and inform the development of the future. This future includes decisions, actions, 
and an understanding of the past. Given the importance of wine production in regions 
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such as Kefraya, which specific tropes of wine offer such a sense of historical 
continuity in the process of social transition and change? In providing a pretext for 
historical continuity, has wine production contributed to the establishment of a 
relationship between urban and rural regions, such as Beirut and Kefraya, in new ways?  
Finally, what particular relations of power and hierarchical notions of personal 
authority and status-honour might be distinctive to wine production, and which were 
reproduced within the village of Kefraya?    
Similarly to Cohen’s observations about the dramaturgical legitimization 
process of Sierra Leone’s elite Creole community, Gilsenan also demonstrates how 
narratives of men of power sought “to establish that deeds were commensurate with 
claims, actions congruent with words, appearances matching with reality” (ibid: 60 & 
Cohen, 1981). In contrast to Cohen however, Gilsenan shows that narratives of local 
categories tell us about the social potencies of different elites within Berqayl, and show 
that these have been continuously shaped by their connection to social networks outside 
of the village. For example, the status and influence of the bey (lord) derives mostly 
from his political and economic links to urban centres such as Beirut and Tripoli. 
Although initially they were not the legal proprietors of the land, but were, rather, tax 
agents for the Ottoman administration, the “lords of the marches” were still effectively 
the possessors of the land. That is, their influence was expressed through powerful 
“symbolic markers”, such as their fortress-palaces, hunting, and horsemanship.  
Meanwhile, their aghas played the role of supervising and controlling the land and 
labour.  
 Exploring this historical dimension of Berqayl’s social hierarchy, Gilsenan shows 
how the interaction between the bey and aghas continuously reaffirmed and reproduced 
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their different elite statuses in the village. Notably, while the relationship between these 
two different elite groups was constantly shaped by other, broader processes of 
powersuch as the region’s shift to a market economy during the late nineteenth 
centurythe persistence of such local categories, which still denoted rank when 
Gilsenan arrived in Berqayl during the 1970s, suggests that such elites groups have 
succeeded in securing their dominance over long periods of time. I will explore the 
dynamics involved in this reproduction of status in further detail later in this chapter, 
but here it will be useful to raise some general questions pertaining to the relationship 
between Kefraya village and the Lebanese wine industry. What kind of local categories 
in Kefraya village might reflect similar social dynamics to those in Berqaylincluding 
the interplay between more local and broader flows of power?  For example, while it is 
apparent that Michael de Bustros has played an influential role in shaping the 
viticulture landscape of Kefraya, what terminologies might be used to describe his 
status, both in Kefraya and beyond? These questions I explore in Chapter Four.   
 
 
 
Methods of the Elites 
 
More generally, studying elites can throw up certain methodological issues that might 
initially appear rather challenging to any anthropological endeavour. After all, as Shore 
aptly illustrates, perhaps with some degree of humour, “one cannot simply pitch one’s 
tent in the board room of the World Bank or the Pentagon, or unobtrusively observe the 
bargains being struck at a European Council Minster’s meeting” (Shore, 2002: 23).  
Nugent has argued that even within more accessible settings one is still faced with 
having to identify different flows of power that do not necessarily originate at a local 
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level (2002). In his study of Amazonian elites, for example, the topic must be 
understood, “not as a fixed feature of the social landscape” but instead incidentally 
shaped by the flows of power in the world system (2002: 63). Such a methodological 
framework thus facilitates a more nuanced discussion, concerned with what Nugent 
describes as the “institutional conditions under which elites are socially reproduced” 
(ibid: 61).    
Such a perspective also resonates with Marcus’ observation that, through 
analysis, the notion of elites can be differentiated from other concepts like class and 
state because of the way that “it focuses one’s imagery at a much lower level of 
abstraction than do the latter terms” (1983: 8; and for further discussion and debate: 
Cohen, 1981; Pareto, 1979; Marx 2000). Adopting such an approach for studying elites 
can thus allow for powerand the responsibilities adjacent to that powerto be 
associated with particular persons or groups, rather than attributing it to the 
“impersonal” of social and historical processes (Marcus, 1983 & Shore, 2002).  That is, 
the notion of an “elite” might conjure up ideas of “‘agency,’ ‘exclusivity,’ ‘power,’” 
thus elucidating howand to some extent whyparticular individuals and groups are 
distinguished from the masses due to certain distinctive practices and their associated 
qualities (Shore, 2002: 4 & Bourdieu, 1984). Yet as both Shore and Marcus suggest, it 
is only through a comparative and historical approach that we can more fully explore 
the extent of the influence of such elite strategies. Such methodological approaches to 
studying elites thus draws attention to the way that usages of language and other forms 
of representation reveal ranks and categories of status that might reinforce social 
stratification at both the local and global level (Shore, 2002 & Marcus, 1983). Indeed, 
Nugent has suggested that, rather than attempting to identify what constitutes as an elite 
per se, it would be more beneficial to documenthistorically and 
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ethnographically“what passes as the local category/categories, or examination of the 
conditions which make possible (or preclude) the emergence of that category as socially 
potent” (ibid).    
 It is apparent that while ethnographic accounts of elites use participant-observation 
in order to explore the prevalence of particular ideas of affluence, there is also a 
tendency to rely heavily upon other qualitative methods such as interviewing and 
archival research. Nevertheless, they are still able to gain some intimate and unique 
insights about the heterogeneity of elite groups. For example, Lomnitz and Pérez-
Lizaur’s meticulous ethno-historical study of the elite entrepreneurial Gomez family of 
Mexico that was based on a combination of extensive archival research and interviews, 
and these highlights a somewhat tentative relationship between patriarchal sentiment 
for autonomy and succession and economic action (1987). In particular, their research 
sheds light on how the Gomez family negotiated and compromised with other business 
elites, such as members of multinational corporations, to uphold influence and status in 
Mexico. 
 Another useful example is the study of the “good families of Barcelona” by 
McDonogh who integrates archival research and interviewing into his fieldwork. In so 
doing, he explores the “the interplay of historical consciousness and historical 
materials” in terms of how ideas and images of elites that were reproduced required 
efforts in both private and public settings (1986:14). For instance, regarding how oral 
histories discuss affective labour, or “domestic power”, and the role of women’s labour 
in the reproduction of the elite status of these Catalan families (ibid: 14). In this regard, 
McDonogh’s study brings to the fore an especially relevant issue concerning immaterial 
and material contributions to the propagation of elite power. I will pursue the 
theoretical thread of this inquiry concerning the material and immaterial in further 
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detail later on in this chapter, but for now it is important to draw attention to the 
specific advantages of incorporating archival research and interviewing into my 
methodological framework, especially in terms of elucidating the more subtle nuances 
of elite practices. Indeed, I have utilized the methodologies of both McDonogh and 
Lomnitz and Pérez-Lizaur in my research when exploring how expressions of particular 
historical perceptions come from a specific understanding of particular elite practices.  
 In Chapter Three, I trace the shifting practices of winemaking and grape growing 
across the Bekaa Valley’s landscape during the mid-nineteenth-century, as French 
influence in the region grew. Similarly to McDonogh, I make use of historical material 
and oral narratives in order to explore the reproduction of certain elite images and 
symbols of wine-making in Lebanon. Meanwhile, my observations in Chapters Four 
and Five parallel the conclusions drawn by Lomntiz and Pérez-Lizaur. This is 
especially so in regards to how the economic motivation for producing wine cannot 
necessarily be separated, analytically, from the patriarchal desire for succession and 
autonomy. The importance of such forms of kin-related sentiment in motivating both 
capitalist action and class-formations is of particular relevance in Chapter Five where I 
explore the relationship between family and work in the Cave Kouroum winery. I thus 
also make use of Yanagisako’s ethnographic study of Italian family firms to explore 
how sentimental attachment to place has a role to play in “shaping production, 
reproduction and transformation of economic action” (2002:10).  
 Significantly the concept of “elite” can at times be fairly ambiguous and difficult to 
attribute to a particular group or certain persons. As Shore has observed, there is the 
tendency for certain types of elite networks to strategically conceal (and at times reveal) 
the extent of their privileged positions in order to generate influence (2002). Yet as I 
show in Chapter Six, such practices can also lead to ambiguity concerning the 
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boundaries of networks and membership, where the requisites for joining the UVL, 
Lebanon’s wine business association, remain nebulous. These ambiguities help make 
the UVL an influential organization, since, as I also propose in Chapter Six, the 
involvement of the initial UVL founders in the writing and passing of the Lebanese 
wine law in 2000 suggests that their influence in shaping wine production extends 
beyond current UVL members. However, while this is indicative of their attempts to 
exert control over production, the role of the state as an officialising medium for wine 
production is in itself a pre-requisite for the export and the trade of Lebanese wines 
across the globe, and especially to Europe. Bearing this in mind, the important role of 
French oenologists working at prominent wineries brings to the fore once more the 
extent of the European influence in shaping contemporary wine production in 
Lebanona focus for Chapter Seven.  
 
Patronage’s Labyrinth  
 
By broaching the topic of elites in anthropology, I feel that there are also certain issues 
I would like to raise concerned with how particular types of hierarchical relations, that, 
to borrow a phrase from Appadurai, have become “prestige zones of anthropology 
theory” (1986:358). In particular I refer to the anthropology of the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, where studies of elites have mostly focused on patron- clientalism 
and/or systems of patronage, broadly defined as a “personalized, affective, and 
reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources 
and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond 
the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships” (Weingrod: 1977:42). The problem here 
is not necessarily that such approaches might be insignificant or provide inaccurate 
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representations of the region, but rather that there is a potential for the dialectical 
process of othering and self-making, derived from a “fundamental structural inequality” 
(Abu-Lughod, 1989:270 & more broadly, Bromberger, 2006).  
 Given this, such approaches have a tendency to make certain temporal assumptions 
about places; and the praxis that takes precedence is one that spatialises culture, fixing 
it in time—which is then confirmed as an empirical truth through the ethnographic 
present (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997). In the study of elites in the Mediterranean and Arab 
world(s), the issue especially regards how the prevalence of patronage is often used to 
gauge the extent to which different communities—and mostly those located within rural 
regions—have transitioned into a market society. Generally speaking, such perspectives 
tend to start with the proposition that “traditional” patron-client relations have hindered 
or contributed to the postponement of the marketization of communities across the 
region (e.g. Blok, 1969 & Campbell, 1964). 
  These observations can be extended to aspects of Johnson’s ethno-historical study 
of class relations amongst Beirut’s Sunni community from 1840 until 1985 (1986 & 
2001). The main premise is that, in order to ensure post-independence, Lebanon 
remained stable for business investment from the mercantile elite, who developed a 
complex patronage system extending into Beiruti neighbourhoods. The local political 
bosses, or zu’ama (singular zaim), were able to assert and maintain their privileges 
through local political subservients known as the qabadayat, who monitor the streets, 
both ensuring law and order and controlling their patron’s clients. In turn, the political 
strength of the zaim was reaffirmed through family allegiances, and as members of the 
Lebanese parliament, they also had access to state patronage.   
 Johnson follows a system of kinship alliances up through the confessional political 
framework of the state to the position of prime minister, which is always held by a 
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Sunni Muslimthus highlighting the pervasive role of Lebanon’s religious 
sectarianism in shaping hierarchical social relations. He observes, however, that the 
higher the zaim rose in state ranks, the greater the necessity for him to forge cross-
sectarian alliances. Yet the growing presence of new regional actors during the 1960s 
and 1970s, (i.e. Nasserism and the effects of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war) led to broader 
reconfigurations of power and more local realignments of nationalist sentiment that 
resonated with the ideologies of Nasr’s Pan Arabism. The role of the zaim and his 
qabayat in controlling peoples’ daily activities in Beirut’s Sunni neighbourhoods 
therefore weakened, providing space for the violence of the civil war to persist. In 
conjunction with these events, the economic elite diverged business interests abroad, 
weakening both the laissez-faire state infrastructure and the cliental system. 
 While Johnson’s perspective provides interesting insights about the role of Beirut’s 
political and economic elites, his historical treatment of Lebanese society makes his 
approach reductionist. Johnson makes it clear early in his introduction that clientalism 
was indicative of a society where “capitalism had not yet transformed social relations 
by fully transforming the mode of production” (1986: 6). This leads him to draw 
various conclusions concerning, for example, the role of kinship and religion in forging 
social ties in Lebanese society. To elaborate further upon the problem I have with such 
assumptions, I turn to a more recent study by Johnson where he recounts his earlier 
perspective of Lebanon and quite rightly points out that his previous approach was too 
Marxist and structural in that the underlying basis for his argument drew upon the idea 
that the emergence of a proletariat class consciousness would eventually break down a 
traditional system of clientalism.     
 In an attempt to move away from this earlier approach, Johnson argues that the 
“development of capitalism undermined an order based on the inherited honour of 
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warrior lords” and gave rise to an “egalitarian ethic” where the fellahin, or peasant 
population of rural Mount Lebanon, possessed rights equal to their feudal lordsand 
this included the desire for honour and status associated with their patrons (2001:15). 
With the growing rebellions across Mount Lebanon, such as the Maronite fellahin 
uprisings of 1860, notions of honour became a significant aspect of the rights of men. 
The act of claiming that right, in a society where an “egalitarian ethic” became central 
to social practices and relations, was largely founded upon an intricate relationship 
between honour and feudingone that also inadvertently maintained a sense of order in 
a highly competitive economy and an individualistic society. Johnson also points to a 
shift in gender relations characterised by the way that patriarchal honour was 
increasingly articulated through “the control of women [more] than the imposition of 
domination on lesser men” (ibid: 19). Here, much in way the Foucauldian panopticon 
functions, Johnson’s notion of “patriarchal surveillance” illuminates the internalization 
of discipline and the production of docile and gendered bodies. 
 Johnson continues to believe, however, that this sense of patronage is part of the 
modernization of Lebanon rather than a consequence of the process itself, assuming, 
once more, a universal (and homogenous) temporal framework for the development of 
a modern society. Indeed, despite retracting some earlier arguments, Johnson concludes 
his most recent account by suggesting that conflict in Lebanon can only end once there 
is further economic development towards a free and open economy without any system 
of patron client dependency. To elaborate upon this point, Johnson refers to the decades 
just after independence, where relative civic order and economic development prevailed 
and the urban mercantile-financial elite had direct control over the state. As the control 
of the business elite began to weaken in the years leading up to the war, so too did their 
grip over civic society. Violence became the norm, following the growing presence of 
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external political actors, and emotive motivations to protect the homeand 
homelandand honour came to the fore. The weakening political (and economic 
power) of the mercantile oligarchy, according to Johnson, thus unleashed the (overly) 
emotional warrior from within the Lebanese male psyche so he could maintain his 
honour and seek vengeance when it was lost. Johnsons’ analysis therefore remains as 
reductionist as it is essentialist in its approach, not least because of the assumption that 
kin-related sentiments, such as patriarchy or emotive motivation, remains separateor 
stemsfrom outside of the (modern) economic sphere.  
 That is, such an approach to patronage can be reductionist due to a supposition of 
cultural homogeneity and universally-shared ideals and values. Or, as Goddard puts it, 
such studies have “long rested on the assumption of generalized and shared values of 
honour and shame” (1996:8). The demarcation of social life into distinctive spheres of 
politics, economics, and kinship thus limits a broader understanding of what Goddard 
stresses as the heterogeneity of capitalist processes. Graeber presents a similar critique, 
extending the focus to include Melanesian and Arab societies. Here, “men of honour” 
or “big men” are considered to be the main actors in the (re)production of certain “key 
values” during the “cosmological ritual”, and are further perceived as representing the 
society as a whole (2001:19). Like Goddard, Graeber suggests that in order for a 
perspective such as Johnson’s to reach conclusions, they are almost forced “to make a 
strict division between ‘modern’ societies, in which people are individuals and seek 
economic values, and ‘holistic’ ones, in which they do not” (2001: 20). This 
perspective on the Mediterranean and Arab world is of course not restricted to 
Johnson’s view on patronage. Gellner (1977) presents a similar view when describing 
how patron-client “unsymmetrical” relations are separate from economic 
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activitiesand more specifically the market. Gellner argues that while economic 
relations might be exploitative, they are inherently impersonal, and therefore “hardly 
patronage”.  
 
 
Patrons of Capital  
 
It is important to point out that, while perspectives separating patronage from market 
relations may continue to persist in the knowledge production of Mediterranean and 
Arab societies, another line of enquiry has also emerged that is precisely concerned 
with how patronage can actually exacerbate the exploitative nature of class and labour 
relations. Most notably, Gilmore demonstrates quite convincingly how systems of 
patronage were used by large local proprietors known as senioritos (little lords) in 
Fuenmayor, Western Andalusia, as a strategy through which to secure political and 
economic resources (1977). In drawing such conclusions, an important point that 
Gilmore makes is that patronage systems might reflect local ideas of class and labour 
relations. Indeed Gilmore goes on to demonstrate how patronage can actually serve to 
not only personalise but also shape economic relations and decisions by establishing 
informal contracts and reciprocal obligations “between people of unequal status and 
power” (1977: 446; Silverman, 1965; Li Causi, 1981, Scott, 1977).  By viewing 
patronage from such a stance, we can begin to see how these “imbalanced” reciprocal 
yet affective and emotive relations are more a part of current practices within capitalist 
economies than the likes of Johnson would have us believe. 
I demonstrate in this thesis, it is precisely through the forging of implicit 
agreements and informal contracts that wine elites have managed to strengthen and 
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secure their influence over the social means of Lebanese wine production. Indeed, more 
recent work on the subject also demonstrates that patron-client relations are more 
commonplace than assumed within business institutions. This evokes the way in which 
Eric Wolf describes patronage as resulting from a process whereby “instrumental 
friendships” eventually reach a “maximum point of imbalance” due to political and/or 
economic superiority and the ability of one “partner” to provide goods and services to 
the other (1968:16). In particular, the edited volume by Haller and Shore on 
anthropological approaches to corruption offers some interesting perspectives on how 
patronage within neo-liberal market relations can serve to assert political and economic 
power—another point that I continuously explore throughout this thesis (2005).  
 This is especially so in terms of how such works on issues of corruption share 
some similarities to social analyses of the Arab world (including Lebanon) that 
frequently comment on the role of wasta in both business and bureaucratic networks. 
While wasta was not a term I heard a great deal during fieldwork, how it has been 
conceptualised within social theory is of relevance. “Wasta,” usually refers to one’s 
ability to use connections and privileges for particular purposes. At the same time, 
wasta is perceived as a phenomenon that is quite deeply entrenched in daily life; and as 
Joseph remarks, “without wasta one gets nowhere” and “without wasta there is little 
belonging” (1999: 67).  Sharabi describes wasta as the “lubricant” of the patronage 
systems in the Arab world, serving as a form of social cohesion in that everyone has 
something to gain (1988).  
Here, wasta acts as a mechanism where the “bestower of favour” gains the 
most, while still allowing the lower and “most impotent” of the system to operate 
within such frameworks of power (1988: 46). Such notions of wasta in relation to 
systems of patronage thus resonate with observations concerned with the nebulous 
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nature of corruption within business network. And this is especially in relation to how 
issues of non-transparency that surround ideas of corruption and wasta draw our 
attention to the kinds of tensions that are rife in the way business networks (West & 
Sanders, 2003). Indeed as Zinn notes, “opaque” characteristics such as friendship and 
nepotism usually associated with patron relations are now used to describe forms of 
corruption that tend to occur within business relations (2005). She further suggests that 
by exploring the motivation to join such official networks, there is also the possibility 
to consider the power dynamics behind the processes of inclusion (and exclusion) from 
such alliances.  
 In this light, it is also useful to briefly draw attention to Boissevain’s network 
analysis of patrons and “friends of friends” (1974 & 1979). There are of course some 
apparent issues with network analyses in that there is a tendency to portray those 
involved in forging alliances and transactions as somewhat anonymous and ahistorical, 
and therefore without much room for an understanding of the more intimate dynamics 
between status and power (Cohen, 1977, Miller, 2002). Nevertheless, as an “analytical 
instrument,” network analysis can generate some understanding concerning with what 
Boissevain describes as the “difficult analytical category of friends-of-friends, those 
persons who lie just beyond the researcher’s horizon because they are not in direct 
contact with his informants” (1979: 393 & Callon, 1998).  
 In some ways, Boissevain’s application of network analysis as an attempt to take 
into account the social significance of actors who are—usually for practical reasons—
out of reach for the ethnographer, is reminiscent of Shore’s comment brought up in the 
previous section concerning the challenges to studying elite. In this respect, 
Boissevain’s approach offers a broader lens for exploring the ways different relatives, 
friends, religious groups and coalitions might be linked, albeit at times hierarchically, to 
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one another. For example, in Chapter Six I explore how patron networks characterise at 
least some aspects of how entrepreneurial wine elites—where some are also prominent 
businessmen in transnational business corporations—attempt to negotiate with both the 
state and international wine organizations. In so doing, I draw attention to how the wine 
business coalition formed by the certain wine elites serves to secure their interests and 
retain status and influence at both local and global levels.    
 
Handwerk or Commodity Fetishism?     
 
The discussion thus far has focused mostly on the social significance of local 
classifications of rank and status and on the types of performances and displays of 
wealth that are associated with elitist ideas. Further exploration would therefore be 
beneficial for understanding the arrangements of such types of performative exchanges, 
and also the way value is ascribed in such contexts to certain “props” that are utilized 
during such performances, including the prestige of particular objects, artefacts, goods, 
and “things” associated with such events and certain types of elites. Upon briefly 
establishing the thematic approach that I am adopting to explore the way value is 
ascribed to prestige goods, I will proceed to discuss issues more specifically in relation 
to wine.  
Appadurai associates luxury goods with elite groups who are responsible for 
influencing a refined taste of consumption through the construction of specialised 
bodies of knowledge and the manipulation of notions of scarcity by means of price 
setting and/or law; they thus establish “regimes of value” (ibid). He argues that such 
social goods are “incarnate with signs”, where their function and necessity are 
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predominantly “rhetorical” and “political” (1988: 38& more broadly of anthropological 
discussions of prestige goods: Bohannans, 1968). 
This aspect of Appadurai’s perspective is especially useful in terms of exploring 
both the rhetorical use of certain goods and the way such items are perceived as 
exclusive to a particular elite within any given society. However, his overemphasis on 
consumption and the “social life” of goods as they undergo different regimes of value 
as well as assuming an a priori of economic rationalism dictating all kinds of 
exchanges (including those that exist outside of capitalist market relations) overlooks 
the political and rhetorical role of production—and this is both in terms of the 
production of certain goods as well as the ideas that ascribe a particular value to such 
luxury goods (see Graeber, 2001 & Callon, 1998). Generally speaking, this has to do 
with Graeber’s critique concerning how Appadurai’s adoption of Bourdieu’s approach 
to gift-exchanges dismisses the significance of what the latter describes as “symbolic 
capital” (Graeber, 2001: 32). That is, the uniqueness of such types of goods has to do 
with the way they have managed to “accumulate a history” (Graeber, 2001:34; c.f. 
Kopytoff, 1988; Mauss, 1990).  Not all exchanges are therefore necessarily about the 
acquisition of prestige goods, but can also be about securing certain prestige ideas; that 
is: “establishing one’s honor, or generosity, or of putting a rival to shame” (ibid).    
Nevertheless, Appadurai rightly points out that to appreciate such historicity and 
tradition, just as knowing how to decant an aged wine and to reciprocate accordingly, 
represents a certain aesthetic disposition. And, underlying such symbolic competence is 
a form of economic power attempting to create distance from that deemed to be 
economic necessity (Bourdieu, 1984: 54). The “disinterested gaze” is thus an important 
feature, in that it acts to disguise the real value of economic necessity by reproducing 
64 
 
the conditions required for the continuation of this aesthetic disposition. For example, 
while the chateau in southwest France might evoke a romantic image of an aristocrat 
residing (and not working) in his domain, as peasants work their lands from one 
generation to the next, in reality such chateaux are usually owned by multinational 
corporations (Ulin, 1996). After all, the “powerful symbolic association” of the chateau 
evokes images of a rustic countryside that Ulin demonstrates to embody subliminal 
commercial benefits within seemingly less strategic (and more seductive) cultural forms 
(1996: 55). Yet the marketing of such invented traditions also conceals histories of 
hierarchical labour-relations as well as the establishment of cooperatives by table-wine 
growers attempting to compete in the wine market (ibid.). Broadly speaking therefore, 
unlike mass-produced commodities, wine can conjure up, for example, images of a 
landscape, of a chateau and vineyardan image that fits closely with ideas of 
aristocracy and nobility more than business and trade (e.g. Ulin, 1996). 
Whilst seemingly situated outside the market, the commodity production of 
wine appears however, to operate according to Smithian economic principles regarding 
scarcity and market prices. That is, the market price for a product remains closely 
aligned with its natural price, until scarcity occurs in the availability of labour and/or 
the product, resulting in a disparity between the two (Smith, 1982). Yet, like Quesnay 
and Turgot, the founding fathers of the Physiocrats, Smith argued that wealth began 
with the productivity of agricultureand more specifically from the potentiality of the 
land (Gudeman, 1986; & Meek, 2009).  Agricultural production, as Marx argues, thus 
appears as a “gift of nature” rather than of labour, thus paving the way for the 
(re)production of capital (Marx, 2000). Indeed, as Pratt observes, the economic 
organization surrounding the production of wine and various other agricultural goods 
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aims to manipulate such notions of scarcity through marketing strategies that link the 
wine with intimate “biographies” of its production (1994: 155). The notion of a scarcity 
of natural resources—a gift from nature—thus has the potential to transform into a 
cultural norm, evoking, once more, ideas of distinction, authenticity, and tradition. 
There is, in this regard, something to be said about the transformative value of 
craftsmanship in the production of wine. This has already been documented by Black, 
who draws a correlation between the way handwerk is perceived by Benjamin to pre-
date anonymous capitalist production but could also potentially redeem it and the way 
the contemporary natural wine movement seeks to reject industrialisation by limiting 
the use of technology in their production of wines, both in the vineyards and winery 
(2013). Black’s analysis sheds interesting light upon the way nature is not only 
perceived, but also how notions of nature (and technology) are negotiated in both 
spheres production and consumption, in order to define wine as natural. Yet Benjamin’s 
allegorical narrative of craftsmanship can perhaps be extended to the way wine in 
general possesses potentially powerful symbolic qualities as a “prestige good”. That is, 
the prestige value attributed to wine is derived from its potential to converge both 
spheres of production and consumption precisely because of the way it has been 
endowed with qualities evoking “non-reproducible authenticity” that are associated 
with craftsmanship (Leslie, 1998; Benjamin, 2003).  In other words, wine potentially 
carries with it a ritualized potential to “negate” and “repudiate” the “unattractive 
institutional forces” of capitalism (Miller, 1998:193).   
Indeed, as Black observes, despite the fact that the natural wine movement 
might be “an ill-defined and rag-tag movement,” a strong motivation for its producers 
and consumers is “to reconnect agriculture with craftsmanship” (2013: 280 & 293. My 
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emphasis). That is to say, a presumption seemingly held by members of the natural 
wine movement is that, prior to industrialisation, producers were intimately linked to 
production precisely because wine-making is perceived to have been at its closest to 
natural processes at that time. However, Black also suggests that the emphasis placed 
upon the importance of knowing which individual producers are within the natural wine 
movement is somewhat paradoxical. This is because, simultaneously, it is a variant of 
wine marketing strategies attempting to evoke differentiation and distinction. It is 
especially in this light that a significant aspect of the value of wine derives from its 
ability to appear outside of commodity production, and instead within the realm of “art 
and luxury” (Bourdieu, 1984: 52; c.f. Ulin, 1996: 55). For wine to achieve a status of 
distinction, it must be able to successfully carry artisanal life histories that are 
intimately connected not only to agriculture but also to land. Where this is the case, 
wine also has the potential to generate dominant discourses of value concerning work, 
identity and also locality. Yet as Black and Ulin both point out, while such discourse of 
wine might seek to forge intimate connections between handwerk, agriculture, land and 
locality, such relationships more often than not exist only in theory. 
Similarly, Demoissier has observed that in the case of Burgundy, despite 
investment from international companies such as AXA insurance, there initially appears 
to have been little affect upon the “social configuration of the place” (2013: 185). 
Indeed, such investors have often assisted in both offering employment for locals and 
attempts to “keep everything as it was” (ibid). Indeed, Demoissier goes on to 
demonstrate that globalization and transnational practices have affected the production 
of Burgundian high quality grands crus wines. Producers are not only faced with 
having to ensure that their wines suit consumer trends, but must also compete with New 
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World wine producers such as New Zealand and the U.S. This was despite the fact that 
the international companies were keen to stress that their activities would have minimal 
effect on local life. In some respects, the apparent objective of such investors echoes 
Black’s observations concerning the artisanal value placed on wine. And as Demoissier 
points out, such statements draw attention to the entanglement of global forces and 
work identities in Burgundy that were “above all compounded by its essentialization in 
public discourse with the figure of the vigneron as an artisan and artist dominating the 
field of action” (ibid: 184). Yet it was precisely this process of labour abstraction (i.e. 
alienation) that also advertently facilitated the fetishization of winemakers and their toil 
as artisanal worker (ibid & Ulin, 2013).  
Regarding this, we should also note that while Demoissier elucidates the way 
such an emphasis upon work-related practices can potentially reduce the value of other 
important factors in the production of wine, such as soil and climate in Burgundy, her 
methodological focus on the notion of terroir demonstrates the enduring entanglement 
of both human and non-human factors in the production of wine. Generally, the notion 
of terroir refers to the geological and geographical characteristics of a particular place 
(Vaudour, 2002). Although the notion of terroir is based upon scientific and empirical 
research, its epistemological foundations and contemporary usages in wine production 
are as inherently political as they are rhetorical (ibid.; Black & Ulin, 2013). That is, the 
meaning of terroir shifts depending upon the ways in which humans and non-humans 
are linked together.  
While this thesis only provides minimal attention to the notion of terroir until 
the conclusion, this is simply because the term was only mostly brought up by the 
French oenologists working at Chateau Ksara and Kefraya (a focus for Chapter Seven).  
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In this regard, the term remains important mostly because of the way it draws attention 
to the important role of such oenologists and in connection to the way some features of 
wine function similarly to what Sperber refers to as “biological cultural artifacts” 
(2007). That is, the repeated performance of certain biological and/or natural traits 
qualifies the transformation (and fermentation) of grapes into a cultural artefact is 
recognised as wine (ibid.). In this light, the value of wine does not solely come from the 
transformative potential of grapes: importance is also placed upon the combination of 
certain natural resources where both human and non-human factors are associated with 
a particular place. The ability to successfully combine the necessary natural features 
thus requires workers who have both specialised and practical knowledge of the 
industry. In other words, significant value is given to those who possess an intimate 
understanding of market dynamicsand thus also to the importance of manipulating 
symbolic qualities during the production of wine. That is to say, what is important is the 
capacity to forge a connection between the marketing of wine and the relations of 
production (MacKenzie, Muniesa, Siu, 2007).     
More broadly, such characteristics of wine are shared with other cultural 
commodities produced under contemporary capitalism, where significant social and 
economic value is derive from the ability and capacity to generate capital through 
commerce, trade and other forms of service-based labour. Such forms of immaterial 
labour thus also included activities that were not perceived as work per se, but 
perceived as activities defining and fixing cultural tastes and norms and also creating 
niches markets for cultural commodities (Lazzarato, 1996; Hardt & Negri, 2001; 
Harvey, 2009, see also Ong & Collier, 2008). Similarly to Ulin, Harvey argues that 
such cultural commodities have a tendency to invoke notions of cultural authenticity 
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and tradition by evoking historical links to the pastespecially in terms of their 
aesthetic valuewhich are of special importance to urban entrepreneurs seeking to 
accumulate surplus-value (2009). Two forms of monopoly rent thereby intersect. On 
the one hand there is the land, recognized for producing distinctive wines augments in 
value. On the other hand there is the wine produced from that land, which can also be 
traded for monopoly prices. An “economy of qualities” thus emerges, whereby goods 
such as wine must undergo a qualification process whereby they are attached with 
intimate biographies (Callon, Me’adel & Rabehariso, 2008).  
The globalisation of specialised labour, required in the production of wine and 
other such cultural commodities, is vital in guaranteeing that the “special qualities” 
attributed to such goods during production do not prevent it from meeting the 
requirements of tradability. Such experts are not only valued for their technological 
knowledge in creating such goods, but also for their ability to establish a distinctive 
label for that product that can bring forth notions of historical continuity. Yet what 
particular kinds of specialised workers are essential in this type of production process? 
And when and how did they gain ascendance in global wine markets? And how does 
the value of these types of workers, such as oenologists but also entrepreneurs, 
inadvertently devalue the skills of other workers? These questions are explored in 
Chapter Seven, where I examine the role of French oenologists in shaping Lebanese 
viticulture. 
While the importance of specialised workers is considered in the final chapter of 
this thesis, for now it is important to draw attention to how their employment reflects an 
extension of “the strategy of the trademark”: an attempt by wineries in Lebanon to gain 
monopoly privileges (Pratt, 1994: 155). In Chapter Six, I consider collaborative efforts 
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by such wineries as they engage with the state and supra-national organizations in 
attempts both to create a niche in the global wine market and retain their monopoly 
positions I ask how the knowledge possessed by both types of expertsentrepreneurs 
and oenologistsgive more value than other locally-based forms of rural knowledge 
and what the social ramifications of this expertise are. These questions set the pretext 
for Chapters Four and Five, as well as Chapter Three, where I trace the emergence of 
such types of expertise to nineteenth-century Lebanon.     
 
Arcadian or Agrarian Landscapes?   
 
The previous section has drawn attention to Ulin’s observations that the process of 
fetishization of both wine (the product) and its production has contributed towards the 
elevation in status of oenologists and various other specialised workers, rendering other 
more itinerant workers as invisible, or at best, misrepresented (2013 & more broadly 
Mintz, 1986). Yet what can this apparent process of fetishization surrounding the social 
relations of wine production tell us about Lebanon? 
Gilsenan’s perspective is perhaps reminiscent once more with regards to the 
way that status-honour can be used as a lens to explore how labour relations are viewed 
and, more specially, the way negative value is inadvertently ascribed to manual labour  
(1996, 1984 & Gilmore, 1982). Indeed links constructed between a chateau and its 
domain, and the creation of an aesthetically pleasing viticulture landscape, can, like the 
displays of status-honour, potentially—and somewhat paradoxically—valorise 
processes of immaterial labour such as marketing over manual work, placing the latter 
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against the background of the landscape and reducing its importance in the production 
of wine (Ulin, 1996).   
While it is apparent that status-honour and wealth are directly linked in that 
each is conversely reproduced through elaborate ceremonies, these ritualised events of 
leisure have also created a distance between these elite patrons and the necessity of 
work — and especially manual work. Such economic distancing resonates with 
Bourdieu’s notion of distinction and the process whereby “the 'pure', 'disinterested' 
disposition to the conditions which make it possible, i.e., the material conditions of 
existence which are rarest because most freed from economic necessity” (1984: 55). 
That is, the influence of these men of power came about from their ability to appear 
free from the necessity of work. Such displays of status-honour might appear to be 
inseparable from leisure; yet given that such performances functioned as a means to 
legitimize their right to monopoly, privileges, and resources, this demonstrates how 
such performances were constituted and informed by labour and property relations.  
Thus, given the apparent role of the urban entrepreneurial elite in contemporary wine 
production in Lebanon, what might the concept of status-honour tell us about the way 
work relations are currently viewed, practiced and valued in Kefraya and beyond?  
More pertinently perhaps, how can the notion of status-honour allow us to explore the 
broader implications of the potential valorisation process of immaterial labour in 
Lebanese wine production?  
It is also important to bear in mind that elsewhere, Ulin adopts Arendt’s 
approach to work, arguing that the concept of “labour,” especially from an overly 
Marxist perspective, has the potential to limit an anthropological enquiry because “it 
fails to take account of the culturally and politically formative potentials of work” 
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(2002: 693 & Arendt, 1998). This is because the concept of labour suggests both 
instrumentality and a human existence based solely upon the “technical demands of 
subsistence and human needs” (ibid). Whereas, in contrast, the concept of work has the 
ability to take into account the social process by which particular kinds of identities and 
relations are produced as something culturally defined. I do however feel that delving 
too deeply into this discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless I also 
think that Arendt’s distinctions amongst the concepts of work and labour as well as the 
performative qualities of action (as opposed to fabrication), remain useful to bear in 
mind whilst reading this thesis not least because of how it can allow us to potentially 
rethink the overly rigid distinction made by Hardt and Negri between material and 
immaterial labour (2001). In this light, Gilsenan’s notion of status-honour might also 
allow us to think further of the relationships between labour, work and action and thus 
ultimately away from overly structural Marxist approaches. I will attempt to further 
explore some of these issues in the conclusion of this thesis.   
In this light, is important to point out in this final section that one of the major 
issues with Marxist analyses of capitalist agricultural production regard the way in 
which they tend to combine a study of the relations of production with a linear 
historical perspective on the “development of productive forces” (Pratt, 1994: 12). Such 
approaches pose particular problems for understanding how non-wage labour may 
actually be a direct result of the expansion of capitalist markets rather than a precursor 
to them. Federici makes a similar argument, by starting with the suggestion that 
primitive accumulation did not instigate capitalism, but was instead a product of it 
(2004). In some respects her argument is similar to Harvey’s argument concerning 
accumulation by dispossession, in that the basis for the proliferation and expansion of 
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capitalist markets is the process of expropriation and the production of scarcity through 
land privatisation (2003). Yet a central aspect to Federici’s thesis is that, in the process 
of primitive accumulation, the reification of the notion of the family unit serves to 
displace increasing practices of communalism, and becomes a “key institution” for the 
state in the monitoring of the “transmission of property and reproduction of work” 
(ibid: 87). In doing so, primitive accumulation gendered, marginalized and concealed 
affective work (immaterial labour), effectively situating it outside of wage labour. 
While Federci’s analysis might not necessarily be chronological, in that there are other 
preceding works that explore the consequential transformations of peasant households 
under capitalist agricultural production, it nevertheless covers significant ground 
concerning the basis from which these subsequent changes could occur. 
 An especially relevant ethnography of this kind is the reflexive study by Gudeman 
and Rivera of shifting models of place in rural Colombia (1990). Gudeman and Rivera 
use the metaphor of a conversational community to highlight the long and on-going 
relationship between the household economic models of rural Colombia and “Western” 
corporations. The general thrust of their argument is that while such types of folk 
economic models might “echo” earlier European economic philosophies, they are 
nevertheless eventually displaced by more contemporary economic discourses and 
ever-encroaching corporations. Rural farmers are consequentially dispossessed and 
their lands are appropriated into capitalist economies. Significantly, the authors do not 
suggest that such households existed outside of a market economy; the market was used 
to assist in their subsistence economies by providing access to products that could not 
be produced. The on-going displacement of such households is instead a characteristic 
of the uneven development and manifestation of capitalism as it moves into its later 
stages.  
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 Given their different histories in relation to market expansion, it is apparent that 
rural Colombia is rather different to Lebanon, and does not share its rural predicament. 
This is perhaps especially so in relation to Kefraya’s vineyard owners, who are more 
integrated into the market, selling their grapes to wineries across Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, the manner in which the authors highlight the temporal interaction 
between different stages of capitalism through the metaphor of the conversational 
community is an especially useful lens through which to explore changing models of 
place in Kefrayafrom the registration of the region’s land during the French cadastral 
survey of 1926, to more contemporary events when wineries began to change 
production methods to suit the demands of international wine markets (a focus for 
Chapter Four). Although the authors provide detailed accounts of such household 
transformations, including that of the role of women’s work, there appears, however, to 
be little discussion of inter-household relations. What kind of a shared sense of 
community might generate an element of resistance to external forces? This is also the 
focus of chapters Four and Five, where I explore various kinds of collective attempts at 
controlling the transmission of property and social transformation as whole by Kefraya 
villagers. 
 While Pratt does not necessarily pick up on the above-mentioned observation in his 
critique of Gudeman and Rivera’s ethnography, he does raise a related issue concerning 
the significance of industrial appropriationism in rural economies. Pratt demonstrates 
that industrial appropriationism and technological innovation, can be successfully 
adopted by household farms. He argues that the assumption that corporations inevitably 
replace or displace household organization, or that household economies are in 
opposition to corporations, is invalid and such an assumption dismisses the significance 
of “a reconstituted set of social relations” such as kinship, property rights, and 
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inheritance in shaping economic activity (1994: 175). In other words, while economic 
rationality might shift in rural regions to fit within the wider forces of market 
production, such a process does not necessarily “privilege one form of economic 
activity over the other” (ibid.). In Chapter Five, I explore such transforming concepts 
concerned with notions of house and corporation, kinship and collective identity in 
Kefraya, focusing on the only family from the village to have established a winery. In 
so doing, I also begin to consider the ways in which such a form of economic 
rationality reproduces what Lem has described as a “familial hegemony” (2013). 
 Dispossession, therefore, does not necessarily only entail an abrupt displacement of 
inhabitants from their lands, or the replacement of households by corporations. Indeed, 
Mundy and Smith have demonstrated that in the village of Kufr Awan of modern 
northern Jordan the gradually transforming concept of concept of mahr, or “the object 
that the groom gives a bridge as a condition of Muslim marriage contract” reflects a 
transition in the way property is perceived and thus exchanged (2003: 119). Most 
notably, is not only in that the mahr that was offered shifted from land and olive trees 
to cash, but that the way it was given resulted in the economic isolation of women from 
the land (ibid.). In this regard, as economic rationality shifts, expropriation and 
commodification can be seen in a diverse number of ways, which can serve to rupture 
and radically displace a variety of intimate ties and connections that are forged within 
daily life (Seremetakis, 1996: 21 & Benjamin, 2003). In her examination of Greek 
material culture, Seremetakis demonstrates how the displacement of certain fruits by 
others imported from abroad due to “EEC market rationalities” resulted in the loss of a 
“mosaic of enmeshed memories, tastes and aroma” intimately linked to the temporality 
of the seasons (ibid: 2). For example, the “erasure” of a certain Greek peach varietal, 
known locally as Aphrodite's peach, thus entered into the realm of memory and 
76 
 
narrative, told by generations who could remember the texture and taste of the fruit. 
Meanwhile, for the younger generation, Aphrodite’s peach was “digested through 
memory and language”, and consequentially distanced from the everyday experience of 
consumption (ibid.). In the displacement of certain types of fruits there was, therefore, a 
correlating loss of intimate knowledge that was connected to sensory experience, the 
seasonal perception of nature, and the environment.  
 I take a similar approach when exploring the dispossession of particular forms of 
knowledge within capitalist processes of wine production in Lebanon. In Chapter Three 
I examine the relationship between the first plantations of Cinsault vines during the 
nineteenth century, which have come to be the most prevalent variety in Lebanon, and 
those varieties that seem only to appear in the narratives of older generations from the 
Bekaa Valley. What sorts of perceptions of the environment and nature are brought to 
light in these narratives? I extend the theme of dispossession in the subsequent 
chapters, exploring more contemporary strategies for replacing Cinsault vines in 
Kefraya. In Chapter Four, I explore how the displacement of such vines has not only 
alienated the men of Kefraya from work in the vineyards, but has also contributed to 
breaking down a sense of familial time affectively reproduced by seasonal activities in 
the vineyards, of which the Cinsault vine had certain potencies. (c.f. Lem, 1999: 27 & 
Zonabend, 1984). Then, in Chapters Six and Seven, my focus shifts on to those elites 
that facilitated such ruptures and transformations.    
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Concluding Comments  
 
This chapter has attempted to provide the theoretical basis from which the rest of the 
thesis will develop. Broadly speaking, there are three themes that are especially salient 
to the overall argument. The first regards ways in which anthropologists can study 
elites.  By considering this, I have drawn attention to the types of power dynamics that 
appear to be implicit within elite practices, especially in relation to the role of patronage 
in contemporary market relations. I also suggest that, while the idea of the immaterial 
concerns more subtle practices of elites to normalize their positions, in the case of 
Lebanon, the notion can also be linked more specifically with the valorisation process 
of certain types of labour practices. The second theme has to do with the issue of luxury 
and/or prestige goods in terms of understanding the implications in terms of wine (and 
related items) belong to a sphere of value that at least appears to be outside the realm of 
the market. In this regard, I have considered whether or not the type of expertise 
associated with wine production be understood as a form of commodity fetishism. 
Moreover, I discuss whether the valorisation of such types of knowledge can also 
reflect the complex entanglement of wine production with practices of place-making 
and more broadly identity in Lebanon. Third, I have discussed the ways in which 
anthropologists consider social transformation and transition as a process that is at once 
cumulative and actively constructed. Given that the notion of social transformation, as 
well as transition, potentially implies a naturaland even ahistoricalunfolding of 
events, it thus potentially conceals the types of power relations that facilitate such 
changes. Indeed, and as I have suggested, efforts to hide or disguise sources of power 
are in themselves manipulations of the way that events are perceived and experienced.   
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3: The New, Old Wine: Changing Means of Production 
 
In 1928, the recently established Office International de la Vigne et du Vin (OIV) 
announced that wine would hence forth be officially defined as any beverage resulting 
directly from the “complete or partial alcoholic fermentation of fresh pressed or un-pressed 
grapes or must” (Hannin, Codron & Thoyer, 2006: 76). With the exception of certain 
wines such as rasinate in Italy, wine sold across the international markets would 
henceforth exclude all alcoholic products made from raisins and/or other fruits and entail 
the reconstitution of wine with distilled or frozen water (ibid.).  
Arguably, the universalization of this definition of wine also forged a particular 
connection between the region where the grapes are grown and the place where the wine is 
then made (Hannin, et al, 2006: 76 & c.f. Ulin, 1996, Unwin, 1996). And at the basis of 
this relationship between viticulture and viniculture lay a certain assumption about the 
connection between humans and their environment (ibid.). That is, distinctive wine styles 
have to do with the cultural specific qualities emerging through a continuous interaction 
between people and their natural surroundings. While such links between people and place 
might appear natural, it was part of an on-going strategic attempt by elite winegrowers 
from across Europe to establish a global winegrowing hierarchy that secured their 
economic superiority (e.g. Ulin, 1996). It is therefore significant, that, ten years after the 
international definition of wine was officially declared, a wine law was passed in the 
French mandate of Lebanon based around this very description of wine. Yet while the 
Lebanese wine law might have made this notion of wine official, such a perception of the 
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relationship between viticulture and viniculture, and humans and their environment was 
already in the making for almost a century.  
This chapter traces the emergence of this relationship between winegrowing and 
winemaking in Lebanon to the nineteenth century with the return of the Jesuit Mission in 
the Orient, as well as the growing influence of Beirut’s entrepreneurial elite. That the 
beginning of “modern” wine production is marked by the Jesuit’s mission civilisatrice in 
the region is, given that their vision entangled with a French agenda of hegemony, of 
particular significance (Makdisi, 2000 & Dueck, 2010). While the Jesuits’ winemaking 
projects were only a small part of their larger undertaking to educate and civilize the 
populations residing in the region at the time, the introduction of new grape varietals had 
far-reaching ramifications, eventually altering the viticulture landscape of the region 
completely. In reflecting upon such changes, this chapter also considers the validation 
process of seeking to legitimize such shifts in knowledge production and its relationship to 
the political ascendance of Beirut’s merchants. 
Certain aspects of my research into the history of Lebanese wine production do 
however remain somewhat cursory.  I have therefore made an attempt to present the data in 
a more anecdotal manner, examining some of the epistemological foundations that gave 
rise to contemporary wine production in Lebanon. In adopting such an approach, I attempt 
to provide some historical background for the chapters to follow, contextualizing the 
materialization of more recent strategies that have been deployed and the subsequent 
changes to have taken place. I also suggest some questions that can hopefully be answered 
should the opportunity to conduct further historical research arise.  
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Hidden Within the Wheels of Commerce 
 
One afternoon during the peak of summer, I was invited to the home of Mr Selim Nakad of 
the Nakad Winery located in the small hamlet of Jdita in the Central Bekaa. Established by 
his father during the French mandate, Vin Nakad (formerly Chateau Nakad) remains a 
testament to this period of Lebanon’s history. Winemaking instruments such as a bright red 
grape press, imported from Bordeaux at around 1930, while out of use, were still present 
but gathering dust. Wine continues to be produced on a small-scale, and as there are no 
vineyards in the area, grapes are sourced from regions around the Bekaa Valley, and 
especially Kefraya. Yet despite of the absence of vineyards in the Jdita region, Mr Selim 
offered to take me out that day in his old Mercedes for a guided tour of Jdita. He said that 
this tour was paramount to my education of the history of wine production in Lebanon. 
Besides, there was not much happening at the winery, as everyone awaited the harvest that 
was about to begin in Kefraya.   
We drove out of the driveway of his family home, which is adjacent to the winery, 
and turned left, heading upwards away from the Bekaa and onto the slopes of the Mount 
Lebanon ranges that rise gently up behind the hamlet. We then passed an area of recently 
constructed apartments, and the abandoned Jdita railway station that had once been part of 
the Damascus-Beirut railway, which was built during the late-nineteenth-century3. Finally 
we ascended the hills. Here there were crumbling dry stone wall terraces on each side of the 
road; and in between these terraces, with the exception of a few sparse weeds, the land was 
fallow and the soil quite dry. Eventually, Mr Selim drew the car to a halt and told me to 
follow him onto one of the plots of land. At the edge of this terrace was a rather large (and 
                                                 
3 For an interesting historical overview of Lebanon’s  now defunct railroads see: 
http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/380/385/railways/index.html 
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impressive) stone press, and I could imagine how the juice from pressed grape berries 
might have flowed down through the carved out grooves and into the stone basin that rested 
below. Mr Selim said he took the stone press, along with the artefacts scattered around the 
area, to be archaeological evidence suggesting the possibility that winemaking in Jdita 
could be traced as far back as the Bronze Age. He hastened to add that an archaeological 
excavation of the site would be necessary for a more precise date. While I found such 
artefacts interesting, other more recent historical narratives of wine were brought to the fore 
that day.  
As I continued to follow Mr Selim around the empty terraces of Jdita, he told me that 
vines were once cultivated here and that their disappearance occurred relatively recently. 
Mr Selim recalled walking through these vineyards as a child with his father, and recounted 
stories to me about eating grapes that “tasted like honey.” Interestingly, there are many 
others from the Central Bekaa who have similar memories. From the slopes of Jdita to the 
hills of Ksara and ravines of Zahle, the older generations would often tell me that the slopes 
of the Central Bekaa, that are now mostly empty plots of land or sites for newly constructed 
apartments and villas, were once used for cultivating vines. While the relatively recent civil 
war also had a role in changing the landscape, I was told that most of the older vines had 
disappeared following the arrival of the root-eating louse known as phylloxera. The story of 
its arrival as told by Mr Selim is similar to how it was explained by others: 
The parasites came into Lebanon on the wheels of the French officers’ trucks at the beginning of the 
mandate and slowly began to infect the vines. We never replanted and had to start buying grapes from 
others. But the vines were growing here on these slopes all my life, as a child and (I am sure) also my 
father’s life.  
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When I asked what types of varietals had been cultivated on these slopes, his response was 
that the grapes were most likely Merwah and Obeideh. He was not certain however, 
because “back then, we were not so concerned with varieties as we are now.” Notably, 
wine was in fact only one of many products made from the grapes of these vines. Other 
products included arak, vinegar, molasses and raisins—apparently all for personal 
consumption.  Somewhat nostalgically, Mr Selim explained that prior to the mandate 
period, his family used to make wine from raisins rather than directly from fresh grapes and 
moreover that many homes had their own small distilleries to make arak as well as small 
plots kouroum (vineyards). Yet with the destruction of the vines due to phylloxera, many 
families were eventually unable to continue making such products with the grapes from 
their vineyards; some began to buy grapes elsewhere, while others apparently ceased 
production entirely and were forced to buy such products in the market. I thus began to 
wonder how the relationship between viticulture and viniculture might have changed 
following the spread of phylloxera into the region. Where, I pondered, did locals buy their 
grapes? And from whom? Did they even continue to produce wine and other grape derived 
products? What is the significance of “the French” in these changes? And, lastly, what had 
happened to the local grape varietals after phylloxera reached the region?  
 Possible Socio-Economic Effects of Phylloxera   
In Europe, the phylloxera plague of the nineteenth century was a socio-economic 
catastrophewhere, in the case of France, for example, over one million livelihoods were 
at stake (Paul, 2002). Technological advancements in wine production that took place 
during the industrialisation of France between 1860 and 1939 were thus very much linked 
to saving its wine-growing economy following the phylloxera blight (2003 & 2002). It was 
also during this time that universities such as those in Bordeaux and Montpellier, which 
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specialised in the agronomic sciences and with special attention to the advancement of 
technology in order stabilise and secure production, were established. Indeed, it was one of 
Montpellier’s former students, Planchon, who, with two American botanists, was able to 
successfully graft the American Vitis aestivalis rootstocks, (which are resistant to 
phylloxera), to different varieties of the Vitis Vinifera, allowing for the revival of a 
devastated French wine growing economy (ibid).  
Phylloxera did not only destroy the vineyards of Europe. According to Quataert, 
Aydin, one of the major grape growing and raisin producing regions of Ottoman Anatolia 
also went into decline during the nineteenth century (1993 & see also for broader industrial 
info 1993a). The region made up one-fifth of all Ottoman vineyards and when “thousands 
of acres” were destroyed, both production and export went into a sharp decline (ibid: 20). 
In the case of Lebanon, however, official information about the region’s grape production, 
as well as the date of the arrival of phylloxera appears somewhat limited.4 A cursory glance 
over agricultural and geographical journals has only uncovered one brief mention of 
phylloxera by the British geographer Norman Lewis, in his article published in 1953 about 
terrace-farming in Lebanon. He notes that two-thirds of the 53,425 hectares of fruit 
plantations were `“devoted to grapes and olives, neither of which needs irrigation” 
(1953:10). Lewis writes that while vineyards were found everywhere, phylloxera had 
resulted in the uprooting of many vines in the southern mountains and across the Bekaa 
(ibid). Interestingly, he also notes that wine produced from “foreign rootstocks was 
concentrated around Zahle and Chtaura, on the lower eastern slopes of the Lebanon” (ibid).  
                                                 
4 A significant reason for the lack of official information about phylloxera might have to do with the 1916 
famine caused by the locust plague and resulting in over a half a million dead. Further research into the 
plague may provide more concrete information regarding the arrival of phylloxera.  
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In the Jesuit records at the Tanayil Monastery located in the Central Bekaa, an 
account written by Père Torrend in 1913 mentions that regulations had been imposed by the 
Ottoman authorities during the late nineteenth century to prevent the importation of 
different vines from outside of Mount Lebanon and Greater Syriadue to fear of the 
spread of phylloxera (Torrend, 1913). It appears, however, that through the use of bakshish 
(bribing), the Jesuits were able to successfully ship over cuttings of Cinsault and Alicante 
varieties from the Trappistes de Staouëli monastery in Algeria, for plantation on recently 
acquired lands in Ksara and Tanayilless than ten kilometres from Jdita.  Also noted 
elsewhere in the Jesuit archives is that in 1929, Père Alphonse saved the Ksara vineyards 
from the phylloxera aphid by replanting these varieties grafted with an American rootstock 
resistant to phylloxera. Interestingly, Torrend speculates that if phylloxera were to ever 
invade “the country,” there would be a strong possibility that the “robust Arab vines” may 
well be resistant to phylloxera, and vine farmers who had decided to pull out their “native 
vines” may well regret not keeping their “ancient vines” (1913: 408). Notably, despite 
numerous botanical books having been published by the Jesuits, there appears to be a gap 
in documentation of local grape varieties of the Bekaa Valley.  
An interesting study of such varieties was conducted by agricultural engineer, Mr 
Jean Hage Chahine, during 1955. The book, entitled La Vigne Au Liban, classifies different 
grape varietals found across Lebanon and follows the structure of the tomes of Pierre Galet, 
an ampelographer who provides a meticulous profile of different varieties of Vitis vinifera 
(Galet, 1979 & 1990). Each page of Hage Chahine’s study offers a photograph of the 
varietal’s leaf and grape, followed by a brief discussion of the shapes, nodes and hues of 
the leaf. There is also discussion of the different names given to these grapes across the 
regions of Lebanon, and information about which products are made using the different 
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grapes. The study is especially valuable, since it appears that very few of these varieties can 
still be found across Lebanon.  
Chahine grew up in the Ksara hamlet, trained as an agricultural engineer at the 
Jesuit-run Saint Joseph University and worked as an intern with the Jesuit wine-makers at 
the Ksara Monastery. He has lived in Algeria, France and India and was also employed by 
Chateau Kefraya for over a decade, taking up his position when the winery was established 
in 1979, until approximately 1989. Chahine has since retired to his home in Ksara, where 
he permitted me to interview him. It was another quiet summer’s day before the harvest 
was about to begin and when I arrived there, Mr Chahine invited me to sit outdoors on the 
terrace that overlooked his garden. As he poured some coffee, Chahine explained that, prior 
to the spread of phylloxera, the vineyards looked quite different. First, they tended to be 
quite small and other plants such as olives were also planted on the same plot of land. He 
also reminded me that the Arabic word kouroum does not only refer to a vineyard, but also 
an olive grove or fig tree orchard. Second, there would usually be a number of different 
varieties planted within the kouroum.  
Chahine then snapped a piece of branch from a grape vine growing not too far from 
where we were sitting, and demonstrated how vines were planted prior to the arrival of 
phylloxera: “You are able to take a cutting from a vine that produces the grapes you might 
like, and plant it vertically (and directly) into the soil”. Chahine pointed out that, once the 
phylloxera aphid is present in the soil, it is impossible to plant vines in such a manner. The 
grafting of the American resistant rootstock Vitis aestivalis with the Vitis vinifera thus 
changed how farmers were able to plant their vines. Also, unlike the previous method of 
vineyard plantations, a farmer would now have to pay for his vines. Chahine explained that 
the type of vine with a grafted American rootstock that was made most available at the 
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nurseries was the Cinsault varietals. The advantage of the Cinsault was that the berries 
were large and could be used to make products other than wine, such as raisins and 
molasses. Significantly, the same logic applied for prominence of the Cinsault vine is 
applied to the reason for the survival of varieties Chahine considers as more local to 
Lebanon: 
Mainly edible grape varieties remain because they are planted for export to the Arab countries. For 
example are the Tfeifihi and Beitamooni. The Obeidi variety remains because it provides a lot of juice 
and sugar that result in a high alcoholic degree which are all good factors for the production of arak 
and sometimes wine. But all the rest have disappeared such as Mariami, Zeini, Dorbali and Souri. 
Chahine’s theory is interesting, and further archival research will hopefully be able to shed 
light upon the socio-economic effects of phylloxera. Nevertheless, his perspective does 
allow for some preliminary conclusions to be drawn. First, the spread of phylloxera appears 
to have contributed to the emergence of the kouroum that appear more common- place in 
contemporary Lebanon: predominantly mono-varietal (and mono-species) plantations. 
Second, the way these new methods in the plantations of the kouroum reflect transforming 
modes of grape production, from one that appears to have been mostly based on household 
sustainable economies, to one where farmers were unable to grow vines without purchasing 
new phylloxera resistant varietals in the market5. 
                                                 
5 It is important to point out, however, that while phylloxera might have been somewhat instrumental in 
facilitating such socio-economic change, mono-cropping agriculture for market production already had a long 
history across Mount Lebanon and certain parts of the Bekaa Valley. Traboulsi has noted that, by the early 
seventeenth century, the Emirate of Mount Lebanon had become a semi-autonomous polity under the 
Ottoman administration characterized by: “sizeable Christian numerical majority; an early conversion to 
production for market (silk) and to international trade; a long cultural exposure to Europe, and a tradition of 
intervention by European powers in its internal affairs” (2007: 3). In this light, it is apparent that, although 
grape production might not have been commercialised, capitalist market exchanges were already well 
established across the region.  
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Notably, my discussions with Chahine were not only able to provide some insights 
concerning the subtle and gradual role of phylloxera in changing the landscape, but also 
some further insights concerning shifting perceptions of place. Significantly, although 
Chahine was able to identify over 22 kinds of “indigenous” Vitis vinifera varieties, these 
varieties did not necessarily originate in Lebanon. That is, other regions in the Levant may 
well have cultivated such varietals too. Chahine provided the example of the grape varietal 
that was known locally in the Bekaa as Souri, (Syrian), which may have acquired such as a 
name because it was grown across the whole of Greater Syria.  Interestingly, discussions 
with some older residents who recalled both the Souri, and other varieties that appear to 
have disappeared such as Mariami and Zeini, were able to provide detailed descriptions of 
what these grapes looked like and how they tasted. Yet, when I asked where these grapes 
might have come from, the usual response in the case of Souri was: “well if its name says 
Syria, then probably Syria!” Meanwhile, other grape varieties with names not associated 
with places were shrugged off, “it was called Mariami because of Sitta Miriam (Holy 
Mary).”    
While the reasons for the lack of importance given to the origin of the grapes can 
only be speculative in terms of how things were really experienced, I was nonetheless 
prompted to think critically about the usage of certain “aborescent root metaphors” within 
the modern winegrowing political economy (Malki, 1997:57). This was especially so in 
regard to conversations I had with those who could recall a very different viticulture 
landscape, and I realised that I had been influenced by my discussions with many winery 
owners and upper-managers who were often quick to out point to me, Lebanon’s very long 
historical tradition of wine-making potentially datess back to 4,000 BC. This was 
something that Mr Selim was quite enthusiastic to point out during out outing to the slopes 
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of Jdita. Similarly, I had also been influenced by what I had read in Karam’s book on 
Lebanese wine (2005). When interviewing McGovern, Karam asked the archaeologist if the 
indigenous varieties to Lebanon, Merwah and Obeidi were the respective ancestors for the 
French varieties, Semillon and Chardonnay, and Cabernet-Sauvignon. McGovern’s 
response was that DNA testing has been able to disprove the theory that the Merwah is the 
ancestor—or of any relation—to the Chardonnay and Semillon varieties. Thus far however, 
there has been not been any DNA testing carried out to confirm the theory that the Obeidi 
might be the origin of the Cabernet-Sauvignon (Karam, 2005 & see McGovern, 2003, 
2009; McGovern, Fleming & Katz, 2013).  While such insights are interesting, I initially 
overlooked something significant in this interview: which kinds of knowledge, I should 
have asked, are prioritised when one is speaking of “Lebanese,” “indigenous” or “local” 
grape varietals? 
The Legacy of Père  Billotet  
In the next two sections I shall explore how vineyards, such as those planted by the Jesuits 
of Ksara during the mid-nineteenth century spoke of changing visions of the land that 
might have ultimately contributed towards reshaping the viticulture landscape of the Bekaa 
and thus also of the kinds of knowledge prioritised when speaking of “indigenous” grapes 
and vines. In drawing attention to the role of the Jesuits in altering methods of wine 
production in Lebanon, I do not mean to suggest that wine was not produced or consumed 
in the era preceding the return of the Jesuits to the Orient in 1831. After all, wine for the 
Ottomans was, as described by the seventeenth century Ottoman chronicler, Peçevi, a 
cushion on the “sofa of pleasure” (Creasey, 1854). Yet without extensive archival research 
beyond the Jesuit archives, it is somewhat difficult to develop a holistic analysis concerning 
viticulture prior to the mid-nineteenth-century.  
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Halenko’s research of viti-viniculture in the Ottoman sancak (province) of Kefe in 
Southern Crimea can, however, shed some light upon how wine might have been taxed 
(2004). Halenko’s analysis of the only “detailed” surviving tax registers of Crimea from 
1542 indicates that tax was only imposed upon the sura (grape juice), while other grape 
derived products such as ‘araqi (arak) and pekmez (grape molasses) were excluded. 
Halenko observes that, in other Ottoman regions, taxes were taken from the production of 
arak and pekmez. This not only indicates that alcohol was produced from grapes, and that 
it was consumed across the Ottoman Empire. The distinctive tax groups categorizing the 
different fermented and alcoholic products derived from grapes also implies a complex 
system of production. While sura, rather than hamar (sweet wine) was taxed in Crimea, 
Halenko further argues that the reasons for this may have to do with the presence of 
Muslim farmers who also appear to be producing sura. Given that no other grape derived 
product was taxed in Crimea, levels of productivity for sura were high. Moreover, the fact 
that it is possible for grape juice to naturally start fermenting after only one day suggests 
that sura was actually wine.  
Although some aspects of the conclusions drawn from Halenko are somewhat 
speculative, her analysis does provide a useful starting point for further examination of 
viti-viniculture in Ottoman times. Crucially, Halenko elucidates how, contrary to the 
general assumption that wine and viticulture declined during Ottoman reign, there was in 
fact continuity in Crimea connecting it to its earlier Byzantine and Genoese periods and 
also afterwards in its annexation to the Russian Empire. Indeed, it is true that the Ottoman 
tax documents from the region, following the implementation of the iltizām in the 
sixteenth century might not provide any information pertaining to local wine production. 
However, both imported and regionals wines are classified as tamga-I hamr, and taxes are 
also imposed upon “saloons” in the city of Kefe (ibid).  
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 While rule and administration were not uniform across the Ottoman Empire, it does 
appear that, in Crimea and certain islands on the Aegean, the production of grape derived 
alcoholic substances was also carried out across Mount Lebanon.  After all, Mount 
Lebanon did, to an extent, follow the confessional-based millet system. This was similar 
to how the Ottoman administration governed the Christians of the Balkan regions; and the 
production of wine was thus permitted at least on Christian ‘waqf lands. Indeed, we also 
find the consumption of wine was not restricted to the monks and priests at the 
monasteries. A prominent figure in the 1860 fellahin uprisings of the Kisrawan region of 
Mount Lebanon, Tanius Shaheen, who himself was part of the Maronite ‘ahali  
(community), writes to the clergy of the village in ‘Aramun, concerning the consequences 
for those in the village who might have had a little too much wine and arak:  
Then we inform Your Reverences what must already be known to you, concerning the incidents that 
occur on festival days as a result of drinking ‘araq and wine. The Council agreed that it was 
necessary to announce in all places that whoever drinks ‘araq or wine outside his house and there 
results from it any mischief, unseemly talk, cursing or quarrelling, etc. this is in itself a very vile 
thing. Then may God—be He exalted!—the faithful of the Church, and the leaders all proclaim this. 
We hope that Your Reverences will announce this in church to all the populace. Whoever 
transgresses after the announcement is made, and does the slightest mischief, will be punished by 
one month’s (imprisonment) or several times that much. (Makdisi, 2000: 109) 
There is also evidence for a similar sense of continuity to that observed by Halenko, 
which comes by way of Braudel, who writes of the visit to the cedars of Lebanon by the 
ambassador of Breves with his travelling companions. On the 26th of June, 1605, the 
ambassador wrote of his surprise regarding the varying effects of altitude: “Here [on the 
mountains of Lebanon] the vines were only just beginning to flower, as were the olive 
trees, and the wheat was just turning yellow; and at Tripoli [on the coast] the grapes were 
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growing, the olives were already big, the wheat had been harvested, and all the other fruits 
were 'well advanced’” (Braudel, 1995: 60).   
Nevertheless, it is apparent that significant changes in viticulture and winemaking 
began following the return of the Jesuit Mission in 1831. Having set up their first mission 
during the mid-seventeenth-century, the Society of Jesuits left the region, following their 
Suppression in 1773. According to Makdisi, after hearing “of the resurrection of the 
Company of Jesus,” the Greek Catholic and Maronite Churches were delighted to invite 
them back in 1831. Upon arriving on the shores of Beirut, according to Paul Riccadonna, 
one of the three Jesuits sent on the new mission, the group was “surrounded by a mass of 
turbans, staffs and pistols” (quote taken from Makdisi, 2000:25).  Fortunately for the three 
Jesuits, “a native Christian” spoke up and invited them to his home (ibid). Yet the Jesuits 
were about to encounter a reality they had not expected: “the confusing similarity of 
Christian to Muslim in manners, dress and habits” (ibid: 25). At the home of the “native 
Christian,” the Jesuits found it hard to forget their instructions to practice restraint and 
grace that were given to them in Rome, for the “discomfort of sitting crossed legged on 
the Damascene carpets and the strength of pipe tobacco” was perhaps almost too much to 
bear (ibid: 26). That this was followed by a long night of sleeping on a hard floor, plagued 
by insects, does not appear to have appeased the weary monks, and Riccadonna was 
eventually to declare with frustration that the inhabitants of the city lived “twenty 
centuries behind European culture” (ibid).  
Makdisi has argued that the Jesuits and American Protestant Missionaries (amongst 
others) were eventually able to apply “their own sectarian vision of Mount Lebanon” that 
“bypassed the political exigencies” of Ottoman governance (ibid: 88). They provided 
elites with seemingly viable and modern sectarian paths of development; cultivating them 
as modern leaders of their sectarian communities and offered them the support and 
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protection of Europe. In return, local elites protected and gave land to the missionaries 
(ibid). This “total independence”, as declared by Père Planchet declares, allowed foreign 
missionaries to engage in practices of “civilizing” and educating the locals of Mount 
Lebanon. In what Makdisi calls “the gentle crusade,” the mission civilisatrice, entailed a 
systematic education of local inhabitants, of which many of the Nahda scholars in Beirut 
had,at least initially, advocated (2000).  The new crusade was gentle in this regard 
because it was not directly a military expedition, but was instead “actively courted by 
native elites, and it advanced itself primarily through the pen and paintbrush rather than 
sword and musket” (ibid: 16). Newly established universities offered courses such as 
history (including the Levant), law, and agricultural engineeringmostly for members of 
the urban aristocrats and the bourgeoisie (Kassir, 2010). This also involved developing 
missionary schools in towns such as Ghazir in Kisrawan and Mallacat in the Bekaa Valley 
(ibid). The technologies of modern science were also invaluable to their missions, and in 
1857 Père Billotet complained that the Jesuits were losing popularity because Protestants 
were offering medical care in the southern coastal city of Sidon (Makdisi, 2000: 89).   
 Yet medicine was not the only interest of Billotet. According to Carayon's 
biographical chronicle of the austere monk, despite never quite mastering the Arabic 
language, Billotet rose through the Jesuit ranks, eventually becoming the Supérieur of the 
Zahle monastery (1865). It was during his administration that 23 hectares of land was 
acquired in Ksara, located a few kilometres south of Zahle (ibid). According to Torrend’s 
account entitled Ksara, Son Histoire, Père Billotet, “le Supérieur de la Mission” bought 
the land in December 1858 from Emir Bechir Ahmad Bellama (1913). Both Carayon and 
Torrend note that Billotet was involved in the agricultural exploitation which followed. 
Moreover, it is possible that Billotet oversaw the beginning of a process where 
plantations, mainly of the Cinsault and Alicante grape varietals, replaced a collection of 
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small parcels of mulberries and cereals, as well as “Arab vines, cultivated since time 
immemorial” (Torrend, 1913: 406). Some years later, a winery and observatory were 
constructed. Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Ksara Monastery was a hub 
for more than just advancements in the agronomic and oenological sciences. The 
observatory built amongst the vineyards was fitted with the first refracted telescope in the 
region. The mapping of the stars by the scientifically minded Père Berloty would later 
serve the French cadastral surveyors who took to mapping the Lebanese mandate based 
upon the azimuth system he had already established.  
 However, Billotet would bear no witness to the construction of the winery and 
observatory. For, despite the “total independence” enjoyed by the Missionaries in to the 
Orient, he was amongst five Jesuit priests killed during the uprisings of 1860. According 
to the Jesuit records at Tanayil, in compensation for their deaths, the Ottoman 
administration gave a plot of land to the French government in the region of Tanayil, only 
a few kilometres from Ksara. The French government also allowed the Jesuits to open an 
orphanage for the Christian victims of the 1860 clashes. According to informants I spoke 
with during fieldwork, the Tanayil property continues to be under French ownership as 
long as one member of the Jesuit Order remains on the premises. While further research is 
required to explore the anthropological implications of such a legal contract, there are still 
other ways to explore the legacy of Billotet in Lebanon’s history of winegrowing.    
Visions of the Land 
According to the Jesuit records, the 230 hectares of land acquired in Tanayil was mainly 
composed of swamps. It was thus deemed unsuitable for the agricultural exploitation. 
Nevertheless, the property was drained, and plots of vineyards were planted alongside 
apricot and apple orchards. Apparently, it was Père Kirn who, in the latter part of the 
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nineteenth century, decided to plant vines not only on the slopes on the Ksara property, but 
also on the some of the flatter plains situated in the Tanayil properties.  According to 
Torrend, “after noting the potential for the soil and climate, as well as for developing the 
economy of the country,” Kirn decided to plant vines imported from their monastery in 
Algeria in order to replace “the Arab vines, cultivated since time immemorial” (1913: 406):  
The arrivals of the cuttings to Ksara caused quite a commotion in the region. What were these foreign 
plants that the Fathers had brought to the region? Could they spread diseases to the local vines of this 
country? The jealousy of the certain land proprietors fuelled these rumours. The Fathers had to hide 
the cuttings for many weeks and then after the plantations, guard the vines day and night so that no one 
would tear them out of the ground. Little by little the vines began to expand and eventually replaced 
the mulberries. The squares of Arab vines were broken a part in order to place these new vines. These 
new vines, from then on were known throughout the region of Syria as the "vigne française”. (ibid: 
407 my translation) 
With the arrival of the vigne française, different planting methods were required, and these 
began in terms of how much space had to be maintained between each vine. This included 
pruning and then fashioned the wine grapes into a goblet style. Such techniques were, 
apparently, in sharp contrast to what the Jesuits perceived as the chaotic methods practiced 
by the locals. Torrend writes about the aesthetically pleasing arrangement of the Ksara 
vines that were distinctive from the Jesuits’ neighbours: 
Different voyagers who wander down the paths admiring the vines with their tidy stems that iswell 
pruned and perfectly aligned. These visitors ask us why the neighbours do not also replace their Arab 
vines with these French vines . . . The vine farmers of Zahle and neighbours of this region don't see 
anything else but these table grapes. They are considered with great esteem everywhere. Even in 
Beirut, where wagons travel (from Zahle) full of these grapes from previous seasons. Why would they 
want to replace their vines with something so unfamiliar? (ibid: 407) 
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Significantly, the Jesuits’ “neighbours” also started to grow these “French” vines. The 
reasons for such a shift in preference remain unclear, although phylloxera might have been 
one motivation. However, Torrend notes that many of his neighbours continued to use 
methods for plantation and grape maintenance that they were familiar with, albeit with 
disappointing results.6 When they “tore out [the] vines of the Arab variety,” the neighbours 
carried on using the method of “long pruning” which resulted in harvests with lower yields 
and grapes with low sugar content (ibid: 408). It is debatable whether these “French vines” 
were actually unable to reach optimum productivity levels with the techniques used by 
local residents around Zahle at the time (see Naff, 1981 for Zahle historical background). It 
is somewhat more likely, however, that a combination of such methods used with these 
“French vines” did not achieve the levels of which Torrend considered as the required 
standard for producing wine. That is, although the land and climate of the Bekaa Valley 
was perceived to possess the positive qualities for the development of viticulture, its 
transformative potential could only successfully materialise through a recombination with 
the right kinds of human and non-human factors (e.g. Sperber, 2007).   
In this regard, Torrend’s remarks concerning the unsuccessful attempts by locals 
looking after their “French” vines with older techniques can also, perhaps, reflect 
endeavours to validate the Jesuits’ efforts in assisting in the development of the country. 
That is not to say that Torrend wrote his account as part of a calculative attempt to 
                                                 
6 It is important to point out however that there were other European and American agronomists who actually 
saw the potential of Lebanese grape varietals for wine-making.  Here an acknowledgement is due to Dr 
Eugene Rogan for drawing my attention to this and sending me copies of letter exchanges between the 
American Agricultural Department (in the US) and the American Consul in Beirut dated to the 
nineteenthcentury. The content of the letters concern the shipping of vine cuttings of grape varietals from the 
region that could possibly be used to make wine in California. Further research would be required to see what 
came of these cuttings.  
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legitimize and justify the socio-economic advantages of the Jesuits’ viticulture projects 
over other kinds of grape production. Rather, the language used by Torrend reflects the way 
the use of seemingly neutral terms such as “potential” and even “fertile” to describe the 
agricultural properties of a particular place can—perhaps even unintentionally—conceal 
long histories of dynamic social process (Purcell & Horden, 2000) In other words, the 
region is believed to be naturally fertile rather than because of the human capacity to alter 
it. Yet, or at least in the case of the Bekaa Valley, Purcell and Horden have demonstrated 
how the region’s agricultural potential derives from continuous activity, spanning 
thousands of years. This activity has transformed land that was otherwise quite difficult to 
farm.   
With this in mind, Mundy has pointed out how Ottoman conquests were based on 
different ideological grounds to European commercial expansion, and that they belonged to 
a distinctive but equally long and complex economic history (2004:144; Mundy & Smith, 
2007). While property rights within Ottoman Islamic law allowed for the occupation and 
cultivation of landeven wastelandsthe basis for this not “European notions of civilizing 
a state of nature”. Rather, there was “the conceptualisation of rights over the ‘potentiality’ 
and not of labour per se but of the fruits of cultivation land” (Mundy, 2004: 147).  In the 
use of terms such as “fertile”, but also “Arab vines, cultivated since time immemorial”, and 
“vigne française”, there appears to be an inherent method of “time-keeping” that belongs to 
a particular European “historiographical consciousness” (Goody, 2012: 26). This was a 
vision of modernity that Makdisi argues sought to reclaim “the history of this region from 
the morass of decline and the stagnation of time” (Makdisi, 2000: 16). Importantly, this 
opposition that was established between a dynamic “western” society and the static 
ahistorical societies of “rest” also has parallels to methods Ulin points out are so vital for 
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the legitimization process of an invented tradition of historical authenticity by elite 
winegrowers within contemporary wine production. Indeed, he argues that a fundamental 
aspect in the cultural production of wine in France regards an entanglement of a concept of 
rootedness to the soil and of a particular sense of blood ties, bound together through vine 
and wine (1996). Significantly, this validation process might also be observed when one 
speaks of indigenous grapes or of la vigne française. Yet in the context of historical 
Lebanon however, while there is an apparent similarity here to the hierarchical sense of 
rootedness to the soil as observed by Ulin, it appears that this connection was initially 
forged between a locality in Lebanon to vines and people perceived to come from outside 
the regionand in particular, Europe.  
Les Chateaux du Liban   
Yet we can also see that this naturalisation of a hierarchical connection between place, 
people and grapes began to extend beyond the Jesuit vineyards of Ksara and Tanayil. 
Indeed by the time Chateau Kefraya was established in 1979, in his memoirs entitled, 
D’Haute d’une Breteche, Michael de Bustros states his reasons for planting vines on his 
family lands in Kefraya:   
Thus, after noting the inadequacy the traditional usages of the soil and land in Kefraya, the first 
vineyard was planted in 1951. It was 9 hectares-that is to say 90,000 square feet! (de Bustros, 2001: 
16, my emphasis) 
Eventually, de Bustros hired a viticulture expert from France to oversee the vineyard 
plantations and supervise the viticulture maintenance. Yet it is also clear that the de Bustros 
family was not the only large landholding family from Beirut that had taken the decision to 
plant vines. The Domaine de Tourelle winery, established in 1868, by a French man named 
Pierre Brun, relied upon vineyard growers across the Bekaa Valley. According to the 
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current owners, he regularly bought Cinsault and Alicante grapes grown on lands owned by 
members of the Sursuq and Eddé families in the Ammiq region of the West Bekaa.7 
Thus while the introduction and promotion of new techniques of viticulture and 
winemaking by the Jesuits belonged to their much broader vision of the mission 
civilisatrice, there remains to be explore in the final two sections, the issue pertaining to 
why wine might have eventually become a significant agro-industry for urban elites. 
Indeed following the establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920, and then the French 
mandate of Lebanon in 1923, wine production appears to have taken a significant turn, 
perhaps best reflect by the eventual passing of a wine law in 1939 is suggestive of at least a 
small thriving industry.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 This information was given to me by the current owners of Domaine de Tourelles. I have been informed 
that there are documents with information such as the quantity and also the price of grapes bought. It has, 
however, proved difficult to obtain permission to access these documents. The reason given was that Michael 
Karam had priority to look at these documents given his extensive publications on Lebanese wine—a topic I 
have discussed in the introduction. It is also important to point out that the establishment of Domaine 
Tourelle by Pierre Brun, followed the passing of the 1867 property law, allowing “foreigners” the right to 
buy and own land across the Ottoman Empire (Lutsky, 1969). 
8 I would like to express my gratitude to Mr James Palgé , the oenologist working at Chateau Ksara at the 
time, for providing me with a photocopy of the 1939 wine law and for sharing his own research into the 
history of Lebanese wine production.  
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Source: Table for Alcohol production in Lebanon between 1939-1945 reproduced from Gates, 1998: 73.  
Thus it is notable that despite the limited amount of information obtained pertaining to the 
number of wineries established during the French mandate, some of the wineries that 
continue to produce wine in contemporary Lebanon can still be traced to the mid-
twentieth-century.  We are already aware of Selim Nakad’s father, who established his 
winery in 1924, naming it Chateau Nakad. Another well-known winery today that was also 
established in 1930 (during the French mandate) is Chateau Musar. The winery was 
established by Gaston Hochar, the son of the founder of the Banque Hochar. Following the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the bank had gone bankrupt, which surely contributed to 
the simultaneous sericulture decline (Karam, 2005). However, the family was already part 
of the urban elite: Gaston Hochar had attended school with a relative of Michel de Bustros 
called Nicolas Ibrahim Sursuq (ibid). The family did not own a significant amount of land, 
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and instead rented from the Eddé family from the Ammiq region of the West Bekaa. There, 
the Hochar enterprise began to plant grape varieties and build a reputation for their rather 
unique wines. It appears that the main consumers of their wines were the French 
administrators, officers, and businessmen and their families.  
Arguably, and as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the passing of the 
1939 wine law can serve to reflect a process of reification where the relationship that is 
defined between people and “things” within a particular legal institution can have the effect 
of naturalising particular ideas (e.g. Pottage, 2004a & Luckacs, 1971). Yet while the wine 
legislation is able to offer some indication concerning the formalization of the discourse of 
wine growing, the usage of the term “chateau” to describe the Lebanese wineries is also of 
interest. While there is no apparent chateau on the premises of the Chateau Nakad winery, 
the name prevailed until after the civil war era when, in attempts to restructure both 
production and marketing strategies, the name was changed to Vin Nakad—although 
Chateau Nakad is still frequently used by the Nakads and also in many newspaper articles. 
Chateau Musar does however have a castle on site. The winery was built in an old 
seventeenth-century castle that the Hochar family had bought in Ghazir of the Kiserwan 
region of Mount Lebanon (Karam, 2005). The trend in the use of the chateau appears to 
have continued following the establishment of the independent Lebanese state. Perhaps the 
most significant is the Chateau Kefraya estate, which was founded in 1979 by Michael de 
Bustros, who had commenced his viticulture enterprise some decades earlier.  
As noted in the previous chapter, Ulin suggests that, in the case of France, the 
construction of this chateau during the late- eighteenth and nineteenth centuries replicated 
those from the Middle Ages. This created an “invented connection” to an aristocratic past, 
thus supplying “elite growers with sufficient cultural capital to insure their commercial 
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success” (Ulin, 1996: 54). The “invention of tradition” by these elite winegrowers was a 
strategy to establish or maintain “their role as leaders in local winegrowing associations 
central to the construction of French winegrowing discourse and knowledge” (ibid). In the 
case of Lebanon, I would suggest similar sorts of strategies were being used in that this 
replication represents a kind of “selective tradition;” an inherently political social process 
through which an “effective dominant culture, is always passed off as tradition” (Williams, 
1973: 9). However, I would add that the use of the “chateau” within Lebanese wine 
production might also reflect the emergence of new spatial relations of power. This would 
be particularly so between the urban and rural, much like of Gilsenan’s argument brought 
up in the previous chapter, concerning a sense of histoire mentalités and the role of status-
honour within that process, in the case of the Akkar region (1984). In the other words, the 
usage of the term chateau and the production of wine allowed for certain types of elites to 
continue to display their affluence and exert their influence, following the increasing 
French influence in the region.    
Yet it is important to point out that in the case of wine production in France, Ulin 
argues that the construction in the nineteenth century of the chateaux, replicating the Neo-
classical architectural models of the pre-revolution era, while in itself a method of 
validation to evoke aristocratic roots to the past, and also to the land, was one specifically 
tied to sentiments of heritage and nationalism. Parallels emerge once more and it was 
during the Nahda (The Arab Renaissance) of the nineteenth century, Beirut and Cairo were 
both centres where the intelligentsia met, exchanged ideas, and participated in what Kassir 
calls the “cultural revolution”. The episteme of the age was characterized by the 
progression and dissemination of new interdisciplinary ideas, alongside the rise of different 
kinds of nationalist sentiment (2010).  The Nahda in Arab history, Kassir writes, “. . . was 
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at once an era and an attitude” (ibid: 168). For it was also during the Nahda that the term 
watan (homeland) took on the modern meaning9.  
It is significant therefore that this “awakening to the world,” was encouraged by 
Europeanmainly Jesuitand also American (Protestant) missionaries in the Levant 
(Kassir, 2010). In what Makdisi calls “the gentle crusade,” the mission civilisatrice, 
entailed a systematic education of local inhabitants, of which many of the Nahda scholars 
in Beirut had, at least initially, advocated (2000).  The new crusade was gentle in this 
regard because it was not directly a military expedition, but was instead “actively courted 
by native elites, and it advanced itself primarily through the pen and paintbrush rather than 
sword and musket” (ibid: 16). Newly established universities offered courses such as 
history (including the Levant), law, and agricultural engineeringmostly for members of 
the urban aristocrats and the bourgeoisie (Kassir, 2010). Significantly, the history of the 
Levant, taught at the Saint Joseph University, came from research conducted by French 
orientalists who were studying and excavating archaeological sites at key areas of the 
region’s ancient civilizations. Notably, however, and as Kaufman puts it, “as with the 
muted archaeological sites,” the indigenous populations also came under scrutiny as well 
(2004: 23). The populations were perceived as the progenies for different ancient 
                                                 
9 Such ways of perceiving the world resonate broadly with Anderson’s “imagined community”, which resides 
within a nation where members might not know each other personally, but still share a similar sense of 
spatio-temporality (1991). In this regard, the essence of this sense of time is one of building a fixed and 
stable referential system for capitalist production. Indeed, E.P. Thompson argues for the imposition of a 
synchronic sense of time necessary for capitalist work-discipline, which is nicely illustrated in the 
construction of a Hamidiye clock tower in downtown Beirut during 1897 (Kassir, 2010; Thompson, 1967).9  
A Hamidiye clock, named after Sultan Abdulahamid II, provided alla Franca or “European time”, following 
the Gregorian calendar, and alla turca, “Ottoman time”, which followed the Ottoman Islamic calendar. 
These clocks (and watches) were built by Swiss clockmaker Johann Meyer, and entered into the Ottoman 
market during the mid-nineteenth-century (Bir, Acar, & Kacar, 2010). 
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civilizations; and thus different contemporary physical features and social behaviour were 
attributed, for example, to the Egyptians, Assyrians and Phoenicians.     
One particularly influential study of this kind was by the prominent French 
philosopher and orientalist, Ernest Renan. Upon receiving the mission from Napoleon III to 
visit the Mount Lebanon region and research its Phoenician history, Renan set sail from 
France in 1860, arriving in Beirut in October of the same year. His subsequent book, 
Mission de Phènicie, was the first of its kind, providing a modern analysis of the 
Phoenician civilization (Renan, 1864 & Kaufman, 2001 & 2004). The book is an account of 
his travels, observations, and historic findings regarding the Phoenicians, who are depicted 
as a trading civilisation residing in coastal regions such as Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli, and the 
mountainous areas of Kiserwan. Renan’s research was frequently referred to by French 
administrators in their descriptions of Lebanon, and also by the French foreign minister to 
Mount Lebanon, Gabriel Hanotaux, who served in the region between 1894 and 1898. 
Hanotaux’s remarks, in particular, linked Mount Lebanon to France (through the Bible and 
Renan) and forged strong historical links between French cultural heritage and the rest of 
Mediterranean, encompassing Lebanon:  
The Mountains of Lebanon may not be the highest, but the summits are the highest in the history of 
the world. From Salomon to Renan, the wisdom of humanity sits in the shadow of the Cedars. 
(quoted in Kaufman, 2001: 176).  
Similarly, in 1902, the Jesuit orientalists, Henri Lammens and Pierre Martin, working at 
the newly inaugurated Oriental Faculty of the University Saint Joseph, set out to research 
the history of the people of Syria.  Lammens and Martin argued that the region was a land 
for ethnic and religious minorities in an Arab/Muslim dominated world, and wrote 
extensively on the legacy of the Phoenicians, who, they argued, were the ancestors to the 
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“Maronite minority” residing in Beirut (Firro, 2003). They believed that the Phoenician 
civilisations consisted of non-Semite people, of Indo-European genealogy, and sea-faring 
traders was also taught this at schools in Lebanon and France (ibid & Kaufman, 2004). 
Notably, the intellectual group that proclaimed themselves the “New Phoenicians” were all 
graduates of the Oriental Faculty of the University of Saint Joseph. Significantly, 
“Phoenicianism” retains an emphasis upon the merchant-like character of the Phoenicians, 
whose ancestors continue to dwell in the city of Beirut. Their political visions are well 
documented in “La Revue Phènicienne”, founded in 1919 by the poet and writer Charles, 
which covered issues concerning the economy, agriculture, and industry. Writers included 
the politician Michel Chiha, who was also the financial director of his family’s bank, the 
Banque Pharaon-Chiha, and contributed articles promoting the idea that the Lebaneseor 
perhaps more specifically the Beirutishad inherited their business-like characteristics 
from their mercantile, sea-faring ancestors (Chiha, 1949).  
In this light, discourses of nationalism (such as Phoenicianism) that promoted a 
sense of geographical determinism clearly articulated and sought to naturalise notions of 
market and trade. The most notable thing about Phoenicianism, perhaps, is the way the 
emphasis placed upon Beirut and the important role of its silk merchant and traders also 
inadvertently shaped notions regarding the city’s hinterlands and, subsequently, forged a 
particular type of urban-rural relationship. Thus, while Beirut may have been the 
cosmopolitan centre for many “ancient races,” Mount Lebanon was perceived by many 
urban elites and Europeans as a “Biblical landscape;” “a stunning beauty of the mountain 
chain overlooking Beirut, which appeared to be an inviolate sanctuary” (Makdisi, 2000: 
15).   
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Ritualistic Displays of Hospitality  
While we can see that “chateau” appeared during the French mandate, it is apparent that, 
much like other symbolic and agricultural practices used in wine production, it also 
belonged to the same political vision of the world that began its hegemonic ascent during a 
period, Kassir defines as the “Great Transformation” of Beirut during the nineteenth 
century (2010). This was not only marked by the return of the Jesuit Mission into the 
Orient but also when Ottoman markets were opened for European trade and Beirut became 
an important trading centre. Kassir notes that this was an era of significant price 
fluctuations, where products such as Egyptian sugar had to compete with Caribbean sugar 
(refined in Marseilles), as did Yemen mocha with Brazilian coffee. Meanwhile other 
goods, such as silk from Lebanon and Syria and cotton from Egypt and Palestine actually 
gained value. In this light, it is important to point out that this period of Beirut’s 
transformation does not only represent a particularly important part of the region’s history 
within the world-system, but is also indicative of a process of accelerated change (Hann, 
1994).  
The rebuilding of the city to make way for increased trade, as a result of the 
expanding world-system, did not necessarily occur overnight. Nevertheless, these measures 
still reflect the rapid changes occurring at the time. More pertinently, this transitional phase 
was also one of social crisis. For example, the increased circulation of “European” 
commodities at an affordable price (ranging from coffee and coffee grinders to cutlery, 
beds, and mattresses) made such items available to larger numbers of consumers across 
Beirut and Mount Lebanon (Makdisi, 2000). In so doing, the social value of such products, 
which were otherwise utilized in the “rituals of hospitality” and were thus so vital for the 
patron in expressing his power, honour, influence, and reputation, was put into question 
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(ibid: 44 see also Nerval, 2012 for an account of such rituals of hospitality). Yet to what 
extent did such rapid changes come about due to increasing European influence in the 
region?10After all, the increasing presence of, and desire for, European commodities in 
Beirut and Mount Lebanon is suggestive of a growing prominence of European tastes in 
the region. Kassir’s remarks concerning the term al-tafarnuf are evocative here: 
the spirit of Beirut that was being formed under the influence of the al-tafarnuj (from Franj, meaning 
Franksa term that denoted not only the French but, since the time of the Crusades, Europeans in 
general), which is to say the Westernization that went hand in hand with the city’s economic 
development. The imitation of the West was not always conscious. And if the term “tafarnuj” was 
applied at first to an indigenous social elite having personal contact with Europeans, its subsequent 
extension suggests that the urge to imitate foreign models soon became irresistible, affecting all 
classes and all areas of social activity. (Kassir, 2010: 207, my emphasis)   
Also highlighted in Kassir’s account however is the symbolic significance of Beirut in 
perpetuating this sense of al-tafarnuf. This regards the way in which the very idea of the 
Beirut metropolis brought forth elitist qualities such as affluence, wealth, and high culture. 
What, then, was the role of the urban elites in accelerating the socio-economic changes that 
were characteristic of Beirut’s Great Transformation?  
Significantly, during this period of Ottoman Beirut, urban elites, such as the 
Sursock and de Bustros forged particularly strong political ties with Europe during their 
roles as the dragoman. As hosts, these families received European officials into their lavish 
palaces and villas, performing “rituals of hospitality”. These established ties were not only 
articulated through political and economic links, but also through social bonds. For 
                                                 
10 This crisis of value also manifested in more violent forms of conflict. Indeed, the rise of a religious 
sectarianism akin to more contemporary practices emerged in the form of rebellions across Mount Lebanon 
in 1860.  
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example, daughters of families such as the Sursock were married to European aristocrats; a 
legacy that continued well into the twentieth century. Lady Cochrane Sursock, a 
philanthropist and public figure in Lebanon today, married Sir Desmond Cochrane in 1946. 
Her mother was Donna Maria Theresa Serra di Cassano, the daughter of Francesco Serra, 
seventh Duke of Cassano. In his memoirs, Nicolas de Bustros, the father of Michel de 
Bustros (founder of Chateau Kefraya) writes of his family’s relationship with Tsar 
Alexander III of Russia. It was because of the Grand Duke Serge of Russia, who used to 
call his forefather, Habib Bustros, ‘Habib El-Kebir’ (Habib the Great), that the ‘de’ was 
added in front of the name Bustros (1983). 
At the same time, it appears that a new form of “broker capitalism” emerged, where 
such urban elites began to develop extensive social networks in rural regions (Burke III, 
1988). Rather than the Sicilian gabelloto and campiere, it was the zaim and qabadayat who 
controlled (or at least attempted to control) the peasantry populations (Burke III, 1988 & 
Schneider & Schneider, 1976). We could also extend such similarities, as Burke III 
observes, by drawing attention to the distinction made by Schneider and Schneider between 
the processes of modernization and the processes of development (1976: 3). Although both 
sets of processes entail growth and change, the former tends to lack “economic 
development”, and they “are vulnerable to the ideologies and life-styles of industrial 
metropolitan centres” (ibid). Modernizing societies, therefore, are not characterised by 
increasing productive capacity, and usually remain dependent upon more advanced centres. 
Significantly, dependence elites within such societies have a “vested interest” in 
maintaining some sort of compliance to the demands of foreign powers, and therefore also 
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have little interest in economic diversification.11 Indeed, as Burke III suggests, the 
contemporary characteristics of Lebanese agriculture, as in Sicily, appear to have resulted 
from a long history of monoculture and dependence upon world-systems.    
In the process of Ottoman decentralisation, there was also a clear shift in the 
conceptualisation of place, and of property relations based more explicitly on the 
transformative potential of labour. While these types of property (and labour) relations 
might be universal to capitalist production, their specific manifestation during the “Great 
Transformation” of Beirut appears to have been shaped by the economic interests of the 
elite merchants, who had developed strong ties with business elites of Britain and France. 
Given that the prominence of Beirut’s elites had started to extend well into the region’s 
hinterlands and as far as the Bekaa plains, significant social and economic value began to 
derive from the ability and capacity to generate capital through commerce, trade, and other 
forms of service-based labour. In many respects the crisis of value highlighted by the 
fellahin uprisings of 1860, and the issue of increased circulation of commodities originally 
used exclusively in hospitality rituals by elites, reflects the broader struggles of shifting 
labour and class relations. Notably, many elite mercantile families were also owned land in 
parts of Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, and their affluence was thus quite clearly 
visible in these rural areas.12  
                                                 
11 The Schneiders also point out that both types of elites (dependence and development elites) can be present 
in the same place, competing for control (1976). 
12 While religious sectarianism is not a central focus of this thesis, it is notable that, despite the growing 
affluence of urban merchants during the nineteenth century, the Christian fellahin uprisings of 1860 were 
directed against their Druze lords. While I cannot provide further analysis here, such observations are parallel 
to Makdisi in the way that the rise of religious sectarianism during Lebanon’s modernity served to conceal 
the political agenda of European hegemony (2000). 
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It is significant, therefore, that the widespread use of European commodities grew 
at this time, with consumers replicating the activity of the elites. I would also argue that, 
along with the increasing circulation of such goods, there was also an acquirement of new 
ideas of taste that was similar to European notions of quality. In this regard, the prestige 
value placed upon wine by urban elites and their attempts to control production reflects 
such a process. Indeed, the usage of wine in such rituals of hospitality can also be reflected 
in the travel diary, ‘Voyage en Orient,’ of the 19th century traveller, Gerard de Nerval, 
who writes of a prestigious “vin d’or” served by a prince (2012: 14).     
By the time of the French mandate, the administration encouraged an outward 
looking economic model for Greater Lebanon, where its capital, Beirut became the 
principle port for greater Lebanon’s rural hinterlands; suggesting the enduring influential 
social and economic prominence of these elite families (Gates, 1998: 91). La Belle Epoque, 
as Kassir describes the mandate period, was one of transformation reminiscent of the mid-
nineteenth-century, and a new dock and an airport were also built (2010). Beirut underwent 
further urban (re)planning, replicating the designs of the Palace d’Etoile in Paris. A 
growing number of cafes and restaurants were established, as well as a number of hotels 
such as the Grand Hotel, built on the summit of the Broumanna slopes. Traboulsi observes 
that one aspect of the economic interests of theses elite families were turning towards 
developing the Lebanese tourist industry (2007). With many owning shares in prestigious 
hotels such as the Bristol Hotel and St. George Hotel, as well eventually the having 
command over major land and air transport companies, for example with shares in Air 
Liban and Middle Eastern Airlines. These elite families also invested “in modern 
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agricultural projects” in the Bekaa (ibid)13.  Indeed it is of significance that, by 1925, most 
of the Bekaa Valley had become collectively owned by a few Beiruti—mercantile 
families—while religious institutions owned one third of the fertile lands (Hoshmand & 
Doueiri, 1998).  
Concluding Remarks 
In tracing the emergence of certain visions that articulate particular hierarchical connections 
between land and people as conveyed in written and oral histories, this chapter has attempted to 
explore how these visions have come to permeate practices within Lebanese wine production. In 
so doing, I have attempted to demonstrate that the replication of “modern” wine production in 
Lebanon, with features such as French grape varietals, a wine law first established during the 
French mandate, and winery estates that utilize the term “chateau”, have made it possible for 
some level of symmetry with wine production globally (and especially in regards to France). Yet, 
as Sahlins has argued, these social transformations were not part of a “universal march of reason 
proclaimed by the eighteenth century” in that those residing in the region at the time are 
represented as “neo-historyless peoples whose own agency disappeared more or less with their 
culture, the moment Europeans erupted on the scene” (Sahlins, 1999: 45 & 58).  
The making of the “Merchant Republic”, as Gates argues, was not, then, founded on a 
tabula rasa (1998). Rather, the emergence of Lebanon’s open economy was part of an on-going 
                                                 
13 It might of further interest to note that, in his memoirs, de Bustros expresses his commitment to the 
development of the Lebanese agricultural sector. During the early years of vineyard plantation on the family 
lands in Kefraya, de Bustros also planted other crops such as tomatoes, cucumbers and melons. Some of 
these crops earned widespread recognition for their quality and size. He explains that in 1957, he received the 
first prize in the annual Zahle agricultural competition for the watermelons grown within the de Bustros 
domain at Kefraya. The seeds for these watermelons, which were imported from the United States, were 
known as the ‘Black Giant.’ However, the winning giant seedless watermelon, weighing at 32 kilograms, 
became known in Kefraya, from then on ‘simply as Bustros’ (de Bustros, 2001).  
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process whereby local actors continuously respond and adapt to “movements in the international, 
regional and local arenas” (Gates, 1998: 2). The emergence of a “modern” wine industry in 
Lebanon thus expresses cultural hegemony and the ways in which elites, aspiring or otherwise, 
sought to maintain or gain social prominent positions as the Lebanese nation-state slowly edged 
towards independence. In this light, the emergence of a wine law in Lebanon draws our attention 
to the reification process that forged a particular relationship between the realms of viticulture 
and viniculture. Meanwhile, the significance of the chateau as utilized by certain elites served as 
a means through which to assert a hierarchical connection to both land and labour.  
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4: Along the Watch Tower: Narrating the Kefraya Landscape14 
 
There is a well-known story in Kefraya about the formation of the region’s viticulture 
landscape. The events in the story however, pre-date the first vine plantations to a time 
when everyone looked after goats and tended to their fields of legumes and wheat. As 
the story goes, it was during the French mandate that land surveyors arrived by car and 
started putting markers along the side of the road, on the outskirts of Kefraya. They 
became thirsty and stopped to ask a fellahi shepherd for some water. The shepherd 
could only offer them milk from one of his goats as they were quite far from any source 
of water. In return for his hospitality, the administrators offered him the land they were 
surveying. The shepherd, initially (politely) refused because he was worried about 
paying land taxes. Eventually the land surveyors convinced him that he could use the 
land to grow crops to sell, and the shepherd accepted.  As a result of this exchange, the 
shepherd and his family were among the first and largest vineyard owners in the region.  
On one level, the story speaks of the emergence of a new method of 
categorizing property that stands in sharp contrast to the Ottoman administrative tax 
system (Smith, 2004)15. Maps were barely used to categorize and tax private property 
                                                 
14 Parts of this chapter have been used in Saleh, 2013a. 
15 The cadastre surveying project of Lebanon began in 1926 and carried on into the 1940s (Firro, 2003). It 
was entrusted to French engineer Duraffourd (El Hibri, 2009). The cadastral survey could not, however, have 
taken place without the accomplishments of the Jesuit Pére Berloty in using innovative surveying techniques 
such as the triangulation and the azimuth across Syria and Lebanon. Berloty is recognised for the 
construction of the observatory in Ksara, and according to his obituary in the Jesuits’ Order’s 1934 
publication of Relations d’Orient, he acquisitioned a ‘lunette equatoriale'; known in English as a refracting 
telescope during 1913–1914 (Combier, 1934). After World War I, Berloty turned his attention to rebuilding 
what had been destroyed in Ksara and in 1921 was appointed by the French General Gourand as the director 
of the meteorological service in the Syrian and Lebanese mandates. Liaising with the Geographic and 
Navigation Services of the French Army, Pere Berloty determined the longitude and latitude coordinates of 
the region. The data that emerged from this research is still referred to by scientists across the world, 
including those working for NASA. He also installed a seismograph that was able to read and log the 1927 
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during the Ottoman period, in sharp contrast to European administrative strategies such 
as those deployed by the English bureaucrats in colonial India (ibid).  In the case of 
colonial Egypt, Mitchell argues that these new forms of measurement used in the 
cadastral survey gave rise to “a new regime” of calculation and representation 
(2002:90). Unlike older mapping systems, this new surveying system displayed both 
the size of the plot of land and its relation to other plots within the same area (ibid). The 
cadastral survey compelled those attempting to avoid taxationeither by failing to 
register their land or by claiming lower taxes due to the quality or potential of the 
landto abide by the new regulations for private property. At the same time, people 
were represented as numbers associated with particular plots of land, while coordinates 
established a referential system within the village, which extended across the country as 
a whole (ibid). Villages were therefore situated, “contained and organized” within a 
new spatial order in the emerging nation, characterised by urban centres and rural 
peripheries (ibid). In turn, this nation was situated within the broader spatial order of 
the global market economy. Mitchell’s observations resonate strongly, particularly 
when studying the map of the Kefraya region that was based on the cadastral survey in 
1933. Not only are all plots of owned land numbered, but the size of each plot is also 
clearly depicted, and the names associated with the numbers are held at a land registry 
office situated in Zahle, a town further north in the Bekaa16.    
While the account given by the shepherd of Kefraya speaks of broader political 
and economic transformations, the story simultaneously serves as a foundational 
                                                                                                                                                    
catastrophic earthquake. The epicentre of the earthquake was in Jericho, but it had disastrous effects to the 
West Bekaa. In 1928 Berloty received a cross of recognition from General Weygand for his dedication to the 
development of the “la science francaise”.  
16 This is the only map of Kefraya I have been able access that contains information pertaining to property. It 
has, however, proven impossible to obtain information concerning which families owned the lands.  
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mythit is frequently told in conjunction with narratives about the arrival of the 
Cinsault vines in Kefraya, which began a couple of decades later, and also the 
prominent role of de Bustros in instigating these plantations. The myth of the good 
shepherd speaks of how the emergence of these new types of property relations was 
intimately linked to the rise of commodity production. For with the advent of the 
plantations of Cinsault kouroum, led by de Bustros on his lands, Kefraya was quite 
literally placed onto the wine map of the world. Kefraya became an important 
winegrowing centre, where wineries from across Lebanon converged during harvest 
time to buy grapes. Once Kefraya residents agreed to de Bustros’ proposals to plant 
their own Cinsault vines, contractual agreements were set up and wineries began to buy 
grapes from Kefraya village. Those who owned larger amounts of land, such as the 
shepherd and his family, would have benefited the most from this contractual system.  
In the most general sense of Malinowski’s myth of origin, the story of the 
shepherd offers a sense of continuity, allowing those narrating and listening to interpret 
the changes that were taking place across the Lebanese wine industry, and which 
continued to affect the lives of Kefraya residents (Malinowski, 2004). There is, 
however, also an element of cosmic irony in the story of the exchange of land for a cup 
of milk that seems to convey that the hospitable and somewhat innocent shepherd was 
not really aware what he was getting himself and his family intoor the rest of Kefraya 
for that matter. On the one hand, in accepting the land, the shepherd was 
agreeingalbeit unwittingly to a new social contract based upon the expectations of 
absolute and individual property relations (Pottage, 2004b).  
The promise of commodity production by the surveyors would potentially have 
allowed the shepherd to break from an older social contract, where the fellahin of 
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Kefraya were subject to taxes collected in the form of produce from the land by certain 
members of Beirut’s elite, who also owned lands in Kefraya. In registering the land as 
his own, and subsequently selling his produce directly to the market, the shepherd 
seemingly had the opportunity to break away from his previous obligations to the urban 
lords of Kefraya. Yet little did he realise that once the vineyard plantations began to 
expand across Kefraya, residents would now be subject to the demands of urban wine 
elites, such as de Bustros, who had a vested interest in the Kefraya region. And 
coterminous to this patronage system was the apparent emergence of a new hierarchical 
system within the village, reproduced through the unequal distribution of land. After 
all, within the new wine market economy, those who acquired land in the village were 
seemingly in a more advantageous position than those who had not.   
This chapter seeks to unpack the elements of the foundational myth and related 
irony concerned with the emergence of a new social contract, which is evoked in the 
tale of the shepherd of Kefraya.  Broadly speaking, I share the view of Ortiz: that the 
emergence of these new contractual agreements, such as those between a vineyard 
owner and winery, is indicative of the presence of a market driven economy, and thus 
also of a flux or shift in power relationsgenerally to an imbalanced exchange that 
asserts and maintains capitalist monopoly privileges (Ortiz, 1992). It is useful to bear in 
mind that, similarly to Ortiz’s observations, such contracts in Kefraya were not always 
written but were instead implicit agreements characterised by custom and social 
relations of power, forged over time. For example, some contracts between wineries 
and vineyard owners in Kefraya were characterised by relationships that continued on 
to the next generation through acts of gift-giving and reciprocal exchange, extending 
beyond the commoditized realm of production. In doing so, such personalised relations 
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encouraged further commitment, while attempting to ensure a degree of control over 
resources.  
Yet while there was a sense of continuity in such relations, there were also 
attempts to shift these social relations of power through narratives of the history of 
viticulture landscape in Kefraya.  In this regard,and a central point in this chapteris 
that, in agreeing to participate in this new social contract, residents of Kefraya were 
subsequently also able to see themselves as active participants in the history of 
Lebanese wine production. Of importance here are the narratives that sought to 
emphasize the active roles of Kefraya residents in forming and continuously shaping 
their landscape.  
Given that recognition of de Bustros’ role in Kefraya was not limited to the 
village, the chapter begins by exploring narratives from outside of the region that spoke 
of his accomplishment of transforming Kefraya into a viticulture landscape. An 
examination of such narratives provides a useful lens from which to explore another 
important form of irony emerging from the tale of the good shepherd. Namely, the tale 
also conveys a sense of dramatic irony in that, unbeknown to the shepherd, but also to 
the surveyors, the exchange of a simple cup of milk for land raised three rather 
significant contradictory questions. First, how can the value of the land be measured? 
Second, who decided the value of the land? Third, was it not paradoxical that the 
French surveyors were giving land from Kefraya to someone from Kefraya?  
In raising these questions, the tale of the good shepherd thus draws attention to 
the intimate awareness that people of Kefraya had of the paradoxes of ownership of 
such “fictitious commodities” (c.f. Polanyi, 1957). For, more often than not, when the 
story was told by residents of Kefraya there was usually an emphasis on the fact that 
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the shepherd did not initially seem to understand the implications of owning a plot of 
land. His fear of paying taxes had to do with his lack of knowledge about the potential 
of the land as a valuable commodity. That is, the significance of acquiring the land and 
conforming to the market economy was intimately connected to the possibility of 
autonomythat is, freedom from subservience to the lords of Kefraya. Yet while the 
surveyors might have bestowed the land on the shepherd for his hospitality, unlike the 
narrators and audience of this tale, they were unaware of the contradiction they 
participated in by giving the land to someone already from that land.  
In this light, the usage of terms such as “landscape” in the narratives by Kefraya 
residents, which will also be explored in the proceeding sections, speak of the 
emergence of a particular sense of place-making that is linked to the incorporation of 
the region into a market economy, and which has significant parallels to observations 
made by Gudeman and Rivera concerning “conversational communities”. It is also 
linked to the relationship between shifting economic models and focal metaphors of 
economic process (1990 and more broadly: Hirsch, 1995). While these narratives echo 
broader economic and agricultural epistemologies, they also convey a certain shift, 
where we see the way the emergence of a boundary between the realms of production 
and reproduction in which the landscape, the kouroum, and the Cinsault vines were 
intimately entangled within the spheres of work, home, and kinship. I argue that 
narratives of the landscape, such as that of the shepherd, portray an enduring sense of 
the longue memoire of family events that appear autonomous from the unfolding of 
broader (and external) historical events (Zonabend, 1984).  
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The Kefraya Landscape as a Model for Lebanese Wine Production  
The media overflows with articles about distinguished businessmen who have invested 
in wine production in Lebanon, with rather successful resultsdespite the potential 
hazards of a country in continuous political and economic instability. Perhaps the most 
prominent story is that of de Bustros, the founder of the Chateau Kefraya winery. 
Accounts of de Bustros’ successful wine enterprise are often seen in newspaper articles 
in local and international media, as well as images of the Kefraya region regularly 
featuring in tourism campaigns to promote Lebanon’s cultural traditions. Lebanon is 
depicted as a place of rural beauty, where tourists can escape to taste wine and eat at Le 
Relais de Dionysius, which overlooks the vineyards and chateau of Kefraya. Credit is 
also given to de Bustros for the successful establishment of the Chateau Kefraya winery 
in 1979, when the conflict in Lebanon intensified dramatically. Equally important, 
however, were his viticulture initiatives that transformed a whole region into a 
landscape of vineyards. De Bustros began modifying family lands in Kefraya as early 
as 1951. Even then his business pursuits were considered extraordinary. In the excerpt 
below, from his memoirs, published in 2002, entitled D’Haute d’une Breteche, de 
Bustros speaks of his early days in Kefraya: 
 
I was regarded as an outsider by my entourage. Not impressed thus far, I proceeded to extend this 
vineyard in 1953: 15 acres of land were cleared with dynamite and more vines were planted. I was 
devoted to my project and in a succession of waves from 1958 until 1978 I cleared land and 
created 300 hectares of vineyards; the grapes were sold to different wineries. (de Bustros, 2001: 
16; my translation) 
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Following the transformation of his family lands in Kefraya, de Bustros turned to local 
residents in the Kefraya village, offering to pay upfront if they would plant 
vinesmainly of the Cinsault varietals. By the time of my fieldwork, the Kefraya 
region, with over 700 hectares of vines, had become the winegrowing hub of Lebanon 
and the most important source of grapes for most of the country’s wineries. Some 
wineries rely upon the region’s grapes as a back-up during low-yielding harvests, while 
others return annually. There were, at the time, two other wineries in Kefraya: Cave 
Kouroum and Chateau Marsyas. Cave Kouroum is owned by Bassim Rahal from the 
Kefraya village. The Chateau Marsyas winery was under construction, and is located on 
the outskirts of the Kefraya municipality. The major investors are from the Saade 
familya mercantile family involved in wider networks of trade and banking. Yet the 
uniqueness of Chateau Kefraya remains, perhaps because it is eponymous with the 
region from which grapes were sourced exclusively for its wines. No other winery in 
Lebanon could lay such a claim.  
The prestige of de Bustros, as featured within the narratives of those I met 
during fieldwork, is based upon his accomplishments and success in his contribution to 
the establishment of a wine enterprise in Lebanon; one that traverses different layers of 
the local and global wine markets.  Indeed the Comte de M 1996 vintage, which 
received a 91 (outstanding) rating in Robert Parker’s Wine Advocate, was a trailblazer 
for the entry of Lebanese wines into the international high-end wine market.  
Many informants from outside the Kefraya village described de Bustros as the 
“original aristocrat”, referring to his family’s historical ties to the Beirut mercantile 
classes. He was recognised as one of the few early “pioneers” of the Bekaa Valley, for 
he saw the potential of the land. Mr Ramzi Ghosn, of the Massaya winery, spoke of de 
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Bustros’ strategies as “geopolitical manoeuvres”. As I followed him up one of the 
coteaux of Kefraya during an early summer afternoon, Ghosn asked what would be 
more pleasing to the eye, fields of potatoes or a landscape of vines planted 
geometrically so that they trace and enunciate the hills on which they were planted? 
Making wine, he explained, was better for the economy of Lebanon. After all, what is 
best for a country to be known forwine or potatoes? De Bustros, Ghosn concluded, 
was the man who started such a tradition for Lebanon. Indeed de Bustros shared a 
similar view, informing me during an interview that “Kefraya was from my parents”, 
and until he had started planting vines, “Kefraya was not anything that they looked 
after, it was just somewhere in Lebanona property of land”. With the plantation of 
the vines, Kefraya was no longer just a ‘”property” of land that the family had acquired 
by way of a maternal aunt at the beginning of twentieth century; it was transformed into 
a landscape: a distinctive place that invokedor demandeda certain kind of aesthetic 
appreciation.     
Such narratives of de Bustros’ were suggestive of the qualities attributed to 
successful wine producers in Lebanon. After all, these accounts highlight not only his 
charisma and foresight in identifying the potential of his family’s lands in Kefraya, but 
also his initiative in identifying wine as an appropriate product for Lebanon to export to 
international markets. All the more notable here however, was the absence of the 
vineyard owners of Kefraya in these narratives. When I asked informants for their 
thoughts on the contribution of residents of Kefraya to the landscape, on a number of 
occasions winery owners from across the country explained that while the village was 
full of vines, “there was no culture of vines per se”, and nobody from the region fully 
appreciated “the beauty of the paysage (French for landscape)”, or for that matter drank 
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the wines of Kefraya. As one informant asked me, “Do you see them celebrating the 
harvest like they do in Bordeaux?” When I suggested that the Kefraya vineyard owners 
might appreciate their vines differently, my informant responded that no one from the 
region was really interested in working to create a landscape of vines, “they just come 
out during the harvest to oversee the Bedouins who pick the grapes”. 
In conjunction with these explanations, de Bustros was described as someone 
who loved Kefraya “because he loves the vines as well”. Indeed, during an interview 
expressed such sentiments by telling me of his desire for his burial site to be perched on 
top of the Ramatani hill that overlooks the vineyards of Kefraya. Notably, such 
accounts led to a discussion about a rather important topic: the majority of people from 
Kefraya were unwilling to comply with demands to replace their Cinsault vines with 
noble varieties deemed to produce better quality wines for international markets. It was 
suggested that de Bustros was more willing to change the types of varietals he had 
initially planted to ensure the augmentation of Chateau Kefraya’s wines; and 
significantly this was even after the winery opened to other investors such as Walid 
Junblatt, who own up to 70% of the company’s shares.  
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Vineyards leading towards the Ramatani Hill, in the distance. 
Such a manner of representation resonates with Ulin’s observations of the 
cooperatives of table wine producers in the Aquitaine region of southwest France (1987 
& 1996). That is, the strong historical focus and emphasis on Bordeaux merchants and 
elite wine growers reified their cultural capital and provided legitimacy for their 
recognition as the rightful possessors of (authentic) knowledge about the production of 
high-quality wines. Other parallels also surface. Similarly to these cooperatives, the 
Kefraya vineyard owners were notably absent from media sources and historical and 
scientific records of wine production in Lebanon. Indeed, from newspaper articles to 
books, the vineyard owners of Kefraya remained in the background and almost 
invisible, while de Bustros and Chateau Kefraya were usually brought to the fore of the 
viticulture landscape (see, for example, Karam, 2005).  
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In this light, usage of the term landscape takes on more significant connotations, 
especially in regard to a geographical study of the viticulture landscape of the Bekaa 
Valley. The author of this study begins by offering a definition of the term paysage 
(landscape) as conceptualised by the European Council in 2000: “Article 1 defines 
landscape as an area, (as perceived by people,) whose character is the result of the 
actions and interactions of natural and/or human factors” (Bel, 2009: 19 my 
translation). Bel suggests that viticulture landscapes are unique because of their ability 
to bring forth the distinguishing features of a place through their wines.  He argues that 
despite the fact that viticulture is subject to regulations imposed by the state and 
international organizations such as the OIV, it is the particular cultural history of the 
region that shapes the viticulture landscape. In the case of Lebanon, he observes that 
there are very few regions that fit with this definition of a viticulture landscape.  
Vineyards (for wine) cover about 14,000 hectares of Lebanon, with a few 
scattered across the slopes of Mount Lebanon and the northern coastal regions of Jbeil. 
These, however, are merely small patches of vines planted alongside other agricultural 
produce such as olive trees. The area that fits most closely with Bel’s definition is the 
Bekaa Valley, which he calls Lebanon’s “viticulture corridor”. Yet even within the 
Bekaa, Bel could find few regions with an extensive viticulture system. In the north of 
the Bekaa, the Coteaux Heliopolis Cooperative’s members were vineyard owners from 
the villages of Ainata, Yamouneh, and Boucheit. The cooperative was founded in 1999 
by the current manager, Dr Sami Rahme, from Ainata, as an initiative to replace the 
growth of illicit crops such as hashish and opium poppies, and with financial and 
technical support from the French government. According to Bel’s figures, these 
vineyards cover approximately 136.3 hectares and are considerable in comparison to 
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the minute five hectares of vines belonging to Mr Sebastien Khoury of Domaine de 
Baal, over in Zahle in Central Bekaa. Yet the vineyards of the cooperative are 
irregularly spread out and thus, visually speaking, lack consistency.  This is a similar 
situation to the owners of larger vineyards across the Bekaa Valley who sell their 
grapes to Chateau Ksara, where the viticulture landscape is broken up across the plains 
and slopes.  
The sheer uniformity of Kefraya’s viticulture, however, makes the region the 
most “dynamic” landscape in Lebanon. “Dynamic”, as Bel notes hastily in a footnote, 
does not refer to the quality of the vines; for as he points out later on, the Kefraya 
region is covered with approximately 60% of Cinsault. The term “dynamic” refers 
specifically to the surface region covered by vines and in the “true sense of the term, a 
monoculture of vines” (ibid: 82).  While describing Kefraya as dynamic, Bel does not 
speak of the viticulteurs of Kefraya as he does the viticultuers of the Bekaa.  In fact he 
opens his discussion of Kefraya by stating that “with 752 hectares of vines” Chateau 
Kefraya constitutes the largest region of vines in Lebanon (ibid). Bel fails to mention 
that only approximately 300 hectares of these vines actually belong to the Chateau 
Kefraya estate. The other 400 hectares or so belong predominantly to Kefraya villagers. 
He continues to write that if the Jesuits can be recognised as the founding fathers of the 
modern wine industry, it is de Bustros who should be acknowledged as a key figure in 
the expansion of the viticulture landscape of Lebanon. Since then, the region has been 
of interest to other wine producers such as Cave Kouroum (whose owner, he fails to 
mention, is from Kefraya village) and more recently, Chateau Marsyas, who Bel reports 
holds 55 hectares with 6,000 vines per hectare.   
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In many respects, the absence of Kefraya’s vineyard owners from Bel’s analysis 
reflects the less formal narratives told to me by many of the winery owners across the 
country. The similar usages of the term “landscape”, or “paysage”, by Bel and the 
winery owners is suggestive of the reproductionor replicationof a particular model 
of place that is contingent on other strategies in the production of wine (Gudeman and 
Rivera, 1990). Significantly, landscapes of wine production have a tendency to produce 
certain aesthetic values such as notions of authenticity and history. Narratives featuring 
a chateau, an aristocrat, and his vineyards thus speak of an aesthetic disposition and 
subsequently of what Bourdieu terms a sense of “legitimate superiority” (1984). Here, 
the perpetuation and celebration “of the essence by virtue of which they are 
accomplished” generate the value of the viticulture landscape as one that is unique and 
distinctive; and it attains even more singularity through its attachment to one particular 
man (1984: 24). That is, a sense of historicity emerges, whereby credit is given to de 
Bustros in forming a landscape of vineyards and a chateau that can easily be 
categorized alongside other exclusive viticulture regions across the world, but 
especially perhaps in relation to France. At the same time and within this sense of 
historicity, the vineyard owners of Kefraya seemingly lack a sense of wine culture, or 
so they appear, and thus their roles in viticulture have quite literally been written out of 
the history of wine production in Kefraya and, subsequently, Lebanon as well.   
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Vineyards during the harvest with seasonal workers carrying crates on their shouldersin the 
background Chateau Kefraya is concealed by trees. 
 
 
The Landscape as a Metaphor for Changing Models in Kefraya 
The absence of Kefraya residents from even the most official narratives potentially 
evokes how silences within historical records, as Ulin points out, elucidate what Wolf 
considers a broader reflection on the social relations of power (1987 & Wolf, 2010). 
Yet Ulin demonstrates that the Aquitaine table wine producers were hardly passive 
actors, as they continued to deploy strategies in order to assert power, and at times 
counter their subjugation. Exploring the ways table wine producers actively sought to 
ensure a position within the wine market not only contributes towards balancing the 
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perspective but can also shed light on how elite structures and models are culturally 
reproduced by table wine growers.  
With this in mind, Kefraya, I was frequently told by its residents, had the “the 
most beautiful munẓar (landscape) in the whole country”. The etymology of the word 
munẓar is of significance here, as it derives from the word naẓar and can refer to 
different ways of perceiving an object. These include: “to glance” and “to gaze”, as 
well as more explicit forms of surveillance such as “to oversee” or “to supervise.”  
Munẓar in this regard is already suggestive of a way of “seeing” that can perhaps imply 
a particular position where one is able “to supervise, see, or look from above.” To speak 
of the Kefraya munẓar thus resonates somewhat with Cosgrove’s definition of 
landscape as a particular cultural representation of the world where one adopts “the role 
of observer rather than participant’” (1984: 18). In this way, and contrary to the views 
expressed by many wine owners and managers, such narratives of the beautiful Kefraya 
munẓar were indicative of a shared appreciation for the aesthetic values portrayed in 
the accounts in the preceding section.      
Notably, explanations about the Kefraya landscape by local residents often 
begin by emphasizing its tranquillity. As the owner of a fast food restaurant in Kefraya 
explained to me, “The munẓar of the karam (vineyard) and chateau of Kefraya is 
beautiful and calming”.17 He went to explain, “This is what we have here in Kefraya, 
and everything is peaceful. It is calmso different from all the chaos and noise in the 
rest of Lebanon”.  He had a point: there was something very different about Kefraya. 
With a population of approximately 1,200 residents, the region was quite distinct in 
                                                 
17 Conversations with most Kefraya residents were in Arabic. Unless otherwise stated, I have translated all 
quotes and narratives from our discussions.  
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comparison to the hustle and bustle of urbanised areas across the plains or even the 
neighbouring villages where fields of agricultural crops were a broken-up patchwork of 
plots surrounding peoples’ homes. Kefraya was, as Bel describes, “a sea of vines”.  
There was the occasional fig tree, a small cluster of olive trees, and a group of 
miniature pine trees growing on a sloping plot of land further up into the village. Many 
of the villagers’ homes were quite ornate with rustic red roofs. In the plains below, 
Chateau Kefraya added to the pastoral character of the scenery.  
At a glance, the greenery and foliage that covers vast amounts of the region 
appears both static and unchanging. There is always a sense of tranquillity in Kefraya 
village, especially during the early summer months. Families, out on their verandas and 
balconies, shout out to invite those strolling by. The scent of freshly made mulberry 
cordial intermingles with the kahwa aroma and drifts on the breeze across the plains. 
Crickets sing, while cars driven by young men zoom along the village roads. During 
fieldwork, I often took the opportunity to go for a leisurely walk at this time. After the 
cold winter nights stuck indoors and sleeping next to the hot stove, I appreciated the 
warm sun and fresh air. Most of the village is situated up in the hills, and sometimes my 
walk would take me down towards the flatter plains near the area known locally as the 
Ḥerj (wooded area), which is covered in vines. Other times my stroll took me across the 
hills to the region known as the Mound of Sand, also covered in vines.    
I was usually fortunate to have received invitations earlier in the day, so 
following my late afternoon walks I would arrive at the house of my host. During visits, 
my hosts were keen to hear about recent findings and my adventures across the Bekaa 
Valley. Who had I visited in the north of the Bekaa and what grapes did they grow? 
There were some awkward moments when I felt that saying too much would leave me 
129 
 
in a compromising position. Topics of conversations would then usually change and 
more coffee was poured. Despite this momentary discomfort, I really enjoyed my 
evening visits in Kefraya. It was a relaxing time and as we placed our empty coffee 
cups back on their saucers; there would often be a collective sigh as everyone gazed out 
onto the landscape. I would then be told, usually with a great deal of pride, that Kefraya 
had the most beautiful landscape. When pressed for an explanation about why it was 
beautiful, many residents would recount the narrative of de Bustros and his role in 
transforming the region. 
In these narratives, people from Kefraya, of different generations and families, 
referred to de Bustros as Khawaja, a word with Ottoman roots, meaning “esteemed sir.” 
I was told that by the 1950s, the Khawaja had encouraged residents to grow vines and 
offered many interest-free loans to people to buy Cinsault vines. These vines were from 
France, thus ensuring that phylloxera resistant rootstock was grafted onto the vine. 
Repayment usually began three years later, once the vines yielded grapes, which were 
then sold off to wineries such as Chateaux Musar, Ksara and Nakad. Residents 
explained that when de Bustros transformed the landscapeand the vineyards were 
extended out onto the lands owned by the villagershe made the region “known” 
(ma’r ūf). This was because before de Bustros decided to plant vines, there was nothing 
in Kefraya to see. Nobody knew where Kefraya wasor that it even existed. Here, 
“nothing” implied that Kefraya was a place where only lentils and chickpeas were 
cultivated, primarily for personal consumption. Following the transformation of the 
munẓar (landscape), people started to come from all over the world to visit and “see” 
Kefraya.   
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Such narratives of the beautiful landscape featured what Gilsenan describes as a 
“new quality deriving from changing times” (1996: 59). These stories after all 
recounted the roles of elites “in articulating” spatial divides between “periphery and 
centre” during the modernization of Lebanon, and in this way spoke of a history 
pertaining to changing social relations of power (Gilsenan, 1984: 460). For when 
residents narrated the emergence of the munẓar in Kefraya, because of the kouroum, 
they were also telling a story about the changes of a rural regionfrom one located on 
the peripheries of a newly independent state, to one fully integrated into the Lebanese 
political economy, as well as a centre for wine production and a marketplace for grapes.  
Yet, as with many of the wineries in Lebanon where direct or indirect financial 
capital flowed from other investors, the Chateau Kefraya winery is no longer 
predominantly owned by de Bustros and his family. By the late 1980s, the winery was 
opened to other investors, including Junblatt and members of the Fattal family, who 
owned the giant distributing company, Fattal et Fils. A somewhat defiant de Bustros 
told me during an interview that, “it was and is only me in Kefraya”. However, while 
de Bustros may have been quick to assert his autonomy in response to my query about 
how the company had changed in the transition from a family run enterprise to 
something more corporate, he later explained with a sigh that, “for a company to grow 
and expand, one must make it open to outside investors”.   
When residents discussed the management restructuring of Chateau Kefraya, it 
was usually with reference to their changing relationship with the Khawaja and the 
landscape. Many explained that unlike in earlier times, they were never sure when the 
Khawaja had arrived from Beirut to stay in the chateau. It was only the estate guards 
who had this knowledge; and many of them were not from the Kefraya region. The 
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guards, I am told, were hired by Junblatt.  Narratives of the munẓar al karam thus 
changed, and in this way, positions on the landscape also shifted, signifying the 
emergence of new relations of power. The Khawaja was described as a different 
person, and people said they rarely saw de Bustros because he had lost interest in 
Kefraya. When pressed for further explanation, some residents explained that during 
the harvest there was usually a degree of uncertainty as to who would be buying their 
grapesand more importantly, how much they would be sold for. This is highlighted in 
many of the conversations I had during my visits to peoples’ homes; there was a vested 
interest in obtaining information about the wineries’ plans in Kefraya in the coming 
harvest. I was told that continuing pressure from wineries such as Chateaux Kefraya 
and Ksara to plant grape varietals other than Cinsault meant that the price for these 
grapes remained volatile.  
One informant explained that up until the 1990sjust after the warde Bustros 
had offered vineyard owners financial support to buy vines. De Bustros would organize 
soil analysis to ensure the best rootstock was grafted on the vines that were brought 
over from France in his name. So, for example, my informant’s father had asked for 
5000 saplings between 1975 and 1995. More recently, when my informant had 
requested financial support to purchase the Cabernet Sauvignon vines that were more in 
demand by the wineries, de Bustros was, apparently, no longer willingor ableto 
help. I was told, and as we shall see in the following section, that as de Bustros’ direct 
control over production weakened, so too did his ties with particular residents in 
Kefraya.  
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The Landscape as a Source of Status-Honour  
The role of the Khawaja in the narratives of the munẓar of Kefraya thus conformed “to 
practical aesthetic expectation”, speaking of the “virtues” and qualities that a man of 
respect and honour should possess (Gilsenan, 1996: 60). For in bequeathing to Kefraya 
residents the landscape, de Bustros participated in a particular gift-exchange 
relationship.  That is, the source of his honour as the patron of the kouroum was largely 
founded upon the indebtedness of local residents, where repayment was not only 
monetary but also in preserving and commemorating his important role in making 
history in Kefraya (Davis, 1973).  
In this light, it is useful to recall that in Chapter Two, I discussed Gilsenan’s 
notion of “status-honour” and how such ideas were reinforced through elaborate 
performances in “the chateau or villa in the countryside” (1984: 462). In Kefraya, 
evidence of early forms of display of status-honour come by way of the autobiographies 
written (in French) by de Bustros and his father, the late Nicholas de Bustros. In his 
memoirs, Nicholas de Bustros refers to his “villa” in Kefraya, and of the shame brought 
upon his family by President Chamoun, who in 1956 failed to stop at the chateau when 
he was en route to inaugurate the newly constructed dam further south in the Bekaa 
(1983). This was despite the reception organized by Nicholas de Bustros and the 
villagers of Kefrayawhom, he writes, potentially lost honour and dignity due to the 
disrespect shown by the president in not attending the reception. In the memoirs of his 
son, Michel de Bustros, the story of President Chamoun’s discourteous dismissal of the 
invitation to the “chateau” is discussed with the same disdain as in his father’s account. 
The chateau is also mentioned frequently as a place where heads of state, ambassadors, 
and other powerful figures visit for wine-tasting soirees and meals in the gardens.   
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It is interesting, however, that I did not encounter such displays during my stay 
in Kefraya. While this may have been because I was simply not invited to such events, 
there is some significance in the way that narratives of the beautiful landscape of 
Kefraya, and the sense of status-honour associated with it, were frequently spoken 
about in relation to the past actions of the Khawaja. Also of relevance was that many in 
Kefraya acknowledged that narratives about preserving the Khawaja’s sense of status-
honour were especially important to the Nabhane family. The patriarch, Mr Nabhane 
Nabhane was the wakil at Chateau Kefraya, and was recognised by many in the village 
for the intimate knowledge he had of the Kefraya landscape; knowledge deriving 
mainly from his experience working with his father, a couple of decades or so ago. It 
was also his father, Abdel-Helim Nabhane, who has long since passed away, who 
planted the first vines in Kefraya with de Bustrosand encouraged others in the village 
to accept the Khawaja’s propositions in the then newly-established Lebanese state.  
Following the death of Abdel-Helim, his son, Nabhane, carried on the task of 
beautifying the Kefraya landscape. Like his father, Nabhane continued to act as a wakil, 
a role that appeared to hold some similarities to the social category of the wakil 
mentioned in Gilsenan’s ethnography and described as “deputies in charge of managing 
landholdings for beys” (ibid: 49). Yet we shall see, the role of wakil extended beyond 
the management of the Chateau Kefraya estate, and there were some parallels with the 
Schneiders’ description of the “estate superintendents” of Sicily, who played central 
roles not only in the economic but also social organization of the large landowners’ 
latifunda” (1976: 7). 
After taking over the position of wakil, Nabhane worked with a number of 
French (and one Spanish) oenologists hired by Chateau Kefraya. He had assisted many 
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in gaining familiarity with the landscape of Kefraya and especially with the climate, 
and this allowed one winemaker to produce the celebrated 1996 Comte de M. Nabhane 
was also responsible for ensuring that Kefraya residents were aware of the amount of 
grapes the winery was expecting to buy from the village in each harvest. Nabhane 
therefore knew as much about the vineyards in the village as he did about the Chateau 
Kefraya estate. Indeed, he often advised other wineries coming from outside Kefraya 
about the vineyards in the village that might be most suitable for their needs. It was 
quite common to meet an owner or manager from one of the small-scale wineries as 
they sat with Nabhane on the veranda of his villa, commanding a view of the sahel 
(plains) and Chateau Kefraya. 
Nabhane’s influence extended beyond the kouroum of Kefraya. According to 
Nabhane, when de Bustros began to renovate the Chateau and winery at the end of the 
civil war, he asked Nabhane “to speak with everyone in the village who wanted to build 
new homes”. Nabhane explained that “We must try and make them with red roofsto 
make the mnuẓar (landscape) beautiful”. The timing of de Bustros’ request was quite 
interesting however, because it was made at the time when the winery had been opened 
to outside investors such as Junblatt. It appears that Junblatt had initially banned de 
Bustros from entering the chateau. While Junblatt’s reasons remained obscure it was 
Nabhane who negotiated with the politician and his guards at the chateau to allow the 
Khawaja to return. As the story goes:  
The Khawaja was in Beirut and Junblatt came to visit the winery. He was standing outside the 
winery with his shebab (young men). He waved and greeted me, before inviting me to join him 
and his men for lunch at that restaurant down by the lake. I was at first willing. Then he asked me 
‘So where is the “Comte” today? In the Chateau?’ He started laughing and everyone else did as 
well. I would not take this, I turned around and left. Just like that. 
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Nabhane emphasized the words “Comte” and “Chateau” so to indicate that Junblatt was 
mocking the Khawaja. Given Junblatt’s reputation in politics and also in war, 
Nabhane’s actions were really quite brave. When I asked Nabhane why he felt obliged 
to defend the Khawaja’s honour, he pointed his index finger towards his chest, “Ana (I 
am) Nabhane Abdel-Helim Nabhane.” It was made clear that his loyalty to de Bustros 
had to do with maintaining the honour of his fatherwhose actions were an important 
source of Nabhane’s own influential position in Kefraya’s viticulture landscape. For in 
maintaining the reputation of the Nabhane family as influential and knowledgeable 
actors in Kefraya’s kouroum, Nabhane was able to uphold the family’s “good name” 
that had started with the arrival of the landscape (Davis, 1973: 22). In preserving the 
memory of de Bustros’ role in beautifying the landscape, it appeared that there was, for 
Nabhane, a clear sense of carrying on the legacy his father had started so many years 
ago. 
A reminder of how important it was to continue the legacy of the landscape 
came to the fore at the entrance to Nabhane’s house, where a framed black and white 
photograph of the late Abdel Helim hung as the centre piece. Dressed in a gentleman’s 
jacket and head scarf, the patriarch stood regal, with his arm extended to rest on a table. 
To the right was a photo-portrait of his son, Nabhane’s brother, who died from a heart 
attack. On the left of Abdel Helim was a framed article from the Lebanese newspaper 
An-Nahar, dated from 1979. The photograph depicted the Chateau of Kefraya 
surrounded by fields of wheat. In the distance, a woman held a sickle in her upraised 
arm as she cut the ripe grain.  This was one of Nabhane’s sisters, who had since married 
and lived in the villa just below Nabhane’s house. 
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Nabhane’s relationship with de Bustros was, however, not as close as his 
father’s had been. One afternoon we were sitting in his jeep, parked at a strategic 
viewpoint that allowed Nabhane to oversee the pruners below. He pointed in the 
distance towards a pile of limestone rocks on the perimeter of one of Chateau Kefraya’s 
vineyards. While these rocks did not appear out of place to me, they were actually 
rubble from the days when de Bustros had used dynamite to make way for the 
vineyards. According to Nabhane, it was Abdel Helim who had organized the 
dynamiting and bulldozing of those rocks. Following these events, Abdel Helim 
ensured the vines were planted geometrically and that each vineyard appeared 
symmetrical to the other. Nabhane concluded by asking me somewhat rhetorically, 
“who was it to convince the other villages to accept de Bustros’ offer of loans for the 
vines?”  
There seemed to be little public recognition for the role of father and son by de 
Bustros and the winery. Still, in de Bustros’ memoirs, Abdel Helim is one of very few 
people from the village who are mentioned; he is described as de Bustros’ homme de 
confiance in Kefraya. Even then, Abdel Helim’s character is usually present only to 
emphasize the stronger character of de Bustros. I had also discussed de Bustros’ 
memoirs with Nabhane’s maternal uncle, who was the Mukhtar of the village. Although 
I did not purposefully instigate the discussion, I was reading de Bustros’ memoirs one 
evening as I sat with the Mukhtar and his wife in their salon. The Mukhtar did not read 
French and was interested to hear whether Abdel Helim was mentioned in de Bustros’ 
autobiography. I explained the discussion of Adel Helim’s role in protecting the 
Khawaja during the civil war. The Mukhtar nodded his head and then insisted that I 
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speak with Nabhane to hear more of what his father had done to assist the Khawaja 
during the war.   
When I finally had the opportunity to ask Nabhane, we were once more out in 
his jeep but this time next to the rocks he had pointed out weeks earlier. Nabhane 
stopped the jeep rather abruptly and nodded towards a rock he had once called the 
“guitar rock” because of its distinctive shape. The “guitar rock” was perched next to a 
larger pile of rocks where the Syrian army had camped. Nabhane explained that there 
had been considerable concern the army might occupy the chateau and in so doing, 
eventually take over the whole of Kefraya. It was his father who had convinced them to 
stay away from the chateau. Once again Nabhane appeared upset that de Bustros had 
not publically recognised the actions of his father. When I asked Nabhane what sort of 
acknowledgement he expected, he explained that following the management 
restructuring of the winery, de Bustros had started to distance himself from the 
Nabhane family and consequently the village as whole. There were, according to 
Nabhane, currently “too many managers” at the winery and the Beirut office who were 
paid considerably larger salaries than those who pruned the vineyards or worked in the 
winery. He felt that these managers, including the oenologist who held the title of 
“technical manager” and who had come to be entrusted with important decisions that 
affected many in Kefraya, were largely responsible for the breakdown of the 
relationship between the region’s vineyard owners and the winery. This had to do with 
the issue that many in Kefraya were unable (or unwilling) to comply with the demand 
to plant new vines. That the Khawaja no longer provided financial assistance for 
purchasing these vines meant the future of Kefraya’s viticulture landscape was full of 
uncertainty.  
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Given that many managers at Chateau Kefraya did not seem to share or value 
the contribution of the Nabhane family to the formation of the landscape, potential 
future developments were also quite important to Nabhane. For as the Khawaja aged 
and the authority he apparently once wielded was weakened by new management 
structures, the winery and the village grew increasingly estranged. Nabhane also 
reminded me that there did not appear to be any son willing to take the place of the 
Khawaja. Once Nabhane’s teenage son had finished his studies, the likelihood of 
inheriting Nabhane’s role as wakil was quite slim. On being asked about his son’s 
future work prospects, Nabhane made clear that the best road for Abdo was one where 
he learnt how to “become a man of the pen and not of the land”. In other words, there 
was no real value in working the land, and prosperity for the family lay in the type of 
work that had come to be valued at the Chateau Kefraya winery. Thus even if Abdo did 
end up working at Chateau Kefraya, his position would be quite different to the one 
held by his father. Nevertheless, he still believed that the important role played by his 
family in transforming the landscape of Kefraya into a munẓar al karam would not be 
completely forgotten by future generationsbecause the sentiment to preserve and 
maintain its beauty would remain.  
The Landscape Incarnate  
The singular of kouroum is karam, which, in Arabic, spelt the same way, can also mean 
bountiful and generous (Wehr, 1976). It is interesting that when residents presented the 
narrative of the munẓar, karam and not kouroum was used to describe the arrival of the 
vineyards. Karam in the sense of bountiful was thus perhaps implied through narratives 
that spoke of the munẓar that arrived with the kouroum. A notable narrative of this kind 
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was that articulated through certain types of exchanges that occurred between the 
Nabhane family and de Bustros.  
While the relationship between Nabhane and the winery had become somewhat 
strained in the last decade or so, there was still some level of care taken by de Bustros 
to maintain bonds with the Nabhane family. On a couple of occasions during the 
summer months, the Khawaja sent his driver to the Nabhane household to deliver some 
freshly caught and cooked fish. During these occasions, Abdel Helim’s widow, Hajjeh 
Nabhane, who at the time rarely joined everyone for lunch, would also sit down to 
share the meal with the rest of the family. Such fish was apparently her favourite dish, 
and it would take precedence on the table, being served solely with the rice that was 
delivered with it, without any other accompaniments. Gifts also flowed in the opposite 
direction, and the Nabhane household made sure to send foodstuffs to the Khawaja.  
Significantly, all the produce sent came from the Nabhanes’ kouroum. During 
springtime, delicately stuffed vines leaves, made from the smallest of leaves, were 
wrapped by Hajjeh Nabhane's youngest daughter, Dunya, who also lives at the Nabhane 
household. These exchanges were seasonal, and thus both cyclical and continuous, 
evoking a sense of “food generosity”the produce from the kouroum spoke of a long 
history of karam (generosity). In this way these reciprocal exchanges were much like 
those food exchanges observed by Sutton in Kalymnian that articulated ideals of 
personhood through sustaining a shared sense of historical continuity (2001: 16). This 
process also resonates with Palmer's work on the Bedouin and fellahin in Jordan, where 
she identifies the way that food relations are embedded historically within hierarchical 
relations (2002).  The commensality of sitting at the table with only the food sent over 
by the Khawaja can be seen, therefore, to not only symbolize his social status, but his 
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political and economic influence, with his gifts informing the way “his” food is eaten in 
his employee’s home. The Khawaja’s influence, then, was not confined to the 
productive sphere of the winery, but rather entered into the domestic domain.   
Yet these acts of remembrance that lay claim to status and honour, while of 
strong symbolic importance, seemed to be predominantly metaphoricalprecisely 
because de Bustros did not appear to be as influential in affecting what would unfold 
across the Kefraya landscape as he once had been. Nevertheless, he still held the 
honorary title of Khawaja, and this, the villagers said, was because of Hajjeh 
Nabhane’s husband, the late Abdel Helim. “Food generosity” therefore collapsed space 
and time as it called forth previous actors such as the late Abdel Helim. The ways in 
which commensality was practiced in the home commemorated the memory, life, and 
honour of Abdel Helim Nabhane, and reinforced inter-household relations across 
generations.   
Thus, for Nabhane, and indeed for many of the people of Kefraya, the landscape 
did not imply a complete and finished narrative but rather an unfoldingor tellingof 
a particular story of and by those who had physically worked to carve out that 
landscape. That is, the social significance of the landscape in Kefraya could be 
understood as “an enduring record ofand testimony tothe lives and works of past 
generations who dwelt within it, and in so doing have left there something for 
themselves” (Ingold, 2000: 204). Such importance of the landscape came to the fore 
during the intimate everyday engagement residents in Kefraya had with certain types of 
kouroum. I say “types” because the word kouroum in Arabic and its singular, karam, 
can also be used to refer to an olive grove, a fig orchard, or a vineyard. An olive grove 
is known as karam al zaitoun and its plural is kouroum al zaitoun. A fig orchard is 
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karam al teen and the plural, kouroum al teen, while kouroum al ‘anab signifies 
vineyards. While the number of olive and fig trees was minute in comparison to the 
vineyards, and were at times hard to see across the landscape, these plants were still 
important to Kefraya residents. 
In Kefraya the Cinsault variety was known locally as Zaitouniy.18 The Zaitouniy 
grapes, I was told, have been in the kouroum since the karam arrived in Kefraya. In late 
summer, with the harvest around the corner, the plump Cinsault grape berries, with 
their deep purple hues, became olivish in characterhence the name Zaitouniy. It was 
not uncommon for the men of Kefraya to pick some of these grapes from the family's 
kouroum; at home the women would set some aside under the sun to dry into raisins. 
The Cinsault grapes are full of juice and sugar, and, I was informed are the best for 
making Zbīb (raisins) and grape juice.  
Encounters with the Zaitouniy grapes appeared to be part of the everyday 
consciousness of Kefraya residents: apparently mundane daily activities, such as 
picking grape leaves or drying certain kinds under the summer sun, (re)created and 
sustained a seasonal connection to the landscape of the karam. In this way, al karam al 
Zaitouniy, or the vineyard of the olivish, belonged to an ontological account that, 
although attached to the historical narrative of wine in Kefraya, diverged from more 
contemporary viticulture. It spoke of a genealogy of kinship and relatedness, and of the 
spaces where it was nurtured within Kefraya (c.f. Carsten, 2000). Here the intimacies of 
the kouroum, where grapes were connected to olives through etymological terminology, 
brought forth other senses of production and consumption related to the embodied act 
of eating. It evoked a similar sense of sociality and forging of bonds known as ‘ishra, 
                                                 
18 In Arabic grammar Zaitouniyy is a form of an-nisbah: a suffix is added to a noun in order to form an 
adjective. The suffix iyy is masculine and iyya(t) is feminine.   
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because these foods were never sold, but rather shared and exchanged through acts of 
kindness and generosity that allowed for a sense of reciprocity (Obeid, 2010 & Abu-
Lughod, 1999). Yet karam al Zaitouniy also evoked a seasonal association of the olive 
harvest to come, perhaps in a manner not too dissimilar to what Sutton describes as 
“prospective memory” (2001: 19). Autumn was thus as busy a time in the kouroum, as 
the grape harvest had been a month or so earlier.  
These olive trees appeared for the first time in Kefraya a couple of decades 
before the Zaitouniy grapes and, like the grapes, the olive saplings were imported from 
Europe. But this time the plants came from Italy instead of France, and some residents 
in Kefraya still kept the wooden crates with the date of the olive saplings’ 
import1934stamped on the side. The reasons why Italian olives were chosen or 
favoured over local varieties remain unclear19. Nevertheless the narrative of the olives 
describes the hands that planted these saplings as those same hands that planted the 
Zaitouniy grapesKefraya’s forefathers. Despite this patriarchal legacy, much of the 
work that took place in the kouroum al zaitoun was done by the women of Kefraya. 
Apart from driving the olives to the makbis (press), the women were usually the ones 
out in the kouroum, rustling the trees. They were also the ones at home plucking olive 
pods from the stems, before allowing the olives to soak in cold water for a period of 
time, usually up to a month. For, unlike the grapes, most (if not all) of the olives reaped 
from the kouroum were kept for consumption within the home. The villagers of 
Kefraya ate olives mainly in the form of olive oil. Al zait zaitoun (olive oil) was poured 
into jars full of cured olives or strained labneh (yoghurt), the latter being rolled into 
                                                 
19 It is possible that the importation of these olive saplings might have been part of a larger agricultural 
project at the time facilitated by the investment by Lebanese entrepreneurs and coupled with the “aggressive 
Italian marketing of fruit trees” (Gates, 1998:133).  
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balls. These jars were stored in the kitchen throughout the year and spoonsful of the 
stored foods were scooped out into little bowls, commonly placed on the kitchen table 
or a large round tray carried out to the living room or balcony.  
These practices did not only mean that foods were available throughout the 
seasons, they also left traces of the karam al zaitoun and Zaitouniymerged together 
as they seeped across the seasons and entered into daily life; the olive oil soaked into 
the vine leaves that were stuffed with rice and meat. That the karam of the landscape 
was predominantly associated with activities that began in the kouroum, but were 
finished within the home, is suggestive of the ways in which the continuity of narratives 
was practiced. 
The olive harvest was quite different to that of the grapes in this respect. It was 
the men of Kefraya, out in their kouroum supervising the seasonal workers cutting the 
grapes that were then sent off to the wineries. There, only some of the grapes brought in 
by the men were kept for raisins or grape juice.  In the autumn, when women entered 
the kouroum and commenced the gathering process, the produce was once more kept 
and preserved entirely for eating in the home. I was told that the men were more 
involved in the olive harvest, and elder residents in Kefraya recalled memories of their 
fathers working in the olive groves. The elder residents lamented times gone by and the 
disconnection of the younger men from the kouroum. 
  On a number of occasions, many parents and elder residents of Kefraya told me 
that there was no future in type of kouroum for the young men. Nabhane explained that 
the reason for this sentiment was that the Chateau Kefraya winery’s policy did not 
allow minors to be hired to work during the grape harvest and many youngsters were 
left idle in the summer, when they could be earning from the kouroum of Chateau 
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Kefraya. Migrant workers were hired instead, yet many of these workers were in fact 
minors. More skilled adult workers such as his nephew Omar, for example, had 
expressed a desire to work in the kouroum and trained as an agricultural engineer at 
universitybut was unable to find employment. There was also little income to be 
made by looking after his family’s kouroum or others in Kefraya.  
With socio-economic and material transformations taking place in the kouroum 
of Kefraya, the narratives of karam (generosity) seemed to be increasingly reproduced 
in practices carried out by women. Such narratives had become an engendered form of 
knowledge, and a type of affective labour that was increasingly transmitted and 
reproduced though time by grandmothers, mothers, and daughters (c.f. Lem, 1999). 
Yet, as these practices shifted into the domestic realm, they were concealed by 
narratives of the landscape that spoke of commodity production of wine.  
Notably, however, changes did not only emerge from the strategies deployed by 
the wineries. Other, more dramatic events, such as the occupation of the region by the 
Israeli and Syrian armies during the 1980s also left a distinct impression within the 
minds of local residents. Many people left; some migrating to urban areas such as 
Beirut, while others went abroad. These accounts of the war period carried more weight 
given that wild edible plants were picked from the kouroum and sent to relatives in 
Beirut or abroad as reminders of home. Again, it was the women of Kefraya who were 
active in weaving and (re)binding these ties. Each year in spring, many of the women 
went out to the kouroum to pick the ḥindb’, one of the many wild edible plants that 
grew seasonally in small clusters among the vines (Edgecombe, 1970). The women 
would make sure that some of the plants were parboiled and frozen immediately. These 
would be set aside, awaiting the next person who might be making a trip abroad.   
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The landscape of the kouroum of Kefraya thus spoke continuously throughout 
the seasons of life genealogies and of the types of social relations involved in the 
preservation of that landscape. These social relations were formed through notions of 
kinship that allowed for a sense of family time to structure, or even at times perhaps 
take precedence over, “History” (Zonabend, 1984 & Goddard, 1996). Yet in the 
(re)production of a sense of place through “historical and social reflexivity”, Kefraya 
residents seeking to ensure the continuity of the landscape of karam also sought to 
forge a communal identity based upon a shared sense of family time, evoked through 
the cyclical temporality of the changing seasons (Seremetakis, 1996, Zonabend, 1984 & 
Goddard, 1996). In keeping of family time, a sense of family history was produced, 
which provided structure to broader historical events (ibid).  
The Materiality of the Landscape   
As the landscape moved towards the familial realm, there were significant shifts in the 
perception of de Bustros. These shifts were highlighted in explanations from residents 
about how de Bustros had obtained land in Kefraya. The significance of these accounts 
was not in the way de Bustros inherited the lands from his father, who had in turn 
received the lands from his maternal aunt, Mary Sursock. Rather, of interest was the 
fact that de Bustros was not from Kefraya. The reason why de Bustros was not from 
Kefraya was because neither he, nor any members of his family, had worked the land, 
as had the villagers and their fore-fathers. One vineyard owner, who was also a pruner 
employed by the Chateau Ksara winery, provided one such response: 
 
These lands can be given to one by a Khalto (maternal aunt), a brother or a father. Bustros is not 
from here and the land was given to his father from Khalto (maternal aunt) Mary Sursock who had 
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married someone from the Tueni family. No! They are not from here either. They had no children 
so they gave the land to other relatives. So you know how some work all their lives to get land and 
continue to live from the land until they die. . . . Then there are those who inherit big pieces of 
land and others the fellah like us from Kefraya, will also work in their land until we die! It is like 
this.  
Familial attachments to place that were brought forth in narratives of the Kefraya 
landscape also belonged therefore, to broader historical narratives of labour relations, as 
is suggested by the term fellah. The term fellah here has parallels with the way that 
Gilsenan suggests the term categorized agricultural labourers and sharecroppers in 
Berqayl (1996). Indeed, Kefraya residents constantly spoke of the link to agricultural 
labour by pointing out the similarity of this word to that of tilling the soil (felaha). The 
main difference is that, unlike Berqayl’s fellah (of the 1970s), most Kefraya residents 
were landowners. In Berqayl the term also referred to one particular category of social 
class within the village. In Kefraya however, fellahin (plural) was used both by those 
who owned lands and those who did not, to suggest their collective origin and 
difference from those who owned wineries and did not work directly in the tilling or 
working of the earth. At other times, the term was used to describe their rural 
background in contrast to those (like myself) who came from the city. Fellah, on one 
hand, referred to types of labour, such as the pruning that most Kefraya (male) residents 
did (and were doing less of). On the other hand, the term evoked a shared sense of 
belonging that also invoked a process of “othering”. In this way, fellah linked the 
domain of material labour used in carving out the landscape to the shared communal 
sense of family time. While seasonal interactions with the kouroum provided a 
continuity of kinship that was situated outside of, or concealed from, market 
production, narratives of fellah identity actively sought to lay claim to that history of 
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wine production. In so doing, residents were able to exercise some authority over more 
recent changes in labour and property relations.  
Notably, the process of “othering” shaped by this shared sense of fellahin 
identity did not only exclude those elites who had not worked on the land but also 
certain labourers who actually did. This was especially the case for seasonal migrant 
workers who came from Syria and beyond. While many of the winery managers 
referred to these workers as “Bedouins”, villagers pointed out that the term did not 
accurately represent all of those who came to Kefraya. Residents made a difference 
between the bedawy (Bedouin) and the shaghaly (deriving from the word for work). 
This distinction was also made by many of the migrant workers: those who fell under 
the category of “shaghaly” were Kurdish and/or Syrian. A few of these Syrian workers 
returned during the winter to continue working in the vineyards and some had set up 
semi-permanent campsites on the outskirts of the village. Interestingly, it was these 
workersas opposed to those perceived as the Bedouinwho were more actively 
excluded from this shared sense of belonging to Kefraya. Yet that is not to say that the 
Bedouin were included within this shared perception of social identity. Indeed, when I 
suggested to some residents that perhaps all migrant workers might be referred to as 
fellahin, it was explained that this would be impossible, because the Bedouin were 
nomadic and the shaghaly came from somewhere else.  
Still, many in Kefraya appeared to hold a romanticized view of the Bedouin. 
Bedouin women, for example, who were usually out picking grapes during the harvest 
while the men of Kefraya oversaw their work, were often described by the latter as 
sexually desirable, because of their exotic qualities. As one young man who drove the 
pick-up truck around the vineyards explained, “these Bedawiyya know and understand 
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pleasure”. While an exploration of representations of the noble (and seductive) 
“Bedouin savage” is a tempting route of analysis to follow, for our purposes here it is 
sufficient to point out that the Bedouin workers were often perceived with less disdain 
(c.f. Lavie, 1988: 41). Indeed the term shaghaly was somewhat derogatory, and many 
from Kefraya described these workers as completely opposite in character to the 
Bedouin. The shaghaly were not to be trusted and this was even the case with those 
such as Ahmed and his family, who had been in Kefraya for nearly two decades and 
had set up camp on the side of the main road not far from the chateau and village.   
Ahmed’s story has similarities with those recounted by Syrian migrant workers 
to Chalcraft (2009). Ahmed was a landowner in the north of Syria who grew crops and 
raised some cattle. According to him, he could not earn enough (if any) money farming 
his land.20 In an attempt to sustain the family’s farm and lands, Ahmed decided to seek 
work in Lebanon, sending remittances to his family. While he returned to Syria 
regularly, Ahmed and his brother, Mohammed, had over the years developed strong 
economic ties to Kefraya. During the early winter months, Ahmed and Mohammed 
arrived with their wives and younger children to carry and set fire to heavy bunches of 
vines pruned by vineyard owners in Kefraya and the pruners of Chateau Kefraya. If 
they were unable to finish before the heavy snow began, one of the brothers would 
return home to recruit other family members to help with the work. In the summer, 
Ahmed supervised Syrian workers as they picked grapes. While in the winter a majority 
                                                 
20 Chalcraft points out that until the 1970s wage labour was non-existent in Syrian family farming economies. 
While food production might have been sustainable, money was still required to buy other necessary 
commodities. As marketization expanded, money was increasing important for consumption and production. 
Chalcraft suggests that this was an important factor contributing to the influx of Syrian workers into 
Lebanon’s labour market, most of whom were predominantly smaller landowners trying to find the economic 
means to keep their lands (2009). 
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of men worked in the vineyards, most of the harvest workers were women, young girls, 
and children who were on summer vacation.  
It seemed that Ahmed had put into place a fruitful strategy that provided 
extended family with sufficient capital to keep their lands in Syria. Ahmed was proud 
of his accomplishments and hoped that I would visit his farm and village. There was 
also, apparently, a beautiful munẓar to be seen there, which stretched over many 
mountains. Even when days were especially laborious in Kefraya, and perhaps 
especially so, Ahmed recounted stories of the delicious milk and cheese that came from 
his cows. Yet in spite of such achievements, life in Kefraya was not always easy and 
comfortable. One on-going problem was the positioning of his family tent, because it 
was susceptible to flooding during heavy rainfall and consequently to mosquitos. 
One afternoon, after another hard day’s work carrying crates of grapes through 
the vineyards of Kefraya, Ahmed invited me to join him, his wife, and three children to 
break the Ramadan fast later on that evening. I was happy to accept the invitation for 
the iftar, and went off in search of some dessert that I could take to his family. 
Following iftar, Ahmed expressed his intention to make his living conditions more 
comfortable in Kefraya. However, renting a home was out of the question as prices 
were too high, and besides, he doubted that people in Kefraya would accept the 
“shaghaly” in one of their homes. But Ahmed hoped the family could move their tent 
out of the sahel and further up onto an empty plot of flat land located at the foot of 
Mount Lebanon. He explained that the soil was drier there, and water drained away 
quite effectively, and hence there were fewer bugs and mosquitos. Yet nobody in the 
village accepted his request to move. Given that I had become close to certain residents 
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of the village who were quite influential in swaying collective decisions, Ahmed asked 
if I would speak in his favour.  
I was reluctant to get involved; I did not know who the land belonged to and I 
really did not feel that it was my place to give an opinion. Curiosity, however, had got 
the better of me, and prior to my visit to Ahmed I had already heard some discussion 
about the topic at the local fast food restaurant. “Did you hear that Ahmed wants to 
move his tent up?” asked one man in his late forties to another. “Yes, and I know 
where”, said the other. “Well he can’t move it there, this will not be”. I began to 
wonder who owned the land.  There was, however, something peculiar about the drama 
that was unfolding, because it was only really after it began that I noticed an 
“anamolie” in the landscape. For despite the aesthetically pleasing “sea of vines”, there 
was one plot of land that remained fallowand this was the land where Ahmed hoped 
to set up his tent. My initial assumption was that there might be some family dispute 
over the ownership of the land.  
What I unearthed, however, was rather unexpected. The following day, after my 
visit to Ahmed, I paid a visit to an (anonymous) friend in the village. We were sitting in 
the kitchen, and her young sons were running in and out laughing and shouting at each 
other. I asked her why people did not want Ahmed to move there, and she shrugged and 
said, “The land is not good”. The conversation was left for some time, until I finally 
asked her, “How does one decide that land cannot be good?” She looked at me and 
shook her head, “You want to know everything!” I was embarrassed and decided to 
change the subject. Her eldest son overheard our discussion and came in to say “I know 
why Ahmed can’t put his tent there”. His mother glared at him, “You think you know? 
Go outside and play”.  He started to leave but turned to me and said quickly, “The land 
151 
 
is not good!” I was still embarrassed and so remained quiet, trying to think of 
something to say to change the subject. Finally my friend began to talk, “You know that 
in the war, there was a lot of fighting here. No, we did not really fight, just tried to 
make sure that nobody took our land. But the Syrian and Israeli armies were here for a 
while and they would fight each other”. I nodded, and wondered where this was going. 
She continued:  
Well the Israelis had set up camp on top of the mountain that overlooks Kefraya, and the Syrians 
were belowhere on the plains. One day, the Israelis stared throwing missiles and there were a 
lot of body parts of the soldiers on the land. We could not leave them lying around. So we had to 
go out and dig up the earth with spades and knives and bury them. That is what we had to do.   
The conversation ended and the topic was never alluded to again. When I bumped into 
Ahmed a few days later, I asked of his progress in moving. He avoided the topic of the 
fallow land and instead said that he had decided not to move as there were several 
advantages to residing adjacent to the patches of aubergine and melons kept by some of 
the villagers on the periphery of the sahel. There are many aspects of these events that 
require a much more extensive discussion then is possible here.21 Some parallels, 
however, emerge with the observations made by Collard in the case of village histories 
in the Evritania province in Greece (1989). Collard suggests that the choice not to 
remember the “disintegrating effects of the ‘recent’ Civil war”, but instead to 
emphasize a notion of an enduring past that predates these events, largely have to do 
with providing a sense of permanence that is shared exclusively by those from these 
villages. There are similarities here with the case of Kefraya, in that the story of this 
                                                 
21 I believe that aspects of these events have to do with issues of collective memory and traumatic events, 
selective memory, and the transmission of memory from one generation to the next. I have started to explore 
these issues in a paper presented at the Anthropology Departmental Seminar in Goldsmiths. The working title 
of the paper is War and Wine in Lebanon: Carving out the Landscape.  
152 
 
fallow plot of land was one that seemed to be known only by the adults in the village. 
Yet there was also strong symbolic significance in the events that unfolded in the war 
story, where villagers were once more represented as guardians of the land, working to 
break open the soil and bury things that could potentially break up the beauty of their 
landscape. Not to have experienced the events in the story, and, perhaps more 
pertinently, not to know about this narrative situated people such as Ahmed on the 
outside of Kefraya’s history.  
Yet there is something to be said about how the story of the fallow land was 
used to prevent Ahmed from setting down roots in Kefraya. While Ahmed and his 
family had been known by many Kefraya residents for a number of years, clear social 
boundaries had been put into place. For example, Ahmed’s wife did not visit the 
women of Kefraya to drink coffee, nor did she engage in the activities of the kouroum. 
When I asked my friend about this, she looked at me with disbelief before explaining, 
“But she is not from Kefraya!” I pointed out that I too was not from Kefraya, but had 
received numerous invitations to go out to the kouroum. “Yes,” my friend replied, “but 
you are a guest and want to know about our life in Kefraya”. She continued to explain 
that Ahmed and his wife had come here to work, and as they did not own any land in 
Kefraya, they had to ask permission before going out to pick vine leaves and the like. I 
then pointed out that there were a couple of landless families in Kefraya who did not 
seem to ask permission to go out into the kouroum. My friend started to get irritated: 
“They are still from Kefraya and maybe the family does not own land directly but 
someone like a wife might own some land”. She explained that allowing Ahmed to get 
too comfortable in Kefraya might encourage them to stay for good. That wouldn’t do 
and this was especially important now that many Kefraya were struggling to keep their 
153 
 
land because they could not afford to replace their grape varietals with those that the 
wineries demanded. She exclaimed what many had already said to me many times 
before, “Kefraya was for Kefraya”. My friend finally concluded, “Besides, Ahmed and 
his family own land in Syria where they can go and settle”. In this respect, the tensions 
that were brought to the fore when Ahmed expressed his interest in settling more 
comfortably into the Kefraya landscape also had to do with how labour and property 
relations in Kefraya were changing due to the more recent strategies deployed by the 
wineries.      
During a conversation with Nabhane, I was told that as relations changed with 
the wineries, especially Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara, many residents in Kefraya were 
unable to comply with the new required standards.  As a result, there fewer vineyard 
owners because many were selling their lands to those in Kefraya who had the enough 
capital to plant and maintain the types of vines the wineries demanded. Nabhane also 
explained that many people who were selling their lands in Kefraya were interested in 
building new villas. As very little profit could be made from selling their grape vines to 
the wineries, many preferred to sell some of their land and use the extra money to 
construct a new house, surrounded with a few vinesusually of the Cinsault variety. It 
is perhaps of significance that some younger teenagers worked in these vineyards 
during the harvest for a bit of pocket money. Their roles, however, remained distinct 
from the migrant workers in that they usually oversaw the harvest, counting the crates 
of grapes stacked near the trucks. Yet many of these young men did not know how to 
prune the vines and did not appear to be interested in learning. As Nabhane once asked 
me, somewhat rhetorically, “Everybody now wants to live in a chateau surrounded by 
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vineyards, even if they do not sell many grapes to the winery. How many castles do you 
think there can be in Kefraya?”   
 
A vineyard owner who also works as an “overseer” or supervisor of the harvest supervising 
seasonal workers.  
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The Castles of Kefraya: Ruptures in the Narrative  
While the Chateau Kefraya winery had offered to buy vineyards from residents who 
wanted to sell their land, many (if not all) had refused to sell to the winery or to any 
“outsiders”; a sentiment that was expressed through another well-known story about the 
history of Kefraya. The story of the the naqāshe, or inscriber, was recounted to me 
quite frequently throughout my stay in the village: 
A long time ago there was a man, a naqāshe that would go around from village to village. He 
would stay for a while observing the villagers. Then he would write about what he saw. In the 
village of Rawda, the people were described to have big bellies because they drank too much 
water from the nearby river. In Balool, they are like cows. . . . and in Kefraya people are like 
wolves. Why? Because they fight amongst each other but when an outsider comes the villagers 
will unite and fight the outsider. 
The story of the naqāshe can of course be interpreted in many ways. Perhaps the 
narrative is a polite way of conveying to an overly inquisitive anthropologist a warning 
to not to get involved in village politics. However, after relaying the story of the naqāsh 
to the Mukhtar, and asking him for further information, it became apparent that the 
story was also told for other reasons. While the Mukhtar confirmed that this was an 
important story about Kefraya, he seemed startled to hear it, and wanted to know who 
had told me about the naqāsh. The story was initially told to me by Mr Hassan Rahal, 
from Kefraya villagean agricultural engineer for the Cave Kouroum winery. Rahal 
recounted the story during a conversation about vineyard owners in Kefraya starting to 
sell their lands. While land in Kefraya was considerably more expensive than in other 
parts of the Bekaa, locals were willing “to put their differences aside” and sell their land 
only to “insiders”. In the process, the Rahal family had appropriated a considerable 
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amount of land, as had the Didi family. Hassan suggested I ask the Mukhtar for further 
information about the naqāsh. I explained all of this to the Mukhtar, who responded:  
People in Kefraya don’t make money from staying here. People leave to make money and then 
come back to use this money. Take Bayt (House) Didi. Dr Didi has the most number of kouroum 
in Kefraya and perhaps more than Bayt Rahal.  Didi lives in Senegal where he works as medical 
doctor throughout the year. But every summer he comes back for the harvest.  
The Mukhtar failed to mention, however, that he too was in the process of selling some 
of his vineyards. While the identity of the buyer remained unclear, it was implied by 
others that Didi had expressed an interest in the Mukhtar’s vineyards. In this regard, the 
story of the naqāshe perhaps spoke of shifting ideas of autonomy for a sustainable 
future for the Kefraya landscape. For, as some residents explained, it might be a useful 
strategy if a few larger landowners in Kefraya were able to negotiate more beneficial 
contractual arrangements with the wineries. Yet I did wonder to whom such a strategy 
would be beneficialand how could others in the village losing land believe that such 
a move could be advantageous for them?  
I met with Dr Didi on several occasions during the harvest in Kefraya. 
Throughout the harvest, the doctor wore jeans with a t-shirt that depicted the Dakar 
rally, and a black and white kaffiyeh. His Arabic accent was somewhat different to other 
Kefraya residentshe pronounced his words with more articulation and appeared to be 
more fluent in Wolof, having spent most of his life in Senegal. Didi was enthusiastic 
about my visit to his vineyards and wanted to me to taste the olives and figs that came 
from his kouroum.  These were the olives from last year’s harvest and his mother, the 
aging Hajjeh, had salted them, adding garlic and lemon. We sat on the ground with his 
cousin Kassem Makki, and ate some breakfast. We were in his vineyards near the sahel, 
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and behind us construction was underway on Didi’s new villa, which was near 
completion. It was an exquisite villa, with marble balconies, and an ornate set of stairs 
at the entrance. I asked him if he missed Lebanon when he was in Senegal. Didi 
preferred speaking in English and responded, “Not really, I was born in Senegal. I only 
come here for my mother in the summer to see her and make sure the harvest goes 
well”.  
He then spoke about the history of his viticulture enterprise. Didi and his half-
brother had started out with “nearly nothing”: fifty hectares of vineyards inherited from 
their father.  The brothers started to buy land, developing nearly 300 hectares of vines 
across Kefraya. Didi was also proud that he and his brother were the first in Kefraya to 
train their grapes onto wires; a technique that both Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya 
favoured. Through training the vines on wire, production had doubled and profits were 
considerably higher. There was, however, not much else that Didi was prepared to do in 
order to increase production. He explained, “If we were to pump water in, like Chateau 
Ksara do in some of their vineyards, then we would be producing double again. By not 
providing water, we are looking to ensure quality and the taste of the wine is better.” In 
contrast to many of the vineyard owners in Kefraya, Didi’s knowledge of viticulture 
maintenance echoed the discourses of quality utilized by the oenologists working at 
Chateaux Kefraya and Ksarawhich I will focus on in Chapter Seven. Didi, however, 
also made it clear that he was not simply following what the wineries required but 
instead his expertise was grounded in his intimate understanding of the soil, due to his 
familial connection to the region. He said, “The terroir in Kefraya is the best. . . . the 
earth, soil, and rocks are the best in Lebanon”. By linking sentiments of place to the 
logic of terroir, Didi once more showed how locality is perceived in Kefraya within 
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these wider discourses, discourses that express a similar valuation of distinctive 
aesthetic features to some of the winery managers and owners. 
Didi, however, refused to sell to Chateau Kefraya because “de Bustros is not 
from here and the winery is not interested in working with Kefraya in a good way. They 
do not respect us”. He was happy to work with Chateau Ksara as they had interests 
across the Bekaa Valley and not just Kefraya, “they (Ksara) do not get “so involved 
with the village”. For the last few years, Didi had sold his grapes to the Massaya 
winery, but as of the current harvest he would start selling to Chateau Ksara. Up until 
1996, Didi had in fact sold his grapes to Chateau Ksara. However, following the 
winery’s change in strategy they sourced grapes elsewhere, and the subsequent 
reduction in price of Cinsault in Kefraya had caused problems between the Didi and the 
winery. Apparently this was because certain members of Chateau Ksara had found it 
problematic that they not been directly involved in the plantation of Didi’s vines, 
despite the fact that most vines were not Cinsault vines. Nevertheless, the problem was 
solved and Didi eventually returned to Chateau Ksara, where an on-going contract was 
finally set up. Didi was quite knowledgeable about the types of long-term contracts 
Chateau Ksara had with other larger landowners in the Bekaa Valley. He pointed out 
that long-term contractual agreements usually implied that the price would remain 
stable each year. Entering into such a contract would be the most favourable, as being 
away for most of the year made it a challenge to constantly negotiate with the wineries 
for the best price.  
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The Doctor’s vineyards and in the distance the Chateau Kefraya.  
Yet was it economically viable for Didi to maintain vines? What were the costs 
involved? Wineries usually bought Didi’s (noble) grapes at approximately 1,000 
Lebanese Liras (LL) (about 80 cents) per kilogram, and the price remained constant 
throughout each harvest. The price of workers and pesticides, however, increased every 
year. Didi pointed out that “a bottle of wine is sold for $10+, but it costs about LL 
4,000 to produce a bottle and then it is sold for a higher price”. Yet despite the high 
costs involved, Didi was adamant that he would continue with his viticulture enterprise. 
He stressed that nothing else could really grow in Kefraya, as the soil and environment 
were only really suitable for grapesbesides, he enjoyed growing grapes. When I 
suggested that he could have bought more land elsewhere in the Bekaa, where land 
prices were substantially lower, Didi responded:  
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Because it is our region and it is better than strangers buying it. If someone wants money and 
needs to sell his land, it is better that someone from the village buys it. . . . better to have fifty 
houses than 200 houses. By keeping the land in the village, it keeps the peace. 
When Didi was away, family members were entrusted with the care of the vines. For 
his cousin, Kassim Makki, the caretaker of the vines, this was his only job. Didi and his 
brother provided the capital to invest in the necessary equipment, while also paying 
Kassim’s salary. Kassim was usually to be found driving his truck across the vineyards, 
fixing his tractors, or on some mission to get goods necessary for the upkeep of the 
vines. Kassim did most of the pruning across the 300 hectares during early winter 
months. During the harvest, Kassim was one of the tractor drivers taking the grapes 
from Kefraya to the Ksara winery. The normal half-hour journey in a car took nearly 
two hours by tractor.   
Kassim seemed to be content with his work, although at times he spoke of his 
thoughts about leaving Kefraya. His mother was Brazilian and he expressed a desire to 
emigrate to South America, where there might be more prospects for him and his 
family. When I asked him for his thoughts about working for his cousin, Kassim 
explained that it was better than working for a non-family member, such as Chateau 
Kefraya, and at least he was able to voice his opinions during decision-making 
processes. On the whole, however, Kassim was still subject to decisions made by Didi 
and his brother. Significantly, this also included the maintenance of Kassim’s 
vineyards. Nevertheless, it was clear that Kassim trusted his cousins’ choices. Other 
Kefraya residents expressed similar sentiments, stating their preference to sell their 
vineyards to Didi over “outsiders who don’t understand what it means to be from 
Kefraya who did not understand its beauty.” They were concerned that Kefraya village 
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could become more of a district or zone (mantaqa) for the winery, telling me “We need 
to keep the vineyards in Kefraya within the village”.   
 
A view of Dr Didi’s vineyards from his vineyards on the sahel. Some of Kefraya village is 
visible in the distance; the Ramatani hill is to the top left.  
Didi’s viticulture enterprise was not the only attempt to safeguard the Kefraya region 
from external investors, and which also sought to preserve the viticulture landscape. I 
learnt of a cooperative set up by twenty-eight of the vineyard owners in the village to 
produce dbs, (molasses) from grapes. Support came from the Support to Fund Farmer 
Groups, part of the collaborative Agriculture Development Project between the 
Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture and the European Commission. In 2006 the 
cooperative was granted €88,000 to cover costs, ranging from fuel to telephone bills 
and governmental taxes. Members of the cooperatives told me that residents in Kefraya 
had been producing dbs for personal consumption, transporting some of their grapes to 
a processing plant in a nearby town. Yet the motivation to establish the cooperative had 
to do with the aim of reducing dependence upon the wineries. One cooperative member 
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explained that people from across the world knew of the good quality grapes from 
Kefraya, so dbs made from these grapes would have a competitive edge in the market. 
Such a prospect however, remains to be seen. During my visit in 2012, any significant 
developments in the cooperative were yet to be seen. Indeed one member had sold a 
vineyard to Didi to fund his grandchildren’s university education. The member had 
mixed feelings about his decision. University education was important, but the risk in 
owning less land was that future generations of his family might not have a vested 
interest in Kefraya. He concluded our discussion by exclaiming, “my son’s children 
will not even know the difference between Zaitouniy and Cabernet!”  
In her study of a Turkish village, Delaney noted two types of social relations 
affecting the village economy (1993 & 1991). The first was the relations of authority 
where interferences from external force implicitly put into question the ability of 
villagers to manage themselves. Such intrusions emerged in the form of agricultural 
experts who were given more power to facilitate change in the village and were 
dismissive of the more intimate forms of knowledge the villagers possessed. The 
destructive forces of such relations of authority manifested itself in sentiments of 
distrust that impeded the forging of relations of cooperation (the second type of social 
relations). Delaney argues that while a collective sentiment of belonging might ensue, 
as long as village residents continued to feel a sense of disempowerment and were 
subject to socio-economic changes beyond their will, social relations of authority would 
eventually supersede actions of cooperation.    
Similar conclusions can be drawn in the case of Kefraya. Vineyard owners 
looking to sell felt that the only option left was to sell to Didi. Didi, in turn, had 
accepted the responsibility of safeguarding the village from outsiders who could 
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potentially rupture historicized connections to place. There was also some significance 
in the way Didi spoke of his (and his brother’s) viticulture enterprise as emerging from 
“nothing”. Didi was quick to draw attention to his entrepreneurial accomplishments that 
made him stand out from others in Kefraya. This expression of autonomy, however, 
was not performed in the purest sense of economic individualism, but was entangled 
with notions of relatedness connected to place. After all, Didi appeared to have little 
interest in buying land outside Kefraya and nor did he believe that anything other than 
grapes could be grown in Kefraya. Yet there were ramifications for this stance, in that 
seemingly Didi could make certain decisions without the consent of others in Kefraya, 
and this was indicative of changing hierarchical relations across the viticulture 
landscape. How such relations of power might unfold in the future remains to be 
seenparticularly in light of the possible rupture between the kouroum and the 
younger generations of Kefraya.   
  Yet it was also significant that Didi had no desire to sell his grapes to Chateau 
Kefraya because he felt that de Bustros had become too involved in the village. Such a 
sentiment initially appears contradictory, as it was de Bustros who instigated the very 
first plantations in Kefraya. However, it was perhaps because of de Bustros’ 
enterprising vision that the village had arrived at such a tense juncture of change. For in 
transforming their fields of legumes and wheat into a viticulture landscape, Kefraya’s 
forefathers had accepted the conditions of a contract that had significant ramifications 
on the possible choices and decisions of future generations. The desire and power that 
now lay in the hands of Didi and other large landowners was thus similar to the 
aspirations of autonomy expressed in the story of the good shepherd.    
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Conclusion  
In this chapter I have tried to show how narratives of Kefraya reflect the types of social 
relations that emerged alongside the viticulture landscape in the region. I have argued 
that in some ways narratives of the Kefraya viticulture landscape speak of reproduction 
and production not as distinct domains but rather as entangled and woven together 
through the embodied experiences and social relations of Kefraya’s residents and 
workers. By exploring such entanglements I have shed light on how notions of 
relatedness are constantly reconceived and reconfigured to assert some degree of 
autonomy over production, while also serving to forge continuous links between the 
past and (continuous) present.  
Keeping the kouroum “inside” Kefraya allowed experiences of karam to 
continue. However, in the process, residents who decided to sell their vineyards 
appeared to forgo a sense of autonomy or a notion of independence in the pursuit of 
economic success for Kefraya as a whole. Instead, a “mirage of independence”, for 
many men of Kefraya emerged that was expressed through their pride in the aesthetic 
beauty of the region, and a desire to construct villas on their remaining land (Goddard, 
1996). Yet it was through such allegorical practices of economic superiority that the 
reality of power struggles over autonomy were again brought to the fore. The usage of 
visual imagery, such as an elaborate villas surrounded by neatly-aligned vineyards, 
served to evoke a sense of cultural continuity, while also naturalising ties to the land 
that are specific to the production of high-quality wines. 
It is also important to note that it was beyond the scope of this chapter to 
consider in full certain cultural factors relating to village life in Kefraya. These have to 
do with my observationssimilar to Pratt’s observationsconcerning the education 
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system in the Bekaa Valley (1994). I saw that it was increasingly common for young 
people in Kefraya to study business-related subjects. Another important issue has to do 
with the continuing migration of many of these young people abroad in order to find 
work. I believe that such transformations in labour relations are tangential with shifts in 
economic rationality across the Bekaa region as a whole, due to entrepreneurial 
strategies deployed by the agro-industries in general. Exploring such general shifts in 
detail remains beyond the scope of this chapterand the thesis as a whole.  
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5: A House with Many Vineyards: Changing Ideas of House and Family 
in Kefraya 
 
Just before the sign-post welcoming visitors to the Kefraya region comes into sight, an 
enclosure appears on the right hand side of the Bekaa’s main highway, where deer roam 
freely. A red London double decker bus is also parked within this enclosure: it is a number 
nine bus, and draped along its sides are posters of the former Prime Ministers Rafik Hariri 
and (his son) Saad Hariri. I am told that the land (and perhaps even the deer), once 
belonged to the Edde family, before it was sold onto the Haririsanother family that has 
become deeply entrenched in politics as well as business, trade, and finance. The grassy 
slopes roll upwards to the Mount Lebanon ranges, and also west towards Kefrayauntil a 
fence marks the boundary for the roaming deer.  
On the other side of this fence, lush verdant vineyards have been planted in neat 
rows, indicating the edge of the Kefraya region. A white sign proudly states that these 
vines are part of the estate of the Cave Kouroum winery. In the background, the 
geometrical composition of the tower of Cave Kouroum is the first building of Kefraya to 
come into view. The tall rectangular tower, made of limestone and concrete, is a relatively 
new feature on the Kefraya landscape. As with Chateau Kefraya, it is perched on a small 
hill, panoptical in character, and sources its grapes solely from the Kefraya region. Unlike 
Chateau Kefraya, however, the Cave Kouroum tower is not surrounded by a group of trees 
that allows it to be concealedor to create a private domain, distinct from the village. Such 
visibility across the Kefraya landscape illustrates the type of relationship the winery has 
167 
 
with vineyard owners in the regionin that Cave Kouroum appears to be as much a part of 
the village and vineyards as these features of the landscape are part of the winery.  
The Cave Kouroum winery was founded in 1998 by Bayt (house) Rahal, who is 
from the Kefraya region itself. The establishment of the winery came about due to the 700 
tonnes of surplus grapes left unsold in Kefraya following Chateau Ksara’s decision to 
source grapes elsewhere. The Rahal family wasand continuesto act as a mediator 
between Kefraya vineyard owners and wineries across Lebanon. Unable to shift the 
Cinsault grapes in 1997, the Rahals made their first vintage and officially opened the 
winery the following year. However (and in contrast to their vineyard enterprise), while 
many members of Bayt Rahal were involved in the establishment of the wineryand 
continue to participate in the everyday running of the businessCave Kouroum remains 
under the ownership of Mr Bassim Rahal. Significantly, Monsieur Rahal (as he is called by 
his employees) also owns another winerythe Chateau Mauvanne, which is situated in the 
Languedoc region of France, where he resides for most of the year. While final decisions 
concerning the winery are made by Bassim Rahal, the overseeing and daily running of the 
winery has been entrusted to his brother, Mr Sami (as he is called by the winery’s 
employees) as well as his nephew, Mr Hassan Rahalwho is a trained agricultural 
engineer. Notably, while special recognition in Kefraya is given to Bassim Rahal for 
establishing Cave Kouroum, the winery is simultaneously considered an extension of Bayt 
Rahal.  
Although the winery remains under the auspice of Bassim Rahal, it also became 
apparent during fieldwork that the winery was deeply entangled in village politics. This is 
because Bassim Rahal’s brother, Mr Bahij Rahal, had been elected as head of the 
municipality in 1997. Thus, as with the Edde and Hariri families, certain members of Bayt 
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Rahal held influential positions in both politics and business. Yet most strategies to assert 
and maintain political and economic power deployed by Bayt Rahal were done across a 
much smaller space, so that the Kefraya region is at once a site for business (and political) 
enterprise, while also a private and domestic, or a place for home-making.  
This chapter explores how the concept of bayt is understood and experienced 
amongst members of the Rahal family, especially following the establishment of Cave 
Kouroum. It is important to point out that this chapter is less focused on exploring the 
notion of bayt in terms of household organization and architectural arrangements. Instead, 
the aim is to consider how bayt refers to the productive and reproductive powers of the 
Rahal family. In so doing, this chapter considers how certain types of relations, activities, 
and decisions in the domains of family, business (and politics) conversely inform, shape, 
and affect each other (Yanagisako, 2002). Due to the fact that Mr Bassim Rahal spends 
most of his time in France, I did not have the opportunity to meet him during my time in 
Kefraya. I initially felt that his material absence in my ethnographic data might present 
gaps in my analysis. Yet on further consideration, I realised that despite the lack of overall 
physical appearance during fieldwork, Rahal still maintained a presence throughout my 
visits to the Cave Kouroum winey and during discussions with other family members as 
well as employees. I thus began to explore the significance of his immaterial presence in 
terms of the patriarchal role he has obtained in Bayt Rahal, as well the elite status he had 
gained in Kefraya.      
  I will shed light upon the resourcefulness of the Rahal family, by which they have 
extended their (re)productive powers beyond the vineyard and into wineas well as into 
political endeavours. Kin obligation has, however, constrained, or at least limited, political 
and economic ventures for certain members of the family who are inadvertently restricted 
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in exerting much influence over the production processes or in pursuing other types of 
business interests. Once more, kin-related sentiment is spatially bound to place, and 
attempts are made to ensure that the Kefraya region remains in the possession of 
residentsincluding the name ‘Kefraya’ itself. A consideration of such perspectives of 
bayt can thus serve to highlight how “the category of house represents the wider social and 
political system” (Huwelmeir, 2000: 100).  
 
Photo: The Cave Kouroum Winery  
 
Thinking About Houses in Transition 
   
The importance of bayt in Kefraya appears to contrast the observations made by Obeid 
concerning kinship genealogies in the town of Arsal, in the eastern region of the Bekaa. 
Kinship models in Arsal indicate the persistence of “classical models,” where accounts 
often began with the notion `a¯ ’ila (lineage)viewed as the largest form of familial 
relatedness; the smallest being the bayt. Jubb (branch) on the other hand, appears to sit 
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somewhere in the middle, and refers to the son of an ancestor and his descendants (2010: 
108). Broadly speaking, all three terms appear to have similar meanings in Kefraya. In 
Kefraya however, the social prominence of bayt is one of the most important features of 
accounts of patrilineal descent.   
I rarely (if ever) heard the term jubb mentioned when residents discussed kinship 
genealogies. Also, the term `a¯ ’ila (lineage) was often used interchangeably with bayt. 
Residents explained that due to Kefraya’s small population, there were actually very few 
differences between the terms `a¯ ’ila and bayt. They also added that, at times, `a¯ ’ila 
could be used to refer to broader genealogies in order to forge connections with others from 
outside Kefraya who shared the same family name, regardless of religion; this was even 
when there might not be any prior relation. So, for example, while there was a Bayt Saleh 
in Kefraya this did not imply that I was from that bayt, but implied instead that we all came 
from the same `a¯ ’ila. While we might not share a common ancestor, an idea of 
relatedness came about through our shared name. The absence of a shared ancestor does 
not, however, suggest that such an ancestor doesn’t exist. Instead, the implication is that 
our patrilineal ancestor existed so far back in time that they would be virtually impossible 
to trace.  
However, this temporal dimension of the concept of `a¯ ’ila made it distinctive 
from bayt, and this also seemed to reduce its social currency in Kefraya. That is to say, in 
creating ties across larger spaces and longer periods of time, the notion of `a¯ ’ila could not 
speak accuratelyor, more specificallyabout kin and work relations in Kefraya. Still, it 
is important to point out that, as with the term `a¯ ’ila, the notion of bayt was also 
associated with family names. Yet in the case of bayt, the lineage of the name was often 
traceable to forefathers who lived in Kefraya during the French mandatethe era of the 
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cadastral survey. Indeed it was quite common to find a framed faded black and white 
photograph of a family’s forefather in many homes in Kefraya, which hung at the entrance 
or in the living room. Like the photograph of Abdel-Helim Nabhane I was discussed in the 
previous chapter, these images also portrayed patriarchs who stood upright and stern as 
they stared straight into the camera lens; more often than not, the person’s masbaha (prayer 
beads) also hung on the corner of frame. Significantly, many of the material homes built by 
Kefraya’s forefathers are barely visible on the Kefraya landscape. While some have been 
built upon, or expanded to accommodate a growing bayt, others no longer exist as the 
family have rebuilt elsewhere in the village, or constructed separate households for 
brothers and cousins and their wives and children. For some of the bayt of Kefraya, there 
was thus more than one physical house. Nevertheless, great-grandfathers are still 
recognised for laying the foundations for this transmission of both immaterial and material 
layers the bayt’s name (Carsten & Hugh-Jones, 1995; Pine, 1996 & Levis-Strauss, 1999).  
Similarly to the landscape of Kefraya, the notion of bayt thus implies a continuous 
and unfolding narrative from one generation to the next. It is also significant, therefore, that 
this perception of baytboth in terms of its material and immaterial propertiesseems to 
have come about at a similar time as the emergence of the modern Kefraya landscape, 
following the reorganization of private property. We saw this in the story of the good 
shepherd that we discussed in the previous chapter. That is not to say however, that prior to 
the cadastral survey and the subsequent vine plantations a notion of bayt did not exist. 
Rather, it is interesting how the importance given to this form of familial relatedness over 
other broader kinship models appears to be tangential to the development of a wine market 
economy in the region. While both the house and landscape might reflect an extension of 
the self, it is the social significance of the former that has facilitated the shaping and 
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maintenance of the latter. Indeed, it is useful to recall the words of Nabhane when he 
pointed out that everyone in Kefraya had a desire to live in a chateau, and to think about 
the physical construction of ornate homes such as Dr Didi’s elaborately designed villa, 
which also potentially reflects such strategies. These attempts are suggestive of how a 
patriarchal desire for succession might somehow motivate capitalist action (Yanagisako, 
2002). In this regard, the social significance of the smallest form of familial relatedness, 
that is, bayt, arguably shows us how kin-related sentimentassociated with house and 
placeis able to reflect certain prominent individuals (mostly men) who have facilitated 
the successful transmission of the family name.    
House and Work in the Kouroum 
  
Broadly speaking, the social significance of associating a house with a family name and the 
traceability of each bayt to a similar period of time reproduced a shared understanding of 
place (Huwelmeir, 2000). Yet in this forging of a particular temporal connection between 
bayt and place, there also emerged a hierarchical classification system that was attached to 
a legacy of the type of work that was done in the kouroum of Kefraya, associated with the 
different familiesand thus also to labour relations that extended outside of the village. 
For example, in the case of Bayt Nabhane, the legacy of the late Abdel-Helim and his 
relationship with the Khawaja facilitated the successful transmission of the family name to 
the next generation. Yet while Abdel-Helim had secured both material and immaterial 
wealth for Bayt Nabhane, his son, Nabhane, had arrived at a crossroads, and there was 
some uncertainty concerning the future of the family. Although the family name retained 
social value in Kefraya, the future transmission remained uncertain, not least because of the 
weakening relationship between Nabhane and Chateau Kefraya.  Notably, Bayt Rahal had 
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recently arrived at a crossroadsin 1997, its role as a grape distributor extended into wine-
making.  
The men of Bayt Rahal have been selling grapes to wineries across Lebanon since 
at least the 1960s and acting as grape distributors since the 1970s. Mr Sami Rahal 
explained that his father had started to sell grapes to Chateau Musar as early as 1964. The 
family worked directly with Chateau Musar until around 1974, when they began collecting 
grapes from around the Kefraya, selling them on to other wineries. But when his father 
died a year later in a tractor accident in the kouroum this had quite an impact upon the 
business. As Mr Sami and the others were fairly young at the time, it was Bassim Rahal 
who took charge of overseeing the viticulture business. Significantly, the Rahal’s 
viticulture enterprise became more lucrative after the end of the civil war, because 
established wineries such as Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar began to focus on 
increasing wine productionwhile at the same time new wineries emerged across 
Lebanon. The Rahal sons took their distributive role quite seriously, and I am told that 
before long they had set up longstanding agreements with many vineyard owners in the 
village. The Rahals acted as mediators between the wineries and vineyard owners, 
negotiating the price (per kilo) and the quantities required by the wineries. While it is not 
clear what specific roles each of the brothers might have had in these business transactions, 
it is apparent that these were informed by a certain understanding of grape production.  
On more than one occasion during the harvest, I followed Sami Rahal around the 
vineyards of Kefraya. These were early morning startsaround four-thirty a.m., when the 
sun was barely upand neither was I. Sami Rahal always looked fresh, wearing casual 
jeans, pale pastel shirts, and a khaki vest. As I asked him questions, Mr Sami would eye up 
the crates of grapes about to be loaded into the truck. If a crate was half full, Mr Sami 
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would shout out to the grape-pickers to fill up the crates, informing them that a full crate of 
these Grenache grapes would weigh just over 25 kilogramsslightly less than Cinsault 
grapes. These were just estimates, but were a good indication of how many crates should 
be sent off to the winery that had requested the grapes in question. Mr Sami was also 
always on the movedriving or walking across the vineyards. At one point he would be 
overseeing grape-pickers, while at another speaking with Selim Nakad, who might be 
looking to buy some grapes or change his initial order. It was during the harvest when the 
Rahals were at their most active, and it was also the only time that I saw Bassim Rahal. Mr 
Sami waved at his brother, who stood in an adjacent vineyard, and Bassim Rahal smiled 
and waved back before wandering off into another vineyard.       
Despite this apparent intimacy with the kouroum of Kefraya, the Rahal viticulture 
enterprise was not initially a full-time commitment. Until 1974, Mr Sami’s father was 
based in Beirut and working in engineering, returning to Kefraya during the weekends to 
visit his wife and children and then for an extended stay during the summer to oversee the 
harvest. Similarly, the sons stayed in Kefraya until they were old enough to attend school 
in Beirut and eventually universities abroad. Mr Sami, for example, left to study for a 
business degree in Canada between 1984 and 1985, with a full scholarship from the Hariri 
foundation. I am also told that during the civil war, Bassim Rahal remained mostly in 
Beirut, and like his father, worked in engineering.  
It was only after the grapes harvests of 1997 and 1998 that viticulture and wine-
making became a full-time endeavour for the Rahal brothers. During that time, Chateau 
Ksara stopped buying Cinsault grapes from Kefraya villagers, and other wineries saw a 
chance to buy these grapes at a much lower price. Mr Sami explained that “the price of 
Cinsault (per kilogram) shot down from 33 cents to about 25 cents”. While some Kefraya 
residents accepted private offers from certain wineries, many had relied upon the Rahal 
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familywho worked on their behalfto find better deals elsewhere. Mr Sami explained 
that the family were obliged to ensure that other villagers’ grapes were sold onto the 
wineries. As Mr Sami put it, “selling grapes had become pointless” and with nearly 700 
tonnes of grapes left on their vines, “we were left with no choice but to make wine and 
(some) arak”. In 1998, the first vintage was made in collaboration with the Vin Nakad 
winery in the Jdeita region of the Central Bekaa. In Kefraya, the Rahals fermented 
approximately 450 tonnes of grapes in steel tanks that had been made in Lebanon, while 
the rest was sent off to the Nakad winery. The construction of the Cave Kouroum winery 
was completed the following year, to officially include 100 hectares of vineyard estates in 
its surroundings.   
Changing Perceptions of House 
 
While Mr Sami described the transition from viticulture to viniculture with the pronoun 
“we”, it is significant that the establishment of the winery was mostly, if not entirely, 
funded by Bassim Rahal. Although it remains unclear as to how (or where) Bassim Rahal 
had managed to come by the fortune that allowed him to purchase a winery in Languedoc 
and construct a winery in Kefraya, rumours suggest that the wealth did not come solely 
from selling grapesor from his engineering job in Beirut. I don’t think it’s necessary to 
go into more detail here, but it is worth considering briefly the implications of extending 
production in Kefraya from viticulture into wine-making. Simply put, the phenomenon of a 
man from Kefraya village opening his own winery and taking control of production speaks 
of shifts in power relations and changing social structures. In this way, the establishment of 
the Cave Kouroum winery thus also has the potential to change the course of history, in 
that autonomy from other wineries implies the possibility of no longer being (fully) 
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compliant with and accepting the demands of the other wineriesand especially Chateaux 
Kefraya and Ksara. The expansion of the viticulture enterprise, to include wine production, 
inevitably had an impact upon how other Kefraya residents, as well the management and 
owners of other Lebanese wineries, perceived, spoke of, and interacted with the Rahal 
family.  Significantly, there was a degree of ambiguity regarding the status and social 
position of Bayt Rahal, due to the economic ascendance of Bassim Rahal.  
Unlike the Khawaja de Bustros, there was no distinctive title associated with 
Bassim Rahal in the villagenor was he described, like Michel de Bustros, in terms of 
giving Kefraya an aesthetic legacy of landscapes and views. Yet talk of Bassim Rahal was 
not disapproving, for he was recognised as a successful entrepreneur by many in the 
village. He was known to be sharp-minded and intelligent when it came to business; elderly 
residents who could recall Bassim Rahal in his youth described him as a strong-willed 
person. While many residents spoke of his accomplishments with admiration, there was 
however, also an aura of mystery surrounding Monsieur Rahal, for he had succeeded where 
others in the village had been unable to, or had not even thought such a manoeuvre was 
possible; people would often talk about him in hushed tones. Yet local residents also 
reminded me of his “fellah” origins when speaking of his transition from running a 
viticulture enterprise to owning a winery:    
The father of Bassim Rahal was just a fellah. But when Bassim bought more land from the village . .  
five dunnum here and then another ten . . . so that eventually it was 100 dunnum of kouroum to make 
a khamara (winery). Bayt Rahal even owns offices in Hazmeye now! It is made of dark glass. They 
can see out but no one can see in. Just like the tower of the Cave Kouroum wineryBassim Rahal 
can look out to us, but we can’t see him. The brothers have all become important meneven half-
brothers and cousins. You know there is one [half-brother] who used to be a school bus driverand 
a fellahwho is now a businessman. 
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In the case of such narratives about Bayt Rahal’s fellahin origins, the development of the 
winery business beyond viticulture, to include offices outside of Kefraya, speaks of the 
blurred line between the insider and outsider, and also evokes a relationship between 
material and immaterial labour. Talk about the establishment of Cave Kouroum and the 
construction of its tall stern tower, as well as the opening of the Beirut office in the 
capital’s suburb of Hazmeyeh (with its dark windows), highlights the break from their 
fellahin origins: increasingly, the work of the men of Bayt Rahal resembled the role of the 
Khawaja. There was, in this respect, the possibility of being removed from a sense of 
collective belonging in the village of Kefraya, and thus also of disassociation from a 
particular collective consciousness. It is interesting in this regard to see that, despite one of 
his brothers being described as once being a fellah, Bassim Rahal was never called a fellah. 
Bassim Rahal was therefore not only distinguished from others in the village but also from 
the other brothers of the Rahal family.  
Significantly, owners of other wineries (who had at one point or another relied upon 
the grapes sold by Bayt Rahal) also attempted to make sense of the transition from selling 
grapes to producing wine in our conversations. Many described the Rahals with a term that 
also comes from a history of rural property and labour relations, which also allows for a 
distinction between different social classes. The Rahal family were described by these 
wineries with the word wakil. Similarities to Gilsenan’s ethnographic research in Berqayl 
once more surface, in that the use of the term evokes a particular hierarchical relationship 
between two different social groups (1996). Also noteworthy here is that the term was also 
present in Nabhane’s job title at Chateau Kefraya, where wakil al zir’a refers to his role as 
the chief of agricultural affairs. While with Nabhane the title was formal, official, and 
178 
 
widely-used by those working at wineries as well as Kefraya villagers, when the term was 
used for the Rahal family it was outside of official business discussions. Rather, it wakil 
was used by (a majority) of the winery owners when they explained to me (directly) the 
historical role the Rahals had in the wine industry: 
You see Bayt Rahal? Yes, including Bassim . . . [they] are only good at being wakils. They know the 
region for grapes and how to get the amount we want. If we need extra (grapes) then we go to them. 
We know that they will deliver.  
In fact, when I asked Mr Sami Rahal about the family’s role as wakil, I was quickly 
corrected. In the viticulture side of the enterprise, the family have been, and continue to be, 
mowaz’a (distributors). Yet it is interesting that by using the term wakil, winery owners 
and managers implied that the Rahals were guarding or taking care of the grapes that really 
belonged to these wineries. Now, with Bassim Rahal as a winery owner, and thus fully in 
the realm of the “vini”, he was a competitor in the winebut also grapemarkets. It is 
also significant that within these narratives of Bayt Rahal, Bassim Rahal ceased to be an 
individual separate from his family. Instead such descriptions made clear the role family 
members were supposed to fulfil and deliver. On another note, it was Mr Sami who 
attended most of the Union Vinicole du Liban (UVL) meetings and maintained contact 
with the other wineries on behalf of his brother; this might be interpreted as Monsieur 
Bassim being too preoccupied with his larger (and more successful) winery in France. 
Indeed, I had heard from other attendees at the UVL meetings that this was often how his 
absence was interpreted.   
In both instances, between the villagewith its extensive viticultureand the 
wineries, the changing roles of members of Bayt Rahal, especially after the establishment 
of Cave Kouroum, brought to the fore new market actors as a result of the strategies 
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deployed by the Chateau Ksara winery to source grapes elsewhere. Yet the ways in which 
these newly-acquired positions were perceived, namely with some sort ambivalence, 
suggests that such changes were not just economic, but also part of the relations of 
production constituted by “social and historical processes within a class” as much as 
amongst different classes (Sider, 1988: 8).  Although in many ways circumstantialor at 
least represented as suchthe choice to open a winery in Kefraya, and purchase another 
abroad, highlights the historical aspect of the relationship between intentionality, 
domination, and class formation (Sider, 1988). Indeed both Yanagisako and Ulin have 
suggested on separate occasions that in the process of the extraction and valuation of 
labour, workers’ choices and decisions are continuously shaped by particularly historically-
situated contexts (Yanagisako, 2002 & Ulin 2002. What is especially significant about the 
case of Bayt Rahal, therefore, is that the notion of house served to bind the sentimentalities 
of family and work. Bayt thus served to establish a sense of continuity in the sorts of work 
Rahal men performed in the vineyards.  
While certain wineries might not have appreciated the establishment of a winery by 
someone from Kefraya, bayt was still used to refer to the type of work that was associated 
with that family even if this was an attempt to reduce the growing importance of the 
Rahals in the production of wine. In the case of narratives by Kefraya residents, it is 
interesting that, although bayt was still important in signifying the type of work that the 
Rahals performed, there was strong emphasis upon Bassim Rahal’s departure from his 
fellahin roots. Thus it was implied that, despite the fact that the family’s role as grape 
distributors was instigated by Rahal brothers’ father, it was the accomplishments of Bassim 
Rahal in successfully extending production to wine that bestowed the bayt and all its 
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membersbrothers and cousins includedwith further wealthboth material and 
immaterial. 
 
Brotherly Labour  
 
While bayt names persist in Kefraya, along with the notion of kinship, concepts of house 
also shift in perception and experience from one generation to the next (Pine, 1996 & 
Carsten & Hugh-Jones, 1995). And it is precisely such changes and the struggles to 
understand them that generate processes of class-formation and self-making (Yanagisako, 
2002; Yanagisako & Collier, 1990).  In the case of Bayt Rahal, significant changes seem to 
have occurred following the establishment of the winery, when the brothers each took on 
distinctive managerial roles in order to supervise the activities related to and surrounding 
grape and wine production. Monsieur (Bassim) Rahal is recognised as the owner and 
patron of the winery, while his younger brother Mr Sami holds the position of general 
manager. His other brother, M Bahij, is the head of the municipality. The son of Bahij 
Rahal, Hassan, who trained as an agricultural engineer at the American University of 
Beirut, took on the responsibility of being viticulture manager, overseeing the maintenance 
of the kouroum.  
Along with these clearly-defined positions, there were certain characteristics 
associated with each of the roles. Bassim Rahal remained distant from the everyday 
running of the winery as he spent most of his time at his other winery in Languedoc. Yet 
despite his elusiveness, Bassim Rahal retained his influential position, in that Cave 
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Kouroum employees22 regarded him with respect. Unlike Chateau Kefraya, most of the 
employees at Cave Kouroum were from Kefraya, and Monsieur Rahal was also held in 
great esteem because of his loyalty to the region. Thus, despite Monsieur Bassim appearing 
to be more directly involved in other business enterprises, such as his investment of 2.5 
million Euros in Chateau Mauvanne, he was described by workers as “not forgetting 
Kefraya”. Interestingly, employees were usually unaware when Monsieur Rahal had 
returned to Kefraya. Yet when there was knowledge of his imminent arrival, work became 
more intense, and there was less clattering of coffee cups.   
Mr Sami arrived at work every morning at around nine a.m. His home, like the 
winery, was on the outskirts of the villageless than 100 meters away from the winery. 
During the afternoon, Mr Sami would often drive home for a lunch prepared for him by his 
wife. Like Monsieur Rahal, Mr Sami was highly respected by the winery’s employees. He 
was, however, considered to be less stern, and some described him as kind and 
approachable. Mr Sami was usually the person who liaised with the other wineries and 
attended UVL meetings, acting as the representative for Cave Kouroum. Also present on a 
daily basis at the winery was Hassan, the agricultural engineer, who lived on-site in a 
modern apartment with his wife and children. Hassan usually arrived at his office late 
morning, carrying his Starbucks coffee mug and trailing the aroma of imported coffee, 
from France. While it was clear that employees also held him in high regard, he was much 
closer in age to the majority of the staff. A lot of joking and laughter was common amongst 
the staff when Hassan arrived, and he would socialise outside of work with most of the 
other men working at the winery.  
                                                 
22 I am informed that the winery employees approximately 15 employees.  
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Hassan’s father, Mr Bahij, did not work at the winery, and nor did he visit the 
winery during work hours; although it is probable he visited his son and family from time 
to time. Nevertheless his role as the head of the municipality since 1997 has helped to 
legitimize the presence of the Cave Kouroum winery on the Kefraya landscape. The grape 
harvests of 1997 and 1998 had caused quite a stir in Kefraya village, so much so that 
villagers continued to discuss the events with each other while I was there. Since 1997, and 
once Chateau Ksara had ceased sourcing grapes from the region, many vineyard owners 
have had to deal with a greater degree of unpredictability in selling their grapes. At the 
same time, the opening of Cave Kouroum has had important ramifications on the 
relationship between Chateau Kefraya and Kefraya residents; especially because some of 
the employees at Chateau Kefraya who are from Kefraya, including the French oenologist 
Mr Yves Morard, went to work at the Cave Kouroum winery. These actions created 
considerable tension, because there were concerns that Chateau Kefraya would no longer 
hire new workers from Kefraya. I was informed that as part of Mr Bahij’s electoral 
campaign, villagersespecially young menwere guaranteed relatively well paid-jobs in 
the newly-established Cave Kouroum winery. Vineyard owners were also told that they 
would no longer need to worry about where (or if) their grapes were to be sold during each 
harvest: if Bayt Rahal couldn’t sell the grapes onto other wineries, then Cave Kouroum 
would buy the grapes instead.  
Notably, unlike the other two brothers, Mr Bahij’s was much more frequently seen 
around in the villagedaily making his way along the main road up towards the 
municipality offices, which are situated at one of the highest points in the village. Mr Bahij 
and his wife also engaged more than his brothers and their wives in the custom of making 
official ziyarat (visits) to peoples’ homes, either to offer condolences for a recently passed-
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away relative or congratulatory greetings for a wedding or birth. The passing-away of a 
member of the village would often be marked by communal mourning at the deceased 
person’s home, where the drinking of bitter coffee from a shared cup marked the shared 
sentiment of loss. Or, in order to welcome a new-born to the village, the women would 
visit the mother and child, with newly-purchased baby clothes. Missing such official visits 
could potentially break down social ties and bonds, as well as the trust and allegiance that 
had developed over time amongst (and also within) the bayt of Kefraya. Attending these 
ziyarat, however, is also suggestive of certain “pretensions to status” and honour, 
particularly because of the sense of obligation to attend these events, even when one may 
not actually want to make such official visits (Gilsenan, 1996). While they were considered 
social visits, there was always an implicit sense of official duty attached to the ziyarat. 
Keeping up appearances was thus an important responsibility that Mr Bahij (and his wife) 
had taken on behalf of Bayt Rahal. In attending such events, Mr Bahij provided a sociality 
that othersin particular Monsieur Bassimwere unable to offer because they did not 
spend as much time in the village. Indeed, it was almost as if Mr Bahij were acting on 
behalf of Bassim Rahal.  
While this division of labour might not be strictly fraternal in that the nephew, 
Hassan Rahal, had also appropriated a managerial role, there are some similarities to 
Yanagisako’s observations of “fraternal division of management” amongst the family firms 
of Como (2002). That is, such practices allowed the family to work efficiently to ensure 
that both the reputation and its material source were continuously reproduced. At the same, 
the transferral of certain responsibilities from Bassim Rahal to his brothers is of 
significance, in that it is suggestive of a hierarchical division of labour amongst the 
brothers. It is interesting that on the one hand, although it appears that Bassim Rahal had 
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invested the funds for the establishment and running of the winery, it was his physical 
absence that seemed to add a certain aura of importance to his entrepreneurial persona. On 
the other hand, however, while Bassim Rahal had become an important patriarch of Bayt 
Rahal, cooperation with the other brothers was essential to secure the material and 
immaterial wealth of the house. Interestingly, while this type of familial cooperation 
appears to have assisted the development of the Bayt Rahal enterprise, it also presented 
some limitations to economic development. That is, the decisions made by Monsieur Rahal 
were potentially constrained by kin-related sentiment and obligation, and at the same time 
they constrained and shaped the future of other family members.  Such issues came to the 
fore when I learnt that the productivity of Cave Kouroum was not at the optimum level.  
Controlling the Distributive Powers of the Bayt 
 
Despite employees at Cave Kouroum being quick to look busy as soon as the word got out 
that Monsieur Rahal had returned to Kefraya, the reality was that there not much work to 
do. The scene was unlike Chateau Kefraya or Chateau Ksara, where employees were 
constantly busy throughout the seasons, with staff racking, overseeing the filtration, or 
pumping over the wine. The reason for the minimal amount of work done by Cave 
Kouroum employees was never directly made clear to me. Notably, after my visits to Cave 
Kouroum became more regular, I was approached by individuals from the larger wineries 
and asked for my observations on the winery. Were the employees actually making wine, 
they would ask? Who was in charge of the whole wine-making process? Do you know if 
Yves Morard still works there?23  Someone even asked if I had heard the sound of 
                                                 
23 While Yves Morard remained in France for the duration of fieldwork, he continued to be the consultant for 
the Cave Kouroum winery.  
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machinery in use. As usual, when asked about another winery’s business, I would simply 
say that I wasn’t sure. These individuals however, were already well-informed about the 
financial situation of Cave Kouroum, and told me that it was clear that business at the 
winery was not going well. During one discussion that took place during the harvest, it was 
pointed out that the Rahals “were keeping very few grapes for themselves”. It appeared to 
my informant that Bayt Rahal had returned to their previous role as mediators and 
distributers between wineries and vineyard owners. How accurate these observations 
actually were remains unclear.  During one visit when I asked Mr Sami directly if the 
winery business was indeed facing troubles, he responded simply by saying that business 
was “as well as to be expected”.  
On one occasion, an informant who worked at one of the larger wineries told me 
that the Cave Kouroum winery had an account at Fransabank, whose chairman, Mr Adel 
Kasser, is one of the main investors in Chateau Ksara. Rumour had it that Cave Kouroum 
was not doing very well because very little money had been deposited into their 
Fransabank account for quite some time. While my informant agreed with me that the Cave 
Kouroum winery might hold another account elsewhere, he pointed out that productivity 
remained low at the winery. “Business does not look good,” he continued, “and guess who 
is interested in buying Cave Kouroum?” My informant was referring to Mr Adel Kasser, 
and the other investors in Chateau Ksara. As Cave Kouroum remains under the ownership 
of Bassim Rahal, and to the best of my knowledge the two parties had not met to discuss 
any potential deal, it is still difficult to verify this information. However, it appears that 
Bassim Rahal remained strong, and no outside investors were made welcome. Another 
well-informed individual suggested that what was missing from Bassim Rahal’s enterprise 
was a better and wider business network that included the right contacts. This particular 
informant was quite well-connected, and told me he had made it clear to Monsieur Rahal 
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that his contacts could be exchanged for a price. The price was not cash, and nor was it 
shares in the company. The type of transaction proposed to Bassim Rahal was that of a 
business sales option, where in exchange for selling a certain amount of Cave Kouroum’s 
wine, my informant would receive an equivalent amount of bottles to sell privately. When I 
asked this informant a few months later if his proposal had been successful, the answer was 
negativeBassim Rahal had expressed no interest. “How could this be the case?” my 
informant wondered.  
When I asked Mr Sami and Hassan for their thoughts on such business exchanges, 
both explained that the winery was not open to non-family investors. Mr Sami explained 
that Cave Kouroum was a “Rahal family enterprise,” where “the owner is Bassim Rahal 
and we (the rest of the family) take care of running the business”. He explained that an 
outside investor who might take a majority of shares (as had happened at Chateau Kefraya) 
would limit “the choices we can make”. There was, however, some ambivalence from both 
Mr Sami and Hassan concerning the decision-making process. When I asked Mr Sami for 
his personal thoughts concerning the choices his brother had made, he shrugged, explaining 
that, “We have no choice, but to fulfil to our family obligations”. Hassan expressed his 
opinions more metaphorically: “The owner of our winery deserves a lot of credit, because 
Cave Kouroum is one man on a big ship. Whatever gets into my uncle’s mind, he does”. 
Yet despite the respect he had for his uncle’s adamant determination, Hassan also had his 
own opinion on the types of business decisions that should have been made. He felt that 
there were perhaps better opportunities to invest in wine production outside of Lebanon. 
Although his uncle had already invested in a winery in France, Hassan felt that more 
investment should have been made outside of Lebanon:  
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I tell my uncle that he is mad to have made this investment. The winery in France cost about 2.5 
million Euros. Now it is worth 3–3.5 million Euros. Cave Kouroum was a $12–15 million 
investment. Instead of investing here, we could have invested into three or four wineries abroad . . . 
perhaps in Australia or France.  
We were sitting in his office, and he paused for a moment before looking out of his office 
window. Hassan’s office looks onto the vineyards of the east, and onto the lands belonging 
to the Hariri dynasty. On the wall facing the window is a framed photograph of Rafik 
Hariri, who appears to be looking out the window as well. Next to the photograph is a 
cabinet holding thin piles of wine and viticulture magazines-these were well read. 
Whenever I interviewed Hassan in the office, he would always offer me an array of teas 
and coffees, and on this occasion, after accepting some coffee, I asked him how he came to 
study and work as agricultural engineer. He told me: 
My family were eager for me to stay; to do business here and work here. I had to make a choice 
when I was studying agriculture. I had to major on a particular aspect. Being from Kefraya, and 
seeing all those vineyards, I decided to become a specialist in grapes. When I was younger I wanted 
to study mechanical engineering. But my uncle pointed out that we had all this land, and suggested I 
try agricultural engineering. So I had no choice. I studied agricultural engineering and environmental 
sciences. When I started, I didn’t like it. I felt obliged. But I realised that we have a large amount of 
independence . . . not having to abide by others. So I got to know the vines and I am still learning. 
My uncle wanted to pull out some vineyards and grow olives. I do not want to pull out a single vine! 
I love what I am doing. After the harvest, people from Kefraya say they have yielded a large 
amount. But I ask about the quality. Is it good quality? However, if I had the choice to go back then I 
would rewind. I would not choose this domain. 90% of my friends from my days at the American 
University of Beirut are outside of Lebanon or working in big companies. They are becoming 
salesmensuccessful ones.  
Hassan’s response was somewhat conflicting, in that on the one hand he felt that there were 
limitations in terms of the choices he made, due to family pressureespecially from his 
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uncle. On the other, Hassan also had great respect for his uncle, and felt that it was 
important to listen to his advice because it was his uncle’s choices that had allowed the 
family some degree of independence and less pressure overall to “abide by others”. 
“Others” for Hassan included both wineries, but also non-family members from Kefraya. 
Ultimately, Hassan felt that he had had to compromise on certain personal choices to 
ensure the economic security of the family as a whole. Notably, Mr Sami expressed a 
similar sentiment when he told me that it was “family ties and traditions” that had 
prevented him from returning to Canada, and it was this sense of duty that had held him 
back in pursuing new business ventures abroadand outside of the wine sector.   
While both Hassan and Mr Sami believed it important for their sons to learn about 
the significance of the kouroum in Kefraya, and the work that went on in the winery, they 
both made it clear that there were better opportunities for their sons abroad, where they 
would be allowed to develop their own businesses interests with some degree of 
independence; perhaps, after which, they might return to Kefraya for their retirement. 
While there was still a desire for the sons to remain “close” to Kefraya, and perhaps even 
to marry someone from the village, the sentiments of both fathers was clear in that they 
hoped the sons would have a future with less pressure to work in Kefraya. The winery was, 
after all, as Hassan had aptly put it, like “one man on a ship”. It was also implied that 
Bassim Rahal’s children would inherit mostif not allof the shares of the Cave 
Kouroum winery. Should the sons of Hassan and Mr Sami not find their own paths outside 
of Kefraya, then the hierarchy in the division of labour, which began with the Rahal 
brothers, would potentially manifest amongst family member of the next generation. I 
briefly encountered the son and daughter of Bassim Rahal during harvest time, when both 
had come to gain work experience at the winery and in the vineyards. Whether they will 
take over the executive side of the business however, remains to be seen. Although during 
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a post-fieldwork visit, it appeared that the daughter had acquired a position in international 
sales and distribution, working at both Cave Kouroum and Chateau 
Mauvanneunfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to meet with her. 
While obtaining any official property documents concerning the winery proved to 
be impossible, I was informed that the ownership of the winery was arranged similarly to 
the way in which the Rahal family managed their lands in Kefraya. That is, the lands of 
Bayt Rahal were a joint stock company; the grapes from the vineyards on these lands were 
sold to wineries and the profits were split proportionally amongst the shareholders. 
Significantly, important decisionssuch as whether to sell shares to outsiders, namely non 
Bayt Rahal membersrequired unanimous agreement. As there were up to thirty 
shareholders in the company, such a possibility was near- impossibleunless the whole of 
Bayt Rahal “wanted out of Kefraya”.24 Hassan explained this to me in further detail:  
The profit is separated amongst family members. So, for example, my father has a one-sixth share. If 
we were to sell the shares, then my father would gain one sixth of the profit. Also in this way, after, 
for example, two generations, inheritance is not the land itself, but the shares. So value is less likely 
to decrease and we can also bypass hereditary laws that are part of the personal status law. This is 
what Rafiq Hariri did with his land. So when he was assassinated, no one [particular member] could 
take all of his lands, as it was in the form of a company. It is important to do this in Kefraya, because 
the value of the land is much higher than in other parts of the Bekaa Valley.  
In adopting a corporate model for running Bayt Rahal, family members were thus linked to 
Kefraya through both economic organization and familial relations. That is, the obligation 
to ensure that the companies were successful profitable ventures was simultaneously 
                                                 
24 It is unclear what type of joint stock company the Rahal family have established for the management of 
their lands. However, if, for example, it is registered as a limited liability joint stock companySARL 
(Société à Responsabilité Limitée)then following inheritance, the company is only eligible to have up to 
thirty share-holders. Above this, another company would have to be established.  
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perceived as a form of kin-related sentiment. In the fraternal division of labour, Bayt Rahal 
as a whole had a vested interest in the land in Kefrayabut in the reputation of the Kefraya 
region for producing high quality grapes and wines more generally. Indeed, any member of 
the family, like Hassan, who had specialised in viticulture maintenance, was an important 
asset to Bayt Rahal. Significantly, in the years following the establishment of the Cave 
Kouroum, Bayt Rahal decided to reduce the amount of Cinsault vines planted on their 
landand Hassan’s role became all the more important in the project to plant new grape 
varietals on both winery’s estates and Bayt Rahal lands. It was also brought to my attention 
that included in their project were lands that belonged to the Kefraya municipality. Hassan 
explained: 
In 1997, we had a municipality of four hectares of vineyards. This had been more or less the case 
since the 1970s. The former municipality was unable to plant more vineyards on the rest of the 
municipal lands. I mean that no one was eager to plant more vineyards. After the 1997 elections, my 
father, the Mayor decided to invest money from the four hectares in wine-grape production to plant 
vines on the other common land. This was, in effect, reclamation of the land. We reached up to 
twenty-five hectares. Yes, there was opposition from some of the villagers. They said that we [the 
Rahals] did not own this land. Also, that if we extended the vineyards onto municipal lands, then the 
prices of grapes would go down. The logic was that the 200–300 tonnes produced on the municipal 
land would increase supply and lower demand. But many did not want to grow anything else but 
Zaitouny (Cinsault). We continued [nevertheless], piece by piece. After one year, we moved to the 
other side of Kefraya, until we reached twenty-five hectares. We are getting better . . . selling grapes 
from the vineyards gives us double the amount of funds provided to the Kefraya municipality from 
the internal ministers. The village of Kefraya is the only one that has a positive balance on its 
account sheets!  
 
While “reclaiming” unused municipal land in order to use the profits for the general 
maintenance and upkeep of the village was an innovative strategy, there had been some 
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concern in the village about the possibility of losing buyers. In response to my query about 
such concerns, one of the Rahals explained that these vineyard owners would only lose 
buyers if they didn’t grow the grapes in demand by the wineries. On another occasion, a 
Rahal family member pointed out while the family might continue to act as distributors, 
villagers had to start growing “better grapes . . . if they don’t then we can’t sell them”. In 
this light, it is also significant that, along with Dr. Didi, Bayt Rahal continued to acquire 
more land in the region. In the process, the corporatization of Kefraya’s viticultureand 
viniculturehad thus become an extension of Bayt Rahal.  
Yet given that the winery really belonged only to Bassim and his children, this suggests 
that the diversification of business interests could potentially result in the breaking down of 
the larger collective interests of the Rahal household. This is not to say that, if the winery 
was not the most successful of ventures, other related wine related enterprises would be 
directly affected. Rather, what is at stake is the way Bassim Rahal had managed to centre 
all of Bayt Rahal’s economic activity at the winery. So, for example, if the Rahals were 
unable to sell everything from one particular harvest, then the grapes were sent over to 
Cave Kouroum and made into wine. While it is unclear how family members were paid for 
such transactions, it is of significance that such an exchange reinforces the patriarchal role 
of Bassim Rahal. In other words, if he had not established the winery then unsold grapes 
would mean a loss of profits. Even if the wine was not sold immediately, unlike the grapes, 
it could be aged for a few years before entering the marketthus making it a more durable 
surplus-product. In this regard, in possessing the resources to make wine, Bassim Rahal 
had also managed to extend control of the distributive powers of Bayt Rahal (Yanagisako, 
2002). In so doing, he secured the work-legacy of Bayt Rahal, while also appropriating the 
role of the bayt’s most prominent patriarch.   
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The Reproductive Powers of Bayt Rahal  
 
It is significant that, in many respects, the notion of bayt in Kefraya refers to the social 
importance of a kind of household economy. While the notion of a household economy can 
be conceptually loaded with ideas of pre-capitalist societies, ethnographic studies have 
demonstrated their persistence even after the marketization of societies (e.g. Pine, 1996 & 
Sabean, 1990 & Bourdieu, 1979). It is thus also useful to recall here the discussion in 
Chapter Two concerning Gudeman and Rivera’s distinction between house and corporate 
economic models, and the increasing displacement of the former. Also recall Pratt’s 
critique that the former can exist under the forces of market production (Gudeman & River, 
1990; Pratt, 1994). That is, although Bayt Rahal’s corporate model of ownership might 
imply a marginalization of household economies, I would argue that such forms of 
economic organization portrays an attempt to sustain autonomous units of production as 
well as patrilineal succession, following further changes in market production.  
In this light, a significant feature of discussions concerning transforming house-
societies and household economies is the impact of broader political and economic forces 
upon gendered relationsespecially in terms of how such forces are interpreted and 
incorporated into the house (e.g. Sabean, 1990; Lem, 1999 & 2013; Mundy & Smith, 2003 
& 2007). In the case of modern Lebanon, Joseph has argued that the reproduction of 
gendered subjectivities within the home has a particularly important role in the 
construction of the self (1994). For example, the sense of obligation and duty of fathers to 
protect women allows for the construction and development of certain masculine 
subjectivities: in preserving the honour of their women kin they ensure that particular 
notions of respect and the reputation of the family are upheld.  
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While Joseph does not clarify the historical legacy of the notion of home in terms of 
shaping gendered subjectivities, she does extend her argument to suggest that the 
metaphorical use of familial termssuch as uncle or sisteroutside of the house might 
imply that household familial relations act as the basis for all other forms of social 
relationsincluding those that occur in places of work and business (1993, 1994, 1997, 
1999).  She also argues that due to the weakness of the Lebanese state, people in all social 
classes and religious communities frequently build up trust in both long- and short-term 
relationships through the use of kin-terms in places of work and more domesticated 
spheres. The line between the public and the private is in this way porous and undefined, 
where “fictive kinship” acts as an anchor for social cohesion and security across these 
spheres. In developing this line of reasoning, Joseph also challenges “Western constructs” 
of the state and citizenship, and in so doing so develops a critique of gender-making 
constructed through the public-private nexus (1997).  
The idiomatic use of family ties, as suggested by Joseph, also implies that there are 
two (or more) forms of kinship occurring. Such a supposition inadvertently infers a spatial 
demarcation, where the first form of kinship is considered real, and situated within the 
household; while the latter is unreal and acts a metaphor for relatedness across the public 
sphere. Joseph therefore (perhaps unintentionally) makes a clear differentiation between 
the public and private, and in doing so only ratifies the “Western traditions” she intends to 
challenge. Indeed, the actual use of kin-titles within work and political domains, at least to 
the extent suggested by Joseph, is questionable in the case of Kefrayaor the wine 
industry as a whole. I rarely (if ever) heard terms such as “sister”, “brother”, or “uncle” 
used within such areas or in social activity. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the 
kouroum is a site with different gendered temporalities, but this does not have to imply the 
“blurring” of the public and private. Instead, there is an implicit understanding as to how, 
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when, and the way in which the two spheres of the kouroum should inform and 
complement each other. The breaking down of this understanding of the kouroum has 
obscured particular ways of forging ties and conceptualising ways of relating. 
Nevertheless, Joseph’s concept of “patriarchal connectivity” provides a useful lens 
through which to explore the process of relatedness within and amongst the different bayt 
in Kefrayaand might help us understand how gendered subjectivities are reproduced 
within that process.  To add to her perspective, however, I would suggest that such 
gendered discourses of patriarchy do not necessarily imply that a woman’s role is limited 
to the domestic sphere (Goddard, 2000). Indeed, in the case of Kefraya, many women also 
worked outside the home in professions such as teaching and nursing. These jobs, however, 
were often described as supplementary torather than constitutinga household’s 
finances.  
Yet despite the reduction in the social importance of such types of work done by 
women outside the home, in Kefraya these roles were still perceived as important. This was 
not only in terms of providing sustenance and nourishment from the kouroumboth 
physical and symbolic. The women of Kefraya often had an active role in ensuring the 
continuation of patriarchal succession. Significantly, these roles were intricately 
intertwined with attempts to forge kin relations and increase social mobility (Collier & 
Yanagisako, 1990). Yanagisako’s observations, made during her fieldwork in northern 
Italy, are a case in point, where the wives of many of the Como entrepreneurs are 
extremely knowledgeable about kin-genealogies in relation to the family firms established 
across the region. Such knowledge is invaluable when judging the suitability of potential 
business-partners for the family firm, but also when considering marriage suitors for their 
sons and daughters. Likewise, it was apparent that the women of Bayt Rahal also actively 
engage in shaping their family’s future.  
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For example, during one discussion with Mr Sami about his decision to work at 
Cave Kouroum, he explained to me that he had initially felt obliged to stay in Kefraya 
because of his mother. Had it not been for her pleading, Mr Sami explained that he would 
have happily left for Michigan to “start a new life other there”. After all, his father had 
once left Kefraya, and so had his older brother Bassim. Indeed, Bassim Rahal’s wife and 
their grown-up children remained, for most of the time, outside Kefraya. Mr Sami, 
however, felt compelled and obliged to remain close, in order to care for his aging mother 
and “make a life in Kefraya”. It was “these ties”, he explained, that can “hold you back”. 
Not long after, and much to the relief of his mother, Mr Sami married a woman from 
Kefraya. Significantly, it was Mr Sami’s new wife who, in 1997, acquired an important 
role in the family business during the transition of the Rahal family from muwaza to wine 
producers.   
One evening, late in the summer of 1997, Mr Brahim Serhal paid a visit to the 
Nabhane household. Serhal saw Nabhane on a daily basis at Chateau Kefraya, where both 
worked. He was the chef d’atelier (head of the workshop and laboratory), while Nabhane 
was in charge of the agricultural affairs out in the vineyards. Both knew, however, that this 
important meeting could not take place at the winery, and given the social status of Bayt 
Nabhane, it was expected that Serhal would make the visitand not the other way around. 
Serhal only lived across the road, and it was just a matter of crossing the road and climbing 
up the steps onto the Nabhane family’s long veranda. As the story goes, Serhal proceeded 
towards the other end of the veranda, where Nabhane reclined on his favourite summer 
day-bed, Hana, Nabhane’s wife, got up and went inside to prepare some coffee. Their 
daughters greeted Serhal before also going inside. Nabhane’s son, who was only around ten 
years old at the time, stood up to greet Serhal before sitting back down on one of the chairs 
that faced the sahal (plains) and, in the distance, the Chateau of Kefraya. It is likely that 
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Nabhane’s two nephews, Abdel Helim and Omar, were also present. Serhal would have 
greeted Nabhane before sitting on a red plastic chair, giving his back to the sahal and 
Chateau.  
This was not a social call, but a business meeting: Serhal had come to inform 
Nabhane of his plan to leave Chateau Kefraya. He may have glanced and gestured in front 
of him and into the distance, where a new winery was under construction. Nabhane would 
have listened intently as Serhal spoke about his intentions. It was not just Serhal who was 
planning to leave Chateau Kefraya in order to work at the newly-established winery. There 
was also Yves Murard, the French oenologist, as well as some others from the Kefraya 
village. Although the figures fluctuate, there were up to ten people who planned on leaving 
Chateau Kefraya to work at the newly-established Cave Kouroum. This was a rather large 
number of workers, and the move would obviously have an impact upon Chateau 
Kefraya’s productivity. Serhal emphasized once more that the French oenologist, Yves 
Murard, was also going. With both Serhal and Murard gone, who would be in charge of 
making the wine? 
 While Nabhane was well aware of the events taking place, he had already made his 
decision.  Nabhane, of course, wouldcouldnot leave Chateau Kefraya. There was the 
legacy of his father to preserve, and, as he would constantly remind me, “there would be no 
Chateau Kefraya without Abdel Helim Nabhane”. Leaving Chateau Kefraya, at least while 
the Khawaja was still alive, would dishonour the memory of his father. However, when it 
came to informing Serhal of his decision to stay on at Chateau Kefraya, Nabhane chose his 
words carefully, as there were also the familial ties between Bayt Nabhane and Bayt Rahal 
to consider. Whenever this story was told to me by Nabhane, he would usually point 
towards the house of Sami Rahal, situated on the sahal along the main road and just across 
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from Cave Kouroum, reminding me that his sister, Hayat, lived there too. Nabhane would 
often conclude his narration of this story by exclaiming the term suhur (brother in law), 
and as he did, put his two index fingers close together so that they were aligned equally. It 
was predominantly because of respect and love for his sister that the decision had been so 
difficult. In refusing the offer, there was the potential of breaking down the relations 
between the families and repercussions that might have put his sister in a difficult situation. 
There was also the chance that collaboration between the two families would have been 
beneficial for his sister and husbandperhaps even for Bayt Nabhane. And finally, there 
was the risk of creating a rift in the village itself. In his conversation with Serhal, Nabhane 
would thus bring to the table a reminder of his duty to honour the memory of his father. 
Serhal had expected such an outcomeand, as he told me himself, Nabhane’s decision was 
completely understandable.   
It is also significant that while Hayat is a regular visitor to the Nabhane household, 
I only saw her husband (Mr Sami) at the Nabhane house on one occasion, upon the 
marriage of Nabhane’s eldest daughter. When I mentioned my observations to Mr Sami 
and Nabhane, both were quick to explain that there was no bad feeling between the 
familieseven after Nabhane’s decision to remain at Chateau Kefraya. Working at 
different wineries, however, presented some difficulties in socialising, apparently because 
of their busy hours. Still, both Mr Sami and Nabhane were welcome to visit the other. 
Nevertheless, Sami Rahal rarely (if ever) made an appearance and it was significant that 
Hayat would usually visit during the day in order to help out with kitchen activities, such as 
stuffing vine leaves. If she came during the late afternoon or early evening with her two 
young sons, when Nabhane was in, then she would greet him and occasionally join him for 
a cup of coffee before entering the house or moving down to the other side of the veranda 
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where Hana and her friends would be sitting. Yet it was during these late afternoon visits, 
when Nabhane was home, that Hayat would speak with her brother on behalf of the Rahals. 
There would often be an exchange of information pertaining to the wineries looking for 
grapes in the upcoming harvest and the amount that was in demand.  
Despite the influential positions of people like Hayat and Mr Sami’s mother, there 
were limitations upon the roles the women were able to acquire within some aspects of 
Bayt Rahal’s business. As we saw earlier, the management of the Rahal family lands in 
Kefraya was done through share-holding companiessignificantly; daughters and sisters 
were provided with their own shares. In fact, one of the major advantages of establishing 
the Rahal “land” company was that it allowed some aspects of inheritance to bypass the 
personal status law in Lebanon. In line with Sunni inheritance laws, Rahal sons are (each) 
entitled to a full share of both of their parents’ estate; while daughters only receive a third 
of the shares. As Hassan explained, the transformation of land ownership into shares 
prevented such a division of the Rahal lands, which would thus divide into even smaller 
parcels from generation to generation. At the same time, the value of the shares only 
differed in the amount of shares each member held, and this (arguably) meant that the 
Rahal daughters and sisters were personally motivated (to some degree) to augment the 
value of these shares. However, as we saw, the shares could only be sold within the family, 
and this is indicative of the types of restrictions imposed upon women within the business. 
Thus, despite the active involvement of Bassim Rahal’s daughter, the chances of her 
children owning any shares in the company remain uncertain.    
In this regard, it is clear that ideas of patrilineal succession and the continuation of 
the business were entangled within gendered discourses of the self, where most of the 
activity of the women remained within the realm of the home. Yet despite their prevailing 
“invisibility” within officially demarcated workplaces, these women still held influence in 
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decisions relating to business.  They played “a fundamental part in building up the male 
entrepreneur and particular masculinities” (Mulholland, 1996: 123). The “invisible 
resource” of the work of the women in the domestic serves also to guarantee the connection 
of men to the home, and in this way constitutes “sets of relationships which are mutually 
reproducing” (ibid). This is precisely how these invisible or “silent” resources are deployed 
in order to contribute towards the construction of entrepreneurial masculinities. These are, 
as we have seen, significant, and speak of the active and powerful roles that these women 
have in directing and shaping the futures of their sons, brothers, and husbands.   
Thus, if Mr Sami had moved to Michigan, he would not only be leaving his mother 
for someone else, but in the process he would become disconnected and detached from 
Kefraya: a place of home and also of work. In this way, marrying someone from the village 
indicates the importance of collaboration with others from the village. However, the 
decision to marry does not of course emerges solely from economic motivations. Rather, it 
merges social and cultural aspects that must both be taken into account. As my 
conversation with Mr Sami revealed, the decision to stay had less to do with business, but 
more to do with his sense of duty to respect and care for his mother. As our discussion 
drew to an end, Mr Sami told me that Kefraya was his “home”, and that there were some 
things that he just had to accept. 
There are two final, pertinent things I would like to add here. The first has to do 
with my access to the homes of Bayt Rahal, which was limited to those in Kefraya. In this 
regard, I did not have the opportunity to meet either Bassim Rahal or his wife, and thus was 
unable to fully understanding her role in the family. Indeed I was unable to obtain who she 
was, or if she even came from Kefrayaa question that I asked in vain. The question, 
however, leads on to my second point, which is to do with the importance of marriage 
alliances made by Bayt Rahal with members of elite families from outside of Kefraya. 
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While Mr Sami might have married someone from Kefraya, it is significant that Hassan 
Rahal’s wife came from a village nearby and was the daughter of a prominent patriarch. 
Once more, there are questions that remain unanswered. Was there an historical 
relationship between the two familiesand if so what types? After spending some time 
with Hassan’s wife, and developing a friendship with her, it was apparent that despite 
coming from a nearby village, her connections extended to Beirut and further abroad. 
Indeed, she and Hassan enjoyed taking their children on holiday abroad, to visit 
relativesincluding Bassim Rahal.  
 
The Hands of Raya 
 
Pine has observed that in the case of the Górales in Poland, the social significance of 
naming the house could also be extended to the land (1996). There are some similarities to 
the case of Kefraya, where different vineyards were referred to as being (for example) 
“Kouroum Bayt Saleh”. That is, it was common for villagers not to say that these vineyards 
belonged to a particular house, but rather, imply that the vineyards were a particular house. 
Notably, if the ownership of the land became increasingly fragmented from one generation 
to the next, then villagers would often add a first name in order to designate more 
specifically which house the land was associated with, e.g. Bayt Mohammed Saleh. 
Interestingly, in the case of the Rahals, the vineyards usually remained Bayt Rahal; perhaps 
reflecting their adoption of a corporate model for landownership. Still, in all instances, and 
just as in linking bayt with a family name, the kouroum also entered into the realm of 
kinship genealogies, while at the same time consolidating the familial bond to land as well 
as place.   
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By establishing a link to place, names have the power to evoke identities, and 
different family and work histories become entangled within the process. Such identities 
are strongly attached to the kouroum, and not confined just to the houses of Kefraya. The 
name of the village itself is part of the politics of names associated with the kouroum; after 
all the arrival of the kouroum is what made the Kefraya region prominent as the wine-
growing hub of Lebanon. Thus while the village of Kefraya might pre-date the arrival of 
the kouroum, it is the work of the Khawaja that has made the name of the region 
knownand transformed it from a place of “nothing”. Notably, there are stories in the 
village that the name “Kefraya” was derived from the Arabic word for stop or (qaf) or 
enough (kaf) and the name of a heroine called Raya, who lived long before the Cinsault 
vines arrived. There are two variations of Raya’s story, which were told to me by Kefraya 
residents:  
Raya was a shepherdess and spiritual woman in this region. You know where the old wall is? You 
walked there once with Iman’s children. That is where she is buried. That is where the old village of 
Kefraya used to be. No, I can’t remember the name of the village. But Raya was a good woman who 
helped people. She lived a simple life. But there was a lot of fighting and many wars at that time. 
One day the village was attacked and Raya was trying to stop the fighting. Raya was killed but no 
one could find her body. All that was left was her hand. 
Kefraya? Raya was the shepherdess who went up the mountains from her village. She was following 
the water source up the mountain to find more water . . . when wolves got her. All that was left was 
her hand. 
It is interesting that another important character in a narrative about the origins of Kefraya 
is described as a shepherd. It is significant that both variations of the story were known to 
most of the younger generation in Kefraya, and when I asked elder residents about the 
story, many knew of Raya a wise sage and shepherdess, but “kef” was considered as an old 
word for village: so Kefraya referred to the village of Raya. It is not that such 
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inconsistencies make the story of Raya untrue, or of less importance for us to consider 
analytically as narrative; nor will I dismiss the possibility that the story of Raya’s hand was 
told with someone like me in mindsomeone not fluent in Arabic. I was, however, 
intrigued that the story seemed so recentor perhaps to have undergone some 
modifications.25 The narrative had caught my attention because, first, the story appears to 
pre-date the arrival of the kouroum into Kefraya, and contradicts those narratives that speak 
of a time when there was “nothing” in Kefraya. Second, the wall where Raya is supposedly 
buried is located just below the Cave Kouroum winery. Finally, there had been, over the 
last decade, some contention over the use of the name of Kefraya in wine production, and 
this began when Cave Kouroum had named its then newly-established winery Kouroum de 
Kefraya.  
The name however, was short-lived, and this was not due to protest or expression of 
disapproval from the Kefraya villagers. Objection came, instead, from the winery not far 
down the road: Chateau Kefraya. Pre-fieldwork research had already uncovered an article 
published in Decanter wine magazine on the 16th of June 2003, confirming that four years 
of legal dispute had finally ended between the “longer-established Chateau Kefraya” and 
their rival “Kouroum de Kefraya” (vineyards of Kefraya). The outcome was that the 
Chateau Kefraya winery would retain the “sole use of the name” Kefraya, and Kouroum de 
Kefraya would henceforth be called Cave Kouroum: 
Château Kefraya's proprietor, Michel de Bustros, told decanter.com, 'We now have a deal with 
Rahal, and he's going to observe it from the end of this month'. De Bustros argues his estate has 
                                                 
25 For example, stories of the khamsa hand are commonplace across the eastern Mediterranean. Khamsa 
means five in Arabic and the khamsa hand can represent peace, protection from evil and/or prosperity. The 
khamsa hand is also associated with the hand of Miriam and the hand of Fatimadepending upon the 
religion. Significantly, an amulet of the khamsa is also said to prevent the effects of the evil eyesuch as 
envy. (González-Wippler, 1991) 
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established a right to the village name. Rahal counter-claimed that the name was the common 
property of the village's farmers, who supply grapes to most of the country's wineries. Before 
founding Koroum Kefraya in 1997 Rahal was the local agent sourcing grapes for the well-known 
producer Château Musar. With this agreement, the way is now clear for Rahal's company to join the 
joint industry body, the Union Viticole Libanais, from which it was previously barred. (Matthews, 
2003) 
In fact, it was Chateau Kefraya who had initially pursued court action back in 1999, 
and Decanter mentions that Chateau Kefraya had won the case at the first hearing, but the 
following two appeals had “subsequently gone the other way." However, it appeared that 
an important part of the deal struck between Michel de Bustros and Bassim Rahal was an 
agreement concerning Cave Kouroum’s membership of the wineries business association, 
the Union Vinicole du Liban. I had hoped that upon arrival in Kefraya I would have the 
chance to learn more about the different perspectives on this legal dispute. In particular, I 
wanted to find out why Bassim Rahal might have accepted such a deal, despite his apparent 
legal “win”. However, (and understandably), it was not a popular subject of discussion. 
Gaining access to legal documents related to these events has also been (thus far) an 
impossible task. When I asked members of the wineries involved for these documents, I 
was informed that I would have to speak with their lawyerswho were unavailable to 
meet with me. Despite the lack of further information about the court case between 
Chateau Kefraya and Cave Kouroum, it is clear that the dispute marked an important 
juncture in terms of the politics behind the emergence of an appellation system in 
Lebanonthe focus of the following chapterand the ensuing (or resultant) struggle over 
legacy and succession.  
Ostensibly, for Michel de Bustros, this legacy was one of heritage and recognition 
for his enterprising vision of the Kefraya landscape. It was, as he reminded me during an 
interview, “him and always him” in Kefraya; there had been nobody else. When I asked 
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him about the role of the people living in Kefraya, he informed me of his hopes that they 
continue to look after and care for their vines, ensuring that his vision carries on long after 
his death. I asked him about the Cave Kouroum winery, only a few hundred meters down 
the roadwere they continuing his vision? De Bustros explained diplomatically that if 
they make good wines then that was a good thingnot just for Kefraya but for wine 
production in Lebanon as a whole. But what of the court case between Chateau Kefraya 
and Cave Kouroum some years back? I was told by de Bustros that “Kefraya” belonged to 
the Chateau Kefraya winery because this was where wine (and wine grape) production 
began. It was because of this belief that de Bustros had taken the step of trademarking the 
name so that it could not be put on the labels of wine bottles produced in other wineries. It 
is of significance as well that for de Bustros, the name Kefraya had no meaning other than 
signifying the plural (in Arabic), namely a cluster or group of small villages: kfar. The 
name Kefraya was therefore unique only in the respect that it has a distinctive history 
related to wine production evoked through an association with term “chateau.” There was, 
for de Bustros, no notable history of Kefraya other than that of wine-production.   
The story of Raya, as told by certain Kefraya residents, is thus the antithesis of the 
historical representation of Kefraya recounted by Michel de Bustros. The heroic status of 
Raya suggests attempts made to reconfigure a history of Kefraya, linking its present 
inhabitants with a period that pre-dates the kouroumand perhaps more importantly the 
establishment of Chateau Kefraya and the prominent role of Michel de Bustros. The 
gendering of Raya and the absence of a (patrilineal) surname is an interesting aspect of the 
story in this regard, because it makes it practically impossible for any particular bayt in 
Kefraya to lay claim to this ancestry. In this light, the original name for the Cave Kouroum 
winery (Kouroum de Kefraya) adds another interesting dimension in that the choice of the 
name was, according to Mr Sami, “because we are from Kefraya, the grapes are from 
205 
 
Kefraya and the winery is in Kefraya! It makes sense for us to call it that!” In this way, the 
first name for Cave Kouroum carried significant value, both within the village and as part 
of a wine label. The name Kouroum de Kefraya was once associated with a renowned 
place for making wine while also speaking of the accomplishments of Bassim Rahal in 
beginning a new legacy for Bayt Rahal, one that was an extension of the viticulture 
enterprise his father had initiated a few decades earlier.  
Yet Bassim Rahal’s consenting, not long after the establishment of his winery, to 
the demands of Chateau Kefraya, evenand perhaps especiallyafter his legal success, 
suggests that the dynamics of power relations are relative, in that they must be constituted 
within certain broader contexts. Indeed, as implied by an anonymous informant, in contrast 
to Chateau Kefrayawhere Walid Junbltatt and a member of the Fattal family were also 
shareholdersCave Kouroum was severely limited in both its political and economic 
connections. It was suggested that refusing the demands of its adversary meant that Cave 
Kouroum could face challenges in selling its wines locally, where goods distributed by the 
Fattal family dominated the market. By the same token, exporting abroad could also be 
difficult given the extensive networks of the shareholders of Chateau Kefraya. It is, in this 
way, apparent that in both cases the original choice of name of the Cave Kouroum winery 
and the decision to trademark “Kefraya” by de Bustros are overlapping perspectives of the 
region, which speaks of a “representational economy” (vom Bruck & Bodenhorn, 2009:11 
& see also West, 2012). The name “Kefraya” (and the rights to it) is thus an important 
resource that belongs to converging and diverging historical processes; where in both 
instances the name allows for succession and the continuity of a certain patriarchal 
attachment to place, while also possessing commodity value (ibid).   
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Yet sentiments expressed by Rahal family membersas well as other 
residentsbrought to the fore how the trade-marking of the village name by Chateau 
Kefraya was a contradiction, in that it could potentially break up the interrelatedness of 
bayt and kouroum and both of their associations with work and kin. One Rahal family 
member explained, “Now no one from Kefraya village can use the name Kefraya to make 
wine! Even though we have all been supplying grapes to wineries across Lebanon since at 
least the 1960s!” In being prevented from access to the name Kefraya when making wine, 
residents of Kefraya also faced a limited future role in wine production. In the case of Bayt 
Rahal, there was, quite possibly, little aspiration in the younger generation to expand and 
develop the business that Bassim Rahal had started. 
Concluding Remarks  
It seems that in some ways the predicaments faced by Cave Kouroum reflect the broader 
dilemmas faced by many in Kefraya. That is, as the region continues to be an important 
centre for wine grapes, those who seek to extend production into wine-making are 
restrained by other wineries competing to secure an important attachment to the region. 
The limitations imposed upon Cave Kouroum are illustrated clearly through the court case 
with Chateau Kefraya over the usage of the name Kefraya. While the trade-marking of the 
name Kefraya demonstrates a version of quality discourses that are utilized within wine 
production, it also elucidates the types of power relations that are involved in such 
strategies. In other words, the political and economic networks and alliances amongst 
Chateau Kefraya’s upper management, that extend beyond the relations forged in Kefraya, 
have offered several advantages in influencing and steering decisions towards favourable 
outcomes for Chateau Kefraya’s enterprise.  
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There are more subtle ways to illustrate the constraints that Kefraya residents such 
as Bassim Rahal experienced when attempting to develop their own independent wine 
enterprises. For example, we have mentioned enterprising strategies that seek to buy out 
Cave Kouroum from Bassim Rahal. It might not be a coincidence that those entrepreneurial 
actors offering Mr Bassim potential deals are also quick to point out that winery appears to 
be facing financial difficulty. Such challenges faced by Bassim Rahal might be because the 
winery is of interest to those who are already well connected in Lebanese viniculture, and 
are interested in extending their influence by securing economic ties to the Kefraya region.  
Yet his decision to keep the winery “inside” reflects, more broadly, the observations made 
by Yanagisako concerning the urban entrepreneurs in Como, Italy, where patriarchal desire 
for succession is crucial in motivating capitalist action.  
In this regard, there is something to be said about how the concept of bayt in 
Kefraya continues to reinforce attachments to place. In taking precedence over broader 
forms of familial relatedness, bayt embodies a sense of historical reflexivity, paying 
homage to the legacy of the forefathers of Kefraya who registered their land following the 
cadastral survey and consequently created the space for the creation of kouroum. Yet given 
that this idea of bayt appears to have emerged at a similar time to changes in the regulation 
of private property and the development of the region’s market economy, this suggests how 
notions of kinand other senses of relatednessbegan to shift as well. Indeed, more 
recent changes in the notion of bayt, as reflected in the familial relations of the Rahals, 
demonstrate the continuity of such forms of economic rationality.  The use of categories 
such as fellah and wakil to describe Bassim Rahal, and, more generally, Bayt Rahal, can 
thus be understood as a way of explaining such historical continuity while also portraying 
changes in the social stratification of Kefraya. Yet the tensions and sense of ambiguity that 
emerged from such narratives also reflect how the transition of members of the Rahal 
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family from grape distributors to wine producers challenged accepted norms of the types of 
work that are associated with urban and rural spaces.    
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6: Patrons of Production: The Role of the UVL 
 
One late morning in the middle of the harvest, Nabhane and I were sitting in his jeep 
sipping coffee and looking out the dusty windows at the workers in the vineyards of 
Chateau Kefraya. I had spent the last week harvesting with the workers, and while feeling 
somewhat guilty that I was able to take respite from the arduous labour, I also felt thankful 
for the rest. I had yet to become accustomed to waking before sunrise, and even after the 
copious amounts of coffee I consumed that day, the lack of sleepcoupled with the 
unbearable heatmeant that even though I had the opportunity for some respite in driving 
around with Nabhane, this respite was only relative to working outside under the hot sun.  
Nabhane had picked up on my exhaustion and suggested dropping me off at his home 
to spend some time with his wife Hana’. Although the offer was tempting, I declined, 
saying that if it was okay with him, I’d prefer to follow him as he oversaw the harvest 
across Chateau Kefraya and Kefraya more widely. Nabhane didn’t mind, and as we 
downed the last drops of coffee from our cups, he started the jeep and lit a Winston Red 
cigarette. He offered me a cigarette from his pack before reversing out of the kouroum of 
the Chateau Kefraya estate. We headed towards some of the vineyards not too far away 
from the Cave Kouroum winery. These vineyards belonged to a resident in Kefraya, and 
consisted mainly of the Cinsault variety of grapesbut also had some Cabernet-
Sauvignon. When we arrived, the owner of the vineyard was already there, counting the 
crates of grapes that were being hurled onto a truck. When the owner saw us, he 
approached Nabhane, and after going through the formal greetings, began to speak quite 
openly of his frustration over the current grape pricesfor both Cinsault and noble 
varieties.   
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The owner wanted to know why the prices had remained the same as in previous 
years. Surely prices should increase annually? After all, the cost of labour had increased, 
and so had petrol for the tractor26. Nabhane shrugged, before explaining to the owner that 
such decisions were beyond his control, and it was the upper management of Chateau 
Kefraya, as well as other members of the business association known as Union Vinicole du 
Liban (henceforth UVL) who agreed upon the prices of the grapes. The owner also 
shrugged before changing the subject to discuss the hot weather and the prospect of fasting 
under such conditions in the upcoming Ramadan. When we finally left the rather irate 
owner, I turned to ask Nabhane for further information about the UVL’s role in fixing the 
prices of the grapes. Surely the vineyard owners could disagree with the UVL, and refuse 
to sell their grapes? Nabhane laughed, “Yes they could, if people decided to come together. 
But as I told you before, everyone wants a chateau.”  
While Nabhane was able to offer a somewhat simple explanation, he, and indeed many 
others, had made clear over my months of fieldwork that the situation was far more 
complex. Indeed he also pointed out that day that members of the UVL were in 
competition with each other throughout the yearwith the exception of the harvest time in 
Kefraya, when all UVL members came together and agreed upon a set price for the grapes. 
In this regard, Nabhane’s comments reverberate with the discussion in the previous chapter 
about the predicaments faced by the Cave Kouroum winery that surfaced due to pressure 
coming from Chateau Kefrayabut also from the UVLto remove the name Kefraya 
from its label.  For in order to gain UVL membership, Cave Kouroum had to be willing to 
                                                 
26While it is apparent that the cost of petrol had indeed increased since the previous year, it is not all 
together clear as to what sort of labour the vineyard owner was speaking of. Harvesters (mostly from Syria) 
working during the 2007 were apparently paid the same amount as in 2005. Due to the Israeli war in 2006, 
there were apparently very few migrant workers from Syria. Yet the cost of this type of agricultural work 
remained the same.  
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comply with their demands. Yet why was UVL membership so important to the Cave 
Kouroum wineryand indeed many other wineries in Lebanon?    
This chapter shifts the focus away from the Kefraya region to explore more broadly how 
the UVL may have been influential in shaping the more recent changes in the region. I 
begin the chapter by providing some historical background about the impact of the civil 
war upon wine production, which arguably led to the establishment of the UVL in 
Lebanon’s post-war era. That Chateaux Kefraya, Ksara, and Musar were able to maintain 
relatively steady levels of production and export is indicative of their well-connected 
positions across both local and international arenas. Yet it is also important to bear in mind 
the discussion in Chapter Three, here we saw that these types of networks are hardly 
recent, and have to do with Europeanmore specifically, Frencheconomic interests in 
the region. Thus, on one hand there is an issue concerning the role of the urban mercantile 
elite, whose interests appear diversified, extending across agro-businesses, industries, 
trade, and finance. On the other hand, the instability of the Lebanese state, particularly 
during and following the civil war, must also be taken into account. While some of this 
instability may have to do with geopolitical conflict, other aspects appear to be more 
symptomatic of the general characteristics of global capitalism in the age of neoliberalism.  
Indeed, as elucidated during interviews with members of the upper management of 
Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya, the state’s precarious infrastructure cannot be ignored, 
because global organizations such as the OIV and WTO operate through state 
infrastructure. Thus the UVL serves as an alliance to facilitate further negotiation with 
different sorts of institutions and organizations that would be conducive for the 
development of private business interests. It is at this particular juncture, however, that the 
UVL’s influential position is perhaps the most cogent. For in establishing the mechanisms 
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to ensure that international guidelines and standards were met, the UVL was able to 
mandate wine production processesfrom vineyard to wineryin alignment with the 
founding members of the organization. To add another layer, the UVL was in fact 
established by Chateaux Kefraya, Ksara, and Musar in 1997, which was just a year after 
Lebanon became a member of the OIV. Following these events, the UVL became 
instrumental in campaigning and lobbying for the wine legislation that was passed in 2000.  
Wine Production in the Post-War era 
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, wine production was heavily curtailed during the 
civil war period (1975–1990). In fact, Mr Serge Hochar tells wine writer and journalist 
Michel Karam that Chateau Musar was not able to produce any wine at all in 1976. This 
was because the winery is located in Ghazir, of the Kisrawan region in north Lebanon, and 
its workers were unable to gain access to grapes from the Kefraya region of West Bekaa. 
Yet in spite of these setbacks, Chateau Musar attended the 1979 Bristol wines fairan 
important event that marked the entry of Lebanese wine into the British market:  
By chance I had an old friend who worked at Young and Rubicam, the ad agency and he came down 
to Bristol to see how we were getting on. He went to the press box and spun a line about this great 
wine from Lebanon. The next day, Christopher Tatham, the president of the Wine society, which was 
already carrying Musar, came to our stand, where we were tasting the ’67. We were talking and he 
suddenly shouts, “Michael! Michael! Come here and taste this wine.” The gentleman was called 
Michael Broadbent, from Christies, but I had no idea who he was. He asked me if this was really 
Lebanese wine. I said yes. He asked, “We are 1979 and you are showing 1959. Is it possible?” I told 
him, “My youngest release is 1967. Sure, I have a 1972 but it is not yet drinkable. It is oxidized and 
acidic; impossible to drink. (Karam, 2005: 105) 
As the story goes, Broadbent was so taken by the wines of Chateau Musar that he invited 
Mr Serge Hochar to hold a tasting at Christies. Alsoand in spite of the warthe 
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prominent wine critic, Jancis Robinson, visited the Chateau Musar winery in 1980, 
praising their wines in subsequent articles. Then, in 1981, the company known as Chateau 
Musar UK was established in London’s Sloane Street. Apparently central to Chateau 
Musar’s strategy was to age their wines before selling them. By selling aged and matured 
wines, Chateau Musar also had a constant supply that could also be a back-up for years 
where heavy fighting made production impossible. Thus, even in 1984, when the grapes 
had fermented en route to the winery, there were vintages from previous years readily 
available to be shipped.  
Chateau Musar was not the only winery to continue production during war-time. 
Chateau Ksara took to transporting wines across the Syrian border located only a few 
kilometres away in Anjar. The Chateau Kefraya winery was established in 1979 by Michel 
de Bustros, and when I asked him about his decision to open the winey at such a difficult 
time in Lebanese history, he responded, “Nobody believed that the war was going to last 
for long. Nor did we believe that it would spread across the whole of Lebanon.” Spread 
across the whole of Lebanon it did. In 1982, the Israeli army returned in full force and 
invaded the country all the way up to Beirut, at the same time encompassing all of the 
West Bekaa. The Kefraya region was taken. Tanks drove over the vines and fruit trees and 
soldiers set up camp near the winery. In his memoirs, Michel de Bustros expresses 
disbelief about the extent of the bombing, and disappointment that wine production had 
become heavily compromised (2001). 
 Chateau Kefraya did, however, continue production, and its 1982 red vintage was 
granted a silver medal award at the Blaye Bourg competition in Bordeaux in 1989. Like 
Chateaux Musar and Ksara, alternative methods of transportation were sought during 
periods of heavy fighting or when road blockades were put in place by the different militia. 
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Bottles and corks were shipped from Jounieh to Sidon and then driven across to Kefraya. 
Once bottled, the wines were then sent back over the same route through which the bottles 
had arrived. I was informed that during this time, export for Chateau Kefraya was at 
approximately 10,000 bottles. It is significant that while other wineries, such as Vin 
Nakad, attempted to continue production during war-time, it was predominantly Chateaux 
Ksara, Musar, and Kefraya who managed to not only continue a relatively steady flow of 
production, but alsoand perhaps more pertinentlyremain consistent in their 
distribution. Indeed, a striking feature of their accomplishments was their ability to export 
their wines abroad. As I was informed during an interview at the winery, Chateau Musar 
exported at least 90% of their wines during the war.   
 Such efforts to maintain adequate levels of productivity, while also managing to 
increase exports at the time of the civil war, were hardly limited to the wine industry. The 
industrial sector during the civil war period, as Gaspard notes, was characterized by 
“flexibility and viability” and the development of business networks were essential in 
upholding but also monopolizing production and distribution (2004: 191). Yet when the 
war finally drew to a close, many Lebanese industriesand perhaps especially the agro-
industrieshave had to deal with news kinds of challenges surrounding production and 
distribution. For example, local competition arose as older firms sought to increase their 
outputs, while simultaneously the establishment of new firms could lead to a potential 
crisis in overproduction. External competition, as a result of an influx of imports due to 
reduced tariffs, also had an impact upon the distribution of local goods (Gaspard, 2004). 
Connected to this, local industries also faced difficulties when seeking to export their 
products because of the high tariffs imposed by the state. Finally, Lebanese industries were 
at times faced with increased regulation in quality control within productionparticularly 
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when businesses were seeking to export their products abroad. Indeed, the wine industry 
was no exception, in that the post-civil war era saw a significant number of wineries open 
across Lebanon, while at the same time there was an ever-larger quantity of wine imported 
from abroad and, notably, export has remained an important part of the agenda. Thus, as 
the war was drawing to a close, issues concerning quality control were high on the agenda 
for Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar.  
Urban Entrepreneurs, the Agro-Industries and Trading Policies 
Quality control required financial investment, and in the case of the Lebanese wine 
industry, capital came from the private sector. At Chateau Ksara, for instance, there has 
been an annual investment from one share-holder of at least $1million since 1991. It is 
significant that a majority of those investing such sums of money were also major 
shareholders of larger distributing and sales companies. For example, Mr Zafer Chaoui, 
who was appointed as chairman of the Chateau Ksara winery in 1991, is also a managing 
partner of the Chaoui Group, a transnational company with offices in Beirut, Amman, and 
Stockholm, specializing in the manufacturing and distribution of paper pulp and 
pharmaceuticals. While Chaoui’s father had bought shares into the Chateau Ksara 
Company in 1973, Zafer Chaoui did not, at the time, have any direct involvement in the 
winery (Karam, 2008). Nevertheless, he did visit the winery regularly. As he explained to 
Karam during an interview: 
This was just as the war broke out and sadly, many of the original shareholders lost interest as fighting 
dragged on. I was lucky. I was one of the shareholders that regularly visited the winery and I became 
very attached to the company. This led me to increase my family’s involvement at every opportunity. 
I always believed that there would be an end to the war, and I was very aware of Ksara’s potential. 
Among all my investments, Ksara is the closest to my heart. (Quoted in Karam, 2008: 5) 
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Similarly, at Chateau Kefraya, where the Israeli and Syrian occupations of the chateau, 
winery, vineyards, and village had taken its toll on all aspects of production, a management 
shift was underway. As we saw in the previous chapters, one of the new investors was 
Waild Junblatt; the other main investor to join not long after was a member of the Fattal 
family, who also owns the Khalil Fattal et Fils Distributings Company in Lebanon, 
distributing commodities ranging from pharmaceuticals to toothbrushes and whisky.   
In some ways, the presence of these new actors, as a result of management shifts 
within these wineries, resonates with Gate’s observations concerning the early “merchant 
republic,” where it was at times be difficult to distinguish between the industrial and 
trading sectors of the period (1998). That is, it appears that there was a similar type of 
discourse of merging the spheres of finance, trade, and industry, which also characterised 
policy-making in the early Lebanese laissez-faire state in an attempt by an urban oligarchy 
to retain their market power (Gates, 1998: 96). Indeed the likes of Baroudi and Gates have 
argued that in working towards the establishment of Lebanon’s laissez-faire political 
economy, the choice by Lebanon’s early policy makers to invest little in sustainable 
growth led to the economic ascendancy of urban merchants and financiers (Gates, 1998 & 
Baroudi, 2001 & 2005; Gaspard, 2004). Notably, Baroudi suggests that the trade 
liberalization policies of the post-civil war era have also had a direct impact upon 
Lebanon’s agro-industriesand once more on the role of an urban entrepreneurial elite 
within that process.  
According to Baroudi, the post-war period in Lebanon saw the revival of a process 
of forging trade treaties that had commenced prior to the civil warwith the aim of 
opening and freeing trade at both regional and international levels (2005). With regards to 
Syria, Lebanon signed a new Brotherhood Treaty in 1991, followed by a further 22 
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agreements, 26 protocols, and 11 memorandums concerned with “liberalization of the 
cross-border movement of goods and people” (Baroudi, 2005: 5). With Arab neighbours 
further afield, Lebanon sought to re-establish economic ties that had commenced in the 
1953 “Agreement to Facilitate Trade Exchange and Transit Trade among Arab League 
States” (ibid). Significantly, it was the 1981 agreement (that had superseded the 1953 
agreement) that provided the basis for the treaty between Egypt and Lebanon in 1995. This 
trade agreement was finalised in 1998 and lifted duties from certain agricultural exports 
from each country, while also paving the way for the broader Greater Arab Free Trade 
Area agreement (GAFTA). The motivation behind such agreements were explained by the 
president at the time, Emile Lahoud, who stated that, “Arab countries need to create an 
Arab common market that eliminates all barriers and economic constraints and facilitates 
the implementation of new strategies to revitalize our economies and enable us to enter the 
international market from a position of strength”  (ibid: 8).  
The motivation for the revitalization of these kind of trade liberalisation strategies, 
so to be able to compete in the international markets, cannot, however, be understood 
outside of Lebanon’s long history of trade relations with Europe. While these ties go back 
at least as far as the nineteenth century, it was during the French mandate that these links 
were consolidated, through the country’s reliance on Europe for a broad range of services 
and productsbut with the exception of periods during WWI and II where there was some 
encouragement of certain import substituting industries (ibid: 11). It is also significant that 
in the years directly following independence, Lebanese policy-makers were faced with a 
choice between strengthening the existing ties with Europe or restricting them “so to 
promote local import-substituting industries” (ibid & see also Gates, 1998). While there 
might not have been a unanimous consensus to forgo the development of local industry, it 
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is apparent that the move towards pursuing economic ties with Europe continued to gain 
strength.  
Moves to strengthen these ties, however, were not always advantageous for 
Lebanese industry; trade arrangements forged between Lebanon and the EU saw protective 
measures put into place for the latters’ industrial and agricultural outputs. Thus for 
example, the limitations placed upon agricultural imports to Europe due to strict quality 
guidelines outlined in the EU’s CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) thwarted Lebanese 
agricultural trade with the continent. While such an arrangement might have been of 
minimal importance to Lebanese agriculturalists in the pre-civil war era, mainly because 
mother Arab countries (such as Saudi Arabia) were the main interest in terms of 
agricultural export, several issues arose following the end of the Lebanese civil war. On the 
one hand these problems had to do with the EU Neighbourhood Policy Plan (ENP) and 
Association Agreement with Lebanon that sought to reduce tariffs on imports and exports 
flowing from both regions. Given that (historically speaking) industry and agriculture in 
Lebanon have been the poorest performing sectors in the region, the influx of EU (thus 
cheaper) goods into the country only hindered further development in these sectors 
(Baroudi, 2005).  
Baroudi argues that while the early post-war policies implemented by Prime 
Minister Selim Hoss’ government (1998–2000) attempted to reduce high production costs 
in order to encourage agricultural exports, the urban mercantile sector retained their 
dominance in the development of the industrial and agricultural sectors (Baroudi, 2005: 
205).  Indeed this was still the case when further attempts were made to re-address such 
issues, at the start of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s return to office (2000–2004).  During 
that period, the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture was raised, and farmers were offered 
219 
 
access to subsidized loans. However, the number of beneficiaries remained 
limiteddespite plans made to support the export of agricultural production (Baroudi, 
2005: 208). Baroudi points out that, given the speculative nature of the trade of not just 
commodities but also shares and investments, the agro-industries were subject to higher 
forms of instability and therefore higher risk in rates of return. At the same time, higher 
production costs in farming and agro-industries resulted in unfair competition, heavy losses 
for farmers, and an increase in agricultural firms going bankrupt.  
Although there are has been public outcry against such policies, such as the protests 
in August 2001 in the Hermel region of the north Bekaa and also in Tripoli, the 
“agriculturalist lobby” in Lebanon remained quite weak (2005: 8). Baroudi suggests that 
the reasons for this minimal backing of farmers are twofold. On the one hand, there are 
very few organizations representing the agro-industries in Lebanon. On the other, it would 
appear that minimal mobilization amongst farmers has to do with a general “contempt” for 
one another; only those with sufficient capital and well established networks appeared to 
be able to continue to invest in agricultural production (ibid).   
 In this light, the significance of certain kinds of private investors in the wine industry, 
such as urban entrepreneurs (and politicians), in facilitating the industry’s development 
reflects a continuation of the process that marginalizes petty commodity farmers. Notably, 
the capital held and invested by these urban elites was not only monetary, but was also 
underpinned by their agreement with at least some of policies implemented by the 
Lebanese state.   
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The Interests in Supranational Regulatory Organizations 
When I began to explore the relationship between the state and the wine industry in post-
war Lebanon, it became apparent that wineries were not only working closely with certain 
state members but also with supranational regulatory organizations, in order to ensure that 
standardisation and quality control measures adhered to global guidelines. Indeed, it 
appeared that networking with members of these types of organizations was more often 
than not of greater significance for wineries than maintaining ties with the relevant state 
departments. On one hand, the reasons for such a preference may have to do with the 
precariousness of the Lebanese statewhich I will discuss in the proceeding sections. On 
the other hand, however, the importance of working with “supranational” regulatory 
organizations is reminiscent of the relationship between neo-liberal governance and trade 
arrangements in the context of non-Western states (Gupta & Sharma, 2006, Gupta & 
Ferguson, 2002 & Harvey, 2007).  Broadly speaking, such characteristics of neo-liberalism 
have to with how “institutions of global governance such as the IMF and the WTO,” are 
considered as “being simply ‘above’ national states” (Gupta & Ferguson, 2002: 990). At 
the same time, however, such supra-state-like entities still required state infrastructure in 
order to operate and ensureor at best make officialthe materialization of production 
and trade arrangements through the drafting of legislation proposals and the like. 
In the case of Lebanon and wine, such issues came to the fore during my interview 
with Mr Charles Ghostine, the Managing Director and a board member of Chateau Ksara. 
Mr Ghostine explained that, following the end of the civil war, the wine industry faced 
new challenges when seeking to export their wines to markets outside of the Arab 
worldespecially with regard to the EU. Since there had been no wine legislation in 
Lebanon prior to 2000, wineries looking to send their wines to Europe were finding it 
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increasingly difficult to follow the guidelines put into place for imports into the EU. 
Ghostine informed me that wineries were unable to create high-quality vintage labels that 
could be sent to the EU because, without a certificate of origin, their wines were 
considered as only table wines. Notably, not only the EU required a certificate of origin; it 
was also a pre-requisite for the United States. The requirements of the United States were 
not as strict, however, and all that was required was an official document from the 
Lebanese government confirming that the Bekaa Valley “had a well-known reputation for 
producing grapes and mainly wines grapes.”27  The only way to obtain a certificate of 
origin that would be recognised by the EU was to pass a wine law containing articles that 
at the very least demonstrated that measures were being put into place for a classification 
system of origins. Given that the wine law preceding the legislation of 2000 was passed 
during the French mandate and thrown out in 1983, there was very little history of wine 
legislation in Lebanon with which the wineries could work.  
 In his attempts to understand and keep up to date with the “international affairs of 
wine”, through attending international wine exhibitions and fairs, Ghostine had the 
opportunity to liaise with people who had the relevant expertise to create legislation that 
could standardise Lebanon’s wines and make them exportable to Europe. During our 
interview, Ghostine spoke of his visit to Canada in 1992, where the Société des Accord du 
Quebec were organizing their annual wine contest. It was during this visit that he had the 
opportunity to meet with the management of the Office Internationale de la Vigne et du 
Vin (OIV), who urged Ghostine to take the necessary measures for membership. When 
Ghostine returned to Lebanon, he contacted Hochar (of Chateau Musar) and de Bustros 
(Chateau Kefraya), asking for a meeting to discuss the required steps for joining the OIV. 
                                                 
27 All quotes by Ghostine are taken from excerpts of the transcript from interview with him in August 2007. 
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Ghostine explained to me that when he met with Hochar and de Bustros he convinced them 
to join, “I told them, it’s very important to join the OIV. The OIV is different (to other 
wine organizations): it is the United Nations of the wine world” (my emphasis). 
Ghostine’s metaphor is perhaps apt oneespecially given that the OIV has 
maintained special ties with the United Nation’s FAO since at least 1948. In an official 
statement made by the FAO, the OIV is recognised as holding the role of “the 
intergovernmental organization specialized in the wine sector” (Hannin, 2006: 76). During 
the early and mid-1990s, the alliance between the OIV and the FAO was further 
strengthened so as to regulate the quantity of wine produced across the globe (ibid). 
Strategies for quality control largely dealt with misrepresentation in the marketing of wine, 
where it was implied that production originated in more prestigious regions known for 
wine making.28 Significantly, the OIV’s influential role also extended to other 
supranational organizations. Following GATT’s agreement in 1994, WTO members agreed 
to follow and apply the principles of the Standard Codes of sanitary and phytosanitary 
practices to wine production (Spahni, 1995). Once more, previous work done by the OIV 
on such issues was drawn upon heavily; indeed Spahni notes that not adhering to such 
measures would “have the greatest potential to restrict international wine exchanges” 
(Spahni, 1995: 293). 
There were, therefore, several advantages to Lebanon’s joining the OIV. For 
example, the joint FAO-OIV secretariat is responsible for compiling statistics and 
information about the wine sector, as well as organizing scientific meetings and 
                                                 
28 For example are semi-generic wines such as Californian Chablis and Australian Lambrusco. Although 
interestingly and in spite of the protectionism within TRIPPS treaty of certain Geographical Indicators, these 
two wines have been allowed to continue with such titles as they have been in use for over ten years (Spahni, 
1995).  
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workshops. Once Lebanon had become an OIV member, the country’s wineries would 
have access to such meetings, workshops, and various other networks.29 Also, given the 
Lebanese state’s desire to gain WTO status, the recognition by the OIV of Lebanese 
wineries was thus very important. Finally, and perhaps more pertinently for the wineries, 
OIV membership would ease problems with the export of Lebanese wines abroad. These 
sentiments were echoed during my interview with de Bustros over at Chateau Kefraya, 
where he informed me that when Lebanon joined the OIV in 1996, it was important “all” 
Lebanese wineries “obey the OIV laws” so that “all of Lebanon’s wines” could be 
exported to other countries and “without problems.”30 Similarly, Ghostine explained that 
adhering to such internationalised standards was essential for Lebanese winemakers if they 
were to enter and compete equally in the global wine market(s). 
 Notably, one of the important requisites for countries seeking OIV membership was 
the existence of a wine legislationor at best a realistic plan for the future passing of a 
law. During my interviews with de Bustros and Ghostine, both explained that the 2000 
wine legislation was written following OIV guidelines, and that the secretariat of the OIV 
had offered invaluable advice and support to the UVL when they were writing the law. 
Ghostine explains:  
They helped us to have a flexible law and to avoid provisions that are useless, and this is the story. . . . 
if we make our laws correspond to them (the EU) . . . There are rules in the EU that follow the 
guidelines of the OIV- as a technical organization as well as for regulation. And I think that the EU 
laws are inspired by the OIV so this made them international. (taken from transcript of interview 
conducted in July 2007 with Mr Ghostine)   
                                                 
29 There had also been plans to hold the OIV Congress in Lebanon during 2005. However I am informed that 
this was not possible as the Israeli representative to the OIV would have been unable to attend. 
30 All quotes by de Bustros are taken from the transcript of my interview conducted in August 2007. 
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While it is apparent that complying with OIV regulations would have certain benefits for 
Lebanese winemakers, it is also interesting that for Ghostine, “international” quite clearly 
implied European, in the sense that the OIV standards and guidelines overlapped with the 
European Union’s wine laws and regulations. Given that the European Union is Lebanon’s 
biggest financial donor, Ghostine’s comments can be quite clearly situated within the 
broader framework of reciprocal trade arrangements in post-war Lebanon (Baroudi, 2005). 
Yet Ghostine’s remarks also echo Sphahni’s observations concerning the important place 
the wine industry has in European protectionist policy-making (Spahni, 1988). Indeed, 
while debateand dissidenceoccurs amongst different wine producers concerning 
biased legislation and trade arrangements within the European Union, the Common Wine 
Policy has the overall aim of safeguarding against a potential influx of cheaper wines from 
the rest of the world (ibid; Lem, 1999).   
The EU’s involvement in the Lebanese wine industry through such channels as the 
OIV is part of a larger frameworkone that is highlighted by the fact that until 2013, 
European customs protection agreements allow Lebanese wines to enter the EU without 
any import duty. Meanwhile, European high-quality wines entering Lebanon will have 
their import duties reduced from between 70% and 30%. After 2013, European wines will 
be exempt from all import duties when entering Lebanon. As both Ghostine and de Bustros 
informed me, it was essential for Lebanese wines to follow EU production guidelines so as 
to have some chance at fair competition. 
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Local Business Associations and Global Organizations  
The remarks made by Ghostine and de Bustros about the importance of adhering to EU 
guidelines resonate with comments made by the head of the business association of 
Lebanese Industrialists (ALI), Mr Fadi Abboud, in an interview published by the Lebanese 
magazine, Executive, in December 2005. Abboud reminded Executive readers that part of 
the agreement signed between Lebanon and the European Union was that laws relating to 
industrial production in Lebanon would correspond with European laws. He also spoke of 
the many benefits of Lebanon strengthening its ties with the European markets, stating that 
“the future of the Lebanese industry lies with Europe.” 
In light of this, it is important to draw attention to the way business associations 
such as the ALI and the BTA (Beirut Trading Association) in the post-war era have 
contributed to changes in the balances of power between the public and private sectors in 
Lebanon, particularly the way that they often act as important points of contact for 
subsidiary groups of supra-national organizations such as the EU (Baroudi, 2005). Adding 
to this, Baroudi suggests that prominent members from the ALI and BTA business 
associations tend to share common interests and monopolize both trade and industrial 
networksat both local and global levels.31 That business associations such as the ALI and 
BTA were able to exert economic (and political) influence was not necessarily only due to 
the weakening effects of the civil war on Lebanese governance, but was also due to more 
recent trends in global capitalism that saw increasing flows of private capital into 
developing countries as a result of privatisation policies and open trade agreements (2005 
& 2001). Indeed, while certain individual industrialists might have voiced criticism of the 
                                                 
31 Both these business associations were established before the civil war. The ALI was formed in 1942 and 
the BTA in 1921.  
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liberalisation of trade, particularly during Hariri’s government, on the whole the ALI 
remained silentor at best moderate in their criticism (2005: 208). Baroudi observes that 
this was because most shared “Hariri’s optimism” concerning the opening of trade to other 
countries (ibid). The role of ALI and BTA business associations in Lebanon can thus be 
seen as an attempt to officialise networks of individuals who share similar economic 
interests (ibid). That some members belonged to both these business associations implied 
certain advantages, like widening business networks and providing a sharper competitive 
edge in the production and distribution of their products. Indeed this is a trait that can also 
be seen amongst the wineries, where for example, share-holders at Chateau Kefraya from 
the Fattal family are also members of the BTA.  
Business associations also serve as an important platform for alliances with larger 
supranational organizations (ibid). Indeed since the end of the civil war, one of the 
objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon has been to develop 
programmes offering funding and assistance to businesses to help them bring production in 
line with European standards. One of the major institutes, the Euro-Lebanese Centre for 
Industrial Modernization (ELCIM), has collaborated on more than one occasion with ALI. 
Notably, the OIV also required that a similar sort of organization was established by the 
wineries.  
There was, in this regard, a need for cooperation amongst the wineries in Lebanon, 
so as to create a stronger and more coherent platform for developing networks. De Bustros 
explained during our interview that creating an alliance with the two other “big wineries” 
in Lebanon (Chateaux Ksara and Musar) would facilitate the overall regulation of wine 
production in Lebanon, while also serving as a base to work with other international 
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organizations that would help promote the reputation and image of Lebanese wines abroad. 
One year following OIV membership, the UVL was officially established.  
Also significant was that ELCIM worked directly with wineriesand it did so 
through cooperation with the UVL. According to the director of ECLIM, Mr Raja Haber, 
the organization aims to support wine producers in Lebanon by means of legal support, 
technical support, augmenting the quality and quantity of production, and offering 
marketing assistance services (Darmency, 2010). Such support would enable Lebanese 
wines to enter into high-end markets and thus, according to Darmency’s article in the 
Eurojar newsletter, “Help Lebanon to be a member of WTO.” The head of the Economic 
Development Unit at the EU delegation in Lebanon, Mr Francisco Lopez-Menchero, told 
Darmency that assisting Lebanon would allow for the facilitation of exchanges under “one 
unified international system” which would “help ensure high quality wines” (ibid; my 
italics).   
In many ways the UVL became a mediator between international and supranational 
organizations and local wineries. While the establishment of the UVL appears to have been 
instigated by networks forged in a global arena, it is significant that many of these 
supranational organizations operated through state infrastructure. This means that the UVL 
also had to work with the Lebanese state. Yet given that states are themselves dynamic 
and, as Gupta and Sharma note, have a rather troubled place within neoliberal (or advanced 
liberal) market-driven policies, they present a challenge for private business ventures and 
interests (2006). The especially unstable characteristics of the Lebanese state came to the 
fore during lobbying for the passing of 2000 legislation, and once again when the UVL met 
in 2007 to discuss Article 17 of the wine law stipulating the formation of the National 
Wine Institute. 
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1996: Lebanon Joins the OIV with Mr 
Serge Hochar as Lebanon’s 
representative. 
 
1997: The UVL is formed by Chateaux 
Ksara, Kefraya and Musar 
 
UVL members in 2008: 
Cave Kouroum Domaine Wardy 
Chateau Ka Heritage 
Chateau Kefraya Karam Winery 
Chateau Ksara Clos St Thomas  
Chateau Musar Ixsir  
Domaine de 
Tourelles             
Coteaux du Liban 
Nakad Winery Domaine de Baal 
 
UVL Members (data collected from fieldwork but more recent updates can be found on the 
UVL website, at http://www.lebanonwines.com/members.php 
Regulation in the Absence of the State  
Following the formation of the UVL, its founding members immediately began to 
campaign for the creation of a wine legislation in Lebanon. The process, however, was not 
straightforwardthe UVL had to seek out ministries in the government willing to 
collaborate on the project. While during the drafting of the law there doesn’t seem to have 
229 
 
been a great deal of a liaison with state members, finding people in the different ministries 
who would offer support in lobbying for this law appears to have required some strategic 
networking. Ghostine explains:  
When we (finally) sent the law I translated it into French and I gave it to the late Basil Fuleihan. 
He was the Minister of Economy and more interested in helping the then Ministry of 
Agriculture at the time. 
It is significant that UVL members chose to contact Mr Basil Fuleihan, an economist 
recognised for his extensive experience working at the IMF. Upon his return to Lebanon at 
the end of the civil war, Fleihan acted as economic advisor to the government before 
eventually taking up a position as Minister of Economy and Commerce. While Fuleihan 
endorsed the idea of a free and open market, he was also critical of the Arab region’s 
position within trade liberalization strategies. In an article published posthumously in 
2006, Fuleihan expresses these ideas, arguing for more balanced reciprocal trade 
arrangements between Northern and Southern countries. He was also was a friend and 
political ally to former Prime Minister Rafik Haririin fact both were assassinated during 
2005 in the same explosion, just outside of the St George Hotel in Beirut. Significantly, it 
was this event that contributed to the political instability of the Lebanese government, and 
to the subsequent challenges faced by the UVL that surfaced at the time of my fieldwork. 
The wine legislation was successfully passed in 2000, but this was only the start of 
a process to augment the standard of wine-making in Lebanon, and to bring it in line with 
international guidelines for high-quality wines. Ghostine explains that further steps were 
needed in order to implement a system of appellation d’origine contrôlée. While 
developing the 2000 wine law in Lebanon, further investigation was required to construct a 
more specialised type of AOC system, and Article 13 states that, until further agricultural 
230 
 
research was undertaken, wine producers could adopt the administrative division at the 
Mohafazat as a basis for defining the appellation of origin. I will discuss some aspects of 
this AOC in the following chapter. Ghostine explained that he proposed the Mohafazat as a 
certified place of origin because the Bekaa Valley was one of its administrative units. 
Given that most grapesand indeed most winesfrom Lebanon are from the Bekaa 
Valley, the system had certain advantages. Further steps were required, however, in order 
to create a more refined Lebanese AOC that was based upon solid scientific research into 
the soils, geography, and climateat a micro-level. Indeed these steps are stated in Article 
17 of the wine law, stipulating that a National Wine and Vine Institute must be in place by 
2007. This institute would initially oversee scientific projects, such as an agricultural 
consensus and geological survey required for a Lebanese AOC. Following its completion, 
but perhaps also during these projects, the institute would be responsible for overseeing 
production and ensuring that standards were met. 
The consultative committee of the institute required representatives from the UVL 
and from certain ministries of the governmentincluding the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Industry, and Economy and Commerce. Other expected members of the committee 
included five experts specialising in viticulture and wine-making, who couldn’t be 
employees of the civil offices or of the local viti/vini-enterprises. At the time of my 
fieldwork, the National Wine and Vine Institute still required one final approval from the 
government, which had remained pending since 2007. Ghostine’s response to my question 
about this process provides an insightful overview:  
It happened on the 21st of May of this year (2007): the government approved the creation of the 
institute of wine in Lebanon. It has not appeared in the official newspapers yet, because we need the 
signature of the minister of industry. And you know that Pierre Gemayel died, and the minister that 
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should replace him belongs to the Shi’ia. And he is not signing anything related to the ministry of 
industry. The institute should have five signatures: economy, agriculture, industry, social affairs, and 
finance. This is why it has not appeared officially yet. But all is approved and that is irreversibleit is 
finished. The government approved the creation of the institute, and the institute is under the private 
law and not a public service. We tried not to create it under the public sector because we would lose 
flexibility. But the board consists of four from the private sector, suggested by the minister of 
agriculture, and three from the public sector, representing the ministries of economy, industry, and 
agriculture. The director of the institute belongs to the public sector, and will be chosen by the 
minister of agriculture. He will be contracted for three years.  
Despite numerous meetings held by UVL during 2007, the final signature required for the 
formation of the institute did not arrive. Indeed at the time of writing this chapter (2012), 
the institute has yet to be established. Thus, in spite of the initial success in the passing of 
the wine law, it was clear that the UVL continued to face major challenges when working 
with ministries of the state. When I had asked both de Bustros and Ghostine why they had 
encountered such problems, I was never given a clear or direct response. It was suggested 
by others that the disinterest of the state ministers could be politically motivated.  
The Lebanese parliament was going through a particularly unstable period at the 
time of my fieldwork. As I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, following the 
assassination of Hariri and Fuliehan in 2004, the two oppositional political factions, the 8th 
March and 14th March political alliances were formed, where the former took a pro-Syrian 
stance. The 2006 war fought between Israel and (pro-Syrian) Hezbollah would complicate 
the situation even more. Tensions were high following the end of the 2006 war. Indeed, not 
long after my arrival in Lebanon, Pierre Amine Gemayel, who was the Minister of Industry 
and part of the 14th March movement, was assassinatedon November 2006. In December 
2006, the 8th March parties organized a sit-in outside the Lebanese parliament in 
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downtown Beirut, demanding the resignation of the Siniora (14th March affiliated) led 
government. Early the following year, 8th March parliament members had stepped down 
from their positions in an unsuccessful attempt to veto the Siniora government and protest 
against the organization and arrangements for the Hariri tribunal. The president of 
Lebanon, Emile Lahoud (8th March), resigned in late 2007 with no successor, and there 
was no head of state at the point of my departure from fieldwork in early 2008. There had 
also been a further two assassination of MPs who appeared to have taken an anti-Syrian 
stance.  
The precariousness of the Lebanese government at the time (which continues to be 
the case) was a serious problem for the UVL to say the least, especially in their attempts to 
form a National Wine and Vine Institute. Yet to add to this complex situation, an 
(anonymous) informant suggested that the presence of certain shareholders, such as the 
politician Walid Junblatt, involved with both the 8th and 14 March, might be another 
reason the Lebanese state had become (more) difficult to work with. Pursuing this line of 
inquiry, however, proved quite difficult, and thus any conclusions that might be drawn 
from my informants’ remarks remain purely speculative.  
Nevertheless, while Ghostine and de Bustros were both unwilling to discuss these 
issues with me, it was apparent that the UVL were seeking other ways to independently 
develop the points mentioned in Article 17 of the wine law. Collaborating with the EU (via 
ELCIM), the UVL were able to gain assistance from the OIV’s former managing director. 
Mr Robert Tinlot, who, by then, had become an independent and highly regarded wine and 
vineyard expert, initially assisted the UVL in the logistical side of creating the National 
Wine and Vine Institute. Ghostine explained that, as Tinlot had extensive experiences 
working in wine industries across the globeincluding China and Francehe was able to 
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support the UVL in “internal organization of the institute.” Tinlot offered advice upon how 
“the board should act”, on the profiles of members of the board, and on the types of 
relations that could be expected to be forged.   
As time went by, and official formation of the institute was still pending, Tinlot 
was privately hired by Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar, as well as a more recent 
member to the UVL, Domaine Wardy. This time his support was for another project. The 
UVL recognised that an AOC classification was inevitable for the entry of Lebanese wines 
into higher-level international markets, and Tinlot’s assistance in such matters was seen to 
be invaluable. Given the importance of a Lebanese AOC system in both creating and 
exporting high quality wines, it was seen important to seek supportonce more from 
outside of Lebanon. Mr Selim Wardy, the General Manager of Domaine Wardy (and 
Minister of Culture from 2009 until 2011) explained to me that as the Lebanese state was 
taking so long and in any case was unlikely to offer such support to wine producers, it was 
necessary to act independently. Ghostine explained that the three wineries had asked Tinlot 
to join them on another task that was related to geographical indications and the formation 
of a Lebanese AOC system. He told me that the Ministry of Economy had drafted laws on 
geographical indicators concerned with “all products in the country, excluding wines.”    
The project was initially funded (2005–2006) by the Swiss State Secretariat of 
Economic Affairs to train local Lebanese experts in the field, as well as to assist in drafting 
the aforementioned legislation proposals.32 It is purely speculative as to why the Ministry 
of Economy excluded wines from this project, however according to statements on the 
                                                 
32 At the time of fieldwork I was unable to gain access to those working in the project. Also given the 
limitations of fieldwork in the sense that I spent most of my time in the Bekaa Valley, logistically speaking, it 
was quite challenging to develop the relevant contacts.  
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website of the project’s implementing agency, IDEAS, the aim of setting up a GI 
classification system was that it could “offer to producers a useful marketing tool as their 
products” and obtain market recognition and often a higher price”.33 In this light, one 
possible reason why wine was excluded might be the private capital that was available to 
these wineries to independently undertake the relevant enquiries for the advancement of a 
geographical classification system.  
Such observations are based on remarks made Gupta and Ferguson concerning the 
increasing trend towards an enterprise model of the state (2002). They argue that such 
types of neoliberal reforms, where new modalities of government function through 
methods of decentralization, displace the “risk” factor of economic transactions onto the 
(sovereign) citizen/individual who is “now construed as the entrepreneur of his or her own 
firm” (2002: 989). If individuals are unable to enter into such modes of entrepreneurial 
behaviour, then they must be trained and educated to work within such a model (ibid). 
Gupta and Ferguson also observe that, when extended to “governmentality” within non 
Western states, such trends for transnational governance bring the issue of state 
sovereignty into question. Indeed non-Western state sovereignty often functions within the 
larger frameworks of supranational governance.  
With this in mind, it is apparent that despite the lack of support from the state, some 
UVL members were still actively involved in creating standards and finding ways to 
regulate wine production across Lebanonand this was due to collaboration with 
members of supranational regulatory organizations. Yet UVL members are still subject to 
the effects of state instability. Indeed, as I was told on a number of occasions, because the 
                                                 
33 http://www.ideascentre.ch/lebanon_geo_indication.html 
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National Wine and Vine Institute was yet to be established this hindered competing equally 
with other high-quality wines in the international market. Nevertheless, the UVL continued 
to work towards finalizing certain points set out in Article 17 that were concerned with 
establishing an AOC system. Still, there were some strategic advantages for the UVL when 
the worked independently for the attainment of their agenda.  
As I was repeatedly informed, it was important that the UVL were seen by 
supranational organizations to be at least working towards meeting international 
guidelines. Yet in attempting to meet these international standards, the UVL were also 
inadvertently shaping the local form of the Lebanese wine industry. The repercussions 
appear to be twofold. On the one hand it seems that the central role of the UVL, and 
especially perhaps for its founding wineries, allowed pre-emptive measures to be taken that 
ensured that they retained their prominent position in the future Lebanese wine industry. 
After all, through having a hand in the design of the AOC system, the UVL’s legacy would 
endure not simply as recognition of having initiated such an important project. In acting as 
the representative for the wine industry, the UVL also provided the information required 
for these endeavours. It was quite clear that the founding UVL members were aware of the 
long-term implications of their goals. For example, during my interview de Bustros he 
explained:  
But this process [of regulating] will take time. You see we [the UVL] are taking unilateral decisions. 
That is why perhaps after only 28 years, we [Chateau Kefraya] are so well known in the markets. I 
think it is because we stick to some principles. We [the UVL] decided ourselvesunilaterallyto 
observe them. Not because there was an organization or institute who obliged us. 
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In taking unilateral decisions to regulate production in Lebanon, the founding members of 
the UVL drew from their own experience in the wine industry. Having been trained as a 
lawyer, Ghostine informed me that he hadn’t waited for a law to oblige him to follow 
international production guidelines, but had already ensured that Chateau Ksara followed 
such standards. De Bustros made similar comments, stating that the law was an 
“officialised continuity of what we are always doing”. While this striving to control the 
future of the wine industry came about largely due to a weak state, coupled with 
supranational governance, it had another significant advantage. That is, in the absence of 
the state, the UVL also became the mechanism for regulating and supervising wine 
production in Lebanon. 
The Ambiguities of Membership 
The competitive nature of the free market, as Shore and Haller suggest, can leave 
regulationand the interpretation thereofto entrepreneurs and those who have specific 
profit-related interests (2005). The importance of business associations is thus not only in 
the way they are able to create links with broader networks connected to the state and 
beyond. Their significance is also in the way they are able to control the resources 
necessary for augmenting profit by influencing and shaping production. Yet this objective 
of profit accumulation is paradoxical, because on the one hand by controlling resources 
one must also to some extent exploit others in the process. On the other hand, there is the 
issue of “moralities” involved in attempts to reduce corruption and provide some sense of 
transparency. Indeed as Sanders and West put it, “Modernity, paradoxically, generates the 
very opacity of power that it claims to obviate” (2003: 16). 
One important strategy for such networks and business associations is to be 
strategic when it comes to revealing the full scope of members’ privileged positions 
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(2002). In so doing however, these types of elite networks can also promote ambiguity in 
understandings of the boundaries of such networks, and also of their membership (ibid). It 
surfaced during fieldwork that UVL membership was similarly based upon a series of 
interpersonal networks which entered “into a complex construction of identity on multiple 
and supra-local levels” (Zinn, 2005: 234).  Significantly, when it came to joining the UVL, 
there appeared to be no official membership application process. Rather, wineries were 
accepted if current members believed that they followed the right “philosophy”. When I 
asked for further elaboration on this policy, it was implied that wineries were expected to 
follow the quality standards employed by UVL wineries. At the time of fieldwork, 
Sebastien Khoury, of the Domaine de Baal winery, was in the process of applying to join 
the UVL. While the actual construction of his winery was months from completion, he 
believed it necessary to start taking steps to join the UVL. He explains to me that: 
The UVL suggests standard and a benchmark for quality wines, not just here in Lebanon but abroad 
too. Also, it is important to join the UVL because then you can be part of the meetings and the 
decisions. You know? 
Khoury was well aware of the advantages of joining the UVLespecially in terms of 
legitimising the standards of Domaine de Baal’s wines. Indeed, when I asked him for his 
thoughts on the wine law in Lebanon, he reiterated the importance of being associated with 
the UVL. It was not that he did not think the law was unhelpful, but rather UVL 
membership validated his wines in more ways than one. After all, the reputation of the 
UVL carried more weight, both locally and across borders, because members were known 
to keep up to date with global standards. Yet Khoury was unable to provide me with a clear 
answer as to how he was applying to the UVL. When I asked him about his uncertainties 
concerning future sales of his wines, his response drew my attention to his relationship 
with those working in Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara. While he was aware of the challenges 
238 
 
in selling his wines abroad, he felt that as he had good relations with certain employees at 
Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya, there would be some support when it came to exporting 
abroad. Khoury also had strong ties with wine merchants in France, and he thus hoped that 
his contacts would support his endeavours.  
I was present when Khoury met with Palge (the oenologist at Chateau Ksara) and 
Fabrice Guiberteau (oenologist of Chateau Kefraya). Khoury had made a point of visiting 
these oenologists during their working hours for some technical advice. At times he would 
bring samples of his wines that were maturing in the oak barrels stored in a temporary 
building next to the winery under construction. Both oenologists were more than happy to 
assist, offering him advice and suggestions as to how to augment the quality of his wines. 
The oenologists regarded Khoury as a promising young Lebanese wine maker. Khoury 
also invited these two oenologists to visit the site and taste the wines directly from the 
barrels on more than one occasion, and this usually took place outside of working 
hourssometimes even at weekends.  
On a couple of occasions I was invited to join such visits, which included a meal 
and wine tasting. There was a clear sense that the visit went beyond solely providing 
technical advice. Indeed both oenologists socialised with Khoury outside such “official” 
visits and it emerged later on in fieldwork that Palge was a long-term friend of the Khoury 
family. With a French mother, and having lived in Bordeaux for some time, Khoury had 
also obtained several certificates in vineyard maintenance. It was during this time that the 
Khourys and Palges had met. In fact, it was Palge who encouraged Khoury to start planting 
vines on the small family land located in the valley above Zahleh; prior to establishing a 
winery, Khoury sold (and continued to sell) his grapes to the Chateau Ksara winery.  
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The seemingly informal ways in which members of the UVL went about 
overseeing and regulating production did, however, have several more formal implications. 
Joining the UVL was advantageous not least because membership at the very least implied 
high standards in production and therefore good quality wine. Indeed it is significant that at 
the time of writing the company’s wines are distributed internationally. The winery has 
also collaborated with UVL ventures such as the global promotional campaign known as 
“Wines of Lebanon”. Not all wineries however, have had similar opportunities to join such 
networks. Another vineyard owner I met was also in the process of setting up in his own 
winery, and he informed me that he had also spoken with members of the UVL about the 
possibility of joining the union. However, despite having established his own winery in 
2010, he had yet to obtain membership. His winery was not exporting any wine, and very 
little can be found in local markets.  
Another noteworthy case is of course that of Cave Kouroum, owned by Mr Bassim 
Rahal. Cave Kouroum was initially banned from joining the UVL because of its initial 
nameCave de Kefraya. Following several court cases brought against the winery by 
Chateau Kefraya, the name was eventually changed to Cave Kouroum. Chateau Kefraya 
claims are that the name “Kefraya” is trademarked by the company, and therefore other 
wineries are prohibited from using the name “Kefraya” on their labels. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Cave Kouroum was prevented from joining the UVL until it changed its 
name. Also as noted in the previous chapter, I have been unable to obtain formal 
documents for the court case. However, I was told by an anonymous informant that Cave 
Kouroum had won the first round of legal proceedings. These hearings took place in the 
courts of Zahle, the administrative town of the Bekaa Valley. Chateau Kefraya did not 
accept the verdict, and had taken the case to a Beirut court, where the outcome was in their 
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favour. I was also informed that Junblatt and Fattal wielded more influence in the Beirut 
courtroom. It remains unclear as to why Mr Bassim of Cave Kouroum accepted the 
agreement and changed the name of his winery, subsequently joining the UVL. Given the 
important role the UVL has in forging networks across different arenas, it would appear, 
however, that there were several advantages in creating an alliance. 
It is significant, however, that not all wineries sought to join the UVLand one 
winery even decided to leave the association. In 2005, the Massaya winery took the 
decision to end their UVL membership, and it was suggested that they saw the dominating 
presence of the Chateaux Kefraya, Ksara, and Musar wineries as a problem. I was 
informed that while Ramzi and Sami Ghosn of Massaya both had profound respect for, and 
had even taken inspiration from, the long-term vision of de Bustros, there was very little 
room for the newer wineries to voice their opinions. Yet it is significant that while the 
Massaya winery is a Ghosn family venture that was established in 1998, there was also 
French investment from the Brunier family of Vieux Telegraphe Wines and the Herbrard-
owners of Chateau Angelus. I was told by an anonymous informant that due to these 
“important” French investors, the winery had several advantages over smaller-scale 
wineries with little or no investment from outside (non-familial) sources.  
 Still, regardless whether Massaya was able to work independently from other wineries, 
by being obliged to abide to the regulations as set out in the 2000 wine law, the winery was 
in some ways subject to the decisions of the UVL. That is, even if the National Wine and 
Vine Institute has yet to be established, the fact that certain UVL members are active in 
working to establish an AOC system suggests that wineries unwilling to accept the 
association’s conditions might be excluded from future development in the wine industry. 
This is especially visible if we consider that one employee from a founding winery of the 
UVL had already begun trade-marking other regions in the Bekaa Valley, where there is 
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potential for a new wine-growing hub to emerge. One particularly important name that was 
trade-marked was Baalbek, in the north Bekaa, where an increase in viticulture coupled 
with its ancient history, which remains vivid due to many remains of Roman temples of 
Bacchus, made the region a promising new enterprise.    
Producing Honestly  
Yet there were other more subtle ways that the UVL extended influence beyond its 
members, which broadly evoke Pardo’s concern with the at times ambivalent relationship 
between morality, legality, and corruption (2004). Of particular relevance here are types of 
actions that are not necessarily defined as corrupt or abusive of positions of power, but still 
have certain implications when it comes to morality. With this in mind, one important task 
for the UVL was to prevent what de Bustros described “as attempts to be tricky or 
dishonest in production”. Indeed, during fieldwork I heard numerous rumours of fraudulent 
methods used by some of the lesser-known small-scale wineries. There were stories of 
these wineries using oak chips instead of actual oak barrels. Such a technique is actually 
legally acceptable in global markets; allowing wines to acquire the taste of being aged 
through a process that costs considerably less. Yet this method is generally thought to 
produce lesser-quality wines. It was problematic that these wineries allegedly claimed on 
their labels that the wines had been matured in oak barrels. It is of course unclear how true 
these rumours were,-and this not a discussion I intend to go into here.   
Alongside these accounts however, other narratives spoke proudly of how 
businesses such as Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar were following globally-
recognized procedures in the production of high-quality wines prior to passing of the wine 
legislation. These accounts, which attempt to define the boundaries between those 
lowering and corrupting the quality and image of Lebanese wines and those who weren’t, 
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are thus perhaps as much about relations of power as they are about quality wine.  Indeed, 
as Parado has suggested, an understanding of how ideas of morality materialise largely 
stems from identifying those who have the ability to define what is legal, and thus also 
what is outside the law and hence corrupt (2004). Yet the line between legality and 
illegality can be rather nebulous, in that defining such a boundary can require some abuse 
of power. As de Bustros explained, “There is a danger that many more (wineries) are 
coming into business . . . and as usual in Lebanon, they like to make some “tips” (bribes) 
and we (the UVL) want to prevent that”.  
In appropriating the position of regulators of production, the UVL had perhaps 
unintentionally (and quite undemocratically) also excluded those wineries that were 
producing wines acceptable in international wine markets, albeit at a lower standard. Thus 
those that did not have the sufficient capital, or well-established networks, such as 
Massaya, were faced with challenges keeping up with those who did. Indeed, these were 
the reasons implied by the owner of the aforementioned winery, established in 2010, that 
has yet to be accepted by the UVL. Significantly, the UVL did not only appear to be solely 
interested in regulating the technical side of production. Members of the business 
association also thought it necessary that the newly established wineries also follow 
conventions for naming their wineries. De Bustro’s response to my query about the 
importance of winery name illustrates these sentiments quite succinctly: 
 
 
 
Now, even in their way of naming them (smaller wineries), they are using their own names instead of 
using the names of the domestic region. You know something like Chateau Nakad, what does it 
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mean? What does Chateau Khoury mean?34 When you say Ksara, it’s a region, it’s a village . . . its 
something and it’s a place . . . when you say Kefraya too. But those people are putting their own 
names on the label. I don’t know but for me I don’t see it . . . It has to be related to the soil, to the 
land, to the place, to the name of the villageand not related to the family name. 
It is significant, therefore, that the owners of the more favourable wineries, such as 
Domaine de Baal, expressed a similar rhetoric. When I asked Sebastien Khoury about his 
choice of a rather unusual name for the winery, he explained that the term domaine was 
French for the surrounding area of a castle or an estate. The word “Baal,” a pre-
monotheistic word for a deity, also evoked the Baalbek ruins located further north of the 
Bekaa. Khoury explained that in using such a name he hoped to articulate a sense of 
authenticity that was as intriguing as it was familiar. In this way, such decisions by 
recently established wineries were strategic but also influenced by Chateaux Kefraya, 
Ksara, and Musar, perhaps because of their increasing monopoly in all aspects of the 
industry. Indeed, as was made clear to me by both de Bustros and Ghostine, officialising 
their strategies through local legislation was only one aspect of the legitimization process. 
For despite the slow advancement of the stipulations set out in Articles 13 and 17 of the 
wine law, the UVL are independently designing the infrastructure required for entering 
into high-end wine markets. The initial founders of the UVL have, after all, created an 
exclusive association where potential members are required to follow the required 
standards before they are awarded entry to the association. As de Bustros concluded:  
 
                                                 
34 Chateau Khoury is owned by Jean-Paul Khoury who is the cousin of Sebastien Khoury of Domaine de 
Baal. It proved difficult to meet with Jean-Paul Khoury during fieldwork because there were tensions 
between the two cousins. My initial meeting with Sebastien was by chance and I was highly discouraged to 
meet with his cousin. While I still hoped to have the chance, it appeared that in working with Sebastien, I had 
lost the opportunity to meet with his cousin.  
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Other wineries are now trying to do as Kefraya and Ksara. This is because Ksara and Kefraya 
represent 65% of the market. This is really something you know? So they [the other wineries] will say 
that if it succeeds for them [Ksara and Kefraya] then why not imitate them? 
Finally, the UVL’s influence also extends to viticulture. While I will explore certain 
features of monopolizing viticulture in the next and final chapter, it is important to point 
out here that viticulture remains a significant aspect of the UVL’s agenda, and one which 
overlaps with its interests in viniculture. It also appeared that Kefraya’s viticulture was an 
especially important focus; the UVL continued to decide upon the price of grapes sourced 
from Kefraya, and there are meetings held annually to discuss the issue. When I asked 
about the importance of these meetings, de Bustros indicated that it was necessity to 
regulate grape production by villagers to ensure that the wineries produced good quality 
wines. He explained that it was not just how the grapes were maintained the what kinds of 
grapes that were grown. In order to standardize production, the UVL decided to lower the 
price of Cinsault grapes from its standard average price of 35 cents per kilo to something 
closer to 23 cents per kilo. This decision to decrease the price was part of an attempt to 
motivate local vineyard owners in Kefraya to pull out their vines and plant more noble 
varieties. The lower price for Cinsault may have been tempting for those wineries looking 
to reduce the cost of production. Given that many of the wineries seeking UVL association 
were expected to avoid Cinsault, lower-scale wineries were once more faced with difficult 
decisions. It is of interest, however, that Chateau Musar remained an ardent supporter of 
Cinsault. Yet so long as this winery remains a prominent Lebanese label abroad, its choice 
does not appear to have any significant repercussions.  
 Significantly, at the time of my fieldwork, there was no viticulture counterpart to the 
UVL that would negotiate grape prices. During my last visit to the Bekaa Valley in early 
2012, I was informed about the beginnings of a viticulture union. While nothing has yet 
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materialised, there has been negotiation between the NGO, Arc En Ciel, and vineyards in 
the Central Bekaa regionincluding the Jesuit-run Taanayel properties. Part of the 
initiative is to establish a fair price-plan, whereby vineyard owners are paid a sum that is 
proportionally related to the price for which the winery sells a bottle of wine.  
However, when I spoke with vineyard owners in other parts of the Bekaa Valley, 
many appeared sceptical about such an organization. Informants explained that wineries 
would simply buy their grapes elsewhere. When I asked where the wineries could go to 
buy their grapes, responses were as ambivalent as they were ambiguous. Some suggested 
that new vineyard plantations would emerge in the furthest hinterlands of the Bekaa 
Valley, while others spoke of the possibility of wineries buying their grapes from outside 
of Lebanon. While I am unable to verify these claims, the apparent reluctance of some 
vineyard owners to participate in such a union perhaps illustrates the extent of the 
wineries’ influential positions. It therefore remains to be seen if such a plan can be 
materialisedand, indeed, if other vineyards owners across Lebanon will be willing to 
join.  
Concluding Remarks 
In diverting the focus away from Kefraya, this chapter has attempted to shed some light 
upon the types of relations that exist outside of the region, which might have contributed to 
the recent changes experienced by those living within. In so doing, this chapter also aimed 
to shed some light upon the broader and more complex issues surrounding wine production 
within the context of global capitalism. I refer particularly to the the way that supranational 
regulatory organizations such as the OIV appear to have been influential in creating 
“harmony” in wine production for seemingly “fair and equal competition” in the market. In 
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this regard, I also asserted that new developmentssince the end of civil warare 
connected to broader political and economic changes, in turn related to new trade 
arrangements concerned with promoting an open and “free” economy. Such economic 
policies appear to have only reinforced mercantile and entrepreneurial influences across 
the industrial and agricultural sectorsthe wine industry notwithstanding. The 
precariousness of the post-war Lebanese state does, however, provide another layer of 
complexity in the quest a free-trade economy. Regional conflict, and Lebanon’s remaining 
a battleground for many, means that investment into its industries remains a risky affair. 
Nevertheless, given that regional urban entrepreneurs still seem to retain at least some of 
their business interests, this may be suggestive of their political goals for the country as a 
whole.  
In this light, I have also attempted to demonstrate how, despite the challenges faced 
when working with members of the Lebanese state, the UVL business association has been 
influential in shaping the production processes for wine in Lebanon. Significantly, their 
success in asserting, maintaining, and exercising economic (and political) power are due to 
the diverse ways in which their strategies are deployedparticularly perhaps those of 
Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara. After all, even if a winery decided against (or prevented) 
UVL membership, the wine-maker would still be subject to articles of the Lebanese wine 
legislation. Given that Article 17 requires the establishment of a National Wine and Vine 
Institute, this suggests that there is vested interest for non UVL members to maintain 
relations with those who are members.   
The chapter has also considered the influential roles of the Chateaux Kefraya and 
Ksara wineries in shaping the relationship between the viticulture and viniculture processes 
in Lebanon. The continuing growth of wine production and its viticulture, so that it 
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outperforms a number of other agri-businessesdespite the absence of state 
subsidisesperhaps serves to illustrate the continuing (and successful) attempts of the 
mercantile oligarchies to shape and monopolize the agricultural sphere. Noteworthy here is 
more recent (and post-fieldwork) establishment of wineries by other elite urban 
entrepreneurs. This includes IXSIR, located in north Lebanon, with the Nissan-Renault 
tycoon, Carlos Ghosn, as a passive investor, and in Kefraya the Chateau Marsyas, founded 
by members of the philanthropic Saade familywho are also influential in the tourism and 
real estate industries, as well as holding financial and real estate investments.     
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7: In Pursuit of Quality: French Oenologists at Work in Lebanon35  
 
The sun shines relentlessly down upon the vineyards of Kefraya. It is the peak of 
summer and within weeks, or perhaps even just days, the grape harvest will begin in 
the country’s largest winegrowing region. Starting in the winter months and continuing 
into spring, the vines have been pruned and their canes trained. During late spring and 
early summer, excess leaves are removed and branches are cut. By the early summer 
months, pesticide is applied to some of the vineyards, and the vines are then more or 
less left to their own devices until the start of the harvest. Given that the vineyards are 
a hub of activity until this point, it seemed that this brief respite, shaded from the 
sweltering heat, was welcomed by all who were anticipating the hard work of the 
coming harvest. On one such afternoon, I made a visit to the home of the head of 
agricultural affairs of Chateau Kefraya. I asked Nabhane when the harvest would 
begin. We were sitting on his family’s veranda in Kefraya village, and Nabhane 
reclined back into his summer chair as he looked out beyond the villagers’ kouroum 
(vineyards), mainly of the Cinsault varietal, before finally resting his gaze upon the 
vineyards of the noble varietals such as Cabernet-Sauvignon and Chardonnay on the 
winery estates surrounding Chateau Kefraya.  
Nabhane picked at some grapes from the fruit bowl that had been placed by his 
wife on the table next to him, then proceeded to tell me that the harvest would begin 
very soon. However, he could not confirm exactly when. This would be up to Fabrice 
Guiberteau, the Bordeaux-trained oenologist, or muhandis al khamara (literal 
                                                 
35 Parts of this chapter have been used in Saleh, 2013b. 
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translation from Arabic is wine engineer) who originated from the Cognac region and 
is employed by the Chateau Kefraya winery. It is Guiberteau who decides upon the 
exact time of the harvest, and many of the vineyard owners in Kefraya are dependent 
upon his decision. I asked Nabhane how Guiberteau would decide when he wanted the 
harvest to begin. Nabhane smiled, and informed me that the time of the harvest was 
subject to how Guiberteau wanted the wines to taste. Yet as this was only Guiberteau’s 
second harvest in Lebanon, I wondered what knowledge he would draw upon in order 
to decide when the grapes were ready to be reaped. Surely, as he had not experienced 
all the different possible weather conditions in the Bekaa Valley, he could face 
challenges and perhaps may even require advice and support from locals such as 
Nabhane. Nabhane tells me that Guiberteau will look at the sugar content of the 
different types of grapes (growing on different plots of land); this is all the knowledge 
he needs in order to make the style of wines he desires.  
In some respects, Nabhane’s comments draw attention to the way viticulture is 
the “social construction of nature” (Ulin, 1996:55). In other words, while non-human 
or natural factors, such as the kind of grape, the location, and the weather conditions 
hold significance because their natural traits create specific types of wine, it is the 
capacity to continuously reproduce a combination of these natural features in different 
settings that point to the social significance of these natural artefacts (e.g. Sperber, 
2007). In Chapter Three, I suggested that the materialisation of a particular 
combination of these non-human and human factors in the Lebanese wine industry 
could be traced to the mid-nineteenth century and the first plantations of Cinsault vines 
by the Jesuits. I also argued that such a combination belonged to a hierarchy of quality 
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in winegrowing, where elite growers in France have come (and continue) to 
monopolize production and the market in diverse ways, at both local and global levels.  
In Chapter Six, I observed that contemporary strategies belonging to this 
historical trajectory came to the fore through quality regulations set out by supra-
national organizations associated with the EU and OIV. While the previous chapter 
also explored the patronage of the founding UVL members (especially Chateaux 
Kefraya and Ksara) in (re)organizing and controlling production across Lebanon so 
that it could adhere to such quality regulations, there was, however, minimal discussion 
of the importance of technical expertise within that processand its specific role in 
transforming certain features of Kefraya’s social and viticulture landscape. It is of 
significance, therefore, that the type of specialised knowledge regarded as most 
valuable in transforming particular non-human factorslocated not just in the winery 
estate, but also in the Kefraya villageinto high-quality wine was associated with a 
French oenologist working at Chateau Kefraya. In many respects, Guiberteau’s 
position thus reflects that of the “flying winemakers,” who gain expertise in wine-
renowned regions such as Bordeaux, and have become “quality and marketing 
symbols,” instrumental in universalising French methods of production (Lagendjik, 
2004:13). That is, the value of Guiberteau labour derives not only from his oenological 
knowledge, but also from the social and cultural capital connected to his heritage (from 
Cognac) and qualifications (from Bordeaux).  
This chapter will examine the apparent ongoing replicationwhere French 
oenologists strive to transform grapes into high-end retail wines for international 
markets, with skills, expertise, and values that emerge from their extensive experience 
working in wine production outside of Lebanon. While there were in fact other French 
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oenologists employed either on a full-time basis at other wineries, or acting as 
consultants, at the time, both Chateau Kefraya and Chateau Ksara are the largest wine 
producers in Lebanon, and as the previous chapter suggests, their influential roles in 
shaping wine productionparticularly though the establishment of the UVL, and 
through campaigning and lobbying for the passing of the wine lawhad become very 
clear. 
Thus, while I provide some historical background to the growing prominence 
of experts in the following section, this chapter focuses specifically on the roles of 
Guiberteau from Chateau Kefraya and Mr James Palgé from Chateau Ksara. Palgé 
originates from the Champagne region of France and has been employed by Chateau 
Ksara since 1994. Given that Palgé was instrumental in the decision by Chateau Ksara 
to cease buying Cinsault vines from Kefraya in the mid-1990s, and to plant new 
plantations elsewhere in the Bekaa Valley, consideration of his strategies can shed light 
upon the long-term effects of attempts to transform and extend the viticulture 
landscape in Kefraya. In so doing, Palgé facilitated the process of (re)combining non-
human and human factors outside of Kefraya to effectively produce high-quality 
wines.  
While reading this chapter, it will be useful to bear in mind aspects of the wine 
law mentioned in the previous chapterconcerned with creating a hierarchical spatial 
classification system of high-quality wines. This is especially important in terms of 
how the techniques and strategies deployed by the French oenologists are aimed at 
controlling and pre-empting the potential outcomes of their endeavours. To this effect, 
this chapter explores nuances in how quality is perceived in their respective practices, 
and how attempts to extend this discourse of quality into the contracts forged with 
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vineyard owners in Kefraya and beyond, who were willing to comply with demands to 
maintain certain types of grape varietals, also aimed to exclude those who were 
unwilling to follow their guidelines for the market production of wine.  
 
Guiberteau and Nabhane discussing the quality of the vines.  
The Blending of Quality and Quantity 
 
In Chapter Three, I drew attention to how the application of scientific methods in the 
production of wine had particular socio-economic ramifications during the phylloxera 
blight that spread from Europe to Lebanon, which subsequently resulted in a selective 
process of grafting louse-resistant root-stock to specific types of grapes varieties (e.g. 
Paul, 2002 & Ulin, 2002). In spite of these successful endeavours, scientific methods 
that extend into vineyard maintenance and the transformation of grapes into wine did 
not gain full ascendance in France, or Lebanon, until almost a century later. An 
especially prominent proponent of this oenological knowledge at the time was Émile 
Peynaud, a professor of oenology at the University of Bordeaux, who, between the 
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1950s and 1970s, increasingly advocated the quality maintenance of vineyards. One 
such method for quality control that was endorsed by Peynaud was to set the date for 
the harvesting of grapes based upon the optimum sugar-content associated with a 
particular variety (Peynaud, 1984). Not only could such a method exclude grapes that 
were either too ripe or unripe, it also belonged to broader wine model that sought to 
establish a basis for the standardization of wines entering into local and global markets 
(Paul, 2002 & Ulin, 2002). The popularity of oenology as a means for the capitalist 
production of wine grew, not least because of the way that such scientific endeavours 
worked to consolidate and thus to controlan all important relationship for many 
French elite wine growers: that between quality and quantity (ibid).  
This quality-quantity nexus in the production of wine has of course both 
symbolic and material dimensions. On the one hand, the idea of quality is articulated 
through the notion of limited quantities, signified, for example, through an exclusive 
selection of certain types of grapes grown on a particular plot of landwhere 
representational usage of the chateau also adds to this sense of distinction and 
exclusivity. On the other hand, however, the quality-quantity nexus implies specific 
types of economic efforts involved in controlling agricultural production to ensure 
minimal costs and higher profit margins (Pratt, 1994). That is, it points to attempts to 
ensure that each year’s harvest can be successfully fermented and transformed into 
wine cost-effectively. Significantly, oenology involves both aspects of the quality-
quantity nexus. Indeed, not only can scientific developments such as adding specific 
types of yeast to aid the fermentation of wines demonstrate a method of industrial 
appropriationism; that such types of yeast are supposedly able to create styles of wines 
associated with those of elite grands crus illustrates the symbolic power of this quality-
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quantity nexus. Given such capabilities, the use of oenological knowledgeand thus 
the use of oenologistshas also become a marker of distinction in the making of 
wineone that extends beyond France. Notably, Mr Serge Hochar of Chateau Musar 
studied oenology under Peynaud at the University of Bordeaux during the 1950s 
(Karam, 2005).  
The increasing importance of “scientific wine-makers,” not just amongst 
producers in France but across the globe, can perhaps be best illustrated by the events 
surrounding the wine tasting organized in 1976 by the British wine merchant Steven 
Spurrier (Taber, 2005). Also known as the “Judgement of Paris,” the competition 
entailed two blind tastings of top quality reds and whites from France and California 
by a panel of wines experts: nine from France, one from Britain, and another from the 
U.S.A. Significantly, the judges (including Spurrier) unknowingly ranked the 
Californian wines higher than French wines in all of the tasting categories (ibid). While 
the event was practically ignored by the French press, the only journalist attending the 
event, Taber, notes that the judges’ decision was a landmark event because it signified 
that emerging “New World” wines were able to compete with established “Old World” 
wines. The subsequent repositioning of New World high-quality wines in the global 
market also suggested a shift in the perception of these wines, which no longer seemed 
inferior in quality in comparison with the robust and stellar European wines. Taber 
highlights two significant changes in the production and marketing of wines following 
“the Judgement of Paris”.  
First, the wine competition challenged the idea that high-quality wines could 
not be produced outside “the hallowed terroir of France” (Taber, 2005:23). 
Technological advances, such as the cloning of renowned grape varietals like 
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Bordeaux Cabernet-Sauvignon and Burgundy Chardonnays, as well as the 
development of drip irrigation, meant that high-quality wines (using the grand cru 
French wines as a benchmark) could be produced across the globe in varying 
environmental conditions. Significantly, the move to produce these particular types of 
quality wines saw the overall volume of wine made across the world decrease 
dramatically (ibid & c.f. Archibugi, 2007). That is, in the process of replicating 
specific styles of wines, producers also began to adhere more closely to the French 
grand cru standards of the quality-quantity nexus.     
Notably, although terroir continues to be heavily debated amongst wine 
experts, Vaudour suggests that a central aspect to the concept is that of a notion of 
origins (2002 & see also Van Leeuween & Seguin, 2006). While an understanding of 
terroir can be extended from more familial senses of place and belonging to more 
scientific aspects concerning the agricultural properties of the land, there remains a 
shared perception based upon a specific combination of natural factors and the 
continuous interaction of humans with that environment. In this regard, although the 
notion of the “hallowed” terroir, in terms of the significance of the place where the 
grapes are grown, might have altered, the knowledge possessed by those who 
originated from regions recognised for the production of high-quality wines appears to 
have become increasingly valuable. 
Indeed, the second change Taber identifies as having occurred across the 
international wine industry as a whole is a growing market for winemakers who have 
gained skills and techniques in countries such as “France, California and Australia” 
(ibid:232). Taber argues that the “Judgement of Paris” Paris Tasting demonstrated to 
producers across the world that “a long heritage” of wine-making associated with 
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particular regions was not necessarily required for the production of “great wine,” and 
instead more recently established producers could simply follow “French and now 
Californian procedures” for successful results (ibid: 230). And, as Langendik points 
outs, wine produced in countries that have a relatively recent history of wine-making 
and/or have little presence across international wine markets, were often judged less 
upon the reputation of the terroir of their region than on the status of the 
internationally renowned winemakers involved in their production (2004). 
Similar observations can be made in the case of Lebanon, where one of the first 
French oenologists hired was Mr Noel Rabot at Chateau Ksara in 1972. Rabot, 
however, was forced to evacuate and return to France once heavy fighting broke out in 
the neighbouring town of Zahle. His role became that of a consultant, making visits 
when the situation allowed him to do so.  Two years after his departure from the 
company in 1992, Mr James Palgé began working for Chateau Ksara. Following the 
establishment of the Chateau Kefraya winery in 1979, Mr Yves Murard, from the 
Rhone region, was employed as oenologist. Murard left in 1995 to work with Cave 
Kouroum, where he remained until 2005. After Murard’s departure, two other 
oenologists were subsequently hired; the first of these came from France, and the 
second from Spain. They both left for reasons that remain unclear. Significantly, the 
oenologist employed directly after Murard, Mr Jean-Michel Fernandez, is recognized 
for creating Chateau Kefraya’s Comte de M labela wine designed for connoisseurs. 
The first of its vintage, the 1996 Comte de M was produced by Fernandez and 
described by Robert Parker in a well-circulated quote that serves to draw attention to 
the blending of different layers of the quality-quantity nexus:  
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A blend of 60% Cabernet Sauvignon (from yields of 28 hectolitres per hectare), 20% Syrah (32 
hectolitres per hectare), and 20% Mourvèdre (32 hectolitres per hectare), from a non-irrigated 
vineyard that was manually harvested, this wine, which I tasted three times earlier this year in 
Bordeaux and once again in September, exhibits an opaque purple colour, and a sweet nose of 
cedar, blackberries, and cassis with nicely integrated smoky, toasty oak. The wine is full-bodied 
and rich, with adequate acidity, and ripe tannin. It possesses layers of concentration, and should 
prove uncommonly long-livedup to 20 years. The architect behind the wine is none other 
than Jean-Michel Fernandez, the man behind the renaissance of Château Citran in the Medoc. 
This wine has been made with no compromises, and will be bottled without any fining or 
filtration, in order, as Fernandez says, “to guard the maximum of purity and authenticity of 
Château Kefraya.” In addition to the lofty price, production of Château Kefraya's Comte de M 
is limited to just over 1600 cases (sic Parker, 1997quote taken from: 
http://www.selectivewinesandspirits.com/index2.html). 
While the foundations of modern wine production in Lebanon might have been shaped 
by the scientific advancements of the nineteenth century, it is thus also clear that recent 
developments are linked to attempts to align production to contemporary global trends 
in the production and consumption of high-quality wines. The importance of expert 
knowledge in maintaining quality standards was highlighted by Ghostine of Chateau 
Ksara when he explained during our interview that wine production in Lebanon 
required “specialised people and not just amateurs.” Significantly however, oenology 
qualifications cannot be obtained at Lebanese universities, so students interested in 
specialising in winemaking must travel abroad for further training.  
Notably, between the departure of his predecessor and Guiberteau’s arrival in 
2006, Ms Diala Younes, who had trained as an agricultural engineer at a Lebanese 
university and worked as an apprentice under the previous oenologist, was temporarily 
employed Chateau Kefraya. I met with Younes during my pilot study in December 
2005, and remained in contact with her after she obtained a scholarship to study 
oenology in France, where she would eventually marry and settle. During one of our 
discussions, when I asked for her thoughts about returning to work at a Lebanese 
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winery, she explained that heavy competition for high-profile positions at wineries like 
Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara made her chances very slim. In some respects, Younes’ 
circumstances also seemed similar to Mrs Paulette Chlela, who worked as an 
agricultural engineer at Chateau Ksara but had trained in oenology in France.36 Also, 
although other wineries might be willing to employ a Lebanese oenologist, such 
positions were temporary or based upon familial ties. Thus while there was an apparent 
labour market for Lebanese oenologists, decisions to hire and pay substantially high 
salaries to French oenologist by the likes of Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara had to do 
with their experience and skillsto not only make wine efficiently but to create 
distinctive labels that would also generate sufficient symbolic value in terms of the 
quality-quantity nexus.   
Lebanese Quality Wine Models 
 
Although a qualification in oenology might provide a basis for producing wines to a 
particular benchmark, also essential is an intimate comprehension of the long- and 
short-term effects of changing trends in the global market on the wine models that are 
designed by the oenologist (2009).  Oenologists had to develop wine models that could 
effectively utilize the quality-quantity nexusperhaps best illustrated through the 
words of Fernandez in a conversation with Robert Parker, where he described his 
motivation for creating Chateau Kefraya’s Comte de M label: “to guard the maximum 
of purity and authenticity of Chateau Kefraya” (Parker, 1997). In other words, products 
                                                 
36 While I do not extend the analysis in this chapter to the issue of gender and work, it is interesting to point 
out that I met with a number of Lebanese women who had either trained as oenologists in France or were in 
the process of training as agricultural engineers with a speciality in viticulture and with the hope of obtaining 
a scholarship to study for a Masters qualification in oenology at either Bordeaux or Montpellier. I have 
chosen to limit the discussion of such women in an attempt to maintain the focus on the roles of oenologists 
such as Palgé and Guiberteau.   
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such as the Comte de M had to evoke a sense of historical continuity and 
integritywhich is, in effect, the symbolic aspect of the quality-quantity nexus that 
was already associated with Chateau Kefraya. At the same time, however, the label had 
to undergo a (re)qualification process to enable symmetry once the goods began to 
circulate across international markets (Callon, Me’adel & Rabehariso, 2008).  
The importance, for both Guiberteau and Palgé, of this kind of understanding of 
the market was evident during our meetings. For, Guiberteau, who also has an MBA in 
Wine Marketing Management from the Inseec business school in Bordeaux, keeping 
up to date with contemporary global wine events appeared to be a regular part of his 
routine. His office, adjacent to the winery’s laboratory, contained stacks of wine 
magazines, and during some of his coffee breaks Guiberteau would sit at his desk 
absorbed in one of these or in an online article. Guiberteau was also well-connected in 
the wine world. He came from a long line of Cognac makers in France, and his time 
working with elite growers in Bordeaux, as well as acting as head oenologist at a 
winery in Morocco, suggested that Guiberteau was as experienced in wine (and 
Cognac) making as he was in the marketing of these products. Indeed, prior to his 
employment at Chateau Kefraya, Guiberteau was already well-acquainted with a 
number of French wine merchants who visited the winery on a number of occasions.  
While Palgé does not have an MBA, his experience is fairly similar to 
Guiberteau’s. Palgé is from Champagne and has worked for many years in Bordeaux 
and Australia. Incidentally, during his time in Bordeaux, Palgé gained recognition as a 
major proponent of adding prepared yeast to aid the fermentation process. He 
explained that although some producers were against the use of such methods, a 
majority appreciated the end results. His networks were also extended through his 
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wife, who had worked as a winemaker in Saint-Émilion, France, prior to their arrival in 
Lebanon. I did not have the opportunity to meet Mrs Palgé during fieldwork, yet it was 
apparent that her work experience remained a useful source of market insights. Finally, 
like Guiberteau, Palgé’s office had stacks of well-thumbed wine magazines and books.  
Maintaining contacts and reading up on the latest wine events, such as the crisis 
of overproduction in Australia, or further developments on the debate on heavy 
regulation in France, assisted both oenologists in designing their wine models for each 
winery. Guiberteau and Palgé’s decisions were informed by their identification of wine 
styles and grape varietals (and combinations thereof) that were excessively produced in 
other countries (such as Australia), as well as understanding their potential impact 
upon the market for Lebanese wine. Indeed both oenologists drew attention to the fact 
that production levels were minute in comparison to the likes of Australia, which 
meant that it was even more important to make high-quality wines. During one 
interview, Palgé illustrated this point by recalling a conversation with a former director 
of the OIV: 
. . . he said that the Lebanese wine industry was so small that producers should not even think 
about selling table wine. They must sell high-quality wines. If people start to make table wines, 
as an international brand, it won’t be good for Lebanon. Production is, after all, only very 
small, and so the focus should remain on producing high-quality wines37. 
Palgé went on to explain that Lebanon was at an interesting stage:  given that 
production levels remained stagnant during the civil war, and that there had been only 
precarious access to vineyards in some regions of the Bekaa, such as Kefraya and 
Taanayel Monastery, it had been a challenge to plant new grape varietals as well 
increase the volume and quality of the wine produced. Arriving at the end of the civil 
                                                 
37 My translation from French. 
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war, Palgé identified Chateau Ksara’s potential to increase overall production while 
also establishing only high-quality brands of wine. Palgé saw the importance of 
developing “classic” labels, which were described as wines made with well-known and 
“reliable” grape varietals such as Cabernet-Sauvignon and Chardonnay, which could 
produce wines reliably similar in style to those of Bordeaux and Burgundya strategy 
that Guiberteau also endorsed. Along with classic labels, Palgé believed it was 
important to develop more exclusive vintages.   
At the time of my fieldwork, his most recent endeavour had been the 
preparation of the 2007 Chateau Ksara Le Souverain, to celebrate the winery’s 150th 
anniversary. The vintage was made with 50% Arinarnoa grapes and 50% Cabernet-
Sauvignon. A significant feature of that vintage was the use of the obscure Arinarnoa, 
a crossing of two Bordeaux varieties, Merlot and Petit Verdot that was bred in 1956. 
While recognised for producing “complex” wines, vineyards of Arinarnoa remain 
limited across the globe. According to Palgé, thirteen years ago (from the time of my 
fieldwork) “there were five hectares in the world”now Chateau Ksara had twelve 
hectares. The use of such a rare grape varietal, combined with the wine’s limited 
edition, inevitably put this vintage in a higher category than classic labels.  Indeed, as 
Palgé explained, such a blend of wine can “speak for itself,” and make people want to 
know more about Chateau Ksara’s wines.  
Yet Palgé’s comments about the importance of Lebanese producers making 
only high-quality wines also reflects the broader and more collaborative efforts of the 
founding UVL members, Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar, to control the process 
of augmenting the quality and quantity across Lebanon as a whole. It significant, 
therefore, that Palgé and Guiberteau shared similar ideas about the kinds of high-
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quality wines to focus on and the types of grapes to plant. While it did not seem as if 
the two oenologists were particularly close friends, there appeared to be a common 
understanding concerning the relationship between quality and quantity. Echoing 
Palgé’s earlier remarks, Guiberteau explained that the niche for Lebanese wines was 
only a small segment of the global wine market and that even one winery making “bad 
wines” would have a negative impact on the reputation of other wine producers. Once 
more the importance of understanding the long- and short-term impact of the market 
came to the fore. For example, Palgé highlighted the importance of not planting grape 
varietals that might be fashionable momentarily: 
If the director of the winery comes to me and says; “Listen, consumers are demanding Malbec 
wines,” I will ask him, “How long might this demand lastten years?” And in ten years people 
will want another kind of grape. It is a system of fashion. Fashion for wine, it lasts ten years. If 
I plant Malbec, I will start to harvest in three years, I have a vine, not necessarily very good. In 
ten years, my Malbec grape variety would have reached its optimum quality level. But it will no 
longer be fashionable.  
Palgé explained that the effects of planting such varietals were not only problematic for 
Chateau Ksara, but also for other wineries in Lebanon who might decide to produce 
similar wine styles. Instead, Palgé preferred other wineriesand vineyard ownersto 
plant more obscure grape varieties such as Arinarnoa, stating that “it is here where we 
(the wineries) have to work together, ‘the wines of Lebanon.’” While such objectives 
demonstrate the importance of collaboration, they also, however, reflect the strategies 
of the founding UVL members and their attempts to regulate the quality-quantity 
nexus.  
Similarly, Guiberteau stressed that it was important for Palgé and him to make 
sure that not just the wines of Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara maintained good standards, 
but also that they encouraged smaller wineries to do the same. As Guiberteau 
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explained, the smaller wineries were important in this respect because they were able 
to produce limited quantities, thereby pointing to higher standards and more exclusive 
quality. Yet Guiberteau’s comments were also indicative of the UVL’s aims to control 
quantity, because of concerns about overproduction and a possible decrease in the 
perception of quality. Supporting smaller wineries would allow for the overall 
augmentation of quality and quantity, while ensuring that the two largest producing 
wineries (Ksara and Kefraya) would continue to increase their production levels and 
consequentially their profits. In designing quality wine models for each of the wineries 
they worked for, both oenologists thus also had in mind a broader plan for Lebanese 
wine production as a whole. There was, in this regard, a shared objective: to establish a 
sense of symmetry across the Lebanese wine industry; one that demonstrated an 
understanding of changes in the local market where there were a growing number of 
wineries, and that guarded the international prestige of the wineries they worked for. 
Such observations are clearly stated in further comments made by Palgé during our 
discussion: “We need everyone to do well so that it sells. This is a good model for 
Lebanon.  You know the saying in French, that you start a train and the rest of its 
wagons will follow.”   
Implementing Lebanese Wine Models 
 
Understanding the dynamics of the wine market was not only important for designing 
an agenda to produce high range wines, but was also important for the process of 
implementation. At the same time, however, while the models designed to produce 
high quality wines for the market is suggestive of the expertise of Guiberteau and 
Palgé, their ability to implement such strategies demonstrates the real extent of their 
competency. After all, the effectiveness of market models is measured not on what it 
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sets out to do (and thus what it says) but rather in how it is applied and whether the 
expected outcomes are reached (Mitchell, 2007:245). In this regard, by aiming to 
establish a particular form of symmetry in the production of Lebanese wine, 
Guiberteau and Palgé actively sought to influence the way the symbolic and/or 
representational marketing aspects of wine and the relations of production were 
(re)combined (MacKenzie, Muniesa, Siu, 2007: 3).  
We might say that the implementation of their new models required changes in 
the qualification process and thus a renegotiation in local networksand also in how 
they were represented. In other words, the qualification process for the new styles of 
wine required a (re)breaking down of production that entailed a rite of passage, 
allowing these goods to be endowed with  new “special qualities” and consequentially 
attached to new intimate biographies (Callon et al., 2008 & Van Gennep, 2011). 
Within that process of attaching new biographies, representations and relations were 
consequently (re)combined; non-human as well as human components were thus re-
assembled and readjusted to comply with the expected standards of quality wines. In 
effect, the successful implementation of the oenologists’ quality wine models 
simultaneously required the forcible detachment of older biographies that were in 
conflict with the quality-quantity nexus that they both sought to establish. 
Significantly, strategies to remove these old biographies also entailed a rite of passage 
that this time aimed to dissolve and exclude particular non-desirable qualities. Thus, 
while the process of reconceptualising the quality-quantity nexus began (as we saw 
Palgé explain in the previous section) with decisions pertaining to the wine style, the 
implementation of these changes had to begin in the vineyard. 
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In more practical terms, given that improving the quality of grapes used to 
make their wines was an important feature of Guiberteau and Palgé’s strategy, and that 
both Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya relied upon grapes from vineyard owners, a 
significant method of implementing their models was through the use of contracts. Yet 
in the process of creating and upholding these contracts, Palgé and Guiberteau had to 
terminate, or at best renegotiate, older contracts so that they could once more be 
reincorporated into the new relations of production. Notably, these older contracts were 
usually with vineyard owners in Kefraya who grew Cinsault vinesa grape varietal 
that both oenologists disliked.    
It is interesting that this contempt for Cinsault was described in terms of its 
displeasing qualities and problematic quantities for making high-quality wines. One of 
the main problems for Guiberteau was that Cinsault berries are bigger in size than 
other grapes, resulting in a higher volume of wine but a weaker colour and aroma. 
Palgé thought that the sugar content of these grapes was too high, resulting in large 
volumes of wine unsuitable for ageing. In some respects these perspectives evoke what 
Mansfield (2003) observes quality techniques that can be perceived as subjective and 
judged through the senses, while they are also in some sense objective and made “real” 
through measuring quantities. The somewhat intangible properties of a “weak” aroma 
and apparent inability to age are validated through tangible properties such as size and 
volume. The Cinsault grapes were thus also thought to be counter-intuitive when it 
came to the (re)qualification process that sought to (re)combine natural factors. It was 
a politics of the aesthetic, so to speak, that also extended to the way the vines look and 
the way they are maintained; elucidating further the properties of singularity associated 
with the wine.  Guiberteau explains:  
266 
 
The vines must be looked after properly. You must make sure that the grapes are planted in the 
right manner: either trained along a wire or planted in a goblet style. These must be planted at a 
certain distance apart and pruned in the correct way. The vines must yield a certain volume of 
grapes, too. Here, the relationship between quantity and quality is crucial. Limited amounts of 
grapes will make a good wine. You see all of this is important. If you stand at any point in the 
vineyard, all the vines should line up equally. This is a good indicatora basic one, but a start. 
And it looks beautiful! 
The use of aesthetic properties to describe the positive attributes of vineyards also 
illustrates the quality discourses that occur within enterprising strategies across agro-
food production, where the use of visual imagery engages with a materiality of nature 
in order to classify distinctive features and characteristics of a goodand in doing so, 
creates intimate links to the origin of the produce (c.f. Murdoch, Marsden & Banks, 
2000 & Goodman, 2003). Yet what perhaps distinguishes wine from other agro-food 
industries is that not only that the aesthetic traits of the grapes have to be retained 
following transformation into wine (so as to maintain an intimacy with the origin of the 
grape), but intimate ties must be forged that link grapes, vineyards (land), and human 
actors. Given that the praxis of the oenologist is grounded within such practices, the 
process of creating harmony between viticulture and viniculture production also 
encompassed the vineyard ownersor as Guiberteau and Palgé described them: 
viticulteursa French term that can be loosely translated as winegrower or 
viticulturist. That is, someone who knows how to grow grapes for the production of 
wine, but does not necessarily possess vinification knowledge.   
In my discussions with Guiberteau, the term balance égale, which can be 
roughly translated as symmetry or harmony, was frequently used to describe the 
aesthetic properties of the way that the vineyards should be planted and pruned, and 
also to describe the perfect colour of the leaves. These were important factors in the 
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maintenance of the vines, the subsequent quality of the grapes, and finally the wines. 
Significantly, balance égale was also used in the process of judging whether a 
viticulteur in Kefraya shared a similar philosophy to Guiberteau: 
 
What do I see when I look out to the vineyards in the village of Kefraya? Of course I am 
looking at quality. How do I do this? Well I must see if there is an attempt to look after the 
grapes. Even if it is Cinsault that they are growing, then I must therefore also know the farmer 
(viticulteurs) and see if he is like me, and also willing to look to the future. If not, then I must 
assume that the quality of his grapes will never be good and there is no harmony. 
Such attempts to create symmetry within agriculturally commodified chains of 
production, as Busch and Tanaka suggest in the case of the Canadian rapeseed oil 
industry, requires the symmetrical treatment of facts and values that become 
interdependent upon one another (1996). Busch and Tanaka provide a number of 
examples, such as “the good farmer” and “the good crusher,” where both are judged by 
what they can yield: the former, the crop, and the latter, the oil. I propose similar 
examples, where the right grape varieties and the right kind of viticulteurs are 
simultaneously represented as both values and facts, and are suggestive of how certain 
ideal qualities are attached to both human and non-human actors:  
The right grape varietal must be those that yield berries with the right amount 
of sugar content to make the desired wine styles. These grape varietals must 
also be on demand across the international wine markets, but are also unique in 
that some of their qualities might be associated with a distinctive Lebanese 
identityand not Cinsault. 
Viticulteurs are judged by their willingness to accept and comply with the terms 
and conditions set out by Palgé and Guiberteau. They are expected to maintain 
their vines according to the required standards, allowing the oenologists and 
their team to intervene (including in the harvest) when it is deemed necessary, 
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so to ensure that the quality-quantity nexus is maintained. A good vineyard 
owner is also willing to grow and produce the types of grape varietals 
demanded by the oenologist.   
 
In this regard, the interchangeable qualities associated with the vineyard owner and the 
viticulteurs speaks of a particular reciprocal construction of value where it is the 
“transformative potential” of these qualities that are valorised by both oenologists 
(Munn 1986; Graeber 2001:47). Nature and people are thus subjected to the same rites 
of passageand with equal intensity and force (Busch & Tanaka, 1996). Symmetry 
subsequently occurs following the successful completion of this rite of passage, where 
nonhuman bodies undergo a transformative process so that they, and the human actors 
involved, are simultaneously attributed with corresponding positive qualities, setting 
the standard for the production of good quality wines (ibid:5). There are two 
significant effects that arise from such a process. First, by attempting to create 
homogeneity and uniformity in the representation of “the behaviour of both people and 
things,” Guiberteau and Palgé aim to extend the control of production of quality wines 
to the vineyards that are not owned directly by Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya. Indeed, 
the use of the French term viticulteurs potentially conceals the reality, which is that 
these vineyards were actually owned by the viticulteurs. After all, and as I have already 
suggested in Chapter Four, the term does not necessarily refer to or imply that the 
winegrower owns the vineyards he or she is maintaining. In this regard, diverting 
attention away from the real ownership of the vineyardsand landdemonstrates a 
strategy to normalise control over grape productionprior to the selling of those 
grapes to Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya.  
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One important aspect of what constitutes a “good” viticulteur is, therefore, 
compliance and willingness not only to plant and grow what are deemed “good 
grapes,” but also to allow the oenologists to control all aspects of grape production. 
This was something that Palgé discussed when explaining the decision, taken in 1994, 
to plant vineyards outside of Kefraya. I had asked Palgé if there had been any form of 
contractual agreement between Chateau Ksara and vineyard owners in Kefraya. He 
told me: 
It was not contracts but agreements. There were written contracts but these were more like 
contracts of sale. That is to say that the person agrees to sell, for three or five years, all or part 
of their production. But Chateau Ksara had no right to say “I want to monitor your treatment.” 
Now, with new contracts (outside of Kefraya), we manage everything. It is us who are planting 
what we want. This starts from the choice of the grape varieties, to the planting, pruning, and so 
on. Everything is controlled. 
Yet the use of the term viticulteurs evokes other more immaterial dimensions, where 
an implicit connection is forged between Lebanese vineyard-owners and French 
viticulteurs, and this adds to the symbolic layer of the quality-quantity nexus in 
Lebanon. The successful creation of such symmetry also contributes towards a 
standardisation process that will allow Lebanese wines to be ranked in similar 
categories with French quality wines. Such endeavours draw attention to the second 
effect of successfully establishing standards for quality wines. That is, within this 
standardisation process of Lebanese wine, a hierarchy of quality also emerges that 
corresponds to French quality wine models. Significantly, this hierarchical 
qualification process not only entails the successful transformation of the right kinds of 
grapes into quality wines, but also extends to the location of the vineyards. Thus, while 
Palgé and Guiberteau shared similar objectivesto terminate the use of the Cinsault 
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varietal and to monitor quality control in the vineyardstheir strategies began to 
diverge due to differing articulations of locality by the different wineries.  
Chateau Kefraya only sources grapes from the Kefraya region, and within 
Guiberteau’s quality rhetoric there was a clear emphasis upon the natural properties of 
the land, where he believed that the right conditions were readily available for making 
good quality wines. While Guiberteau, like Palgé, may also be interested in 
diversifying the types of grapes used to make wines, limitations in the ability to 
manipulate certain aspects of the production process are set apartthrough what 
Guiberteau described rather explicitly as “natural” features of Kefraya’s terroir. This 
was in contrast to Palgé, who was less inclined to defining and demarcating particular 
regions in Lebanon as having a higher potential (or terroir) for producing high-quality 
wines. In this respect, nuances in the perspectives of both oenologists as to the way in 
which quality wasor was notspatially attached to the Kefraya region began to 
emerge. This was evident in terms of how the application of their expertise and the 
conceptualisation of quality was discursive and contingent on a specific set of 
parameters. Significantly, various conditions influenced the way in which practices of 
quality control could be materialised in the contract agreements set up with vineyard 
owners across the Bekaa Valley. Yet it was at this stage of the qualification process 
where the transformation of grapes into high quality wines emerged, in a rite of 
passage which took the form of an ambiguous intermingling of objects and people and 
overlapped processes of social transition and shifts in economic rationalityboth in 
Kefraya and across the Bekaa Valley.    
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Making Grapes in Kefraya Taste like Teacakes  
 
For Guiberteau, the land in Kefraya was the basis from which to establish quality 
standards for Chateau Kefraya’s winery. Notably, the particular constraints faced by 
Guiberteau in extending viticulture relations beyond the Kefraya region were situated 
within discourses that naturalised a distinctive localityone which had been brought 
about through the construction of a specialised relationship between chateaux and 
surrounding vineyards (Ulin, 1996). Thus, while Cinsault varietals and unwilling 
viticulteurs remained a problem for Guiberteau, one that could not be solved by 
sourcing grapes from outside Kefraya, he also had the advantage of being able to 
implement strategies that made the most of the available conditions, for example the 
presence of limited resourcessuch as the exclusivity of grapes from a limited 
regionwas used to evoke a more refined hierarchy of quality in comparison to 
Chateau Ksara. Indeed Guiberteau constantly spoke of how the “natural environment,” 
such as dry and rocky soils and extreme cold and hot weather conditions, allowed the 
vines to “suffer”ensuring that the grapes were not full of juice and sugar, and the 
flavour therefore just right to produce the styles of wines he desired. He explained: 
There are several factors that are expected in the production of good quality wines. First of all 
you must have good land and a good grape. Here in Kefraya, the land can produce good vines 
that will yield a good quality. But it is important that the right kinds of grapes are grown to 
make good wines. You cannot make a good wine from grapes such as Cinsault. You need noble 
varieties such as Cabernet-Sauvignon, or for a white wine, my favourite grapewhich is 
Viognier.  
Yet while Guiberteau was enthusiastic about the qualities of the land from where the 
grapes were sourced, he still faced the issue that Chateau Kefraya relied heavily upon 
grapes bought from vineyard owners in Kefrayamany of who continued to grow 
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Cinsault despite many attempts by the likes of Guiberteau and Palgé to discourage 
them. During one discussion on the topic of Cinsault, I asked Guiberteau how he 
envisioned buying grapes from Kefraya residents in future, where agreements 
continued to be based on the volume of grapes bought from the vineyard. Cinsault 
grapes were bought at approximately 30–34 cents per kilogram, while the noble 
varieties, such as Chardonnay and Cabernet-Sauvignon, were bought at 54 cents per 
kilogram. Interestingly, Guiberteau believed that the basis of such contracts was 
adequate, but that further steps could be taken to further decrease the price of Cinsault. 
He hoped that the Cinsault grape would eventually be pointless to grow, thereby 
forcing people to change variety.   
I pointed out to Guiberteau that even if his plans did work, the grapes were still 
priced per kilogram and price varied dependent upon the type of grape rather on the 
quality. Given that vineyard owners in Kefraya could at any point sell their grapes to 
other wineries, Guiberteau was not keen to put too much effort into the maintenance of 
their vines. There was also no intention to develop long-term contracts with Kefraya 
vineyard owners until the first steps had been taken to plant the types of grape varietals 
that Guiberteau required. He believed that following such changes, if contracts were 
eventually made with individual vineyard owners then quality for those particular 
vineyard owners could be controlled further. However, the main challenge he saw was 
that all the vineyards were adjacent, and anonymity in this regard was not possible. 
Nevertheless, Guiberteau believed it important to speak directly with vineyards 
owners, who, based upon the maintenance of their vineyards, appeared to understand 
or have some sense of the importance of quality. He concluded our conversation, “In 
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the meantime, we will continue to buy from Kefraya but reduce the price 
dramatically.”  
Upon my return from the harvest of 2008, it was clear that many in Kefraya had 
not heeded Guiberteau’s advice. During a visit to Kefraya in the early months of 2012, 
I was informed by Nabhane that this was still in fact the case. As I suggested in 
Chapter Four, given that the amount of capital required to pull out the Cinsault vines 
and plant new ones was substantial, vineyard owners required support from the 
wineries to do so, perhaps in a similar manner to the agreements instigated by de 
Bustros during the initial stages of viticulture in Kefraya. Yet there was no indication 
that such an arrangement would be made. Second, Chateau Kefraya continued to make 
offers to buy land from villagersto no avail. At the same time, the emergence of 
enterprising individuals such as Didi, who were willing to accept changes implemented 
by the wineries but refused to sell their grapes to Chateau Kefraya, added another 
complex dimension to the situation. While such changes across the Kefraya landscape 
might have seemed gradual, they are indicative of changes in social relations amongst 
local residents in Kefraya that might also have an impact upon future strategies 
deployed by Chateau Kefraya. Nevertheless, and as Guiberteau pointed out during my 
fieldwork, given that Chateau Kefraya purchases the highest amount of grapes from the 
village, it was be highly unlikely that vineyard owners would completely turn away 
from the winery.      
It was also evident during fieldwork that Guiberteau was looking for ways to 
dissuade vineyard owners in Kefraya from growing any amount of Cinsault at all. Such 
objectives materialised through the encouragement of smaller wineries such as Vin 
Nakad, to reduce the amount of Cinsault purchased from Kefraya. Guiberteau went so 
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far as to suggest that such small-scale wineries sought grapes from other emerging 
viticulture regions across the Bekaa Valley that grow other sorts of varieties. In so 
doing, Guiberteau hoped that as less wineries across Lebanon would buy grapes from 
Kefraya, and its vineyard owners would eventually have no choice but grow other 
varieties. Another noteworthy attempt by Guiberteau to renegotiate networks and 
contracts came to the fore during a discussion where he explained that, during the early 
months of employment at Chateau Kefraya, he had approached de Bustros to discuss 
the possibility of replacing Nabhane. According to Guiberteau, de Bustros was 
completely opposed to the idea, exclaiming that such an act would place the whole 
village of Kefraya against the Chateau. Although Guiberteau heeded de Bustros’ 
advice and continued to work with Nabhane, Guiberteau was not clear on who he had 
hoped would replace Nabhane and nor the reasons behind such a seemingly odd 
request.  
In fact, it appeared that Guiberteau and Nabhane had developed a rapport with 
each other, so much so that the former hoped Nabhane could negotiate with others 
from Kefraya to change their varietals. Yet it is significant that not long after 
approaching de Bustros with the proposal to replace Nabhane, Guiberteau began to 
encourage his assistant maitre de chai (winemaker), also from Kefraya, to consider the 
prospect of working for the Chateau Marsyas winery, which was undergoing 
construction across the road from Chateau Kefraya. While the outcome of such a 
proposition remains unclear, it is significant that Guiberteau had already established 
strong ties with the two Saade brothers who owned Chateau Marsyas, offering them 
informal oenological advice until they hired the most definitive of the “flying 
winemakers,” Stéphane Derenoncourt. Given that Chateau Marsyas is committed to 
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producing quality wines from noble varieties, Guiberteau believed that such an 
opportunity for his assistant winemaker, where he could only endorse the right kind of 
grape varietals, would encourage Kefraya residents to grow other varietals. Yet it is 
also significant that Guiberteau wanted to employ another assistant who did not come 
from Kefraya. While Guiberteau was unwilling to explain how he had met this 
particular young man, it was apparent that he thought it important that his assistant was 
not from Kefraya. Indeed, this appeared to be part of Guiberteau’s overall objective, 
which he summarized by explaining, “We, Chateau Kefraya, should not need Kefraya, 
it is Kefraya who should need us.”  
Indeed, Guiberteau’s main aim began to slowly surface during the harvest I 
spent in Kefraya. Before the harvest, Chateau Kefraya had assessed the amount of 
grapes needed, organizing agreements with some of the vineyard owners. Once 
harvesting was underway, local vineyard owners from Kefraya visited their vines 
regularly in order to check up on the number of crates being thrown into the trucks; 
villagers paid per kilogram, where each crate of Cinsault was approximately 25 
kilograms. Counting the number of crates was thus a way for vineyard owners to work 
out a rough estimate of the amount of money that they would receive for their grapes.  
Every so often, Nabhane would pass by in his jeep to check that the whole 
process was running smoothly. At times, however, he came across vineyard owners 
who wanted to find out when their grapes would be harvested and felt that it was 
important that this was done soon. After all, once the grapes began to shrivel and 
reduce in weight, the vineyard owners would be losing money. Nabhane would assure 
them that this would not happen. One day I joined Nabhane on his travels across the 
vineyards of the Kefraya village, and one vineyard owner stopped him to express these 
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same concerns. When Nabhane tried to reassure him, the vineyard owner pointed in the 
direction of the vines dotted on the slopes of the Chateau Kefraya estates. He asked: 
Ya Nabhane! How can you be sure? Look at what the muhandis is doing out there. I went 
walking up around the winery’s vines and there are some grapes shrivelling under the hot sun. 
What is he doing? Does he not want his grapes? 
 
Nabhane reassured the vineyard owner that the Muhandis Guiberteau does know what 
he is doing and that he would not be doing the same to the grapes of vineyard owners 
in Kefraya. With that, Nabhane bade the worried man farewell and moved on to the 
next vineyard. When I asked Nabhane for further information, he informed me that 
Guiberteau wanted to make a “special” and “important” wine with the grapes that had 
been left shrivelling on the vines at the Chateau Kefraya estate. The next day I paid a 
visit to Guiberteau in his office adjacent to the winery’s laboratory, to ask him about 
these grapes. Rather than explaining straight away, Guiberteau invited me to join him 
in the vineyards along with his agricultural engineer interns from Lebanese 
universities. I accepted and a few minutes later we arrived at the sloping vines that had 
been pointed out by the disconcerted vineyard owner only the day before. As we all 
jumped down from the jeep, Guiberteau handed us plastic bags in order to collect some 
of the grapes for sugar testing. He shouted out to us that we should also taste some of 
the grapes. He explained later that it was important to taste these grapes in order to 
assess the sugar and possible styles of wines that could be produced.  
The grape variety was Ugni Blanc, a grape that was, incidentally, grown in 
Cognac, where Guiberteau grew up. The Ugni Blanc berries were no longer full and 
robust, and to me they look shrivelled and brown. Nevertheless, I tasted some of the 
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berries along with the interns, who also appeared somewhat suspicious. We were all 
surprised. One of the interns suggested that the berries tasted like cake. I, perhaps due 
to my somewhat anglicised taste buds, couldn’t help but think of tea-cakes. The 
following day the grapes were ready to be harvested, and to be sent to make Chateau 
Kefraya’s Mistellecalled Nectar Chateau Kefraya. Guiberteau informed me that he 
had found a lot of problems in the quality of this wine. It would take another two years 
before the wine was ready to be bottled and consumed, so hopefully in the coming 
years the quality would be augmented by decreasing the quantity of the grapes. 
Significantly, the reduction in quantity referred here not only to amount of grape per 
vine but also to the size of the grape berries.  
At the time of fieldwork Chateau Kefraya paid vineyard owners by the 
kilogram, and as such Guiberteau did not intend to create this style of wine with grapes 
bought from Kefraya. Yet this somewhat meticulous attention given to the winery’s 
own vineyards betrayed another dimension of Guiberteau’s wine model. Since his 
arrival in 2006, Guiberteau had overseen plantations of different types of vines on 
lands belonging to the Chateau Kefraya estate further down in the flatter plains of the 
region. Significantly, one aspect of this plan was related to the issue of control over the 
viticulture maintenance of the vineyards in the Kefraya village: 
At the moment our lowest quality wine is Les Breteches, which is made up of Cinsault with 
Carringnon and Mouverde. Then there is the Chateau of Kefraya range and finally Comte de M, 
which is the highest qualitywe blend Cabernet-Sauvignon and Syrah for this wine. You see, 
to make the higher quality wines we still have the potential to increase production by using 
grapes from our estates. This means that I can oversee directly what goes on in the vineyard. 
With wines such as Les Breteches, it would be better for us to blend noble varieties rather than 
Cinsault. However, it is not necessary to control the quantity (in terms of quality) of the grapes 
that will be used for these kinds of wines. So long as they are grapes known and recognised as 
consistent, then the wines can be produced. 
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By developing different specifications for each category of wine, Guiberteau began to 
establish a hierarchy of qualities that extended to the specific location of each 
vineyard. In so doing, he started to implement a wine model that aimed to augment 
both the quality and quantity of Chateau Kefraya wines. Within that qualification 
process, Guiberteau also facilitated the standardisation of Lebanese wine, to adhere to 
the benchmark set by Chateau Kefrayaand also Chateau Ksara. After all, the 
monopsony power held by both wineries over the vineyard owners of Kefraya suggests 
a strong possibility that many will eventually comply to the demand to grow specific 
types of grape varieties.   
 
Ksara’s Wheels of Commerce  
 
While the history of viticulture in Kefraya is long in comparison to other regions, it is 
apparent that the transformations that have occurred in the region have to some extent 
been a response to changes taking place across the rest of Bekaa Valley, mainly as a 
consequence of strategies to diversify grape plantations deployed by Palgé at the 
Chateau Ksara winery. Significantly, Palgé still had an interest in improving the 
quality of vines grown in Kefraya, and this was to ensure a shared and unified 
understanding of quality across the Bekaa Valley.  Here, Palgé speaks of his 
relationship with one of the enterprising and largest vineyard owners in Kefraya: 
Dr Didi was the first to plant Sauvignon Blanc in 1988, and when I arrived in 1994 he grew 
both Sauvignon Blanc and Cinsault. And my advice was to give up on the Cinsault, to pull it 
out and replant other grape varieties. I said to him, “If you do this, then, I am still with you.” 
And he agreed. So we planted Chardonnay and Syrah. Thus, he restructured. He is someone 
who has 20 hectares of these vines as well as the Sauvignon-Blanc, and all vines are now 
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young. So you see here, the process of augmenting quality and quantity begins to slowly spread 
across the Bekaa Valley.  
Palgé’s plan to vary the types of grape varietals also extends to diversifying regions 
across the Bekaa Valley, where these grapes are planted, and branching out means that 
greater control of quality is possible. On several occasions during my visits to Chateau 
Ksara at harvest time, Palgé was present with his chef d’atelier to physically examine 
grapes about to be released from their crates down into the press. With six different 
ranges or grades of red wines, all made from noble grape varieties, from different 
vineyards recognised for their quality, Palgé made clear the importance that each 
vineyard plot is managed separately: 
Everything is separated. Even during the harvest, I receive grapes by variety, per vineyard and 
per domaine (parcel of land). So I can check the grapes, and after a few months taste each of 
the wines. We even have committees for tasting. 
This process also allows for flexibility, so the best quality grapes can be used for the 
higher categories of wines and so forth. In order to create a symmetry between the 
vini- and viticulture spheres, there were two types of contractual agreement set up with 
vineyard owners across the Bekaa Valley. Long-term contracts were characterised by 
vineyard owners who rented their lands outright to Chateau Ksara, where viticulture 
maintenance was the full responsibility of the winery. The prices for the grapes also 
remained stable throughout each harvest. Palgé defined these contracts as reliable 
because there was less room for price negotiation. It is significant that longer term 
contracts are predominantly with large land owners who own property in the West 
Bekaa; this includes lands owned by elite Beiruti families such as the Itani family in 
Mansourah and the Rizk in Tal Ed Noub, but also includes the lands of the Ludwidg 
Schneller School situated in Kherbet Kanafar. There appears to be little 
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communication with these landowners and Chateau Ksara had direct control over 
vineyard maintenance.  
During my visits to all of these vineyards with Mrs Paulette Chlela, the 
agricultural engineer employed by Chateau Ksara, none of the landowners were ever 
present. Instead, their wakils, who come from surrounding villages, were there, and 
there appeared to be very little communication between the landowners and Palgé or 
Chlela. Given the owners’ absence in their vineyards, it also proved quite difficult for 
me to request an interview with them. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that when I 
became acquainted with members of these families upon my return to Beirut, few had 
ever visited their property in the West Bekaa. While this might be an interesting area 
for research, it is perhaps sufficient here to acknowledge their detachment from much 
of the wine production process.  
With the shorter-term agreements, vineyard owners looked after their own 
vines but were also expected to heed the advice of Chateau Ksara. Prices varied from 
harvest to harvest and were dependent upon the quality of the grapes. The differences 
between the long- and short-term contracts set up by Chateau Ksara with vineyard 
owners across the Bekaa Valley highlight the winery’s methods of quality control. 
While the longer-term contracts offered more stability, in the sense that grapes are 
more or less guaranteed in each harvest, the shorter-term contracts allowed Palgé the 
room to manoeuvre during years when the harvest didn’t turn out as well as had been 
hoped. Interestingly, these vineyards mainly belonged to smaller landowners 
predominantly scattered across Central Bekaa. I had the opportunity to meet with a 
number of these landowners and hear their perspectives on the contracts set up with 
Chateau Ksara.  
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Most managed the viticulture maintenance directly, hiring seasonal workers to 
support them in pruning and harvest periods. All had acquired enough capital to invest 
in new vines, either through their own private funds or bank loans. Significantly, these 
short-term agreements enabled vineyard owners to develop contracts with other 
wineries seeking to buy noble varieties. Such contracts could run simultaneously, so 
that Chateau Ksara might buy one type of grape and then another winery might buy 
other kinds. Yet the grapes were not, however, their main source of income. One 
vineyard owner (who wishes to remain nameless) owned lands on the slopes behind the 
Central Bekaa town of Qb Elias, and he informed me that the profit for 700 tonnes of 
grapes was approximately $35,000. He had started planting vines such as Cabernet-
Sauvignon in 1994, following Palgé’s advice. By 1997, he tells me, his vines were 
ready to be sold: 
First Ksara told us that we will give you this to plant . . . then Domaine Wardy asked me to 
grow Syrah and it is now the Kssatly family (owners of Chateau Ka) who are buying from me. 
All the wineries know I have a very good quality. They have battles over my grapes. All the 
vineyards get the sun and wind. In the summer I have wind and in the winter there is no wind. 
There is no humidity as there is on the plains. I have no oidium38 and not a lot of insects. There 
are a lot of ladybirds though. I have eight hectares of vineyards but fifteen hectares of land in 
total. 
The vineyard owner had good relations with Chateau Ksara, and often received advice 
and support. He felt, however, that at times he had very little choice about the way he 
maintained his vineyards or even the types of grapes he could grow. As the grapes are 
intended to produce wines with characteristics distinctive to the respective wineries, 
his control over the grapes grown upon his land was limited. Sometimes, this would 
have impact upon production: 
                                                 
38 Oidium is a fungal disease resulting in a layer of powdery mildew that surrounds the berries. 
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One of the wineries, for example, wanted bio-grapes without any chemicals. They were putting 
chemicals on their own vines but wanted me to remain bio. So I did that and my vines got 
oidium . . . and then there was barely a harvest. 
This vineyard owner continued to sell his grapes to the wineries, stating his intention to 
expand his vineyards onto adjacent lands that belong to other family members. He 
hoped to develop a longer-term contract with Chateau Ksara, or establish his own 
winery. The latter was in fact what another small landowner had decided upon a year 
before I arrived to do my fieldwork. This is the Domaine de Baal winery run by 
Sebastien Khoury. Domaine de Baal is situated on the slopes of Zahle. Khoury 
produces noble varieties such as Cabernet-Sauvignon and Shiraz, which he has planted 
along narrow terraces that descend down onto a little wadi. During the winter, water 
can be seen to run down between the deep crevices of the wadi. The land has been in 
Khoury’s family for some time, and he tells me that before the civil war his father had 
made this land into a kind of nature reserve for local plant life. It had apparently been a 
well-known spot for hiking. Still inspired to work with nature, Khoury became 
interested in cultivating the land. He had not been alone in this venture and other 
members of his family, such as his brother, also played a part in the re-development of 
this landscape. They started out by selling their grapes to Chateau Ksara, and their 
family friend, Palgé advised them about which grapes to grow: 
For the reds we grow 50% Cabernet-Sauvignon, 45% Merlot and 5% Shiraz. For the whites, 
60% is Chardonnay and 40% is Sauvignon Blanc. In 1995 we began with five hectares of vines 
and expanded onwards from there. 
It is significant that Palgé made a point of befriending the smaller vineyard owners 
such as Sebastien Khoury of Zahle and Dr Didi from Kefraya, and continued to offer 
them the expert advice required to grow the expected vines. Notable is that these 
relations are defined as good, once there is compliance to the terms set out by Chateau 
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Ksaranot just for their production of wine but also for the rest of the wineries in 
Lebanon: 
It is important to have contracts with only the vineyard owners who share the same view as 
Chateau Ksara. We want to make good wines, so they must grow the good grapes as we expect. 
This is good not just for us, but for Lebanon. 
Indeed, at times Palgé even extended his role as the patron of wine expertise to 
viniculture when a couple of these smaller vineyard owners took the decision to start 
producing their own wines. It is therefore important to point out that some of these 
small-scale wineries were able to join the UVL, which demonstrates the strategic 
efforts made by Chateau Ksaraand also Chateau Kefrayato extend the discours of 
quality, and to subsequently control production across the rest of the Lebanese wine 
industry.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that Palgé made a point of keeping private the 
prices Chateau Ksara paid to the different vineyard owners. It was made clear that the 
prices varied depending upon quality and also on contract type. It is also intriguing that 
the vineyard owners I spoke with were unsure of what other vineyards owners 
received. In fact the only vineyard owner willing to divulge the amount he received 
preferred to remain anonymous. When I had asked him why, he explained that he did 
not want to ‘upset’ anyone in Ksara. I questioned him further, and he suggested that 
perhaps some vineyard owners may receive more than others and, even if this is based 
upon the quality of the grapes, it might cause problems between Chateau Ksara and 
that vineyard owner. My informant explained that he preferred to not cause 
troubleand thereby to lose support from Palgé and his team. The advice and support 
offered by James Palgé and his team to these vineyard owners thus assured some 
degree of loyalty in that other wineriesparticularly those who had not employed 
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French oenologistswere unable to provide such professional and highly-valued 
advice. At the same time, such contractual agreements offered Chateau Ksara some 
room for market adaptability, while also reducing labour costs.    
Conclusion  
 
On one level, it was apparent that both Guiberteau and Palgé had a clear sense of how 
to classify regions, parcels of lands, grape varietals, and wines into a hierarchy of 
quality that drew strongly upon an understanding of the international wine markets. 
Linked to this is that the wine law passed in 2000 included discussion about an 
appellation-of-origin system dependent upon the geographical area of grapes: Article 
12 concludes by stating that the “geographical area should be recognised for natural 
and human factors.” While an AOC system has yet to be put in place in Lebanon, the 
strategies deployed by Guiberteau and Palgé invoke ranking systems of quality that 
replicate global standards and guidelines.   
It is also significant that their perspectives have come to permeate winegrowing 
practices in Lebanon. Thus while symmetry or balance égale indicated a 
harmoniousand successfulrelationship with vineyard owners across the Bekaa, it 
also served to exclude those who were not willing to comply with standards of wine 
production or follow standardised and regulated procedures in line with how these two 
oenologists understood the international guidelines. The repercussions of such 
strategies have also led to further socio-economic changes where a winegrowing 
hierarchy has been regenerated across the Bekaa Valley. Most of the newer, small-
scale wineries that started out selling grapes from their vineyards to Chateau Ksara are 
located in Central Bekaa, and this suggests the possibility of new emerging hierarchal 
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classifications of space across the valley’s viticulture landscape, which once more 
reproduce spatial categorizations within discourses about high-quality wine. In this 
respect, and in much the same way that Kefraya emerged as the winegrowing hub of 
Lebanon, there is also an apparent replication of a winegrowing hierarchy that 
resembles more global forms of wine production.   
Yet at the same time, the objective to completely remove Cinsault vines from 
Kefraya presents another layer of intrigue, where challenges were faced by both 
oenologists. These challenges had to do with ensuring that the discourse of quality 
could be effectively applied to the region. Reminiscent here are Pratt’s observations 
that economic models have a tendency to become problematic due an assumption of 
homogeneity in the categorization of (for example) producers (1994). It is significant, 
therefore, that both oenologistsbut especially Palgéhave forged more personal 
relations with important actors from Kefraya who are willing to comply with expected 
standards. Although these relations were not all together the essence of economic 
rationalityand could be calculated and impersonalthey were based on the 
motivation to ensure that symmetry was created in the relationship the wineries had 
with their viticultural counterparts. Indeed, Guiberteau, who had obtained an MBA on 
top of his oenological qualifications, was no stranger to the economic lessons taught at 
business schools, and would often draw a SWOT matrix when explaining his 
strategies.39 For, as Guiberteau concluded one such interview, “in order to create 
something new, we have to destroy what was there before.”  When I asked further what 
was implied by the terms “destroy” and “create,” Guiberteau explained that residents in 
                                                 
39 The SWOT matrix or analysis is a method used in evaluating Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and 
Threats that might arise in the application of a business plan. Once SWOTs are identified, the objectives of 
the business venture can be finalised and applied (Pershing, 2006). 
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Kefraya had to come to a “new way of thinking” about vines and wine. Perhaps 
developing some aspects of Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction, and also 
evoking Harvey’s notion of flexible accumulation, Guiberteau believed that Cinsault 
could only be banished from the earth once vineyard owners in Kefraya were left with 
no other choice than to plant new vines (Harvey, 2003 & Schumpeter, 1994 & 2004).  
Yet Guiberteau did not see these changes happening in Kefraya without an 
alliance with other wineriesespecially Chateau Ksara. Interestingly, Chateau Musar 
still continued to use Cinsault in their better-known labels; making their wines 
distinctive (Karam, 2005). Yet the winery also relies upon grapes from other regions in 
the Bekaaand in comparison with Chateaux Kefraya (and Ksara), sourced a minute 
amount of grapes from Kefraya. While the terms “destroy” and “create” might imply 
power and the ability to control and monopolize the production and markets of 
Lebanese wines, there were therefore certain risks involved that Guiberteau had to take 
into account. Namely, the chance that as vineyard owners in Kefraya began to think 
differently about their vines and therefore, as Ortiz puts it, “power ebbs,” than there 
would have to be further negotiation between the two parties and perhaps even some 
comprises made by Chateau Kefraya in relation to other wineries (1992:44).   
Guiberteau appears to have anticipated such a possibility by expanding and 
diversifying the plantations of vineyards across the Chateau Kefraya estate, seemingly 
to ensure that the highest quality grapes would remain under his direct supervision. 
Perhaps in this way, once, or if, a majority of Kefraya vineyard owners eventually 
comply and grow noble varieties such as Cabernet-Sauvignon for the production of 
“classic” wines, than contractual agreements could remain by and large in placeand 
grapes would continue to be priced by the kilogram. Terminating the use of Cinsault 
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continues to be an important project for Palgé, and this indicates a vested interest in 
transforming the viticulture landscape of Kefrayawhich is suggestive of the 
importance the region has in terms of the strategies deployed to ensure monopoly 
privileges and market power.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
In the introductory chapter I observed that a newsletter released by Lebanon’s Investment 
Development Authority in 2003, featured the Lebanese wine industry as the country’s most 
successful agro-industry. I also noted the minimal national subsidization made available 
for agriculture in general and connecting to this, the apparent significance that the 
Lebanese wine industry is, if not completely, privately funded by different political and 
economic elites. These observations draw us to the central question of this thesis: what can 
an anthropological study of wine contribute to our understanding of the role of elites in 
shaping and influencing the agricultural landscape in Lebanon?  
In addressing this question, the thread of this thesis has entailed the exploration of 
features that shape the social relations of Lebanese wine production and are discussed 
especially in relation to the Kefraya region. I suggest that the materiality of wine (as a 
commodity) cannot be understood outside of the social relations of production. The central 
argument of the thesis emerges as one suggesting that the “local” emerges from a 
continuous process of interaction between local, national and global forces. It is therefore 
necessary to take into account local relations of production and property within the broader 
context of status and power in Lebanon. This is especially made visible in the thesis 
through an exploration of the deployment of elite strategies and the reproduction of 
particular elite positions of rank and status. I also demonstrate these social, political and 
economic ties are sustained and perhaps even strengthened through engagement with 
broader business networks. We find this especially in the valorization of expert knowledge 
through the recruitment of wine specialists from abroad, particularly from France. Yet it is 
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also equally evident in the ways in which other forms of labour, knowledge and activities 
are rendered invisible through this framework of expertise.  
 This thesis is thus also concerned with detailing these features while exploring the 
effects of these characteristics of the wine industry and the social structures that support it 
and that are in turn, supported by it. I also argue that in order to understand the specific 
characteristics of the Lebanese wine industry, it is essential to locate these features within 
historical processes that highlight Lebanon’s place within a colonial and postcolonial 
context. For example, the ‘beautiful landscape’ of Kefraya, like that of Lebanon as a 
whole, is understood as a reflection of historical processes of intervention of different 
kinds, from the introduction of grapes varieties to new technologies that craft the physical 
environment and produce very particular landscapes. 
 This conclusion brings together these different themes that have been explored in the 
thesis in order to consider more thoroughly the implications of studying the social relations 
of wine production in Lebanon. The discussion will focus on three central themes of the 
thesis that contribute to the question of the local through historically specific local, national 
and global factors, the question of elite and the question of historical process, and the 
central role of different kinds of knowledge within that process. The first section outlines 
the discussion of the ways in which the social relations surrounding wine industry in 
Lebanon can be framed within a particular winemaking tradition that speaks of the 
capacity of elites to produce and reproduce cultural capital as they attempt to (re)assert 
their power and control over land and labour. The second section critically examines the 
possible components of labour that appear to be significant to Lebanese winemaking. In so 
doing, I also briefly consider the broader debates concerning labour relations. The second 
section also considers how the notion of terroir might enable a fuller exploration of the 
question of how people perceive the land-labour nexus and how they think about locality in 
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the context of the winemaking tradition in Lebanon. In the final section, we consider the 
viticulture landscape in relation to the issues of visibility and concealment. 
The Establishment of the Winemaking Tradition from a Global Perspective 
 
The production of wine takes place in a cyclical timeframe, which might be understood as 
part of a natural process. For example in relation to the annual harvest or the ageing 
process, is as Ulin argues so compellingly, quite strategic in concealing the fact that wine 
is a social invention (1996). From this perspective, the production of wine can be situated 
within a process that seeks to naturalize a particular understanding of what constitutes as 
wine and also, in effect, what is deemed to be natural. For example, the establishment of a 
strict definition of wine as a product deriving from freshly harvested grapes starts a rather 
strategic hierarchical classification system that can potentially demote and even dismiss 
other methods that might otherwise be perceived as belonging to the sphere of 
winemaking. We find evidence for the emergence of this hierarchical classification system 
in Lebanon in Chapter Three where the marginalization of wine made from raisins 
coincides with the growing presence of French actors. This has significant social, political 
and economic implications, not only in relation to Lebanon but more broadly given how 
the globalization of this particular definition of wine can be traced to elites growers in 
Europe, especially France.  
 The naturalization of criteria and of authenticity that are in fact the outcome of social, 
political and economic relationships, achieve such naturalization by highlighting the link 
between viticulture and viniculture. In so doing, the historical production of the industry is 
obscured as the relationship between viticulture and viniculture comes to be conceived as 
existing outside of history. Thus on the one hand, the cyclical rituals involved in 
winemaking such as the annual harvesting of grapes from a nearby vineyard and the ageing 
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of a particular vintage may be perceived as part of traditional customs practiced since the 
start of time. Yet on the other hand, the establishment of the winemaking tradition, as Ulin 
already shows us (see Chapter Two), is firmly located within the timeframe of modernity, a 
period that began around the sixteenth century and involves the shifting (and opening) of 
political and market relations orientated towards capital, surplus value and private 
property. Indeed, as Ulin argues, the arrival of Bordeaux’s grand crus into the world 
market was actually part of a much broader and longer social process of transformation of 
wine production towards capitalist property relations40.   
Yet it was the Bourdeaux 1855 classification for grand crus that reinforced this 
particular winemaking tradition and was, arguably, a precursor to the globalization of a 
dominant system of classification of wine production, where superior quality wines are 
linked to notions of scarcitya system that began at the very point of production, in the 
vineyard (Ulin, 1996) The Bordeaux 1855 classification system materialized through a 
ranked nomenclature of quality where wineries that were replicating the architectural 
designs of the chateaux of pre-revolution France and were surrounded by a limited number 
of vineyards, indicated the highest level of quality. That such claims to exclusivity and 
uniqueness were unobtainable for the likes of contemporary wine cooperatives such as 
those studied by Ulin in the Medoc region of France highlights some of the effects of the 
naturalization process associated within the winemaking tradition. Indeed Ulin’s research 
demonstrates the legacy of this hierarchical classification, whereby, the grand crus are 
situated at the top of a scale of quality and are thereby able to maintain their economic 
privileges within national and international markets.  
                                                 
40 Most notably, the grand crus were not the first classification system for wine; just over fifty years after the 
signing of Meuthen Treaty between the Portuguese and English in 1703, the Marquise of Pombal of the 
Douro Valley demarked the boundaries for the production of “authentic” port (ibid & see also Bohmrich, 
1996).  
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This “invented tradition” of winemaking that reached its apogee in France in the 
nineteenth century has continued to shape the global wine industry and market, as 
demonstrated by Ulin’s research. This thesis also shows this winemaking tradition has 
shaped the organization of the Lebanese wine industry, revealing the ways in which 
notions of continuity are culturally shaped within particular visions of history, which are 
themselves moulded by particular perceptions of the market. Furthermore, we have seen 
how this notion of invented tradition addresses the claims of elites to own the past, and to a 
sense of continuity that legitimizes the material gains accrued over a certain historical 
trajectory, while also enabling successful elites to accumulate cultural capital. In the case 
of Lebanon, I suggest in Chapter Three, that Williams’ notion of “selective tradition” is 
particularly useful to understand the global processes involved in the establishment of the 
winemaking tradition in Lebanon (1973). As I explain in Chapter Three, the notion of 
selective tradition, (as opposed to invented tradition), implies a political process whereby it 
is the practices of the dominant culture that are perceived to belong to the sphere of 
tradition. In light of this, Chapter Three examined how the historical intertwining of the 
modern wine industry and the urban elite accounts for the complexity of social change 
across the viticulture and viniculture landscapes of what constitutes as modern day 
Lebanon. The important point here is that this social change reflects broader global shifts 
in market relations, and it is in this context of local and global transformation that we see 
the emergence of distinctive strategies within winemaking aimed at reinforcing particular 
social relations of power over land and labour. The effects of these changes extend beyond 
the grape growing regions of Lebanon, as the bourgeoning mercantile elite of Beirut 
identified the industry as a viable investment opportunity and a means to build cultural 
capital. 
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In Chapter Three we thus also started to see the emergence of such strategies in 
Lebanon that constitute a winemaking tradition, beginning during the mid-nineteenth 
century with the early plantations of la vigne francaise by the Jesuit fathers of Ksara, 
whose winemaking practices were as enmeshed within shifting patterns of consumptions 
and taste to those in line with the growing French presence in the region, as they were with 
educating the burgeoning mercantile elite. And by the start of the twentieth century, the 
passing of a wine law in 1939 that defined wine as something that can only be made with 
fresh grapes along with the increasing usage of the term chateau to describe wineries 
represented a reification process that facilitated the consolidation of a certain relationship 
between the spheres of viticulture and viniculture. In short, the emerging social relations 
surrounding the production of wine were controlled and influenced by those who owned 
wineries and seemingly resided in les chateaux du Liban. 
 
The Shaping of Social Hierarchies in Kefraya: 
 
The winemaking tradition continues to be a useful concept through which to explore how 
social relations surrounding patronage (and contrary to the views of some social theorists) 
actually belong within the realm of capitalist relations and are shaped by local and global 
processes. We can find historical parallels that exist between the beys of Berqayl, who 
were able to access and influence the services provided by the state to the villagers, to that 
of the Khawaja de Bustros and his relationship with Kefraya (Gilsenan, 1984). Such types 
of power relations have clearly had enduring consequences and with specific implications 
in terms of the distribution of wealth and opportunities across different areas and different 
social groups. For example, as elite patrons such as Michael de Bustros assert control over 
land and labour (through the establishment of the winemaking tradition), local residents of 
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Kefraya have become “trapped” within imbalanced reciprocal relations. Chapter Four and 
Five show that residents were aware of their predicament, and attempted to secure a degree 
of autonomy. At the same time, there is also evidence of what Lem describes as the 
“paradoxes of modernity”, a residents tried to secure their presence in the Kefraya 
landscape and reconnect to the rest of the world, asserting their own control over land and 
labour (1999). It is in this light, that the winemaking tradition has had certain implications 
for the social hierarchies of Kefraya.  
On the one hand, we can see in Chapter Four how the valorization of patrons of the 
wine industry such as the Khawaja through symbolic displays of historical continuity, 
evoke the ways in which the winemaking tradition allows for the (re)production of cultural 
capital for these elite actors. While on the other, there have been attempts by these elite 
patrons to exclude other up and coming elite actors from securing a prominent position in 
the Lebanese winemaking tradition. In this respect, it is most notable that despite 
acknowledgement from Kefraya residents, the owners and upper management of many of 
the wineries were not as willing to recognise Bassim Rahal’s achievements (Chapter Five). 
Indeed strategies of coercion such as the court case made by Chateau Kefraya over the 
original name of Cave Kouroum demonstrates the way the elite winery sought to secure its 
position in Kefrayaand thus weaken the power of the Rahal family. Reflecting and even 
emulating the processes of the winemaking tradition in France, we see that these strategies 
are about securing cultural and economic monopoly rights over the name of the wine and 
place, and the identity of the wine. The contrasting narratives about the origin of the 
Kefraya name as on the one hand alludes to the figure of the shepherdess names Raya and 
on the other hand, a name originating from the plural for the Arabic word for “village”, 
draws our attention to the attempts aimed at establishing a more firmly rooted and secure 
sense of historical trajectory in the region. It is in this light that the notion of the “trade-
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marking tradition” emerges and alludes to this somewhat competitive process whereby 
significant cultural and material value derives from successfully evoking quality of 
distinction, authenticity and history in relation to place at local, national and international 
levels.  
Yet there is an additional layer to the case that relates to the global hierarchies 
embodied in the structures of the industry, such as the UVL and its important connections 
with the influential supranational organization, the OIV. Membership of the UVL thus 
became a negotiating tool for Chateau Kefraya. Cave Kouroum could only join the UVL 
once the legal battle was over, and then given that Chateau Kefraya had won. The 
importance that Cave Kouroum attached to joining the UVL highlights the prominent 
position of this business association. The UVL’s founding wineries were also already quite 
well established members of business networks at both national and international levels. 
Most notably, a number of investors in these elite wineries were either prominent Beiruti 
entrepreneurs or they were politicians who shared similar business interests. And as I 
demonstrate in Chapter Six, it is precisely such collaborative efforts of elite entrepreneurs 
and the political class such as the campaign for the wine law in 2000 that have 
characterised social relations in Kefraya.   
Visions of the Future: 
 
Equally important in the establishment of the winemaking tradition are visions of the 
future looking to continuously legitimize and normalize the strategies deployed by elite 
wine patrons. In Chapter Two, I referred to the remarks made by the historian Kamal Salibi 
concerning the difficulties of developing some sort of coherently unified historical 
narrative of Lebanon (2003 & 1988). The complexities of Lebanese history lie not only in 
the country’s complex past but also in the multitude of visions of that past expressed in 
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contemporary visions in order to portray visions of the country’s future. Indeed, we can 
find a particular vision of the future shared by the narratives of different individuals and 
social groups discussed in this thesis that speak of the role of winemaking in facilitating 
the progress and development of the national economy.  
This can especially be found in the accounts that spoke highly of the pioneering and 
entrepreneurial vision of Michael de Bustros and his foresight to create the beautiful 
landscape of Kefraya. Most notable perhaps are the comments by Ramzi Ghosn of the 
Massaya winery who described de Bustros as the man whose legacy was that of developing 
the tradition of winemaking in post independence Lebanon, an enterprise deemed as the 
best for the Lebanese economy (Chapter Four). A similar vision can also be found in the 
accounts of the Jesuit Torrend who writes in 1913 of the hope of developing the country’s 
economy. Yet the way in which such visions of progress seeps into contemporary 
narratives such as those belonging to Ghosn appear to be very much entwined with a desire 
for the recovery of country’s economy, a desire that is itself entangled with the hope of 
reviving certain ideas of the future from the conflict-ridden past. And within that process, 
the discussions of past conflicts are not usually deliberately made apparent but instead 
emerge as anecdotal fragments and traces on the landscape and in aspirations for the 
future. Indeed, it is this particular practice of historical reflexivity that cuts across many of 
the winemaking narratives that belong to the difference groups and individuals explored in 
this thesis.   
 In this respect, Saree Makdisi’s observations also reverberate throughout this thesis in 
terms of how underlying wine-related practices, perhaps even in both the spheres of 
production and consumption, there appears to be a “fetishized desire” to narrate a history 
of Lebanon with a view to define a future absent of conflict and war (2006). This thesis has 
not focused on the consumption of wine per se. Nevertheless, “Lebanon in a glass”, as one 
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lady attending Michael Karam’s book launch in London described the wines as she 
breathed in the aromas of cedar and thyme, allows us to begin to think about this desire for 
a intimate connection to soil, land and place through acts of consuming (Chapter One).  
 This kind of “fetishized desire” is not necessarily limited to finding expression in the 
drinking of wine but can be extended to a range of products that are connected to the 
production of wine. This kind of nostalgic desire also surface in the seasonal narratives of 
kouroum of Kefraya, drawing our attention to the way a sense of historical duration has 
shaped the choices made by the villagers. In ways that recall Zonabend’s work in rural 
France, while the longue memoire of family events were at times seemingly placed outside 
of the winemaking tradition established by elite wine patrons, the entanglement of spheres 
of home, work and kin through activities in the kouroum is suggestive of how the 
intimacies of place and history give meaning to the product (wine) and the social and 
economic relations that produce it (1984). Indeed my encounter with the man from Kefraya 
in 1993 can serve to illustrate this sentimental entanglement of the past and future, 
particularly in the way he described his hope for a return to a beauty of the past. This hope 
was perhaps not literally for the past, but rather a revival of past ideas about how the future 
might be perceived. And here, once again, the winemaking tradition seems to offer a space 
for such sentiments to surface because of its emphasis upon continuity and change through 
natural forces such as seasonal processes.  
  Yet we can also see how these visions of the future continue to be inextricably 
linked to Europe and the global markets. In Chapter Six, we saw this especially in terms of 
how the motivation to produce wine for high-end retail markets in the global arena was led 
by elite wineries with investors and owners who shared the objective of paving the road for 
Lebanon’s economic recovery. In Chapter Seven, the complexity of this link to the global 
markets and the significant role of Europe in influencing Lebanon’s economic agenda can 
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be observed in the choice by Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya to hire specialists whose 
knowledge derives from their long standing historical connection to winemaking regions in 
France.  
The Land –Labour Nexus 
 
It is apparent that a significant aspect of the land-labour nexus within the context of 
Lebanese winemaking is linked to changing property relations. In Chapter Four, the story 
told to me by residents of Kefraya about the fellahi shepherd who was given land by the 
French surveyors, spoke of a model of social relations of wine production. Specifically the 
story speaks of the entanglement of property and labour relations in Kefraya and how 
residents might have perceived this relationship. Indeed the kinds of ironies that can be 
found in the story of the good shepherd speak of how following the visit of the French 
surveyors, land became private property and was directed towards the production of 
surplus value.  
 It is also apparent that such “fictitious commodities” of the Kefraya viticulture 
landscape share broader properties of the capitalist market. Yet its materialization through 
labour and property relations has been facilitated and shaped by specific historical 
trajectories. We can see this in the case of French wine production for example, how in the 
changing viti-viniculture relations following the development of the grand crus, the 
required specialization of labour resulted in: “a differentiation in hierarchy among the work 
force and growers in general” (Ulin, 1996: 48). Marginalization occurred for those who 
had “limited resources” and were thus unable to participate on an equal basis with elites in 
the reproduction of “winegrowing discourse and knowledge” (ibid). While we are able to 
find similar characteristics amongst wine labour relations in Lebanon, what we also find 
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however, is that the enclosure of private property for capitalist production has been 
distinctly shaped by Ottoman and French historical interventions.  
 We know through Gilsenan for example, that the 1858 Ottoman land legislation and 
the “loosening” of collective land rights gave way to the emergence of a rentier class 
residing in the cities (1984). The cadastral survey conductedduring the French mandate 
was aimed at regulating private property (ibid). As Gilsenan argues, rural and urban 
elites were well aware that the notion of land had permanently changed, and in the process 
so had the idea of labour. It is therefore highly possible that such changes can be 
understood as Burke III argues: a form of “broker capitalism” characterised by urban elites 
with networks that extended into rural regions, controlling peasantry population (Burke III, 
1988; Schneider & Schneider, 1976: see Chapter Three). Indeed it is significant how the 
types of patron-client relations that appear to have emerged at a similar time to rise of 
broker capitalism, were configured along certain types of labour and land rights.  
 For example in the case of Berqayl, Gilsenan argues, the aghas managed the bey’s 
lands as well as the landless agricultural labourers who were known as the fellahin. 
Notably the lower in rank a person was, the less social and cultural value there was placed 
on notions of individuality and autonomy, in that greater emphasis is placed upon the 
family household from which the fellah came from that on any of its individual patriarchs. 
In this regard, local categories can also be indicative of the way notions of kin and work 
are connected to various levels of the social hierarchy. The source of an individual’s status 
and honour thus derives from how this intimate connection between kin and labour is 
perceived by others. Yet it is important to note that such local categories do not imply an 
overly rigid stratification system. Indeed Gilsenan points out that following the 
establishment of the French mandate during the early part of the twentieth century, some 
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beys were unsuccessful in their attempts to ensure the continuity of their influence and 
were thus eventually stripped of such titles (1984). 
 Thus, as Davis’ observations regarding Pisticci, sources of honour and status emerge 
from a patriarch’s ability to continuously maintain and secure wealth from one generation 
to the next (1973 & more generally Pitt-Rivers, 1974). In this regard, and returning to the 
story of the good shepherd in Kefraya, we can find similarities with Gilsenan’s 
observations, in that the tale shows us how and perhaps even why the residents of Kefraya 
perceived themselves to be bound over time and through a sense of obligation to certain 
hierarchical relations and work related practices and kinship networks. Indeed, this sense 
of obligation that emerges in the tale belonged to the broader narrative of patronage in 
Lebanese winemaking and was reinforced through kin-related sentiments and ideas of 
status and honour. For example, the source of honour for Bayt Nabhane originated from 
Nabhane’s father, the late Abdel Helim, who had worked closely with the Khawaja de 
Bustros. Nabhane’s bond to Chateau Kefraya was thus also an obligation to his father. In 
leaving the winery, Nabhane could potentially be dishonouring his father. 
The Immaterial and Material Dimensions of Labour: 
 
While Nabhane saw the potential tensions that could arise if he were to leave the Chateau 
Kefraya winery, there is also great significance that he has made attempts to provide his 
son with a chance to be released from this bond by encouraging him to become a “man of 
the pen.” Such sentiments speak perhaps more pertinently of a process of valorisation, and 
shifting of relations between forms of immaterial and manual labour that are potentially 
distinctive to wine production, but also to Lebanon. This is especially in the way certain 
bodies of knowledge and expertise are not only hierarchically attached to different kinds of 
work, but how such kinds of work are not necessarily perceived as labour per se. In other 
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words, it is the way in which certain types of elites such as Mr de Bustros, Mr Bassim 
Rahal and Dr Didi displayed their knowledge as form of expertise bestowed the kinds of 
qualities that are often associated with men of power or what Cohen refers to as a “power 
mystique” (Cohen, 1981).  So much so, that these skills not only reflected their ability to 
achieve success but also became the qualities that defined their identity and personhood. 
 It is perhaps no coincidence, that all of these prominent individuals were connected in 
one-way or another to a chateau, winery and/or ornately designed villa. Indeed the 
significance of this connection is that these powerful men have the capacity to transform a 
“villa” into a “chateau.” This is particularly clear in the case of Chateau Kefraya, where in 
the memoires of Nicholas de Bustros, the father of Michael de Bustros, the chateau was 
referred to simply as a “villa.” Michael de Bustros was able to transform the villa into a 
chateau derives from the recognition by others of his successful enterprising 
accomplishments in planting vines and creating the viticulture landscape of Kefraya. De 
Bustros’ successes therefore reflect the type of value the type of value and are 
preferentially attributed to entrepreneurial knowledge in Lebanese wine production.  
At the same time, the value placed on entrepreneurialism highlights how this kind 
of expertise is entangled with notions of personhood that were evoked through status-
honour (e.g. Gilsenan, 1984). The case of Bassim Rahal illustrates this point well in that 
his achievements in Cave Kouroum were also an important source of sentimental value 
assisting in defining his role as the patriarch of Bayt Rahal. The notion of status-honour 
continues to prove a useful means through which to explore the way entrepreneurial 
knowledge devalued manual labour and simultaneously displaced other kinds of 
immaterial and affective but collective forms of the kouroum.  
In a sense, this concept of the devaluation of manual work that is evoked through 
the notion of status-honour reverberates broadly with the works of Lazzarato, Hardt and 
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Negri concerning the valorization of immaterial labour within the context of capitalism’s 
postmodernity. As with the notion of status-honour, certain forms of immaterial labour and 
especially affective labour includes activities that are not necessarily perceived as labour 
(Lazzarato, 1996; Hardt & Negri, 2001). Notably, while affective labour has been used 
historically to refer to what is usually perceived as “women’s work,” another sense of 
affective labour arises through activities that ultimately attempt to define and fix cultural 
tastes and norms by producing “social networks, forms of community, biopower” (Hardt & 
Negri, 2001: 293). 
While such scholars might attribute the growing importance of the latter form of 
immaterial labour within capitalism’s postmodernity, it is important to point out that in the 
context of Lebanon, there is also a case to be made that the valorization of this kind of 
immaterial labour is not a recent phenomenon. Indeed as my study of the wine industry and 
Gilsenan’s ethno-historical analysis suggest the ascendancy of immaterial labour over 
manual labour started much earlier. It is important to highlight how this valorization of 
immaterial labour through ceremonial acts of status-honour appear separate from economic 
activity, whereas it is very much entangled with changing property and labour relations 
since at least the nineteenth century. Interestingly, it was at this time that we also note the 
emergence of the winemaking tradition in Lebanon. It is also of significance that Ulin’s 
ethno-historical study of wine in France identifies the centrality of such forms of 
immaterial labour in reproducing social and cultural capital as early as the seventeenth 
century (1996).  
Yet this thesis also shows how the contemporary valorization process of 
entrepreneurial and technopreneurial bodies of knowledge demonstrate that a somewhat 
simplistic dichotomy between the material and immaterial forms of labour, even during 
capitalism’s postmodernity, is untenable. Indeed, Guiberteau and Palgé are valued 
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because of how their experiences accumulated in wine-growing regions in France 
bestowed an expertise that validated their work in the vineyards, while also potentially 
increasing the affective values of the (material) product itself. In this respect, their 
prominent positions also raise other important questions concerning the economic 
organization of agricultural labourers. This focus on the materiality of notions of 
quality as perceived by Guiberteau and Palgé thus draws our attention to the 
devaluation of other forms of practical knowledge as carried out by the seasonal 
migrant labourers who worked extremely long and arduous hours in the vineyards, 
collecting and burning vines, or harvesting the grapes.  
Indeed the time spent with Ahmed and his extended family, who were 
mentioned in Chapter Four, offers some extremely invaluable insights into the 
precariousness of their lives. As I explained in the introduction, however, my decision 
to remain within Lebanon—and mostly in Kefraya—meant that it was difficult for me 
to keep in contact with many of the seasonal workers who passed through the region. 
Indeed, following the start of the “Syrian crisis” it has, sadly, become increasingly 
difficult to track the whereabouts and safety of many of the workers I met. 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps the manner in which such people as Ahmed and his family 
were simultaneously perceived as both transient and permanent features of the Kefraya 
landscape that elucidates at least some of the ways labour and work were once more 
linked to notions of social-standing and rank (e.g. Ortiz, 1999& 1992).  
It is also important to point out that in focusing broadly on the valorisation of a 
certain form of immaterial labour, this thesis has paid little attention to other inputs of 
labour (such as the work of itinerant workers). In this sense, the analysis might appear 
to ignore or undermine the theoretical and methodological advancements made by the 
Subaltern Studies School in exploring subordinate and minority groups (Spivak, 1988; 
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Chakrabarty, 2002;). As Beinin has pointed out, there is an urgent need to study both 
the historical and contemporary experiences of subaltern group(s) in the Middle East 
(2001). The limited attention paid to subaltern perspective in the thesis does not reflect 
a lack of recognition of the value of such workers, nor is the intention to write them out 
of the history of the Bekaa valley. Rather, the aim is to explore a process of valorisation 
that legitimizes an elite group, their ideas, practices and the kinds of work they do, at 
the expense of the status, work and ideas of other groups. In making this decision 
however, I feel that we have also been better able to start thinking more critically about 
the valorisation process of certain forms of immaterial labour, and more broadly the 
concept of labour itself. 
 
 
But where is the Terroir? 
 
While the term terroir was only used by the French oenologists, it is still a useful notion to 
“think with”. The concept of terroir can shed further light on the establishment of a 
hierarchically organized winemaking tradition and the processes through which the 
naturalization of a particular vision of history, space and place, also reaffirms a particular 
link between land and labour. Here again, the notion of terrior, that I suggest expresses the 
material and ideological organization of winemaking and its association to place, and that 
can express the peculiar combination of qualities of Kefraya, has its roots elsewhere, in the 
wine producing districts of France.  
 Notably, we can find traces of this land-labour nexus in Europe during the seventeenth 
century, and strong evidence arises in the diary of John Locke who wrote in his short 
account about his visit to Chateau Haut-Brion in 1678, of the “vine de Pontac, so much so 
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esteemed in England, grown onto a rising open to the West, in a white chalk mixed with a 
little gravel, which one would think bear nothing; but there is particularity in the soil…” 
(Locke, 1953: 83). In emphasizing the “particularity” of the soil, Locke is implying that 
even within such a refined demarcation of space, there is the natural potential for a variety 
of quality due to the geographical location of the vine de Pontac and man thus need only 
toil the earth to uncover such potentialities. While this may be the case, such diversity 
across the land and the different soils, also suggests a natural hierarchy of qualities, so vital 
for the legitimization of the winemaking tradition.  
The significance here lies not just in a natural hierarchy of qualities of soils that 
exist on different plots of land, but also in how this discourse of qualities is extended to the 
hierarchical organization of labour. Simply put, not all men (and very rarely women) are 
able to toil the earth because not all men naturally possess the transformative capacities to 
do so (e.g. Glacken, 1976). And this is not only in that some men are physically able to toil 
the land, while others are not. More pertinently is that there are also those men who 
possess the capacities to recognize the soil’s peculiarities. The key point here is that while 
these kinds of men (and once more very rarely women) might also have the skills to 
physically toil the land, their value derives predominantly in their capabilities to realize the 
earth’s potentialities. Thus once more evoking Ulin’s argument that a fundamental aspect 
in the winemaking tradition regards a hierarchical sense of rootedness to the soil. The 
articulation of such sentiments within contemporary processes of wine production is done 
so through the notion of origins, where the very foundation of what is defined as wine is 
constructed through links forged not only with the seemingly natural qualities of the land 
where the grapes are grown, but to the type of grapes used and also the people who are 
perceived to be growing these vines. 
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In the case of Lebanon, we also find early examples of this particular land-labour 
nexus in the narratives of the Jesuits fathers. Torrend writes that Père Kirn’s decision to 
import Cinsault vines and make wine was due to Kirn recognizing the potential of the soil. 
The significance here lies in the Jesuit fathers possessing the kind of knowledge required in 
order to identity its potential for a certain kind of viticulture and also in the importing of 
the right kind of vine, i.e. la vigne francaise from Algeria for the newly acquired property 
in Ksara and Tanayil. There is thus the value ascribed not only to a knowledge of land and 
vine which is acquired from outside of Lebanon, but also to the varieties of grape, and the 
import of these vines that all come from “outside.” On the one hand, there are, in this 
regard some elements that suggest a priority of land over labour. In other words, we find 
little acknowledgment of the workers required in the clearing of the lands and the planting 
of these vines.  On the other hand, the value given to Père Kirn’s knowledge anticipates the 
division of knowledge and different forms of labour (immaterial and material) in 
contemporary wineries amongst the French experts and local and migrant workers.  
Indeed, we see this clearly in Chapter Seven where terroir enables an 
understanding of how the value of the oenologists who originate from regions in France 
with long-standing winemaking traditions and who therefore seemingly have an inherent 
sense of knowledge about how to create the right kinds of combinations of vine and land so 
to produce a high quality wine. In this light, the comments of both the French oenologists, 
Guiberteau and Palgè about how they understood the potential different localities are 
particularly significant. Given that Palgè saw Lebanese terroir’s potential as something 
that still required further scientific investigation and Guiberteau considered Kefraya’s 
“natural features” already exhibited the right kind of quality, it is clear that expert 
knowledge is (also) situated, contextual and contested, highlighting, the social implications 
of such methods of ordering and delineating nature. This is perhaps especially clear in the 
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ways such methods are able to influence and shape social relations of wine production in 
Lebanon. Indeed, perhaps one of the most significant consequences of the strategies 
deployed by the likes of Guiberteau and Palgè are the emerging spatial categories of 
quality whereby most of the small-scale high quality wine producers are located in the 
Central Bekaa.  
We started to see the materialization of this spatial hierarchy in Chapter Seven, 
where both French oenologists were willing to assist in the establishment of the smaller 
wineries located in the Central Bekaa by offering their expert advice. At the same time, 
these smaller scale wineries had to adhere to the standards of quality as set out by both the 
French oenologists. In this light, it is interesting that despite holding slightly different 
views of the terroirs of Lebanon, the emerging pattern of the spatial organization of these 
small-scale wineries appears to be quite beneficial for the long-term objectives of the 
respective wineries that the French oenologists worked for. Thus it is in the interests of 
Chateau Kefraya to encourage small-scale wineries to produce high quality wines through 
similar methods: from grapes that are located on the same plot of land as the wineries 
themselves. Meanwhile for Chateau Ksara, there are a number of advantages in the fact 
that a number of small-scale wineries (producing high quality wines) are located within 
close proximity.   
As we see in Chapter Six, there are broader implications to such hierarchical spatial 
classifications that have to do with ensuring tradability of Lebanese wines abroad, and 
most especially in Europe. While the establishment of an AOC in Lebanon remains 
pending, the sense of urgency and the efforts of UVL members to ensure that the wine law 
passed in 2000 included an article regarding the correct measures to be taken to establish a 
nomenclature and to provide a temporary classification system, sheds some light on the 
significance of spatial classifications for the production of high end retail wines at a global 
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level. It thus apparent once more, that the employment (and the employability) of the 
French oenologists is heavily influenced by their personal experience of long standing 
hierarchical spatial classification systems in countries with well-established winemaking 
traditions. 
In this light, the concept of terroir enters into the discussion because of the ways in 
which it can elucidate how the value attributed to and (re)produced by the French 
oenologists at work in Lebanon belongs to a process of essentializing work-related 
identities (e.g. Demoissier, 2013). In other words, the form of commodity fetishism that is 
often associated with luxury wines, and is due to the way the hierarchical winemaking 
tradition renders qualities of authenticity and exclusivity as natural, results in the alienation 
of the industry’s workers (e.g. Ulin, 2013). Thus, the value of the French oenologists is 
directly related to the value they can confer on the wine, the label and the district; this is 
because they are perceived as being attached to and intimately connected with the 
exclusive qualities that are evoked in the fetishization process of winemaking. We can also 
see this process in terms of how the important positions of the French oenologists often 
overshadowed and even concealed the equally vital role of other workers such as winery 
workers, the vineyard owners of Kefraya and migrant labourers.  
Yet as Ulin cautiously suggests, in reclaiming the term of terroir from market- 
orientated objectives, the notion has the potential to break the anonymity of alienation and 
thus reveal more intimate and sentimental connections to land, place and locality (2013).  
In other words, because terroir can be used as a lens through which to explore the nuances 
of an enduring sense of entanglement of non-human and human factors involved in the 
production of wine, the understanding of this term can change slightly depending upon the 
ways in which the different factors are forged together. While this may be the case in 
settings where more intimate senses of terroir are embodied or imagined, in the context of 
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Lebanon however, or at least during my fieldwork period, where I rarely encountered the 
term, it seems somewhat problematic to apply so directly, this particular sentimental 
perception of terroir.  
We do however find possible parallels in the way terroir can be a multi-faceted 
concept and a similar complexity in the notion of kouroum in Kefraya. This is especially in 
that different perceptions of the kouroum belong simultaneously to different temporal 
dimensions, visions and actors. Significantly, it is not only the same spacethat is the 
vineyardbut also the same plant that has been, at times, multi-vocal. Thus while we see 
that the Cinsault vine was deemed by certain actors to produce unsuitable grapes for 
making high end quality wines, the same vine known intimately by Kefraya residents as 
“Zaitouny”, elicits other strong understandings and expectations of quality, as we see when 
the arrival of the Zaitoun (olive) season is spoken of. Indeed we see that this particularly 
understanding of the kouroum continued to act as an urgent sense of reminder of the 
importance for reproduction of a more intimate sense of locality. Kouroum thus expresses a 
particular forging of intimate connections to land, that is one of place-makingand also 
changing ideas of place-making. In this particular process, labour relations, property 
relations and the control of resources are intricately enmeshed. It is in this light, that the 
notion of kouroum also speaks to the dislocation of intimate knowledge about the land and 
the plants that are grown and the increasing difficulties of young men in obtaining work 
the vineyard and their subsequent alienation from kouroum. This is especially as the 
market-orientated notion of terroir permeates into the daily lives of Kefraya residents, 
most aptly evoked in the way Dr Didi describes the qualities of Kefraya’s viticulture 
landscape quite explicitly with the word terroir. And as this sense of term terroir appears 
to seep ever so slowly and subtly into the everyday language of Kefraya residents, it can 
perhaps eventually offer us a more sharpened lens (and perhaps how it merges with the 
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concept of kouroum) through which to explore the intersections of the land-labour nexus as 
it materializes across the Kefraya landscape.  
Sentimental Views of the Viticulture Landscape  
 
The concept of landscape speaks about how power relations are involved in portraying 
particular aspects of social life as static and unchanging, while others are shown to be more 
dynamic and transient (e.g. Hirsch, 1995). We see for example in Chapter Four, the 
narratives of the chateau and viticulture landscape can speak of a history of the enterprising 
visions of Michael de Bustros, that inadvertently writes out the active roles of many 
Kefraya residents in shaping that landscapesuch as that of Abdel-Helim Nabhane.  
Yet there is further complexity involved in this sense of the landscape, for while 
Kefraya residents such as Dr Didi and Bassim Rahal, were seeking to gain market 
ascendance through applying similar techniques (like other wine elite patrons) aimed at 
asserting their rights over land and labour, like other elite wine patrons and oenologists, 
there was also an apparent sentimental connection to land. Indeed Dr Didi’s choice to 
remain a vineyard owner and the challenges faced by Mr Rahal as demonstrated in the 
case of naming his winery, are indicative of how the possible kinds of sentimental value 
of vine (and wine) might have for residents of Kefraya are attached to work, kin and 
land. Simple put, there is no simply dichotomy between sentimental attachment and the 
market.  
However, in undertaking the task of asserting the autonomy of their enterprises, 
while prominent individuals from Kefraya, such as Mr Bassim Rahal and Dr Didi, 
reproduced similar kinds of imbalanced relations to those other elite wine patrons, it was 
family members and other residents in Kefraya who became their immediate dependents.  
In other words, the impulse towards autonomy entailed the reproduction of hierarchies and 
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dependencies that inevitably reproduced the type of viticulture landscape as that facilitated 
by the likes of de Bustros. The notion of a viticulture landscape can in this regard, conceal, 
certain life and labour histories that are involved in its formation. Indeed, we find this in 
the foregrounding of the roles of Guiberteau and Palgé. It is thus from the perspective of 
the viticulture landscape that we are able to start understanding the strategies of 
legitimization through which elites are able to secure control over land and labour.  
Households on the Landscape: 
 
By exploring the concept of bayt (household) as the smallest form of familial 
relatedness and how it is perceived across the Kefraya landscape and particularly 
amongst Rahal family members, we considered some of the familial and work related 
implications of this contradictory relationship between the patriarchal quest for 
autonomy and the subordination of family members. For example, the notion of bayt in 
the case of the Rahal family demonstrates how the accomplishments of Bassim Rahal 
had provided his brothers and nephew with some opportunities for social mobility, 
while simultaneously restricting their individual capacities for autonomy in the 
production of wine. In this light, Nabhane’s comments that everyone in Kefraya wanted 
to live in a castle are quite evocative, particularly because of how it speaks to the kinds 
of tensions that might emerge in the familial arrangement of production, and in 
particular, generational tensions, and more enduring gender divisions. 
This has to do with the way in which quite a few Kefraya residents who were 
unable to plant the vines demanded by the wineries had decided to sell some of their 
lands to prominent individuals and/or families from the villageand that many went on 
to construct a villa surrounded by a vineyard or two. In this light, we can see how the 
reproduction of a landscape of a chateau and viticulture continues to speak of methods 
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of concealment, through attempts at displaying prominently, ideals of wealth and status 
on the landscape in the form of ornately designed villas that often suggested a particular 
(distorted) link between land and labour. This is especially in light of the fact that 
despite their ornately designed villas, many of the owners were unable to profit from 
selling their grapes.  And once more, some vineyard owners but especially seasonal 
migrant workers are removed to the background or even at times completely absented 
from the landscape. Indeed, we can think about this in terms of the way Ahmed and his 
family were perceived to be outsiders (described in Chapter Four), not just from the 
Kefraya village and their kouroum, but also the landscape of winemaking in general.  
This process of marginalization and reproduction of inequalities across the 
landscape is reminiscent of the practices carried out by the founders and investors 
amongst the urban elite. Indeed many of these urban elites also appear to have long-
standing familial and/or work ties to the region. For an example that indicates the 
possibility of kin-related sentiment we can turn to the case of Zafer Chaoui, who took 
over his father’s shares of Chateau Ksara. Also relevant here are de Bustros’ 
expressions of the desire to be buried on the Ramatani hill that overlooks the Kefraya 
landscape.    
Revealing the Hidden Forces on the Landscape:  
 
This thesis considers the processesboth historical and contemporarybehind how a 
“rural economy became increasingly dependent on industry and subservient to it” 
(Pratt, 1994:1).  The viticulture landscape is thus able to provide us with a lens through 
which we can start to think further about the real extent of such a process of 
dependencyand this is especially in connection with the analytical treatment of the 
economic organization of labour. Indeed I believe that it is through an examination of 
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the positioning of different features on the viticulture landscape that we can critically 
explore the establishment of a hierarchy of the material and immaterial forms of labour 
and work within the vineyards of the Bekaa Valley.  
For example, while the “technopreneurial” roles of Guiberteau and Palgé, and 
this is especially in relation to their knowledge of the international wine markets, 
elucidates the value of immaterial labour associated with industrial production in the 
postmodernity of capitalism, their prominent positions also raises other important 
questions concerning the exploitation of agricultural labourers. In regional contexts 
such as the Middle East, where we can especially see a rapidly increasing number of 
displaced people, a majority of whom have reached beyond the brink of poverty, 
exploring these imbalances and inequalities have become increasingly urgent. The aim 
of this thesis is however not to fully address these questions of the hierarchical 
arrangement of labour and work relations within an agrarian landscape. Instead the 
exercise here is one of developing the framework from which to begin to think more 
critically about such issues by understanding the strategies of legitimization through 
which elites are able to secure control over land and labour.  
Wine in this regard is an especially interesting agriculturally derived product. In 
both the consumption and production of wine, we can find qualities able to evoke ideas 
of prestige, rank and status. While such properties might be similar to other types of 
food and drink that can demarcate social and cultural boundaries, the way in which 
wine is able to forge an enduring intimate link between land and people continues to 
make it an extremely insightful site for the analysis of social relations and actions. 
Indeed the ways in which wine emphasizes locality against a backdrop of nationalist 
discourses, state building and global processes, one could go as far as to say that that 
wine is perhaps even seen by some, as something as of the utmost of necessity in the 
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process of establishing certain social identities. In the case of Lebanon, where the 
industry continues to grow, attracting elite entrepreneurs from across Lebanon’s 
heterogeneous religious society, it is apparent that this link between land and labour 
(and work) continues to be a significant method for the creation of cultural and social 
norms. And as the itinerant subaltern masses also continue to grow, the increasing 
disparities between the rich and poor that are observed when using wine as a lens 
through which to critically study elitist strategies of legitimization, can no longer be 
concealed on the landscape.    
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Appendix I: Glossary 
 
Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée: 
The AOC designates high quality wines in France and is governed by legislation 
stipulating (for example) what types of grape varietal are allowed to be grown in particular 
regions to make distinctive wines. Variations of AOC classification systems based upon 
geographical denominations exist across the globe. While Lebanon has yet to officialise 
such as a system, it is considered by many as a crucial aspect of developing a niche market 
for high quality wines from the country. 
 
Arak: 
Arak (or araq) is an aniseed flavoured alcoholic spirit distilled in an alembic known in 
Arabic as a karaki and produced in countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and 
Iraq. Historically speaking, araq has been made from a variety of different fermented fruit 
juice, such as dates and grapes. However, there is a tendency for arak to currently be made 
mainly from grapes. Arak literally means sweat in Arabic. 
Cinsault: 
Cinsault is a red wine grape that grows well in warmer and dry climates such as in the 
Languedoc region of southern France, Algeria and Lebanon. In Languedoc, the Cinsault 
grapes were historically recognised for producing table wines. Yet this might be due to the 
region not acquiring AOC status until the late twentieth century (Torres, 2006).  However, 
according to the ampelograher Pierre Galet, Cinsault vines yield large berries that can quite 
possibly reduce the quality of their wines (Galet, 1990). In this way, Cinsault is often 
blended with other grapes such as Grenache. Since its arrival to Lebanon during the mid-
nineteenth century, Cinsault has become the most prevalent vine across the country.  
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Dunum: 
Dunum is a unit of measurement for land area used during the Ottoman Empire. It is still in 
use by many countries once under Ottoman administration. One dunum originally was 
equal to 919.3 square meters but following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end 
of World War I, the metric dunum of 1000 square meters became the more widely 
accepted measurement across more countries. There are however still slight variations 
across different regions and countries. Nonetheless, one dunum when brought up during 
fieldwork always equated to 1000 square meters.  
Grafting: 
Grafting is an agricultural method with the aim of attaching one plant to another. In 
viticulture, the grafting of disease resistant rootstocks to grape vines such as Cabernet-
Sauvignon has been widely practiced in Europe since the phylloxera blight of the 
nineteenth century. Historically, rootstocks of the vines native to America, such as Vitis-
aestivalis were grafted onto the European wine grape (Vitis vinifera). Since then, 
rootstocks are usually genetically modified to suit particular grape varietals of Vitis 
vinifera, and also different soils and climates. 
Kouroum: 
Kouroum is the plural in Arabic for karam, and usually refers to a vineyard, olive grove 
and fig tree orchard.  
 
Noble grape varieties: 
Noble grape varieties are recognised for producing high quality wines. There are six noble 
grape varietals. For the whites, there are Savignon Blanc, Riesling and Chardonnay. 
Meanwhile, reds are Pinot Noir, Cabernet Sauvignon and Merlot. Using noble grape 
varieties as a benchmark for quality is frequently used by oenologists working within the 
Lebanese wine industry.  
Oidium: 
Oidium is a fungal disease, also known as powdery mildew that causes severe damage to 
vines. Like phylloxera, oidium is believed to have originated from America.  Vines are 
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usually treated with sulphur powder or other pesticides. Oidium is present in Lebanon and 
a disease that proved to be a constant source of worry.   
Phylloxera: 
Phylloxera is a small louse that attacks the leaves and roots of the Vitis vinifera varieties, 
and was responsible for the plague that devastated the vineyards across most of Eurasia. 
The phylloxera blight started in the nineteenth century when the insect was accidentally 
imported from North America into Europe.    
 
Société anonyme libanaise 
Société anonyme libanaise (s.a.l.) is joint stock company in Lebanon that requires the 
minimum investment of LL 300,000 from at least three share-holders. The maximum 
number of share-holders in s.a.l. companies is twelve. Share-holders are entitled to the 
management of the company and thus also hold the right to vote in company matters. The 
extent of liability by each share-holder is however subject to the value of the number of 
shares held. Shares are also negotiable and transferable. While foreign investors are able to 
join s.a.l. companies, the Board of Directors must have at least three Lebanese members. 
An exception in foreign investment occurs in the companies involved in the trading of real 
estate in Lebanon, where at least 50% of members must be Lebanese nations.   For further 
information please see: http://infoprod.co.il/country/leban2b.htm 
Société à responsabilité limitée   
Société à responsabilité limitée (s.a.r.l.) is a limited liability company formed between 
three to twenty members. The minimum investment required is LL5,000,000 ($3334) and 
must in full upon the establishment of the s.a.r.l. company. Each share-holder’s liability is 
subject to the value of the numbers of shares held. Share-holders are not allowed to 
participate in any management or on the company’s behalf where a deal or transaction is of 
a solely personal interest. An exception is made where permission was granted prior to the 
deal and/or transaction.  
For more information please see:  http://www.mattarlaw.com/Company-Formation-
Incorporation-Lebanon,Companies-Corporate-Lawyer-Attorney.htm#2-
Limited%20Liability%20Company 
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Viniculture 
Viniculture refers to all productive aspects relating to wine, including the science of 
growing the grapes, wine-making, and also trade and business surrounding wine.  
Viticulture: 
Viticulture refers to all productive aspects concerning grape-growing. The separation 
between viticulture and viniculture is of significance, in that the latter tends to encompass 
and both productive sides.  
    
Vitis vinifera 
“Vitis” is the genus, with at least forty species of species of grapes. Vinifera is the species 
responsible for almost all wine, and there are many varieties of Vitis vinifera.  
 
Acronyms  
AOC: Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée 
ELCIM: Euro-Lebanese Centre for Industrial Modernization 
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy 
s.a.l.: Société anonyme libanaise 
s.a.r.l. : Société à responsabilité limitée 
OIV: International Organization of Vine and Wine 
UVL: Union Vinicole du Liban 
 
Exchanges Rates: 
1,500 Lebanese Liras (LL) = $1 
2,500 Lebanese Liras = £1  
 
Governorates and Districts of Lebanon: 
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Government administration of Lebanon divides the country into six governorates known 
locally as mohafazat. These are Beirut, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, Mount 
Lebanon and the Bekaa. The mohafazat are than divided into a further 25 districts known 
as caza. The caza are also subdivided into municipalities of at least one city or village.  
The Bekaa mohafazat was split into two in 2003. The Baalbek-Hermel mohafazat is made 
up of two caza which are Baalbek and Hermel. The Bekaa mohafazat (as of 2003) includes 
the caza of the West Bekaa, Zahle, and Rachaya.  
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Appendix II: General overview of wineries visited between 2006-2008:  
 
The information below was provided by managers and other employees during interviews 
and informal discussions.  
 
Winery: Domaine de Baal 
Company type: s.a.r.l. 
Date of establishment: First vintage is from 2006 
Current owners: Shared ownership by members of the Khoury family.  
Location: Hills overlooking Zahle, Bekaa Valley 
Sources grapes: There are 5 hectares of vineyards within its estates. 
Contracts: None-however Domaine de Baal began as viticulture enterprise, selling grapes 
to Chateau Ksara.  
Wine Production level: Yields never exceed 25hl/ hectares 
Number of employees: less than 10 employees 
Share Capital:  5000000 LBP  
Registration number:  4000787 Zahleh 
 
 
Winery: Domaine des Tourelles 
Company type: s.a.r.l. 
Date of establishment: The winery was founded by Frenchman Pierre Brun in 1868. 
Current owners: The winery was bought by Nayla Kanaan Issa-el-Khoury and Elie F. Issa 
in 2000 from members of the Brun family.  
Location: Chtaura, Bekaa Valley 
Sources grapes: There are approximately 20 hectares of vineyards adjacent to the winery. 
The winery also purchases grapes from the Kefraya region. 
Vineyard Estate: Approximately 20 hectares adjacent to the winery 
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Contracts: With vineyard owners in Kefraya-covering up to 80 hectares. 
Wine Production levels: 350,000 bottles-this also includes araq and liqueurs  
Number of employees: approximately 10 employees  
  
 
Winery: Domaine Wardy 
Company type: A trademark of Solified s.a.r.l. 
Date of establishment: Domaine Wardy was established in 1997. Solified SARL was 
founded by Wardy, Gantous and Abou Raad families. The latter two families have been 
producing araq since the late nineteenth century. The Wardy family bought out the other 
partners in 1997.  
Current owners: Wardy family, with Selim Wardy as General Manager  
Location: Zahle, Bekaa Valley  
Sources grapes:  Across the Bekaa Valley-and including the Kefraya region 
Contracts: During fieldwork, Domaine Wardy sourced a majority of their grapes from the 
Coteaux Heliopolis cooperative. The winery also bought some grapes from Kefraya. I have 
been informed that Domaine Wardy has since set up contracts with other landowners 
across the Bekaa Valley.  
Wine Production level: up to 600,000 bottles 
 
Number of employees: information not obtained 
 
 
Winery: Cave Kouroum  
Company type: s.a.l. 
Date of establishment: 1998 
Current owners: Bassim Rahal  
Location: Kefraya, Bekaa Valley  
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Sources grapes: Kefraya vineyard owners-and including 100 hectares surrounding the 
winery  
Contracts:  Surplus grapes are bought from vineyard owners in Kefraya 
Production level: information not obtained 
Number of employees: approximately 10-12 employees  
 
 
Winery: Chateau Ka 
Company type: Trademark of Kassatly, Chtaura  
Date of establishment: Chateau Ka trademark established in 2005. However, the Kassatly 
family have been producing fruit juice, syrup and jam since the early part of the twentieth 
century.  
Current owners: Akram Kassatly  
Location: Chtaura, Bekaa Valley  
Sources grapes:  
Contracts: Agreements have been set up with vineyard owners across the Bekaa Valley.  
Production level: The winery’s production capacity can reach up to 500,000 litres  
Number of employees: information not obtained  
 
 
Winery: Chateau Kefraya 
Company type: s.a.l. 
Date of establishment: 1979 
Current owners: Chateau Kefraya consists of shareholders including Michel de Bustros,  
Location: Kefraya, Bekaa Valley  
Sources grapes: The estates of Chateau Kefraya include approximately 291 hectares of 
vineyards. As of 2012, Chateau Kefraya claims to source grapes from a total of 430 
hectares across Kefraya; and also a small amount from Kherbet Khanafar:  
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Contracts: Surplus grapes are bought from Kefraya villagers and also landowners from 
neighbouring villages who bought some of the vineyards that had once belonged to 
Chateau Kefraya. Also uses grapes from a small vineyard in the farm estate of Bernard 
Fattal located in neighbouring town of Kherbet Kanafar. 
Production level: up to 2 million bottles  
Number of employees: varying from 50-110 employees (excluding the vineyards) 
 
 
Winery: Chateau Ksara 
Date of establishment: Wine production began at Ksara in 1857. The winery was bought 
out by Lebanese business elite in 1973.  
Company type: s.a.l. 
Current Owners: The current board of directors are Mr Zafer Chaoui, Mr Sara Khalil, Mr 
Georges Sayegh, Mr Adel Kassar and Mr Charles Ghostine  
Location: Ksara, Bekaa Valley  
Source grapes: Central and West Bekaa  
Vineyards: Some vineyards are located in Ksara in central Bekaa. In West Bekaa, Chateau 
Ksara holds contracts in Mansourah, A’ana, Tal ed Noub, Kefraya and Kherbet Kanafar.  
Contracts: Holds long and short term agreements. 
Production level: 2 million bottles  
Number of employees: up to 100 employees  
 
 
Winery: Chateau Musar 
Company type: s.a.l. 
Date of establishment: 1930 
Current owners: Hochar family  
Location: Ghazir, north Lebanon  
Sources grapes: Kefraya, A’na, Tal ed Noub and Mount Lebanon  
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Contracts: Kefraya, Edde family and church lands of Tal ed Noub  
Production level: between 600,500- 700,000 
Number of employees: Information not obtained   
 
 
Winery: Clos St Thomas 
Company type: s.a.l. 
Date of establishment:  
Current owners: Said Touma et fils 
Location: Qb Elias  
Sources grapes:  Qb Elias and Kefraya  
Contracts: Long standing contracts with family in Kefraya village  
Production level: 500,500 
Number of employees: information not provided 
 
 
Winery: Coteaux du Liban 
Company type: Liban Cave Trading and Industry s.a.r.l. 
Date of establishment:  2000 
Current owners: Abou Khater family  
Location: Zahle, Bekaa Valley  
Sources grapes: Kefraya-other locations are unknown  
Contracts: No contracts known 
Production level: 50,000 bottles 
Number of employees: Information not obtained  
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Winery: Chateau Heritage 
Company type: information not obtained 
Date of establishment: 1997 
Current owners: Dr Dargham Elias Touma and fils  
Location: Qb Elias  
Sources grapes: Qb Elias and Kefraya 
Contracts: Long standing agreements with Kefraya vineyard owners  
Production level: up to 500,000 
Number of employees: information not obtained 
 
 
Winery: Massaya 
Company type: SAL 
Date of establishment: 1998 
Current owners: Ramzi and Sami Ghosn, including Ghada Ghosn as a silent partner-and 
French investment from the Brunier family of the Vieux Telegraphe Wines and the 
Herbrard-owners of Chateau Angelus 
Location: Tanayil  
Sources grapes:  Kefraya in West Bekaa as well as regions in the north and centre of the 
Bekaa 
Contracts: across the Bekaa Valley 
Production level: 300,000 
Number of employees: not obtained 
 
 
Winery: Vin Nakad  
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Company type: SARL  
Date of establishment: 1924 
Current owners: The Nakad family 
Location: Jdidta  
Sources grapes: Kefraya and the north Bekaa 
Contracts: unclear 
Production level: Not obtained 
Number of employees: Not obtained   
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Appendix III: Kinship Diagram of the Merging of Two Houses in 
Kefraya 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bayt Nabhane Bayt Rahal 
Merging of Two Houses in 
Kefraya 
Nabhane 
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